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The Sustainability of Public Private Partnership in 
Ireland 
Despite a lack of transparency and a failure to report value for money in the 
public domain, PPP has continued as a public procurement policy in Ireland. Its use 
commenced during the so-called Celtic Tiger years when other forms of public 
procurement may have been possible. There has been limited publication of the 
reasons for the decision to procure through PPP, thereby making public scrutiny and 
assessment of the sustainability of this policy difficult. Major reforms to the policy 
were introduced in 2012, and now in 2018 this research reviews these policy reforms 
to assess the sustainability of this policy. 
Adopting a critical realist position and, by attempting to understand the 
forces at work in the introduction and operation of PPP in Ireland, whether 
observable of themselves or by their effects, this study evaluates the policy and 
makes recommendations to improve on the status quo. If the observable performance 
can be objectively measured against an accepted framework, the forces at work can 
be made explicit, the performance of PPP can be evaluated and improvements, if 
any, can be recommended.  
Influences on the adoption of PPP in Ireland are examined using Dolowitz 
and Marsh (1996 and 2000). The performance of PPP is evaluated using a 
framework based on the Jooste, Levitt and Scott (2009) framework which seeks to 
examine the extent to which institutional environments have been adapted to enable 
a sustainable PPP policy and an environment where legitimacy, trust and capacity in 
the policy exist. A pilot study encompassing interviews and a document analysis was 
completed in 2013, and informed an extended study was carried out in 2016. Data is 
analysed using thematic analysis and Nvivo software is used to organise the data for 
analysis purposes. 
The findings of this research generate unique insights into the nature of 
policy transfer, particularly the impediments to the natural evolution of a policy 
during a period of uncertainty. Ireland has been purposefully selective in embracing 
only some of the measures which would increase the legitimacy of the policy. 
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Ireland’s PPP policy has evolved and it now relies on learning from its own 
experience and less from other countries. The research shows that there are 
weaknesses in the policy, in particular, the role of the National Development Finance 
Agency, the transparency of the policy, the role of stakeholders and political 
commitment to the policy. Further to this, as the policy has evolved in Ireland, there 
has been a de-politicisation of PPP. A greater politicisation of PPP in Ireland would 
bring with it an obligation for more transparency, regulation, accountability and 
post-project reviews. Weak political support for PPP exemplifies a culture of 
satisficing where PPP in Ireland appears to be a useful procurement method, but only 
meets the minimum requirements of legitimacy, trust and capacity. The research 
argues that there needs to be clarity around risk transfer as well as a strong legal and 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction and Overview of the Research 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis explores the sustainability of public private partnership (PPP) in Ireland. It 
was motivated by concerns about risk transfer, value for money and transparency in Irish 
PPPs. These issues continue to pose problems in PPP procurement, yet despite these concerns, 
the policy has continued to be used. This chapter provides an overview of this thesis, starting 
with section 1.2 which highlights the research context and motivations for the study. Section 
1.3 summarises the research questions and section 1.4 condenses the research methodology. 
Section 1.5 gives an overview of the research findings and section 1.6 sums up the 
contribution of this study. Finally, section 1.7 outlines the thesis structure and includes a 
thesis contents chart.  
1.2 Research Context and Motivation 
This section explores the research context and motivations for this thesis. The roots of 
the PPP concept can be traced back to the UK during the Thatcher, Major and Blair years 
(Andon, 2012). PPPs were formally introduced into Ireland in the late 1990s. There was little 
in-depth analysis at the time, however, as to why the Irish government should adopt this 
significant shift in public service and infrastructure delivery (Hearne, 2009). Chapter 2 
describes the original motivations for the introduction of PPP into Ireland and traces the 
evolution of this policy through the financial crisis. 
The numbers and types of public private partnerships (PPP) are overwhelming, 
making a definition of a PPP difficult (Akintoye et al., 2003). Often the terms “privatisation”, 
“PPP” and “PFI” are used interchangeably but they have different meanings in the academic 
literature. Chapter 2 examines this literature to make a clear distinction between them and 
explores how some writers describe PPPs in terms of the type of private sector input, some in 
terms of what PPP provides, and others in terms of the contractual arrangements involved. 
An overview of the academic literature on PPP in chapter 2 also explores the key 
motivations for the introduction of PPP, in general as well as in the Irish context, focusing on 
risk transfer and value for money. PPPs are considered an attractive policy because they allow 
a transfer of risk to take place. Publicly available information on what constitutes risk transfer 
is very limited, however, and evidence suggests that there is confusion about both the 
meaning and measurement of risk transfer (Pollock et al., 2002; Froud and Shaoul, 2001). 
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Concerns have also been raised in the Irish context about whether the government cares about 
how accurately risk is priced in PPPs (Burke and Demirag, 2015).  
The Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG) for Ireland has stated that PPP 
procurement should be employed only where it is clearly established that it provides best 
value for money overall. Reeves (2013a), however, cites one case where the traditional 
procurement approach was cheaper but PPP was proceeded with. The C&AG has noted that 
the National Development Finance Agency (NDFA) has carried out value for money testing 
but has not published the results because of commercial sensitivity issues. The examination of 
the academic literature in chapter 2 identifies concerns regarding the evaluation of VFM and 
risk transfer, in general and specifically in the Irish context. 
Chapter 2 brings to the fore key themes in the PPP literature, such as transparency and 
how PPP success and sustainability can be measured. Transparency and the public availability 
of all PPP contracts have been called for (Khadaroo, 2008; Boardman and Vining, 2012; 
Vining and Boardman, 2008a; Hodge, 2004). Research has shown that transparency in the 
PPP decision-making process requires both predictability in decision-making and the ready 
availability of information to all interested parties (Matos-Castaño et al., 2012).  
PPP success is difficult to measure and evidence provided to document it is often 
lacking (Hodge and Greve, 2011). Recent research has focused on examining institutional 
impacts on the implementation of PPP policies in different contexts. This research has 
examined areas such as the “role that the institutional and political context plays in the 
process of PPP-enabling fields” (Matos-Castaño et al., 2012, p.3). Chapter 3 examines the 
literature on these institutional environments and finds that the main institutional capabilities 
necessary to ensure successful PPP programmes and project development are legitimacy, 
capacity and trust. Jooste, Levitt and Scott (2009) analyse these institutional capabilities in 
some detail and propose a theoretical model that is arguably sufficient to ensure the 
sustainable implementation of PPP projects. While this analysis does not specifically examine 
the success of PPP, it assesses a predictor of success, that is, sustainability.  
This study is motivated by a desire to examine the reasons for the initial decision to 
adopt PPP in Ireland and for its continued use through the financial crisis and post the 
financial crisis. Prominent themes regarding PPP noted in the literature review are risk 
transfer, value for money, transparency and PPP success and sustainability. These themes 
were identified as concerns by the C&AG and the Committee of Public Accounts, and this 
creates a need to explain the continued use of PPP in Ireland.  
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1.3 Research Questions 
This study identifies a gap in the literature regarding the motivations for the continued 
use of PPP post the financial crisis. It is important to know whether the motivations for the 
continued use of PPP in Ireland have remained the same or whether they are now different as 
well as whether its continued use is voluntary or coercive, as this will influence the 
sustainability of this policy. This produces the first research question: 
RQ 1: What are the reasons for the adoption of the PPP policy and its continued use 
in Ireland? 
A major gap identified in the literature review concerns the examination of the success 
or sustainability of PPP in Ireland. Chapter 3 reviews the literature on policy transfer theory 
and institutional theory as they relate to PPP. Policy transfer theory is examined using the 
Dolowitz and Marsh (1996 and 2000) framework which allows for an exploration of how PPP 
policy has come to be adopted in Ireland. The framework helps establish whether the policy 
has been transferred in a voluntary or a coercive context. Policy transfer theory is also used to 
explore whether lessons learnt have changed or improved PPP policy in Ireland and whether 
this has led to a more successful outcome. Accordingly, research question 2 is: 
RQ 2: What is the extent of the influence of policy transfer on PPP adoption in 
Ireland? 
The literature on institutional theory is examined to explore what is meant by the 
success of PPP. The literature reveals that the success and sustainability of PPP can be 
established by measuring the legitimacy, capacity and trust built around the PPP policy. 
Jooste et al. (2009) propose a theoretical framework for the actions needed to ensure the 
sustainable implementation of PPP projects. Applying a modified version of this framework 
to Ireland, this research explores the institutional environments arising within PPPs which 
lead to more sustainable and transparent PPP arrangements. Consequently, research question 
3 is: 
RQ 3: What is the extent to which institutional environments have been adapted to 
enable a sustainable PPP policy in Ireland?  
The theories examined in chapter 3 were used to structure the pilot study, which is 
outlined in chapter 4, and later on informed the extended study, the results of which are 
outlined in chapters 5 and 6.  
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1.4 Research Methodology 
This section provides an overview of the research methodology employed in this 
study. The research philosophy is described in greater detail in chapter 4. Chapter 4 notes that 
the epistemological approach taken in the study is postpositivist based on the ontological 
assumption that there is an objective reality which is socially constructed rather than 
objectively constructed, a position which is also known as critical realism. Consideration of 
the philosophical approach to this study is important as it influences the research design. 
A qualitative research approach was considered to be more appropriate in this study 
due to the nature of the research questions. Qualitative research focuses on describing and 
explaining people’s experiences, actions, exchanges, and social contexts (Strauss and Corbin, 
1990) and on developing an understanding of the meaning and experience of human lives and 
their social worlds (Fossey et al., 2002). This reflects the research questions developed in 
chapters 2 and 3 in this study as well as the nature of the study object – PPP policy. 
As mentioned, this study takes a postpositivist approach in examining PPP, and 
utilises qualitative methodology to answer the research questions posed. Furthermore, reliance 
is placed on a single case study approach in line with Merriam’s (1998) model for the 
description of a single phenomenon, where the case is Irish PPP policy. More specifically, the 
focus of the research is the evaluation of PPP policy in Ireland over three distinct points in 
time. These stages relate to punctuation points in the policy’s evolution where: 
• Stage 1 PPPs (Pilot projects 1999 – 2002) involve the introduction of policy 
through the development of pilot projects;  
• Stage 2 PPPs (Pre-crisis 2002 – 2008) involve the roll-out of this policy across 
different sectors up until the financial crisis; and  
• Stage 3 PPPs (Post-crisis 2012 onwards) involve the use of this policy to 
create jobs and stimulate the economy. 
The research includes a pilot study in which experienced practitioners were 
interviewed and interview questions were asked based on nine of the themes identified on the 
Jooste et al. (2009) framework (which proposes a theoretical framework for the actions 
needed to ensure the sustainable implementation of PPP projects). Although, the results of the 
pilot study were limited as only three interviewees were involved in this study, this justified 
the further detailed examination of the sustainability of PPP in Ireland which is presented here 
as the core of this thesis.  
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Accordingly, in 2016, the study was extended to include further interviewees from the 
public sector, the private sector and the civic sector. This multi-stakeholder approach allowed 
for flexibility in approaching different respondents while still covering the 19 themes of the 
Jooste et al. (2009) framework. Twenty-three semi-structured, in-depth interviews were 
conducted for the extended study and supplementary data was collected through other 
correspondence such as emails and telephone conversations. 
A significant amount of data was thus generated during the extended study. This was 
initially analysed using thematic analysis in line with Braun and Clarke (2006). This method 
of data analysis has been used by previous policy studies such as Brady and Curtin (2012) and 
O’Dolan and Rye (2012). Thematic analysis allows for identifying, analysing and reporting 
patterns or themes within the data (Braun and Clarke, 2006) and can provide a rich and 
detailed account of the data (Vaismoradi et al., 2013). Like this study, Brady and Curtin 
(2012) also used Nvivo in the later stage of their analysis and Nvivo 11 software was used 
here to organise the data for data analysis purposes. Nvivo is a qualitative data analysis 
software package that allows researchers to store and retrieve qualitative data (Bazeley, 
2009). It allows the researcher to analyse data of all forms systematically through the use of a 
database. This introduces rigour into the data analysis exercise and allows the researcher to 
search the data, run queries and reports and examine relationships. The specific details of how 
the data was gathered and analysed are discussed in chapters 5 and 6. 
1.5 Overview of Findings 
The main findings of this study are presented in chapters 5 and 6. In relation to 
research question one, this study finds that the reasons for the adoption of PPP as a 
procurement method have evolved over the different stages of PPP use in Ireland. It notes that 
throughout all stages there are issues with the legitimacy of PPP on account of weak political 
support and a lack of understanding of PPP, compounded by transparency problems and also 
problems with the capacity to procure and manage PPPs. The research finds that while the 
reasons for the introduction of PPP were largely voluntary, the reasons for its continued use 
became gradually more coercive.  
This analysis is reinforced by the findings from research question two on policy 
transfer. The Patterns of PPP Adoption Framework, outlined in 3.3.3 Patterns of PPP 
Adoption Framework, is used to examine the degree of PPP policy transfer in Ireland. The 
framework utilises elements of the Dolowitz and Marsh (1996 and 2000) framework. The 
findings of this part of the study indicate that, while the introduction of the policy was 
6 
 
initially voluntary, its continued use has changed from an indirectly coercive to a directly 
coercive pattern.  
Using a consistent theoretical framework, research question three also utilises 
elements of the normative section of the Dolowitz and Marsh (1996 and 2000) framework to 
consider how the process of policy transfer is related to the success or failure of PPP policy. 
As outlined in detail in chapter 3, evaluation of PPP in Ireland from a financial point of view 
is not possible as this information is not publicly available. Augmenting the Dolowitz and 
Marsh (1996 and 2000) framework with the Jooste et al. (2009) framework, the research finds 
that in terms of legitimacy, stakeholder consent is mixed and lead institutional support, 
political support and the provision of a project portfolio are all weak. In terms of capacity, the 
research finds that methods to encourage market demand, policy learning, public sector 
expertise, quality of projects and a coordinated deal flow are all mixed but the performance of 
PPP is weak. The research also finds that in terms of trust, the provision of a complaints and 
arbitration process is strong but programme accountability and fairness of PPP procurement 
are weak. Overall the research suggests that the sustainability of PPP in Ireland is problematic 
unless steps are undertaken to address key policy, implementation and practice deficits. 
1.6 Contribution 
This study makes a number of contributions to the literature on the practice and policy 
of PPP. First, it examines PPP policy in Ireland and adds to the understanding of PPP in that 
country. Second, it contributes to the literature on policy transfer theory and institutional 
theory by using these two theories to examine the sustainability of Irish PPP policy. Third, it 
contributes to the literature on stakeholder salience theory by mapping stakeholder groups 
according to this theory. Fourth, it contributes to the literature on public policy by examining 
the de-politicisation of PPP in Ireland. Fifth, the findings of the study can be applied to 
examining the practice of PPP in other countries and settings, and the Patterns of PPP 
Adoption Framework can be utilised to gauge whether the practice of PPP is likely to be 
sustainable in a country or region.  
1.7 Thesis structure 
The analytical part of the thesis commences with Chapter 2 which provides a literature 
review with a focus on the evolution of PPP in Ireland. This includes an outline of the 
background to PPP in Ireland, the rationale for its introduction, the key reports and steps 
leading to its introduction and the oversight of PPPs by the C&AG and Committee of Public 
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Accounts. Chapter 3 continues the literature review by studying policy transfer theory and 
institutional theory. Specifically, the themes of legitimacy, trust and capacity are examined as 
they relate to the sustainability of PPP. The Patterns of PPP Adoption Framework is put 
forward as a means of examining the sustainability of PPP. Chapter 4 outlines the research 
methodology utilised in this study. Specifically, this chapter examines the research 
philosophy and its influence on the research design. The use of the pilot study is explained 
and its influence on the extended study outlined. This chapter also explains the data analysis 
approach utilised in chapters 5 and 6 and addresses the validity and reliability of the research 
design. Chapter 5 explains the application of the data analysis approach used in the extended 
study, and goes on to examine Theme 1 Legitimacy. Chapter 6 examines Theme 2 Capacity 
and Theme 3 Trust. Chapter 7 collates the core findings of the research questions and 
highlights the novel findings and contributions of the study. The limitations of the study and 
avenues for further inquiry are also outlined together with the conclusions of the thesis. Table 




Table 1.1: Thesis contents chart 
Chapter Key contents Theoretical and methodological 
underpinnings 
1 Introduction and Overview of the Research  
2 Literature Review: The evolution of PPP in 
Ireland 
This chapter examines the academic 
literature to explain the background and the 
introduction of PPP. Research question one 
is identified in this chapter. 
 
3 Literature Review: The Study of Policy 
Transfer theory and Institutional theory 
This chapter outlines the theoretical 
framework of this study which was utilised 
to inform the pilot study (in chapter 4) and 
the extended study conducted in 2016 (in 
chapters 5 and 6). Research questions two 
and three are identified in this chapter. 
This chapter reviewed the literature on 
policy transfer theory as a means of 
exploring how PPP policy came to be 
adopted in Ireland. The literature on 
institutional theory is reviewed to 
explore how the success and 
sustainability of PPP can be understood. 
4 Research Methodology 
This chapter aims to justify the research 
methodology in relation to the research 
questions stated in chapters 2 and 3. The 
research philosophy is explored and the 
design of the study is explained, including 
the pilot study and the data analysis 
method.   
This chapter describes the pilot study 
undertaken which triangulated a 
document analysis, academic literature 
and three semi-structured interviews. 
5 Theme 1: Legitimacy 
This chapter demonstrates the research 
methods applied in this study and their 
outcomes using the method of data analysis 
outlined in chapter 4. 
The data collected in this study is 
analysed in line with institutional theory 
and policy transfer theory. Documents 
and literature included in the pilot study 
are reviewed again for more in-depth 
insight, are augmented with further 
documents and more recent literature, 
and are triangulated with data generated 
during semi-structured interviews. 
Thematic analysis is used to analyse data 
and report results. 
 
 
6 Theme 2: Capacity and Theme 3: Trust 
This chapter demonstrates the research 
methods applied in this study and their 
outcomes using the method of data analysis 
outlined in chapter 4. 
See chapter 5 
7 Conclusions, Implications and Limitations 
This chapter provides a general conclusion 
to the thesis with a focus on the research 
questions initially posed. 
This chapter returns to the theoretical 
underpinnings of this study to 
summarise the core findings in relation 





Chapter 2 - Literature Review: The evolution of PPP in Ireland 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the academic literature to explain the background to the 
introduction of PPP. Section 2.2 gives definitions of PPP found in the literature on the 
meaning of PPP. This is followed by an overview of the academic literature to identify the 
main themes and issues of PPP. Section 2.3 discusses the background to the introduction of 
PPP in Ireland, and the key reports and steps leading to its implementation and an 
examination of the oversight of PPPs. Section 2.4 identifies the research themes arising from 
this literature review as well as the first research question.  
2.2 Background of PPP 
The roots of the PPP concept can be traced back to the UK but little is understood 
about how it came about (Andon, 2012). One of the main reasons for the introduction of a 
privatisation policy by UK Conservative governments between 1979 and 1997 was the belief 
that private ownership was more efficient (Parker, 1999). Private finance initiatives (PFIs – a 
form of PPP) were introduced in 1992 by the UK Conservative government, and they were 
seen as a way of encouraging private sector involvement in the provision and improvement of 
public services (Connolly and Wall, 2009). They were believed to illustrate “the 
government’s ideological commitment to new public management reform” (Khadaroo, 2008, 
p.1342).  
During the 1980s and early 1990s the UK Labour Party opposed the Conservatives’ 
privatisation programme (Parker, 1999). However, a Labour party government partially 
privatised a state owned enterprise just before Margaret Thatcher and a Conservative party 
government came to power when in 1977 it sold some of the government’s shares in British 
Petroleum as a means of raising cash (Netter and Megginson, 2001). When the new Labour 
administration came to power in 1997, it continued along the PFI path. It has been argued that 
in the UK, the push for privatisation was mainly political, driven by ideology, decreasing 
efficiency in publicly owned firms and the desire to weaken the power of the trade unions in 
these industries (TASC, 2012). Many local authorities and NHS Trusts, however, chose the 
PFI route due to a lack of funding alternatives (National Audit Office, 2011).  
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2.2.1 Defining PPP 
The numbers and types of public private partnerships (PPP) are legion, making a 
definition of a PPP difficult (Akintoye et al., 2003) . Often the terms “privatisation”, “PPP” 
and “PFI” are used interchangeably but they have different meanings in academic literature. It 
is useful therefore to examine the literature to make a clear distinction between them.  
Privatisation, PPP, alternative service delivery and municipal service partnerships 
originally meant the same thing (HM Treasury, 2000) but the term “PPP” was also used as an 
alternative form of privatisation. This was either part of a general trend within public 
management of needing to renew “the buzzwords from time to time”, or it reflected “the 
practice of advancing the same policy” but under a different and more likeable name (Hodge 
and Greve, 2007, p.34). For example, Hodge and Greve (2007, p.34) write that PPPs were 
hailed as the main alternative to contracting out and privatisation, and they talked of PPP as 
being a “language game” designed to cloud other strategies and purposes such as 
privatisation. A number of governments have tried to avoid using the terms “privatisation” 
and “contracting out” in favour of speaking of partnerships (Hodge and Greve 2007, p.34). 
The reason for this may be that “PPP” is a less contentious term than “privatisation”, which 
can be distracting to those ideologically opposed to it (Savas and Savas, 2000, p.2). However, 
distinctions between privatisation and PPP are made. For example,  HM Treasury (2012) 
distinguishes between privatisation, where both ownership and risks are transferred to the 
private sector, and PPP models, which are characterised by joint working and risk sharing 
between the public and private sectors.  
The terms PPP and private finance initiative (PFI) are often substituted for each other 
(Shaoul, 2002; Shaoul et al., 2009; Shaoul, 2011) and PFI is seen by some as a form of PPP 
(Akintoye et al., 2003; Chinyio and Gameson, 2009; Li et al., 2005a; Mouraviev and 
Kakabadse, 2016). PFI has also been described as the “dominant form” of PPP (Shaoul et al., 
2009, p.230). In the UK New Labour re-branded PFI under the umbrella of public private 
partnerships (Wall and Connolly, 2009). However, some writers do make a distinction 
between the two terms. For example, PPP models are described as a joint working, risk 
sharing exercise (HM Treasury, 2012) involving joint ownership (Shaoul, 2011), while PFI is 
described as a longer-term private finance partnership (HM Treasury, 2012) involving 
contractual arrangements (Shaoul, 2011). However, PPP is the name by which the policy is 
known internationally (Shaoul, 2011; Leinhard, 2006) and PPP is said to refer to a range of 
public-private collaborations (Reeves and Palcic, 2017). For the purposes of the remainder of 
this thesis, the terms PPP and PFI are interchangeable. 
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Some writers give more detailed definitions of PPP and PFI. For example, Chinyio 
and Gameson (2009, p.4) describe PFI as being where “the private sector partner takes on the 
responsibility of providing a public service, including maintaining, enhancing or constructing 
the necessary infrastructure or facility, while the public sector specifies the type and quality of 
service desired”. Grimsey and Lewis (2002, p.108) describe PPPs as “agreements where 
public sector entities … participate in … the construction or management of public sector 
infrastructure … or the provision of services by the private sector entity”.  
Despite this, a clear definition of PPP does not exist (Burger and Hawkesworth, 2011; 
Leinhard, 2006; Mouraviev and Kakabadse, 2016) and very few people are in agreement on 
the definition of what a PPP actually is (Hodge and Greve, 2007). As a result, different 
writers have a different understanding of its meaning (Mouraviev and Kakabadse, 2016) and 
often writers describe PPPs in terms of the type of PPP arrangement. A review of the 
literature has revealed many definitions of PPP from various researchers, and these are shown 





Table 2.1: Definitions of PPP 
Author(s) Definitions of PPP 
Kumaraswamy and 
Zhang (2001) 
 “A PPP is a precondition for successful project procurement using BOT” p.195 
Grimsey and Lewis 
(2002) 
“The public sector entity transfers facilities controlled by it to the private sector entity 
usually for the term of the arrangement; the private sector entity builds, extends or 
renovates a facility; the public sector entity specifies the operating features of the 
facility; services are provided by the private sector entity using the facility for a 
defined period of time; and the private entity agrees to transfer the facility to the public 
sector at the end of a BOT arrangement while a BOO project, the private sector also 
finances an infrastructure facility effectively in perpetuity” p.109 
Shaoul (2002) “Partnerships provide the mechanism for delivering the funding that the public purse 
could not or would not afford, and as such they are the only way of improving public 
services. They deliver greater value for money (VFM) over the life of the projects 
because the private sector assumes some of the financial risks (and costs) that the 
public sector would otherwise carry” p.53 
Reeves (2003) “a means of investing in asset-based public services” p.163 
Broadbent and 
Laughlin (2004) 
“PPPs are long-term relationships involving the private sector in the provision of 
public services” p.4 
De Bettignies and 
Ross (2004) 
“Public-private partnerships (P3s) are contractual arrangements between government 
and a private party for the provision of assets and the delivery of services that have been 
traditionally provided by the public sector” p.136 
Li et al. (2005a) “PPP that seeks to combine the advantages of competitive tender and flexible 
negotiation, and transfer risk away from the public sector” p.25 
Grimsey and Lewis 
(2005) 
“the term can cover a variety of transactions where the private sector is given the right 
to operate, for an extended period, a service traditionally the responsibility of the 
public sector alone, ranging from relatively short term management contracts (with 
little or no capital expenditure), through concession contracts (which may encompass 
the design and build of substantial capital assets along with the provision of a range of 
services and the financing of the entire construction and operation), to joint ventures 
where there is a sharing of ownership between the public and private sectors” p.346 
Teicher et al. 
(2006) 
“as cooperative business ventures between the public and private sectors built on long-
term contracts in which public services are delivered on the basis of clearly defined 
public needs” p.85 
Deloitte (2006) “Most common PPP models are … design, build (DB), design, build, maintain (DBM), 
design, build, operate (DBO), design, build, operate, maintain (DBOM), build, own, 
operate, transfer (BOOT), build, own, operate (BOO), design, build, operate, finance, 
maintain (DBFOM), service contract, management contract, lease, concession and 
divestiture” p.5 
Hodge and Greve 
(2007) 
“PPPs are loosely defined as co-operative institutional arrangements between public 
and private sector actors” p.33 
Aziz (2007) “Two common approaches have been used by governments for the implementation of 
public-private partnerships PPPs: a finance-based approach that aims to use private 
financing to satisfy infrastructure needs, and a service-based approach that aims to 
optimize the time and cost efficiencies in service delivery” p.918 
“Several arrangements of PPPs have been utilized including the common build-
operate-transfer (BOT), and its variants such as build-transfer-operate (BTO), design-
build-finance-operate (DBFO), build-own-operate (BOO), design-build-operate 
maintain (DBOM), also, design-build  (DB)” p.918 
UNECE (2008) “[PPP refers to] innovative methods used by the public sector to contract with the 
private sector, who bring their capital and their ability to deliver projects on time and to 
budget, while the public sector retains the responsibility to provide these services to the 
public in a way that benefits the public and delivers economic development and an 
improvement in the quality of life” p.1 
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Table 2.1: Definitions of PPP 
Author(s) Definitions of PPP 
OECD (2008) “An agreement between the government and one or more private partners (which may 
include the operators and the financers) according to which the private partners deliver 
the service in such a manner that the service delivery objectives of the government are 
aligned with the profit objectives of the private partners and where the effectiveness of 
the alignment depends on a sufficient transfer or risk to the private partners” p.17 
Coulson (2008) “The term Public Private Partnership (PPP) is also used, potentially for any situation 
where the public and private sectors are in partnership: for example, joint venture 
companies, or situations where private sector interests are given concessions to provide 
services and gain returns from charges, such as toll roads or bridges, water supplies, 
power stations, waste disposal facilities, and prisons” p.484 
Reeves (2008) “a method for procuring public infrastructure and services” p.2 
Shaoul et al. (2009) “the public sector, rather than owning the underlying assets, becomes a procurer of 
services although it usually retains the delivery of the core professional services” p.230 
McQuaid and 
Scherrer (2010) 
“The first, most common, form of PPP concerns the provision of and/or operation of 
infrastructure … This type of PPP includes concessions and franchise … often 
involving the design, build, finance and operation (DBFO) … The second category of 
PPP is concerned with the introduction of private sector ownership into state-owned 
businesses … The third type of UK PPP is generating commercial value from public 
assets … Fourth, PPPs have also been used as mechanisms to promote specific 
policies. These may range from general local economic development programmes to 
more specific policies aimed at helping the UK to meet the Lisbon Agenda targets for 
employment and productivity growth through improved ICT infrastructure” p.3-4 
Bovis, 2010 “The operational types of public private partnerships … Design-Build-Finance-Operate 
(DBFO) … Build-own-operate (BOO) … Build-develop-operate (BDO) … Design-
construct-manage-finance (DCMF) … Buy-build-operate (BBO) … Lease-develop-
operate (LDO) … Operate under License (OL) … Build-operate-transfer (BOT) … 
Build-own-operate-transfer (BOOT) … Build-lease-operate-transfer (BLOT)” p.7-8 
Demirag et al. 
(2011) 
Public private partnerships (PPP) are an established model for governments 
internationally to provide infrastructure based services, using private, as opposed to 




“the government specifies the quality and quantity of the service it requires from the 
private partner(s). The private partner may be tasked with the design, construction, 
financing, operation and management of a capital asset to deliver a service to the 
government or directly to end users. Furthermore, the private partner will receive either 
a stream of payments from the government or user charges levied directly on the end 
users, or both. If the government is also responsible for a stream of payments to the 
private partner for services delivered, these may depend on the private partner’s 
compliance with government specifications for quality and quantity” p.3 
Bovis (2013) “Public-Private Partnerships can be viewed as investment instruments” p.194 
Reeves (2013a) “[PPP] agreements are typically characterised by: 
(a) A long term contractual agreement between the public sector client and a private 
contractor. The contract period generally ranges between 20–30 years; 
(b) An integrated model of procurement whereby the private contractor generally 
contracts for all or most elements of the project life cycle. Typical PPP arrangements 
therefore include the design, construction and operation of the asset (for example, road 
or school). In addition, PPP arrangements commonly include a finance element 
whereby the private contractor finances the project and recoups the investment over the 
life of the contract. A range of different acronyms have been adopted to describe such 
PPPs. These include DBO (Design, Build, Operate), DBFO (Design, Build, Finance 
and Operate) and concession PPPs with the precise label applied depending on the 
exact roles and distribution of risks between the public and private sectors. 
(c) A significant degree of risk sharing between parties to the contract. This is a 
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Table 2.1: Definitions of PPP 
Author(s) Definitions of PPP 
key characteristic that distinguishes the PPP model from traditional procurement 
models where most risks reside with the public sector. 
(d) A move from providing bidders with detailed input specifications to basing 
procurement on the basis of more open output specifications in order to 
encourage innovation and creative solutions from contractors” p.376 
Mouraviev and 
Kakabadse (2016) 
“a PPP refers to a contractual partnership which means a legal long-term contractual 
arrangement that involves asset construction by a private party and service provision 
on behalf of a public agency with the use of a constructed asset” p.12 
“PPPs may take some specific forms such as a concession, or private finance initiative 
(PFI), or asset life-cycle contract” p.14 
Reeves and Palcic 
(2017) 
“A typical infrastructure PPP involves a long-term contractual agreement between the 
public and private sectors in which the latter agrees to construct a given asset (e.g. road 
or school) and provide related services for the duration of the contract (typically 20–30 
years). This form of PPP is characterised by a number of notable features. First, PPP 
contracts are typically agreed for a bundle of activities that may include the design, 
build, operation and financing of a given project. Secondly, the PPP contract includes 
provisions for the sharing of project risks. Such risk-sharing provisions, which are not 
common under traditional procurement methods, are designed to provide incentives 
for efficient and effective delivery of the asset and related services” p.341 
 
Some writers define PPP in terms of the type of PPP, such as outlined in Table 2.2. 
This ranges from design, build (DB) to design, build, finance, operate, maintain (DBFOM). It 
also includes different types of private sector involvement such as leases, concessions, joint 




Table 2.2: Type of PPP 
Author(s) Definitions of PPP 
Kumaraswamy and 
Zhang (2001) 
Build, operate, transfer (BOT) 
Grimsey and Lewis 
(2002) 
Build, operate, transfer (BOT); build, own, operate (BOO)  
 
Grimsey and Lewis 
(2005) 
Short term management contracts; concession contracts; and joint ventures  
 
Deloitte  (2006) Design, build (DB); design, build, maintain (DBM); design, build, operate (DBO); 
design, build, operate, maintain (DBOM); build, own, operate, transfer (BOOT); build, 
own, operate (BOO); design, build, operate, finance, maintain (DBFOM); service 
contract; management contract; lease; concession and divestiture  
Aziz (2007) Build, operate, transfer (BOT), and its variants such as build, transfer, operate (BTO); 
design, build, finance, operate (DBFO); build, own, operate (BOO); design, build 
operate, maintain (DBOM); design, build (DB)  
Coulson (2008) Joint ventures and concessions  
McQuaid and 
Scherrer (2010) 
Concessions, franchise and design, build, finance and operation (DBFO)  
 
Bovis (2010) Design, build, finance, operate (DBFO); build, own, operate (BOO);  build, develop, 
operate (BDO); design, construct, manage, finance (DCMF); buy, build, operate 
(BBO); lease, develop, operate (LDO); operate under license (OL); build, operate, 
transfer (BOT); build, own, operate, transfer (BOOT); and build, lease, operate, 




Design, construction, financing, operation and management of a capital asset  
 
Reeves (2013a) Design, Build, Operate (DBO); Design, Build, Finance and Operate (DBFO) and 





Reeves and Palcic 
(2017) 
Design, build, operation and financing  
 
 
PPP is also defined in terms of what it provides, such as value for money and risk 
transfer (Shaoul, 2002);  flexible negotiations (Li et al., 2005a); delivering projects on time 
and to budget, providing services to the public in a way that benefits the public and delivering 
economic development and improvements in the quality of life (UNECE, 2008); meeting 
service delivery objectives of governments and transfer of risk to the private sector (OECD, 
2008); and risk sharing and incentives for efficient and effective delivery of assets and 
services (Reeves and Palcic, 2017). 
Other definitions of PPP focus on the contractual arrangements involved (Teicher et 
al., 2006; Reeves, 2013a; Mouraview and Kakabadse, 2016; Reeves and Palcic, 2017; De 
Bettignies and Ross, 2004); the context of the relationship of the public sector to the private 
sector (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2004; Hodge and Greve, 2007; Demirag et al., 2011; 
McQuaid and Scherrer, 2010; De Bettignies and Ross, 2004); in terms of investment in public 
services (Reeves, 2003; Reeves, 2008; Shaoul et al., 2009); generating commercial value from 
public assets (McQuaid and Scherrer, 2010); its usage as an investment instrument (Bovis, 
2013); and as a way of promoting specific policies (McQuaid and Scherrer, 2010). Two 
16 
 
general PPP arrangements can be identified.  One emphasises the use of private finance and 
the other service delivery by the public sector (Abdel Aziz, 2007). Accordingly, arrangements 
where service delivery involves public and private sector investment are also at times 
described as PPP. 
Many definitions relate to the private sector characteristics of a PPP arrangement. The 
private sector provides the finance for the project and may or may not design it. The private 
sector then builds the asset and again may or may not maintain and operate the asset. The 
public sector pays a unitary charge annually to the private sector for the duration of the PPP 
contract. After the expiry of the contact the asset reverts back to the ownership of the public 
sector.  
For the purposes of this research, PPP is assumed to be as per the definition of the 
National Development Finance Agency (NDFA)1 an arrangement between the public sector 
and a private sector company which provides public works and/or services. The state then 
pays a monthly unitary charge once construction is completed and the building is available for 
occupation. The duration of the PPP contract is usually 25 years. This definition closely 
mirrors the understanding of PPP prevalent in the UK where these projects are similarly 
understood as long-term partnerships where infrastructure is financed primarily by the private 
sector with payment being received from the public sector for usage over a period of 20 to 30 
years (Akintoye et al., 2003). 
2.2.2 Overview of the academic literature on PPP 
This section examines the academic literature on PPP structured in terms of the key 
motivations for PPP- value for money and risk transfer. It also highlights the issue of 
transparency of PPP and discusses how PPP success and sustainability can be measured. 
2.2.2.1 Value for money 
PPPs are considered an attractive policy as they are deemed to be VFM (Deloitte, 
2006). The exact meaning of VFM is an under-researched area and the term often has 
different meanings (Andon, 2012). A precise measure for VFM does not exist, but it is 
believed to include both qualitative and quantitative aspects and involves an element of 
judgment on the part of government. It can be defined as what a government judges to be an 
optimal combination of quantity, quality, features and price (i.e. cost), as expected 
(sometimes, but not always, calculated) over the whole of the project’s lifetime. The VFM 




concept attempts to encapsulate the interests of the public, both as taxpayers and recipients of 
public services. A project, whether it is a PPP or a traditionally procured project, should be 
considered for procurement if it represents VFM (Burger and Hawkesworth, 2011).  
The meaning of VFM has become formalised by the interpretation of its meaning by 
public auditors such as the National Audit Office (NAO) and the Audit Commission in the 
UK (Heald, 2003). The UK NAO has concluded that there is no one best way of establishing 
VFM and suggests that individual procurers need to establish their own methodologies for 
assessing performance (Edwards and Shaoul, 2003b). VFM studies are often carried out by 
the same government unit that is responsible for deciding whether to choose PPP or 
traditional procurement and which also manages the contract negotiations (Boardman and 
Vining, 2012). VFM is often carried out by consultants from the private sector and the use of 
such consultants can influence the methodology used to calculate VFM. This was the case in 
the UK when the Treasury Task Force, largely staffed with personnel from the large 
accountancy firms, brought in private sector advisers to devise the methodology for assessing 
whether PFI deals would be VFM. It has been argued that this led to changes in the 
methodology making assessments more biased in favour of the private sector (Shaoul, 2011). 
Value for money in the literature is defined in terms of three elements: economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness, also known as the 3Es (Andon, 2012; Shaoul, 2005; English et 
al,. 2010). Economy is said to focus “on financial inputs, to judge whether the costs were a 
low as possible” i.e., spending less. Efficiency is defined “a ratio of inputs to outputs, 
measurable in financial or non-financial terms” i.e., spending well. Effectiveness “focuses on 
whether the outputs and outcomes achieve what was wanted or not” (Jones and Pendlebury, 
2000, p.22) i.e., spending wisely. The optimisation of VFM is defined as the maximisation of 
outcomes with respect to every unit of monetary value spent on inputs. This is only possible if 
“outcomes are maximised with respect to outputs (effectiveness) and if outputs are maximised 
with respect to inputs (efficiency), which in turn are maximised with respect to every dollar, 
euro, etc. spent on the inputs (economy)” (Burger and Hawkesworth, 2011, p.52). It has been 
argued that aiming to achieve VFM will help to create a culture that will achieve outputs and 
outcomes rather than simply complying with process (OECD, 2008). Outcomes, however, are 
difficult to measure, and therefore a VFM evaluation system should include all three Es 
(English et al., 2010). Evaluating effectiveness should then move beyond a “watchdog” role, 
providing an ex-post reactive analysis, to a “sheepdog” role, which involves trying to improve 
performance (English et al., 2010, p.66). However, VFM is seldom defined in public policies 
due to commercial confidentiality (Khadaroo, 2008). 
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VFM can be difficult to evaluate as it involves predicting costs over the whole of the 
life of a project which could extend 30 years into the future (Shaoul, 2002). The general 
approach to making VFM cost comparisons is to construct a model of what it might cost the 
public sector to deliver the services specified for the project users over the contract life. This 
is often referred to as the public sector comparator (PSC) model. The majority of countries 
using PPPs use a PSC to compare the VFM of PPP projects with the VFM of traditionally 
procured projects (Burger and Hawkesworth, 2011). In Ireland the methodology used is called 
the public sector benchmark (PSB). 
The PSC or PSB involves the use of a  “discount rate” which is the market cost of 
capital in a single percentage rate (Pollock et al., 2002, p.1204) and the net present value 
(NPV) technique. The costs of the project delivered through the traditional route and the PPP 
route are discounted back into the current day’s terms at a rate equal to the cost of capital 
using NPV. The project with “the higher net present value (or lower net present cost)” is the 
preferred option (Coulson, 2008, p.495). Research into NPV and the PSC show that the 
assumptions underlying NPV calculations with regard to PFI are contestable (Shaoul, 2002; 
Cooper and Taylor, 2005; Froud and Shaoul, 2001). Specifically, research in the UK has 
shown that VFM may not be “sound” (Cooper and Taylor, 2005, p.507).  
The PSC  is considered to “be subjective and sensitive to changes in cash flows, 
discount rates and risk assumptions” and it does not deal effectively with qualitative and 
social factors (Khadaroo, 2008, p.1332). Evidence from Australia has shown that crucial 
documentation in terms of the PSC calculations and financial arrangements underlying the 
PPPs was being withheld from the public and was not even provided through Freedom of 
Information requests (Hodge and Greve, 2007). Analysis of the early UK PFI experience 
notes that VFM depended on the efficiency gains through private sector involvement but it 
was difficult to obtain clear evidence of this in the absence of an accurate PSC (Shaoul, 
2005).  
VFM analysis seems to focus on costs and benefits to the purchaser but the question 
must be asked “VFM for whom?” A project could be a good deal for the purchaser but a poor 
deal for the public (Heald, 2003). For example, a project may exhibit VFM but may not be 
affordable. Despite this, VFM is believed to be the main justification for the implementation 
of PPP (Shaoul, 2002). Another aspect of using VFM is that there is an over-emphasis on cost 
efficiencies rather than on service delivery. This was found in a VFM review of prisons in 
New South Wales when cost objectives took precedence over the objectives of incarceration 
(Andrew and Cahill, 2009). 
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Defining VFM in terms of monetary outcomes spent on inputs addresses only “supply-
side” efficiencies and effectiveness and fails to address “demand-side” efficiency, which is 
more difficult to measure. It is, however, essential to measure whether a good or service 
represents VFM (Burger and Hawkesworth, 2011, p.52). The welfare that individuals derive 
from consuming goods and services cannot be measured directly. It is easier to measure this 
in a private market as individuals translate the welfare that they expect from consuming a 
good into demand. Many goods and services which the government supplies suffer from the 
“free-rider” problem which means that demand is not revealed and this will limit the extent to 
which charges can be imposed (Burger and Hawkesworth, 2011, p.52). Identifying the desired 
level of service delivery might result in the government subsidising a service or a private 
partner. This renders the service inefficient, with it demonstrating little or no VFM. VFM is 
not just a quantitative exercise. It also requires a level of qualitative judgment on the part of 
government such as “what are the appropriate services to deliver, and what will constitute the 
optimal combination of quantity, quality and features?” Once these questions have been 
answered, the PPP needs to be able to demonstrate “economy, technical and economic 
efficiency, and technical and economic effectiveness” in the delivery of those services 
(Burger and Hawkesworth, 2011, p.53). Ultimately, failure to demonstrate VFM will be 
judged by the public when it comes to casting votes in elections (Burger and Hawkesworth, 
2011). 
Broadbent et al. (2003) attempted to design a framework which would judge VFM in 
PFI projects over the longer term. They examined pre-decision evaluations analysed as: (i) 
financial: using the PSC and risk transfer to make a business case; and (ii) non-financial: 
using measures such as bed reductions (in the NHS to determine goals over a long-term 
timeframe). They offered a post-project evaluation framework which should comprise three 
elements: (1) an overall post-project evaluation which should concentrate on only PFI aspects 
such as risk allocation, facilities management and non-financial aspects; (2) an evaluation 
which should go beyond merely monitoring outcomes to investigate any project concerns 
identified; and (3) an assessment of non-financial, culturally related, operational aspects of the 
PFI (Broadbent et al., 2003, p.437). A problem with a post-project evaluation is that it 
requires clearly defined contract specifications which are usually written in general terms 
making ex-post evaluation difficult (Edward and Shaoul, 2003b).  
Research has found that governments can decide to proceed with PPPs as a policy 
agenda despite the outcome of VFM tests (Hodge, 2004), while VFM itself may be politically 
influenced as the outcome of long-term contracts is uncertain. By the time the contract is well 
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established, the political scene will have moved on and the original Minister who made the 
final decision to use PPP will more than likely not have to deal with the long-term 
consequences of PPP (Spackman, 2002; Hodge, 2004). Research has also found that 
consultants are often used to carry out VFM tests. In Scotland, doubt has been cast on the 
Scottish Executive use of a leading accountancy firm to independently verify VFM figures 
(Cooper and Taylor, 2005), suggesting that private sector consultants may have a vested 
interest in the privatisation of public services. 
Research has shown that an ex-ante assessment of VFM is not sufficient to ensure that 
a project will deliver VFM. A further requirement is an ex-post VFM assessment that 
examines whether VFM has been delivered (Burger and Hawkesworth, 2011; Asenova et al., 
2002). Research into ex-post evaluations of PPP remains seriously underdeveloped in the 
literature. Accordingly, a 2012 paper suggested that there was an opportunity for researchers 
to take the lead “driving structural, policy and procedural debate” to progress the development 
of ex-post evaluations of PPP (Andon, 2012, p.893). 
2.2.2.2 Risk Transfer 
PPPs are considered an attractive policy as they allow a transfer of risk to take place. 
Publicly available information on what constitutes risk transfer is very limited and evidence 
suggests that there is confusion about both the meaning and measurement of risk transfer 
(Pollock et al., 2002; Froud and Shaoul, 2001). However, it is imperative that risks are 
identified in privatised projects, the measurement of risks is quantified and the extent to which 
risks are allocated between the partners is covered in contracts (Heald, 2003).  
The literature identifies different types of risk as construction, demand, residual value, 
site risks, design, technical, environmental, development, construction and commissioning, 
operating and maintenance, financial, revenue, ownership, uptake/patronage, force majeure, 
project default, regulatory/political, governance and legislative (Hodge and Greve, 2007; 
Grimsey and Lewis, 2002; Ball, 2011; Heald, 2003; Hodge, 2004). The literature also makes a 
distinction between “risk” and “uncertainty”. “Risk” is used when probabilities can be 
estimated and “uncertainty” when they cannot be (Froud, 2003, p.568). Froud (2003, p.570) 
also notes that risk is used to cover two scenarios of  “the likelihood of something going 
wrong, and uncertainty, meaning that the outcome of a course of action is indeterminate or 
subject to doubt”. 
The theory of risk management is that risk should be allocated to the party best able to 
manage it (Burger and Hawkesworth, 2011; De Bettignies and Ross, 2004; Murphy, 2008; 
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Hodge, 2004; Vining and Boardman, 2008b; Burke and Demirag, 2015). It is often assumed 
that the private sector is less averse to risk and will structure projects so that they are managed 
more efficiently (Gaffney et al., 1999). For example, shifting construction risk to the private 
sector is said to incentivise that sector to control this risk “through careful and high quality 
construction” (De Bettignies and Ross, 2004, p.139). The sector bearing the risks is paid a 
premium to do so, and if more risks are borne by the private sector, this will require higher 
financial returns (Hodge, 2004). “Best” refers to the party who can manage the risk at least 
cost. To manage usually relates to “the party best able to deal with the results of the realised 
risk” (Burger and Hawkesworth, 2011, p.2). However some argue that risks should be 
allocated to the party that is best able to “control” it (Reeves and Palcic, 2017, p.341). Control 
theory, meanwhile, holds that risk should be allocated to the party best able to “bear” it 
(Pollock et al., 2002, p.1208). However, if this were to happen then the public sector would be 
allocated all the risk (Pollock et al., 2002). 
Risk transfer is of crucial importance in PPPs for two reasons. First, the level of risk 
transfer determines whether the asset remains on the public sector balance sheet. Second, risk 
transfer can be an economic benefit to the public sector since it is relieved of the potential 
financial responsibility when risky events actually occur. This can be converted into 
equivalent cash flows using the expected value concept. Expected value is the probability of 
the risky event occurring multiplied by the cost of that event. Risk transfer can have 
significant influence on the value for money (VFM) calculation and there is evidence that the 
public sector comparator (PSC) and hence the VFM for a number of schools projects in 
Scotland would have favoured direct procurement over PPP but for the risk transfer (Ball, 
2011).  
Contracts should be drawn up that identify, allocate and manage risk, as this can 
demonstrate an ex-ante VFM. As VFM is so sensitive to risk transfer, it opens the possibility 
that risk transfer will be designed such as to demonstrate value for money (Khadaroo, 2008) 
while in effect masking the extent to which the public sector retains the risks of the project 
(Froud, 2003). The literature also finds that to be competitive and win a contract risk may be 
underpriced, and concerns have been raised as to whether the Irish government cares how 
correctly risk is priced in PPP bids (Burke and Demirag, 2015). This also supports the view 
that “the allocation of demand risk may be based on suboptimal risk allocation, with 




In the UK, there are examples of PFI projects where the VFM case rested almost 
entirely on risk transfer and where the amount of risk transferred was almost exactly what was 
needed to tip the balance in favour of undertaking the PFI mechanism (Hodge and Greve, 
2007; Pollock et al., 2002; Cooper and Taylor, 2005). An example of the VFM case resting 
upon the risk transfer arose in the Pimlico schools project in the UK where the amount of risk 
transferred was almost the same as the amount required to fill the gap between the cost of the 
PFI and the cost of traditional procurement (Edwards and Shaoul, 2003a). 
While some risks may be transferred to the private sector under PPPs, it can cause 
other risks to be added to the public sector’s portfolio. Examples of such risks include service 
breakdown, where the state intervenes as it is reluctant to suffer the political risk of a contract 
not being delivered. For example, in the UK, the Royal Armouries Museum was rescued by 
the government after it was moved from London to Leeds and ambitious visitors numbers 
failed to materialise. In the case of the Pimlico schools project, when student numbers 
declined, the demand risk was shared between the council and the bidder. The impact of this 
meant that, over time, if Pimlico’s school’s enrolment declined, as a PFI contract is a long-
term commitment, pupils would have to be sent to Pimlico regardless of the effect this would 
have on other schools in the local area. This would result in “the risk being shifted on to third 
parties, that is, other schools and pupils” (Edwards and Shaoul, 2003a, p.3).  
Private contractors will naturally seek to protect their income from uncertainty, so if 
significant uncertainty exists, it is unlikely that risk transfer will occur (Gaffney et al., 1999). 
In the early days of PFI procurement, the UK went so far as to pass the NHS Residual 
Liabilities Act in 1996 and the NHS (Private Finance) Act in 1997, which gave assurances to 
banks that should the NHS Trusts go bankrupt, the Government would provide financial 
reimbursement (Broadbent et al., 2003). Where a specific NHS Trust is unable to pay the 
annual tariff to the PFI provider, the NHS will have to intervene, causing public funds to be 
diverted into private hospitals (Shaoul, 2005). In the case of the UKs National Air Traffic 
Services, PPP risk transfers were found to be problematic, yet for political and public service 
reasons the government could not allow the project to fail (Shaoul, 2003). In Scotland the 
assets of two projects, the Skye Bridge and the Inverness Airport terminal, were eventually 
purchased by the public sector from the PFI consortia for a considerable sum because the 
continuation of the PFI format had become politically unacceptable (Coulson, 2008).  
In the words of Shaoul (2011, p.216) “should things go wrong, they [the private 
partner] have been able to fall back on the state, by either renegotiating the deal or handing 
back the keys”. In an assessment of the failed PPP project of Deer Park Prison in Australia, it 
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was found that risks were not easily measured in monetary terms and were difficult to 
estimate into the future, resulting in transfer of risk to the private sector not being easy to 
achieve (English and Walker, 2004). Another major issue with risk transfer is lack of 
transparency. Financial information which is necessary to consider the transfer of risk may 
not be in the public sphere and may be withheld for reasons of commercial confidentiality 
(Gaffney al., 1999). 
2.2.2.3 Transparency 
Transparency surrounding PPP is an issue identified in the literature. There have been 
calls for transparency and the public availability of all PPP contracts (Khadaroo, 2008; 
Boardman and Vining, 2012; Vining and Boardman, 2008a; Hodge, 2004). Research has 
shown that for there to be transparency in the PPP decision-making process, there should be 
predictability in decision-making and information should be readily available to all interested 
parties (Matos-Castaño et al., 2012). It is necessary to be transparent in the choice of PPP for 
projects (Matos-Castaño et al., 2012) and the decision-making surrounding this should be 
transparent (Jooste et al., 2009). In particular, researchers argue that procurement and 
negotiations should be conducted in a transparent way, as should the awarding of projects 
(Jooste et al., 2009; Matos-Castaño et al., 2012; Matos-Castaño et al., 2014). It has also been 
argued that it is essential that the public is well informed regarding project details such as 
targets and performance indicators (Jooste et al., 2009). Research, moreover, calls for 
governments to be transparent and accountable with regard to PPP and not to yield to private 
sector demands for confidentiality (Murphy, 2008). There seems to be a belief in political 
circles that if there is political support for PPPs, it proves their value and lessens the need for 
public and parliamentary scrutiny (Newberry and Pallot, 2003). 
2.2.2.4 Measuring PPP success and sustainability 
Governments and businesses differ in the way they measure the success of contracting 
activities. Economic evaluations of PPPs occur before the projects begin but there are few ex-
post evaluations carried out on the long-term success or otherwise of these projects (Ball, 
2011).  
The private sector provides financial return to shareholders and measures success 
using ratios such as return on equity or assets. The government, however, has different 
objectives, with the main aim being to use assets wisely to maximise benefit return to the 
community (Hodge, 1999). This has also been described as maximising social welfare, 
namely, identifying what is the best value for the whole of society (Boardman and Vining, 
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2012). It is convenient for governments to measure the success of privatisation activities in 
financial terms as this is easily measurable (AlHussaini and Molz, 2009), namely, whether the 
costs of the projects which have private sector involvement are lower than those that are 
funded through traditional procurement (Jones and Pendlebury, 2000). This, however, ignores 
the fundamental objectives of PPP, that is, whether the project has secured VFM and whether 
appropriate transfer of risk to the private sector has been accomplished (Akintoye et al., 
1998).  
Therefore, how can success in PPP be measured? Hodge (1999, p.457) suggests a 
framework for judging the contracting out of government services which involves an analysis 
of the economic, social, democratic, legal and political aspects. While financial ratios of 
performance can be used in some of these areas, most do not fit neatly into performance 
figures (Hodge, 1999). The Dolowitz and Marsh (1996 and 2000) framework asks how the 
process of policy transfer relates to policy success or failure. It does not, however, give 
guidance as to how policy success can be measured. The literature, too, recognises that PPP 
success is difficult to measure and that existing approaches are often weak (Hodge and Greve, 
2011). Jooste, Levitt and Scott (2009) propose a theoretical model they describe as sufficient 
to ensure the sustainable implementation of PPP projects which gives guidance on the 
prerequisites for the successful development of a PPP program. While this is not specifically 
examining the success of PPP, it is assessing a predictor of success, that is, sustainability. The 
Dolowitz and Marsh (1996 and 2000) framework and the Jooste et al. (2009) framework are 
discussed further in chapter 3. 
2.3 Background to PPP in Ireland 
This section explores rationales supporting PPP in Ireland via the academic literature. 
It examines the key reports and steps taken which eventually led to the introduction of PPP in 
Ireland. It also explores the oversight of PPPs in Ireland by the Comptroller and Auditor 
General and the Committee of Public Accounts. 
2.3.1 The rationale for the introduction of PPPs in Ireland 
Privatisation policies in Ireland have largely been driven by pragmatism and have 
been specific to enterprises rather than having been driven by ideology (Palcic and Reeves, 
2004). There is a history of private sector involvement in service and infrastructure delivery in 
Ireland. Religious institutions have run schools and hospitals (Connolly and Wall, 2009), the 
East Link and West Link toll bridges in Dublin were built in the 1980s and 1990s with private 
sector involvement, there was some privatisation of local authority refuse collection services 
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during the 1990s (Reeves, 2003), and several state-owned enterprises in Ireland have been 
privatised since the 1980s. 
PPPs were formally introduced into Ireland following the recommendations in the 
Report to the Inter-Departmental Group in Relation to Public Private Partnerships (Farrell 
Grant Sparks and Goodbody Economic Consultants, in association with Chesterton 
Consulting, 1998). There was little in-depth analysis at the time of why the Irish government 
would adopt this significant shift in public service and infrastructure delivery (Hearne, 2009). 
The main motivation appears to have been filling the so-called infrastructure gap and 
implementing the conservative policies of the then Minister for Finance, Mr. Charlie 
McCreevy TD. Reeves (2003) cites Minister McCreevy: 
The increasing weight of infrastructural investment, which will be required in 
the future, coupled with the Government’s commitment of fiscal restraint, has 
presented an opportunity to seek other ways of financing costly capital needs of 
the country. Therefore it is my aim to attract greater participation from the 
private sector in the financing and development of infrastructure projects 
(Reeves, 2003, p.64) 
The main rationale for the adoption of PPPs relates to problems associated with 
Ireland’s infrastructural deficit. This came about from the curtailment of the capital 
programme followed by a period of rapid economic expansion. The period from the 1980s to 
the early 1990s saw the curtailment of the public capital expenditure programme, with 
expenditure in real terms falling each year from 1982 to 1989. Ireland relied on transfers from 
the EU to fund the renewal of public capital investment from the late 1980s (Reeves, 2003). 
During the period 1993 to 2000, the annual real growth rate of the Irish economy was more 
than double the average recorded over the previous three decades, a rate movement from 
3.5% to 8%, and Ireland was considered the fastest growing economy in the OECD by the 
year 2000 (Reeves, 2003). 
Despite EU injections of investment, there were concerns about the need for greater 
investment in physical infrastructure due to Ireland’s rapid economic expansion. There were 
also concerns about the prospect of reduced investment by the EU (Reeves, 2003). It is 
arguable that the prospect of reduced investment arose in part as a consequence of the rapid 
economic expansion. Overall it was accepted that it was important to invest in infrastructure 
to sustain economic growth.  
Ireland’s options were limited, however, by fiscal constraints in the form of the 
Maastricht Treaty convergence criteria, imposed by membership of the single European 
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currency. The criteria stipulated that the budget deficit should not exceed 3% and the ratio of 
gross government debt to GDP should not exceed 60%. Ireland’s budget deficit never went 
above 3% during the 1990s and the ratio of gross government debt fell below 60% in 1998 
and remained there until 2008. In fact, the exchequer current account was in surplus 
consistently from 1996 to the end of 2007 and the overall exchequer balance was in surplus 
from 1998 to the end of 2004 with the exception of 2003 (Department of Finance, 2003; 
Department of Finance, 2012). A similar situation occurred in the UK during this period when 
economic performance was within the convergence criteria, yet the government pursued a 
policy of Private Finance Initiative (PFI) (Gaffney et al., 1999), although the UK was not 
subject to the convergence criteria, as it had not indicated a wish to join the euro. 
Nonetheless the Irish Minister for Finance decided to promote PPPs as a means of 
easing burdens on the exchequer (Reeves, 2003). The unanswered question is why, at a time 
when the country was fiscally healthy, the Irish government pursued a programme of private 
sector involvement and an injection of private finance in the delivery of service and 
infrastructural projects. The National Economic and Social Council highlighted one possible 
reason for the introduction of PPPs as being the perceived benefits of efficiency gains and 
expertise not available in the public sector (NESC, 1999).  
Perhaps political expediency is an alternative explanation for the introduction of PPPs 
as they offer short-term political attractions to governments by providing early project 
infrastructure and also moving capital expenditure off balance sheet (Hodge and Greve, 
2007). On the global political stage PFI-type PPPs enjoyed policy popularity as well as 
commercial attractiveness. Hodge and Greve (2007) commented that they are an attractive 
policy for governments that are eager to please markets. 
Political expediency might also have been a function in why the government of the 
day was receptive to the suggestions of the private sector. In January 1998, the Irish Business 
and Employers’ Confederation (IBEC) and the Construction Industry Federation presented a 
detailed submission to the Irish government which argued for the use of PPPs as a means of 
addressing the infrastructure deficit (Reeves, 2003). Probably these suggestions would not 
have been without influence. The adoption of PPP proceeded gradually. 
2.3.2 Key reports and steps taken leading to the introduction of PPP 
This section examines the key reports and steps taken which led to the implementation 
of PPP in Ireland, including, the Farrell Grant Sparke et al. report (1998), the National 
Economic and Social Council report (1999), the National Development Plan 2000-2006 and 
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the Programme for Prosperity and Fairness (2000). The section also examines the framework 
for the introduction of PPP, what PPP legislation was introduced and the inception of the 
National Finance Development Agency (NDFA). It concludes by examining developments in 
PPP since 2007 and the introduction of the domestic infrastructure stimulus programme.  
Farrell Grant Sparks et al.(1998) report 
In 1998, an interdepartmental group (IDG) was established to advise the Irish 
government on the potential for PPPs. The IDG commissioned a report to explore the 
possibility of introducing PPPs into Ireland, particularly in roads. Farrell Grant Sparks and 
Goodbody Economic Consultants, in association with Chesterton Consulting, reported to the 
IDG on PPPs in July 1998.  The report developed criteria for and advised on the issues arising 
in implementing the PPP concept.  
Among the issues addressed were: 
• The criteria to be applied in considering whether to adopt the PPP approach, 
taking account of the economic and budgetary contexts; 
• The determination and prioritisation of the key objectives of the PPP approach, 
with particular reference to roads projects; 
• The possibilities regarding partial self-financing of projects; 
• The construction of hypothetical cases for comparison purposes using a public 
sector comparator model (PSC) to illustrate costs and benefits of model cases; 
• The identification of areas where the highest level of savings were likely to 
arise from the use of PPPs. 
The report identified three advantages in PPP procurement: focus on service outcomes 
rather than the provision of assets, optimum risk allocation, and value for money. The report 
stated that the PPP approach should not be pursued where it is inappropriate, and it listed 
criteria that are key to reaching a decision on the implementation of PPPs. The report 
concluded that PPP was not a panacea to be applied in all or even the majority of cases. It 
should be seen as playing an additional or incremental role which should not displace existing 
programmes or plans for exchequer capital spending, that is, traditional procurement. 
The authors of the report discussed the likelihood of so-called hiccups in 
implementing PPPs, as experienced by the UK. Their discussions with the Treasury Task 
Force convinced them of the importance of a central PPP unit to be established in the 
Department of Finance to oversee the PPP process. This was created in January 1999, and at 
the same time PPP units were set up in the Departments of the Environment and Local 
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Government, Education and Science and Public Enterprise (Connolly and Wall, 2009). The 
Central PPP unit now resides in the Expenditure Policy and Reporting Division (including 
Education and Justice Vote Groups) in the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform. 
The unit also hosts a high level Steering Committee which oversees progress on the PPP 
projects announced in the recent Government Stimulus Initiative. The remit of the Steering 
Committee2 is: 
• to ensure the correct projects are selected and that they can be progressed in a 
timely manner; 
• to establish milestones and delivery targets for the projects; 
• to identify ways to streamline PPP processes; 
• to prepare project reports for government; 
A similar approach has been adopted in the South African National Treasury where a 
dedicated PPP unit has been established. It has “the final authority in the approval of PPP 
agreements” (Akintoye and Beck, 2009, p.xxvii). 
The National Economic and Social Council (1999), the National Development Plan 2000-
2006 and the Programme for Prosperity and Fairness (2000) 
In 1999, the National Economic and Social Council (NESC), which advises the 
government on strategic issues for Ireland’s social and economic development, supported the 
introduction of PPPs in Ireland and justified it as a means of filling the infrastructure gap. It 
stated that: 
As the pace of economic growth in both developed and developing countries 
over the last 20 to 30 years has proceeded, infrastructure needs have become 
more acute. Budgetary pressures have forced governments and other public 
sector agencies to look for alternative solutions to finance infrastructure.  
 (NESC, 1999, p.473) 
The NESC outlined the use of PPPs in Europe and internationally in the following 
terms: 




In Europe, these pressures have been heightened due to the constraints imposed 
by the Maastricht criteria and now the Stability and Growth Pact. At the same 
time, there has been a general thrust towards increased privatisation, with 
growing recognition that private sector provision of services and functions 
previously provided directly by the State, can be more efficient and cost-
effective. PPP has been extensively used by a wide number of countries 
including the UK, France, the US, Spain, Portugal, Greece, the Netherlands, 
China, Hong Kong, Mexico, Turkey and many others. 
 (NESC, 1999, p.473) 
The NESC highlighted another possible motivation for introducing PPP as being the 
perceived benefits of efficiency and expertise that are not available in the public sector. 
Outlining the benefits of PPP, the NESC stated that financing costs are only one element as 
the public sector can borrow more cheaply than the private sector. The main benefit of PPP 
was seen that it offers increased value for money over traditional procurement methods. PPP, 
it stated, is a mechanism for obtaining private sector efficiency and expertise rather than just a 
way of funding infrastructure projects. 
The NESC report also stated that PPP was not suitable for all projects and a 
framework should be developed to assess its appropriateness for different projects. It 
recommended that the choice between PPP and the conventional procurement approach 
should be made on the basis of a thorough assessment of value for money. Also, the potential 
to develop PPP in areas of social and community infrastructure should be explored alongside 
those that provide an economic benefit, such as toll roads. 
The approach to PPP was endorsed by the Fianna Fáil-Progressive Democrat 
government of the 28th Dáil (1997 – 2002), when a number of PPP pilot projects were 
announced in 1999 by the then Minister for Finance, Mr Charlie McCreevy TD. The pilot 
projects included areas of roads, schools, sewerage or water treatment schemes, a solid waste 
facility and a section of the Luas light rail project (Connolly and Wall, 2009). The aim of the 
pilot projects was to identify issues and problems encountered during implementation and to 
use this information to develop PPP policy and enhance the PPP process via a “learning by 
doing” approach. 
The National Development Plan 2000 – 2006 (NDP) confirmed the government’s 
commitment to PPP when it listed the potential for PPP in transport and environmental 
projects (National Development Plan, 2000). Of the total €22.3 billion investment in physical 
infrastructure planned under the NDP, “a minimum indicative target of €2.35 billion [10.5%] 
30 
 
was identified to come from private finance” (Reeves, 2003, p.164). The social partnership 
agreement, Programme for Prosperity and Fairness (Department of the Taoiseach, 2000), 
stated that PPP would make a significant contribution to the implementation of the NDP, 
drawing on the experience gained from the then current PPP pilot projects. It noted that 
mechanisms would be introduced, agreed by the relevant social partners, and operationalised 
to deliver efficient, transparent and fair contracts, tendering and contractual procedures for 
traditional and new - PPP - procurement methods.  
Framework for PPPs, PPP legislation and the NDFA 
In November 2001, the then Minister for Finance, Mr Charlie McCreevy TD, 
launched the “Framework for Public Private Partnerships: Working together for quality public 
service” (Public-Private Partnership Advisory Group, 2001). This involved an advisory group 
comprising representatives of the Irish Business and Employers’ Confederation, the Irish 
Congress of Trade Unions, the Construction Industry Federation and Forfás as well as the 
main departments and agencies engaged in the PPP programme. The framework stated that 
the delivery of projects through PPPs gave an opportunity to maximise the interaction and co-
operation between the public and private sectors. The framework included statements of the 
scope, principles and goals of the PPP programme, the identification of key project 
implementation issues, including the requirement for central co-ordination of the programme 
by the central PPP unit, as well as a recognition of the critical role of social partnership and 
stakeholder consultation. 
Throughout 2001 and 2002 a number of legislative Acts were established to facilitate 
the financing and future participation of the Irish state in PPPs. These included:  
(a) the Transport (Railway Infrastructure) Act 2001, which established the Railway 
Procurement Agency (RPA), an independent statutory public body with responsibility 
for procuring new metro and light rail infrastructure and services through PPPs, joint 
ventures or other means, as determined by the Minister with responsibility for 
Transport, since amalgamated with the National Roads Authority;  
(b) the State Authorities (Public Private Partnership Arrangements) Act 2002, which 
facilitated the participation by Irish State authorities in the PPP process by providing 
certainty regarding the powers of Irish State authorities to enter into PPPs and gave 
local authorities the power to enter into joint ventures; and  
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(c) the National Development Finance Agency Act 2002 which created an agency that 
reports to the Minister for Finance and makes it the statutory financial adviser on 
capital projects in excess of €20 million. 
By the time the National Development Finance Agency (NDFA) was launched in 
November 2002, the EU had decided that PPP projects should be assessed case by case and, 
unless significant risk was transferred to the private sector, the funds raised by the NDFA 
would still count against the general government balance (Reeves, 2003). The funding of 
infrastructure development by the NDFA is through long-term debt and equity rather than 
through alternative means of infrastructure financing. Providers of long-term debt have been 
the European Investment Bank (EIB), the Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB), the 
National Pensions Reserve Fund (NPRF), now known as the Strategic Investment Fund, 
domestic banks, domestic pension funds and foreign investors. Equity funding has been 
through the sale of long-term bonds (National Development Finance Agency, 2013). The 
proceeds from the sale of State assets are also mentioned as an equity source (National 
Development Finance Agency, 2013).  
The role of the NDFA was expanded with the National Development Finance Agency 
(Amendment) Act 2007. This extended the functions of the NDFA to allow it to establish a 
Centre of Expertise for procuring PPP projects on behalf of State authorities. Through this 
legislation, the NDFA was allocated a new procurement function, giving the agency the 
power to enter into PPPs with a view to transferring them to the relevant State authority, or to 
act as agents for State authorities for PPP procurement. The NDFA issues formal “value for 
money” opinions on potential projects and actively manages the procurement and delivery 
stages of PPP projects (Murphy, 2013). 
The remit of the NDFA was extended in September 2012 to allow it to provide 
contract management services in respect of PPP projects. Where contract management 
services are provided by the NDFA, the contracting authority generally retains responsibility 
for certain activities, such as approval and payment of invoices, approval of changes to the 
project agreement, issuing warning or termination notices to the PPP company, determination 
of benchmarking and market testing of “testable” services, and approval of changes to the 
ownership structure of the PPP company (Comptroller and Auditor General, 2013, p.132). 
The NDFA is considered a “dedicated PPP unit within a national treasury department” 
(Burger, 2009, p.82). A dedicated PPP unit will monitor and judge the affordability of a 
project and act as a regulatory body. It is seen as a means for preventing a “free-rider” issue 
where a government department may decide to go ahead with a PPP, even though it knows it 
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is not affordable because it knows the government will pick up the tab (Burger, 2009). 
Dedicated PPP units are also expected to create a centre of knowledge and expertise that can 
provide advice and assistance to individual departments (Akintoye and Beck, 2009). In the 
UK, HM Treasury has called for a stronger Treasury role where equity investment will be 
managed by: 
a commercially-focused central unit located in Treasury ... managed by 
individuals with the appropriate professional skills to oversee the investment 
and make commercial decisions (HM Treasury, 2012, p.7) 
In this sense the Irish example is seen as more advanced than the UK approach. 
Developments since 2007 
In the National Development Plan (NDP) 2007 – 2013 PPPs were to account for 15% 
of capital investment in the areas of transport, justice, environment, education, 
arts/sports/tourism and health. This was abandoned during the financial crisis and capital 
budgets were cut successively to 50% of what had been planned in 2007. This was even after 
taking into account a 25% fall in tender prices (Morgenroth, 2013). During the financial crisis, 
24 PPP projects were put on hold or cancelled, including Metro North, Dart Underground, 
and the Dublin Waste to Energy (Poolbeg incinerator) contract (Reeves, 2013b).  
The Infrastructure and Capital Investment 2012 – 16: Medium Term Exchequer 
Framework was launched in November 2011. A new coalition government was in place 
consisting of Fine Gael and the Labour Party.  The framework stated that PPPs would 
continue to have a role to play in the delivery of key social infrastructure projects, additional 
schools bundles and projects in the health sector. It also stated that obtaining private funding 
had been challenging in recent years. However, where the PPP model could offer value for 
money, the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform (DPER), in consultation with the 
NDFA, would continue to access private funding. DPER was established in 2011 when the 
new coalition government came to power. It took over the functions of public expenditure 
from the Department of Finance and was responsible for overseeing reform of the public 
sector in light of the recommendations of Ireland’s memorandum of understanding of 
December 2010 with the European Union (EU), European Central Bank (ECB) and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the so-called troika. The framework noted that the 
European Investment Bank (EIB) had been a supporter of Ireland’s PPP roads programme, 
schools projects and transport projects (Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, 2011). 
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Domestic Infrastructure Stimulus Programme 
The Minster for Public Expenditure and Reform, Mr. Brendan Howlin TD, announced 
a €2.25 billion domestic infrastructure stimulus programme on 17 July 2012 (Department of 
Public Expenditure and Reform, 2012). Funding came from a combination of the National 
Pensions Reserve Fund, the European Investment Bank/Council of Europe Bank, domestic 
banks and private investment sources. Further details were announced on 5 June 2013 
regarding the Phase 1 of this plan which made up the larger part of the stimulus programme. 
The government also agreed a new pipeline of PPP projects valued at €250 million in the 
areas of schools, energy efficiency and road repairs. In the Minister’s words: 
Although the public finances are severely constrained, it is important that we 
build for the future. It is absolutely vital for our long-term well-being and 
prosperity that children have proper school buildings in which they can learn, 
that our roads are safe and well-maintained and that local authority housing is 
as energy efficient as possible 
(Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, 2013) 
A motivation for this Stage 3 PPP programme (Post-crisis 2012 onwards), apart from 
developing infrastructure, was to create jobs and stimulate the economy. This was quite 
different from the objectives of previous PPP programmes. Tenders for projects were required 
to participate in job-creating measures. The NDFA justified why it was using a PPP 
programme: 
• There was a borrowing requirement to be “off balance sheet” in accordance 
with Eurostat rules so as not to affect the general government balance; 
• It would enable risks such as design or construction risk and availability or 
demand risk to be transferred to the private sector; 
• It was important in the context of the deficit reduction programme and the EU-
IMF Programme of Financial Support for Ireland; 
• The programme was sized so that the unitary payment obligations were 
affordable within budgetary arithmetic; 
• It would have a multiplier effect of investment to stimulate jobs and growth; 
• There would be social and community benefit provisions included; and 
• It would have features incorporated to assist SMEs. 
(National Development Finance Agency, 2013) 
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 To instil confidence and to maximise market participation, new measures were 
introduced such as reducing the timeframe from 21 months to 15 months for preparing PPP 
projects to the market through to contract award, the reimbursement of bid costs to 
unsuccessful bidders (agreed by the government in 2012 for Phase 1), a fixed amount to be 
paid in compensation for cancellation, a compliant tender fee to be paid to a maximum of 
three shortlisted tenders, and performance bonds to be capped at 12.5% (Department of Public 
Expenditure and Reform, 2013). The then Minister of State for Public Service Reform and the 
Office of Public Works, Mr Brian Hayes, TD also stated that the PPP process would be 
streamlined, with less documentation, meetings and specimen designs drawn up prior to the 
bidding process (Hayes, 2013).  
Similarities can be seen between the announcements in Ireland and the reform 
measures of PF2 introduced in the UK by HM Treasury in December 2012. Among the 
reforms were plans to accelerate delivery in order that the tendering phase of PF2 would be no 
longer than 18 months, government discretion to make a contribution to the failed bid costs of 
shortlisted bidders, and steps to reduce the amount of design work and resulting costs to be 
carried out (HM Treasury, 2012).  
2.3.3 Oversight of PPPs by the Comptroller and Auditor General and the 
Committee of Public Accounts 
The Committee of Public Accounts reported on PPP in Ireland in 2007. In the report it 
referred to PPP in Victoria, Australia where, after the PPP contract is signed, it is put on the 
“Partnerships Victoria” website, although some information can be redacted if it is assessed to 
be “commercial in confidence” (Dáil Éireann, 2007, p.17). A review by this researcher of the 
website in 2017 indicates that each PPP project has a project summary which indicates the 
value for money analysis of each proposal received from the private sector and compared with 
state managed delivery3. The component elements of the public sector comparator are given 
along with details of additional value for money benefits and a public interest test. Contracts 
are also posted on the website shortly after signature.  
In the report commissioned by the Committee of Public Accounts in 2007, it was 
recommended that Ireland adopt a similar approach to allow for “ongoing assessment of a 
project and provide reassurance to the public” (Dáil Éireann, 2007, p.24). The report also 
referred to Victoria, Australia where the onus of proof of  “commercial in confidence” is on 
the tenderer who must show that it will adversely affect their business. The Committee of 




Public Accounts recommended that this be adopted in Ireland. The report also noted that in 
Victoria, Australia the parliamentary committee and the Auditor General should have 
authority to report “commercial in confidence material” when it is in the public interest for the 
information to be revealed (p.16). However, despite these recommendations the Committee of 
Public Accounts is still asking questions regarding PPPs and commercial sensitivity (Dáil 
Éireann, 2018). 
Hodge and Greve (2007) state that PPPs are an attractive policy for governments that 
are eager to please markets, but they also state that there is a lack of independent evaluators; 
poor evaluation rigour; poor definition of how PPP is judged; evaluations by auditors general 
who, in most jurisdictions, cannot question government policy; inaccurate discount rates of 
time-value-of-money estimates of net benefit; inaccurate estimates of risk transfers from the 
public to the private sector; and predicted benefits being estimated at an early stage of a long-
term contract, at a time when optimism and political sensitivity are both high. Some of these 
issues were highlighted in the Comptroller and Auditor General’s (C&AG) value for money 
report (No. 48) of the Grouped Schools Pilot Project (Comptroller and Auditor General, 2004) 
and by subsequent C&AG reports and reviews by the Committee of Public Accounts.  
The value for money report (No. 48) of the Grouped Schools Pilot Partnership Project 
(Comptroller and Auditor General, 2004) was the first of the PPP pilot projects to reach the 
contract stage. The report stated: 
The cost comparison exercise — completed in September 2001 — concluded 
that procuring and running the schools through the proposed PPP arrangement 
would result in a saving of around 6% compared to procuring and running the 
schools conventionally. However, the analysis contained errors in relation to 
the timing and discounting of payments and overestimated the residual value of 
the school buildings at the end of 25 years.  
(Comptroller and Auditor General, 2004, p.11) 
After correcting the analysis for these factors, the report suggested that the Department 
of Education and Science should have concluded that adopting the PPP approach to 
procurement was likely to be in the region of 13% to 19% more expensive than conventional 
procurement and that the deal involved relatively little transfer of risk to Jarvis, the 
consortium tasked with this project. The report stated that although risks were “appropriately 
retained” by the public sector, the extent of risk transferred to the private sector was “limited”, 
valued at 6% of the overall estimated cost of procuring the schools by conventional means. 
The report concluded that it was too early to conduct a comprehensive comparison of the 
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economy, efficiency and effectiveness of the group of schools built under PPP with a similar 
group built under the conventional route.  
The Committee of Public Accounts met on several occasions in late 2012 and 2013 to 
review PPP commitments under chapter 6 of the C&AG Report on the Accounts of the Public 
Services 2011 (Comptroller and Auditor General, 2012). However, at mid-2018 the 
committee has not carried out any in-depth value for money analysis of PPPs. These reviews 
have highlighted ongoing problems with PPP such as issues regarding value for money 
calculations, risk sharing, unforeseen costs and problems with traffic volumes.  
The C&AG in the Report on the Accounts of the Public Services 2011 (Comptroller 
and Auditor General, 2012) carried out an analysis of the financial commitments under PPP, 
specifically a review of value for money in water services (Department of Environment, 
Heritage and Local Government, 2010) and the impact of risk sharing in roads projects. The 
report stated that PPP procurement should be employed only where it is clearly established 
that it provides best value for money overall. This report stated that in the Department of the 
Environment, Community and Local Government (DoECLG), formerly the Department of 
Environment, Heritage and Local Government, the government department responsible for 
water and waste water (W&WW) PPPs, when compared with traditionally procured contracts, 
PPP design, build and operate (DBO) represented average savings in the range of 10% to 20% 
for project capital costs and 5% to 10% for operational costs, depending on the scale of the 
treatment plant. The C&AG’s report (Comptroller and Auditor General, 2012, p.81) also 
stated that under PPP, the transfer of all construction stage risks, other than archaeology, is 
made to the contractor, which was not the case under the traditional procurement approach. 
Under the traditional approach, the employer, that is, the local authority, carried virtually all 
risks associated with the contract. 
Reeves (2013a) found that the DoECLG had a stated preference for the PPP model in 
the water services sector which was at odds with the official guidelines on PPP procurement 
which require that VFM is demonstrated in advance of the PPP model being adopted. He 
found that in the case of a replacement waste water treatment plant along with ancillary 
facilities, a consultation period allowed stakeholders to review costs, and the subsequent 
report and recommendation to the DoECLG estimated that the whole-life costs to be 2.3% 
lower under traditional procurement. The DoECLG re-worked the VFM assessment and 
concluded that the final adjusted cost differential amounted to under 1% in favour of 
traditional procurement. Nonetheless, the department made a final decision to proceed with 
procurement under the PPP approach (Reeves, 2013a). 
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Despite the C&AG report stating “appropriate sharing of project risks is a requirement 
if PPP projects are to deliver value for money” (Comptroller and Auditor General, 2012, 
p.90), there were issues with risk sharing in the case of the Clonee-Kells (M3) and Limerick 
Tunnel PPPs (Comptroller and Auditor General, 2012). The contracts provided for traffic 
related guaranteed payment mechanisms whereby the National Roads Authority (NRA), now 
merged with the Railway Procurement Agency (RPA) and called Transport Infrastructure 
Ireland (TII), was obliged to make payments to the PPP company if traffic fell below a certain 
level. In both cases the shortfalls in traffic volumes relative to the guaranteed thresholds in 
2010 and 2011 were significant. The NRA estimated the guaranteed related amount payable 
in 2012 at €6.7 million. The C&AG report stated that, based on the assumption that traffic on 
both routes would grow at an annual average of 2.5% a year, the State would continue to 
make guaranteed payments to the Clonee-Kells PPP company until 2025 (Comptroller and 
Auditor General, 2012, p.83). This led to the following recommendations: 
VFM appraisals are carried out for all proposed major public investments and a 
PPP cannot proceed unless it is found likely to deliver better value than 
traditional procurement. However, few value for money reviews of PPP 
projects have been published 
and 
evaluations of the value for money expected to be achieved through 
procurement of projects by means of PPP should be published 
(Comptroller and Auditor General, 2012, p.90) 
However, despite the C&AG recommendations, this does not appear to have happened 
as the C&AG’s report in 2013 acknowledged that the NDFA had carried out value for money 
testing on the third schools bundle project but the results of the final deal had not been 
published. It was argued that publishing results could compromise the NDFA’s negotiating 
strategy and be detrimental to achieving optimal outcomes for other projects currently being 
procured (Comptroller and Auditor General, 2013). As a result of this, value for money 
cannot be assessed in the public domain because of commercial sensitivity issues. 
2.4 Research themes and question 
The examination of the literature in the previous sections draws attention to the 
motivations for the adoption of PPP in Ireland as well as the ongoing reliance on this 
procurement approach. This is further discussed in chapter 4. There have been a number of 
academic studies carried out on the experience of PPP in Ireland. For example, Hurst and 
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Reeves (2004), Reeves (2008) and Hearne (2011) have examined the experience with PPP in 
the Irish schools sector; Petersen (2011) has focused on policy-making and regulation of PPP 
in Ireland; Burke and Demirag (2015) have examined demand risk on Irish PPP road projects; 
Reeves et al. (2015) have analysed the length of tendering periods for PPP contracts in 
Ireland; and Reeves and Palcic (2017) have examined the impact of the financial crisis on PPP 
in Ireland.  
However, there is a gap in the literature regarding the motivations for the continued 
use of PPP post-financial crisis. It is important to know whether the motivations for the 
continued use of PPP in Ireland have remained the same or are now different and whether its 
continued use is voluntary or coercive, as this will influence the sustainability of this policy. 
This study will investigate this issue. This is expressed in the following research question: 
RQ 1: What are the reasons for the adoption of the PPP policy and its continued use 
in Ireland? 
Research has found that there is limited availability of information on the public sector 
benchmark (PSB) in Ireland which makes public scrutiny of PPPs very difficult (Reeves, 
2013a). Even though there have been calls for transparency and the public availability of all 
PPP contracts (Khadaroo, 2008; Boardman and Vining, 2012; Vining and Boardman, 2008a), 
in Ireland VFM tests and PPP contracts are not published and there is limited evidence on 
management of contracts (Reeves, 2013a). 
Studies have explored the PFI decision-making process and have raised concerns over 
accountability and VFM, the implications of risk transfer on VFM and “the difficulties and 
subjectivities involved in preparing the PSB” (Khadaroo, 2008, p.1325). There has been a lot 
of effort in the UK put into developing ex-ante VFM criteria (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2004) 
but less attention has been devoted to considering VFM ex-post to assess if outcomes have 
been achieved (Broadbent and Laughlin 2004; Khadaroo, 2008, Edwards and Shaoul, 2003b). 
It is considered to be a gap in the knowledge and practice (Andon, 2012). In particular the 
Irish PPP experience has received limited examination in academic literature (Reeves, 2013a). 
 A number of case studies of PPP practice in Ireland, outlined in 2.3.3  Oversight of 
PPPs by the Comptroller and Auditor General and the Committee of Public Accounts have 
been examined by the C&AG and discussed in the Committee of Public Accounts, and the 
results have been disappointing. The analysis indicates that the public sector has failed in the 
design of contracts, failed to ensure sufficient competition for contracts, failed to specify and 
allocate risks adequately and failed to monitor and enforce contracts adequately. A major 
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theme arising from the literature is the need to establish a model of public sector procurement 
which includes the establishment of fundamental objectives of public service delivery to 
generate competition, monitor and enforce contracts, and ensure accountability is called for 
(Reeves, 2006). The failures of PPP and recommendations for future PPP mentioned by 
Reeves (2006) merit research into the establishment of a framework for the involvement of 
the private sector in PPP in Ireland.  
The examination of the academic literature, key reports and oversight of PPP  have 
identified themes which warrant further research. These are the evaluation of VFM, the 
transparency of the policy, and the public availability of PPP reviews. These themes are 
further discussed further in chapter 3. 
2.5 Conclusion 
Since the foundation of the State, Ireland has had private sector involvement in the 
delivery of services and infrastructure projects. This involvement was formalised during the 
28th Dáil (1997 – 2002) under the economic liberalisation policies of the then Minister for 
Finance, Mr. Charlie McCreevy, TD. There was a highly visible political commitment at the 
time to the PPP approach with the backing of the Taoiseach, the Minister for Finance and 
senior Ministers, although there was no overriding imperative to do so.  
PPP was introduced after the publication of the Farrell Grant Sparks et al. report 
(1998). The reasons for its introduction brought about by the infrastructure deficit through 
underfunding, in tandem with rapid economic expansion and fiscal constraints imposed by the 
Maastricht Treaty convergence criteria. Other reasons for the introduction of PPP given were 
possible efficiency gains and expertise not available in the public sector, as well as political 
expediency where PPP offered early project infrastructure delivery and the movement of 
capital expenditure off-balance sheet. 
The National Development Plan 2007 – 2013 reaffirmed the government’s 
commitment to PPP, but some projects were cancelled as a result of the economic downturn. 
The coalition government of 2011 introduced the Infrastructure and Capital Investment 2012 
– 16: Medium Term Exchequer Framework which stated that PPP had a role to play in the 
delivery of key social infrastructure projects, such as schools and projects in the health sector. 
PPPs were affected by the financial crisis and the coalition government introduced the 
domestic infrastructure stimulus programme, announced in 2012, part of which was to be 
delivered through PPP, as an attempt to stimulate the economy, reduce the infrastructure 
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deficit and create employment. This programme was followed by a number of new PPP 
measures announced in 2013 aimed at building PPP capacity.  
In summary, this examination of the literature has explored the motivations for the 
introduction of PPP in Ireland but this does not explain the reasons for its ongoing use. 
Therefore, the first research question was identified in this chapter: 
RQ 1: What are the reasons for the adoption of the PPP policy and its continued use 
in Ireland? 
The C&AG carried out an evaluation of PPPs in the pilot schools project and 
identified issues with risk sharing in two road transport PPPs, where the state is obliged to 
make guaranteed payments to the PPP companies involved if certain conditions fail to be met. 
The C&AG has stated that PPP procurement should be employed only where it is clearly 
established that it provides best value for money overall. However, Reeves (2013a) cites one 
case where the traditional procurement approach is cheaper but the PPP was proceeded with. 
The C&AG has also stated that the NDFA has carried out value for money testing but has not 
published the results because of commercial sensitivity issues. This examination of the 
academic literature, key reports and oversight of PPP has identified concerns regarding the 
evaluation of VFM, the transparency of the policy, and the public availability of PPP reviews.  
In the absence of value for money audits on current PPP projects, we cannot judge 
whether these projects have achieved the objectives initially set out and whether the PPP 
approach is the appropriate method in which to involve private investment in the delivery of 
public services. These themes are further discussed in the next chapter which will also 




Chapter 3 – Literature Review: The Study of Policy Transfer 
theory and Institutional theory 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the theoretical framework of this study which was utilised to 
inform the pilot study (chapter 4) and the extended study conducted in 2016 (chapters 5 and 
6). Section 3.2 examines the literature on policy transfer theory as a means of exploring how 
PPP policy came to be adopted in Ireland and examines whether the policy was transferred 
voluntarily or coercively. Policy transfer theory is also used to explore whether lessons learnt 
have changed or enhanced PPP policy in Ireland and whether this has led to more successful 
outcomes. Section 3.3 reviews the literature on institutional theory to explore how the success 
and sustainability of PPP can be understood. Section 3.4 uses the foregoing to identify the 
remaining research questions of this study. 
3.2 Overview of Policy Transfer theory literature  
The sharing of policies across states and nations has brought about a transfer of 
policies which has been described as lesson drawing, policy band-wagoning, policy 
borrowing, policy shopping, systematically pinching ideas, external inducement and direct 
coercive transfer (Stone, 2001). These labels relate to “action-oriented” concepts where the 
transfer results from a rational decision made by the policy-maker (Stone, 2001, p.5) having 
assessed the feasibility of an idea or the advancement of a problem (May, 1992). In general 
the term “policy diffusion” describes the adoption of a practice, programme, policy (Stone, 
2001, p.4) or innovation (Rogers, 2010) which is communicated (Rogers, 2010), or spreads, 
gradually (Stone, 2001) through certain channels (Rogers, 2010) or geographically (Stone, 
2001) among members of a social system (Rogers, 2010) and over time (Rogers, 2010; Stone, 
2001). Westney (1986, p.185) refers to “transfer” in discussing “imitations/innovations” of 
foreign experiences. Wolman (1992) discusses policy transfer in the context of urban policies 
transferred between the US and UK.  
The contemporary study of policy transfer draws on policy diffusion studies, a sub-set 
of the comparative politics literature (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; Evans, 2009a) which 
emerged in the 1990s (Benson, 2009). Not all academics agree on whether “policy transfer” is 
actually the most adequate term to use. Some authors use “policy borrowing”, “policy 
mobilities”, “policy mimesis”, “imitation” or “reproduction of  policy in another context” but 
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these terms are not necessarily better or worse than “policy transfer” (Dussauge-Laguna, 
2012, p.317).  
Policy transfer can be defined as “a process in which knowledge about policies, 
administrative arrangements, institutions etc in one time and/or place is used in the 
development of policies, administrative arrangements and institutions in another time and/or 
place” (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996, p.344). Policy transfer involves “cross-cultural transfer of 
knowledge about institutions, policies or delivery systems” (Evans, 2009b, p.238) and thus 
causes organisations to mimic others (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996). It can also increase the 
effectiveness of government operations (Marsh and Sharman, 2009) and help organisations 
gain legitimacy (Connolly et al., 2009). Early transfer studies focused on voluntary transfer 
(Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996) but research found that cross-national policy transfer was not 
necessarily “rational, mechanical or automatic” as policy-makers operated within “bounded” 
contexts as a result of a lack of resources, ambiguous goals and a lack of understanding of 
imported policies (Dolowitz and Medearis, 2009, p.686), which led to the distinction of 
voluntary and coercive transfer (Dolowtiz and Marsh, 1996).  
Voluntary transfer can occur where there is dissatisfaction with the status quo and a 
perception, either by the government or the public, of policy failure. Coercive transfer can be 
direct or indirect. Direct coercive transfer occurs when one government or organisation forces 
another to adopt a policy. The direct imposition of policy transfer on one country by another 
is uncommon. However, supra-national institutions, such as the IMF and EU, have been said 
to conduct coercive policy transfer through their policies. Indirect coercive transfer occurs 
when the role of externalities resulting from interdependence pushes governments to work 
together to solve common problems (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996). International organisations 
such as the EU, IMF and World Bank advocate, and at times enforce, similar policies across 
diverse countries (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000). A country can also be indirectly pushed 
towards policy transfer if political actors perceive it as falling behind neighbours or 
competitors (Keating et al., 2012). Similarities in policy between countries can be explained 
by policy transfer and learning but also because similar conditions exist and similar policies 
may be developed concurrently (Keating et al., 2012). Even if this is so, policy learning is 
possible (Keating et al., 2012).  
When the international community defines a problem in a particular way and  a 
common solution has been introduced in a number of nations, those nations not adopting this 
definition or solution face increasing pressure to join the international community by 
implementing similar programmes or policies (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996). The literature on 
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policy transfer tends to be “process oriented, focusing on how, when, and why adopters use 
diffused information rather than on networks or patterns of diffusion” (Mossberger and 
Wolman, 2003, p.429), and the Dolowitz and Marsh (1996 and 2000) framework reflects this.   
3.2.1 Policy Transfer theory: Dolowitz and Marsh (1996 and 2000) framework 
Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) summarised a general framework of concepts, including 
“policy diffusion, policy convergence, policy learning and lesson drawing under the umbrella 
heading of policy transfer” (Evans, 2009a, p.363). Policy transfer is therefore used as a 
common term to include “claims about the nature of policy development” such as lesson 
drawing, policy diffusion and policy convergence (Evans, 2009a, p.364). The Dolowitz and 
Marsh (1996) framework incorporates all of these terms and is said to be useful for planning 
research questions and examining the process of policy transfer (Evans, 2009a).  
The framework allows a view to be taken on why and where the transfer takes place, 
who is involved, and how to demonstrate that transfer has or has not been successful. It was 
further added to by Dolowitz and Marsh in 2000. Dolowitz and Marsh have invited others to 
develop the framework further and assess it (Evans, 2009a), and O’Dolan and Rye (2012) 
adapted the framework for their study of the transfer of the “Active Access” policy which 
aims to encourage cycling and walking for short trips. Table 3.1 shows the evolution from the 
questions asked by Dolowitz and Marsh in 1996 and 2000 to O’Dolan and Rye’s (2012) 
utilisation of the framework for their study.  
Table 3.1: Policy Transfer Questions 
Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) O’Dolan and Rye (2012) 
Who transfers policy? Who is involved in the policy 
transfer process? 
Who is involved in the 
policy transfer process? 
What is transferred? 
 
What is transferred? What policies are 
transferred? 
Why engage in policy transfer?  Why do actors engage in 
policy transfer? 
From where are lessons drawn? From where are lessons drawn? From where are the lessons 
drawn? 
Are there different degrees of 
transfer? 
What is the degree of policy 
transfer? 
What are the different 
degrees of transfer? 
What factors constrain policy 
transfer? 
What are the constraints on 
transfer? 
What restricts or facilitates 
the policy transfer process? 
What are the problems with the 
literature? 
How does policy transfer lead to 
policy failure? 
How is the process of 
policy transfer related to 
policy “success” or 
“failure”? 
 




Who is involved in the policy transfer process? 
This literature identifies different categories of actors involved in policy transfer such 
as “elected officials, political parties, bureaucrats/civil servants, pressure groups, policy 
entrepreneurs/experts and supra-national institutions” (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996, p.345). 
Actors are defined as individuals or collectives, from groups to countries, and the literature 
describes some of them as seeking to influence public policy (Sabatier and Weible, 2014). 
Other categories of actors include “transnational corporations, think tanks, non-governmental 
institutions, consultants” (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000, p.10), and “knowledge institutions, 
academicians and other experts and pressure groups” (Evans, 2009a, p.244). Another 
categorisation distinguishes between “state” and “non-state” actors, non-state being described 
as interest groups, NGOs, think tanks, consultant firms, law firms and banks (Stone, 2004, 
p.2). Other research places importance upon “epistemic communities or policy networks” 
(Holden, 2009, p.315) defined as “experts from inside and outside government interacting to 
spread ideas” (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996, p.346).  
The literature discusses the role of the private sector in policy transfer, and in 
particular, the use of consulting firms by governments to “reinvent” themselves when 
implementing new public management ideas and advocating the adoption of “a more 
managerial approach in government”. This has been described as “a global fashion-setting 
network of management consulting firms” (Stone, 2001, p.27). Consultancy firms are 
regarded as a transferor of policy ideas from one place to another (Stone, 2001). Large 
consulting firms such as PwC, KPMG or Arthur Andersen are establishing “government 
consulting divisions” in their organisations, producing policy relevant research and liaising 
with public servants (Stone, 2001, p.27). Ikenberry (1990) writes that the role of international 
institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank have resulted in the transfer of private sector 
policies. A “coalition” of groups, including both the public sector and the private sector, 
sometimes emerges around a strategy that includes privatisation, and this coalition 
collaborates with external agencies. These external actors can thus help to “bolster national 
coalitions that favour privatisation and public sector reform” (Holden, 2009, p.315). Other 
references in the literature refer to “global financial institutions, international organisations 
and supra-national institutions” (Evans, 2009a, p.244). 
Policy-makers are increasingly relying on the advice of consultants for “best practice” 
expertise in the development of new programs, policies and institutional structures (Dolowitz 
and Marsh, 2000, p.10), particularly when international organisations are involved, which 
often recommend particular consultants be hired. The recommendations by consultants used 
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by, for example, the IMF on policy for recipient nations may be voluntary or coercive 
(Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000). 
There has been little examination in the literature of the roles of actors, in particular 
private actors, in policy transfer. Also there has been little examination of the beneficiaries of 
coercive transfer and they are not often identified (Holden, 2009).  
What policies are transferred? 
Policy goals, structure and content, policy instruments or administrative techniques, 
institutions (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996), ideology; ideas, attitudes and concepts, policies, and 
lessons (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; Stone, 2004) can be all transferred. Lessons can be 
negative as well as positive and countries may make a decision not to copy some policies, 
believing that they may be limiting in their current form (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996). Earlier 
studies concentrated on “hard transfer of policy instruments, institutions and programmes 
between governments” (Benson and Jordan, 2011, p.370) but there is also discussion in the 
literature of “soft” forms of policy transfer such as the spread of norms and knowledge 
(Stone, 2004, p.3), particularly by “non-state actors in transnational advocacy networks” 
endeavouring to influence policy agendas (Stone, 2004, p.17). Research using the soft forms 
of policy transfer are now said to be pushing the boundaries of the policy transfer concept 
(Benson and Jordan, 2011). 
Why do actors engage in policy transfer? 
Lessons are used by supporters and objectors of policies to gain advantage and 
legitimacy in the pursuit of having their ideas accepted (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996). The 
literature has called for research to examine why certain types of transfer appear in some 
settings and not in others (Benson and Jordan, 2011) and this may be down to the type of 
policy transfer which may take place. The literature distinguishes between voluntary transfer, 
negotiated transfer and direct coercive transfer (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; Evans, 2009a) 
and indirect coercive transfer (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996).  
Voluntary transfer occurs where there is some form of dissatisfaction or problem with 
the status quo; where there is a perception either by the government or the public of policy 
failure; or where there is a new agenda brought about by a new minister or a change in 
government  (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; Evans, 2009a). 
Negotiated policy transfer refers to a process in which governments are compelled by, 
for example, an influential donor to introduce policy change to secure grants or loans. If one 
donor party has influence over the recipient party, however, it may be seen as a form of 
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coercive activity (Evans, 2009a) of which two types have been identified (1) direct coercive 
transfer and (2) indirect coercive transfer (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996). 
Direct coercive transfer relates to situations where one government coerces another to 
adopt a policy (Holden, 2009; Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996). While one country directly 
imposing policy transfer on another is not common (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996) a powerful 
country can encourage a weaker country to adopt a policy by threat of action if it does not do 
so (Sabatier and Weible, 2014) or supra-national institutions can often engage in coercive 
policy transfer (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996). For example, the IMF will demand particular 
economic policies that must be agreed by the recipient if a loan is to be granted (Dolowitz and 
Marsh, 1996), the World Bank can require adoption of polices as a precondition to financial 
aid (Sabatier and Weible, 2014) and the EU can force policy transfer upon member states 
(Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996).  
Indirect coercive transfer arises from the role of externalities which result from 
interdependence, which encourage governments to cooperate to resolve common problems 
(Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996). International organisations such as the EU, IMF and World 
Bank “advocate and at times enforce similar policies across diverse countries” (Dolowitz and 
Marsh, 2000, p.7). A country can also be indirectly pushed towards policy transfer if there is a 
perception, correct or incorrect, that it is lagging behind the adoption of policies made by a 
neighbouring country or a competitor (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996). The emergence of an 
international consensus on a particular problem or solution to a problem may become a form 
of indirect coercive transfer, when nations feel compelled to introduce a policy to join the 
international consensus (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996).  
One concern of the literature is that if policy is imposed or transferred as a result of 
coercion or mimicry it may be “ineffective and dysfunctional” (Marsh and Sharman, 2009, 
p.282). Governments are often motivated to adopt policies that offer legitimacy, rather than 
learning from the experiences of other countries and adopting policies that have the desired 
effects (Marsh and Sharman, 2009). 
From where are the lessons drawn? 
When transfer takes place, lessons can be drawn from another country’s experiences 
on what worked and on what not to repeat, thus saving time and resources (Dolowitz and 
Marsh, 1996). It is common, however, for governments and agents to transfer policies from 
one country to another (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996) and there is a “natural tendency” to look 
abroad in making domestic policy decisions (Bennett, 1991, p.220). Research has shown that 
there are borrowers and lenders and that these roles seldom change. Countries classified as 
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borrowers act as mentors for other countries and lenders draw lessons (Dolowitz and Marsh, 
2000). Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) adapted their original framework to describe three levels 
of governance from where lesson can be drawn: the international, the national and the local. 
This complicates the simple borrowers and lenders dichotomy. 
What are the different degrees of transfer? 
There are a range of options on how to incorporate lessons into a political system and 
Dolowitz and Marsh (1996, p.351) identify five: copying, emulation, hybridization, synthesis 
and inspiration. Copying occurs when a country adopts a policy used elsewhere without 
making any changes (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996). Emulation occurs when a country does not 
copy a policy in totality but accepts that a policy elsewhere is the best standard (Dolowitz and 
Marsh, 1996). Hybridization and synthesis involve combining elements of programmes found 
in two or more countries and using them “to develop a policy best suited to the emulator” 
(Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996, p.351). The literature also distinguishes between policy copying, 
where the policy is almost completely copied, and policy adaption (Birrell, 2012). Studying 
problems and policies adopted by other countries can motivate and suggest solutions to 
problems arising at home (Dolowtiz and Marsh, 1996). Dolowitz and Marsh (2000, p.13) later 
refined the degrees of transfer to include copying, emulation, combinations and inspirations 
and point out that it is not an “all or nothing process”. Transfer will vary depending on the 
particular case and who is involved in it. For example, politicians tend to look for “quick-fix” 
solutions and bureaucrats are more interested in “mixtures” (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000, 
p.13). Other forms of policy mobility have since been identified to include “non-transfer”, 
“failed transfer” and the transfer of “negative lessons” (Benson and Jordan, 2011, p.371). 
The literature has also identified factors which influence the degree of policy copying. 
Influencing factors include: weak policy-making capacity of the civil service, parliamentary 
committees and other bodies, over-reliance on management consultants to produce policy 
analysis and lack of research institutes, policy networks and discussion forums; culture of 
conservatism and lack of appetite for change in public sector reforms; emphasis on cost 
cutting and reductions in public expenditure and lack of motivation for adopting new methods 
of service delivery and reforms; political disagreements on public sector reform and ensuing 
impasses result in policies being adopted based on political advantage being won; lack of 




What restricts or facilitates the policy transfer process? 
The literature has highlighted constraints to policy transfer. Constraints apply to the 
wholesale adoption of past policies which can impinge or constrain the adoption of potential 
policies. Potential policies can also conflict with the dominant political ideology of the 
recipient country. Bureaucratic size and efficiency of the recipient country, implementation 
costs and language can also militate against transfer (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996). The transfer 
of policies from one country to another may be constrained by cultural differences and the 
related high costs of adjusting policies (Benson and Jordan, 2011). Another constraint to 
policy transfer is the lack of trust in the source of a new idea and institutional differences that 
may exist (Rye et al., 2011). Constraints may come into existence at different stages of the 
policy transfer, for example, “cognitive” obstacles may occur at the pre-decision phase and 
“environmental” obstacles may occur during the process of transfer (Evans, 2009a, p.246). 
How is the process of policy transfer related to policy “success” or “failure”? 
Dolowitz and Marsh (2000, p.17) added the question of success to their framework 
and acknowledged that there is a problem establishing what constitutes “success” and 
“failure” in policy transfer. They restrict themselves to examining policy transfer success as 
the extent to which it achieves the objectives of government or how success is evaluated by 
key actors involved in the policy area (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000). The literature has 
highlighted a number of concerns about measuring the success of policy transfer. There is a 
presumption that because a policy was a success elsewhere, it will be transferred successfully 
to the recipient country. It has been argued that consideration of the perspective from which 
success is to be assessed among “multiple stakeholders” is required (Marsh and Sharman, 
2009, p.284). Consideration is also required as to when success is assessed. Should it 
concentrate on evaluation after the project end and is there a generally accepted framework 
for doing this (O’Dolan and Rye, 2012)? Consideration should also be given to whether 
lessons were learnt. For example, was there an attempt to learn lessons by examining policies 
adopted elsewhere to see if they could be improved on or whether they were appropriate for 
transfer (Birrell, 2012)?  
In this research, policy transfer theory will provide a means of exploring how PPP 
policy came to be adopted in Ireland. It will establish whether the policy transferred was 
conducted in a voluntary manner or a coercive manner. Policy transfer theory will also 
provide a means of exploring whether the lessons learned changed or enhanced the PPP 
policy in Ireland and whether this led to a more successful outcome. This last element is 
discussed further in the next section. 
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3.3 An Overview of Institutional theory literature 
Organisations and also governments operate in an institutional environment which 
influences their actions (Matos-Castaño et al., 2014), and institutional theory can help explain 
why governments are so similar (Connolly et al., 2009). Institutional theories assume that 
pressure to conform to a set of expectations is exercised by external and internal forces, 
thereby gaining organisational legitimacy and securing “access to resources and long-term 
survival” (Brignall and Modell, 2000, p.288). Organisational structure, policies and 
procedures stem from social expectations and “myth” about what is socially and economically 
acceptable such as private sector efficiency (Khadaroo, 2005, p.72) which are rationalised and 
gain legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Brignall and Modell, 2000). Under the New 
Public Management (NPM) reforms movement, private sector management techniques such 
as Best Value, Private Finance Initiative (PFI), Resource Accounting and Resource Budgeting 
were institutionalised in the UK’s public sector (Khadaroo, 2005) as a way of introducing 
practices similar to the private sector (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2005). NPM reforms, which 
also include PPP, encourage new institutional arrangements which allow participation from 
the public sector and private sector, and are used to resolve complex public policy issues 
which may arise (Nel, 2014).  
PFI, which had been introduced by the Tories in the UK in 1992, took off when New 
Labour came to power in 1997 with a new emphasis on partnerships between sectors as a 
means of gaining private sector expertise (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2005). PFI was seen as a 
way of modernising government, with ministers being keen to introduce what they saw as 
entrepreneurial private sector values into public services (Weaver, 2003). The adoption of PFI 
by New Labour gave legitimacy to it and to the continuation and development of its use 
(Broadbent and Laughlin, 2005).  
Institutional theory examines how structures including procedures, rules, schemas and 
routines become established and are accepted over “space and time” (Matos-Castaño et al., 
2012, p.4). Government projects can be adopted without a thorough value for money analysis 
prior to adoption because they are in vogue (Cohen and Eimicke, 2001). Perhaps this is to 
gain legitimacy and a desire to conform rather than “rational decision-making” (Connelly et 
al., 2009, p.6). It has been found that governments often adopt new practices, for example, 
PPPs, to conform and are then forced to keep up the appearance that these mythical solutions 
actually work (Connelly et al., 2009). 
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3.3.1 Institutional Isomorphism 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) use the term “isomorphism” to explain the tendency for 
public and private organisations to adopt similar rules and routines and they describe three 
types of institutional isomorphism – coercive, mimetic and normative. In the context of 
institutional isomorphism, “coercion” can explain the way in which PPPs were introduced in 
the UK  (Connolly et al., 2009), where a decision not to use the PPP option meant that the 
project might not go ahead (Newberry, 2004). The manner in which PPPs were introduced 
into Ireland was likely to have been “mimicry”, looking to see what the “closest neighbour” 
had done and adopting it to gain legitimacy, combined with “normative” pressures where 
elements of the “accounting profession interpreted the accounting rules in a manner that made 
the use of PPPs attractive” (Connolly et al., 2009, p.14). For example, the Dutch PPP 
expertise centre, part of the Ministry of Finance, borrowed from the UK PFI model, and this 
is a form of isomorphism (Klijn, 2009). Accordingly, the UK PFI model was seen as a first 
“PPP enabling-field” and an example for other countries (Jooste et al. 2011, p.3). It should be 
pointed out that mimetic isomorphism is not a given, as Scotland did not introduce PFI in the 
form England and Wales did, and its Scottish Future Trust is a significant divergence in the 
area (Asenova et al., 2010). Research into the adoption of PPP policy in British Columbia 
(Canada), Victoria (Australia) and South Africa show that the PPP model was adapted and 
modified beyond the isomorphic “one size fits all” approach by diffusion carriers such as 
relational networks, local advocates, consultants, multilateral and international development 
agencies, and artefacts (Jooste et al., 2011, p.2). In other words, policy transfer with 
institutional change occurred.  
Research into the impact of institutional structures on the implementation of PPP 
policies goes beyond notions of transfer in that is does not assume that transplanted policies 
would be automatically successful. PPPs require a variety of new types of institutional 
capacity (Jooste et al., 2009) and research has also shown how shortcomings in the 
institutional setting can lead to problems with the performance of PPPs and a lack of 
transparency and regulatory safeguards (Matos-Castaño et al., 2014). Creating an enabling 
environment for PPPs requires a combination of institutional creation and institutional 
change, a form of institutional isomorphism. In some cases governments borrowed PFI policy 
from other countries but failed to change the institutional environment (Matos-Castaño et al., 
2014), or borrowed policy in a fragmented nature, leading to uncoordinated policies 
(Johnston, 2010) with weak overall policy performance. There is no one-size-fits-all 
institutional framework. Institutional frameworks are often path-dependent, limited by 
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decisions made in the past, and relates to the ability of policy-makers to adapt institutional 
forms, thus creating legitimacy, trust and capacity in the adoption of PPPs (Matos-Castaño et 
al. 2014). The first generation of PPPs in the Netherlands of the early 1990s suffered from 
financial and structural problems. The second generation of PPPs came about after the 
government assessed international experiences of PPP, evaluated this and assessed conditions 
necessary for a successful partnership leading to political and public buy-in (Matos-Castaño et 
al., 2014). Lessons were learned and institutional change came about with the development of 
PPP policy, guidelines and procedures.  
3.3.2 Measuring PPP success and sustainability 
An examination of the literature shows an evolution in how PPP success is assessed. 
Before PPP became popular, the focus was on the success of privatisation projects. For 
example, Durchslag et al. (1994) recommended a balanced partnership between government 
and investors and a strong legal and regulatory structure to ensure success for infrastructure 
privatisation projects. With the implementation of PPP, attempts to assess PPP success have 
evolved from recommendations on what is key to PPP success. This has ranged from efforts 
to identify critical success factors (CSFs) for PPP success to creating a framework to assess 
PPP success. More recently there has been a shift in the literature to discussing the factors 
necessary for the sustainability of PPPs. This is illustrated in the examination of the literature 
in this section. 
When PPPs were first implemented the literature made recommendations on what is 
key to PPP success. For example, Kumaraswamy and Zhang (2001) wrote that implementing 
build-operate-transfer (BOT) type schemes, a form of PPP, will not be successful unless 
institutional change takes place in the form of governmental support, adequate legal 
framework, the right political and commercial environment and minimal guarantees to 
maintain a balanced risk-return structure (Kumaraswamy and Zhang, 2001). It was 
emphasised that even if governments do provide these supports, it is not a guarantee of 
success and a balanced effort from both the public and private sector is essential to achieving 
successful outcomes (Kumaraswamy and Zhang, 2001). Pongsiri (2002) recommended that it 
is necessary to ensure that a balance of public and private interests is reached, a clear 
legislative framework is implemented, and that there are clearly defined control mechanisms 
and accountability (Pongsiri, 2002).  
As the literature on PPP expanded, authors recommended CSFs for PPP success. For 
example, Li et al. (2005b) examined the CSFs of PPPs in the literature and identified 18 broad 
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factors that determine PPP success (Li et al., 2005b). These factors were arranged into five 
principal groupings: effective procurement, project implementability, government guarantee, 
favourable economic conditions, and available financial market (Li et al., 2005b, p.467). 
Zhang (2005) also discussed CSFs for PPP in infrastructure development. Five CSFs were 
identified: favourable investment environment, appropriate risk allocation, economic viability, 
reliable concessionaire consortium with strong technical strength, and sound financial 
package (Zhang, 2005, p.5). The Canadian Council for Public Private Partnerships (CCPPP) 
in 2005 discussed key success factors to create a competitive environment for the 
procurement process. It identified the following factors: heightening public awareness, 
ensuring project flow, identifying the right project, the optimum procurement process, 
reducing costs and duration of the procurement process, having a standardised procurement 
process, optimum risk allocation, and a “made in Canada” model (CCPPP, 2005, p.3).  
However, despite the evolution of CSFs for PPP, there has been criticism querying 
whether they are the best approach to assessing PPP success. For example, Jooste et al. (2009) 
point out that CSFs are not completely comparable to PPP programme development tasks but 
they do provide a significant insight into issues that need to be addressed.  
The literature then evolved to recommending frameworks for assessing PPP success. 
For example, Deloitte (2006) recommended well-designed PPP policies, legislation and 
guidance, clear project objectives, appropriate risk transfer, adequate public sector capacity, 
ensuring value for money, and a clear pipeline of projects as assessors of PPP success. Aziz 
(2007) recommended the use of a PPP legal framework and implementation units, clearly 
defined private finance objectives, consideration of risk allocation, clearly defined value for 
money objectives, PPP transparency, standardisation of procedures, and the use of 
performance specifications (Aziz, 2007, p.920). These recommendations were expanded to 
create guidelines for successful implementation of PPPs such as enacting broad enabling 
legislation, selecting the delivery service that would provide the greatest benefits to the public 
or users, allowing the use and selection of the financing approach that would achieve the best 
value and benefits to the public, completing comprehensive analysis and articulating clearly 
the controversial issues such as the non-complete clauses, evaluating the various payment 
mechanisms and selecting the one that best achieves the government objectives, creating PPP 
units, and protecting the employees who would be affected from the implementation of PPPs 
(Aziz, 2007, p.927). 
Yescombe (2007, p.22) emphasised the importance of creating political commitment, 
transparent procurement, adequate project preparation, appropriate risk allocation, a project 
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pipeline, suitable financial capacity, and experience of sponsors to assess PPP success. The 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) in 2008 stated that PPPs require 
coherent policies with clear objectives and principles, adequate public sector capacity, a clear 
legal process, adequate risk transfer, a transparent and competitive procurement process that 
minuses bid costs, reduces the procurement timeframe and is free from corruption, and a PPP 
process that is accountable to society and environmentally sustainable.  
Garvin and Bosso (2008, p.163) presented a “P3 equilibrium framework” which aimed 
to assess P3 programs and projects and balance the interests of the state, society, industry and 
market to evaluate the effectiveness of PPPs over the long term. Garvin and Bosso (2008) 
identified “a gap in the measurement of outcomes in PPPs as most evaluations focus on the 
short-term impact and outputs” (Nel, 2014, p.52). However, while the framework provided a 
general overview it did not provide an in-depth evaluation of elements considered in the 
framework or any tools necessary for measurement (Nel, 2014; Garvin and Bosso, 2008). 
More recently there has been a shift in the literature to discussing the factors necessary 
for the sustainability of PPPs. For example, Willems and Van Dooran (2011, p.518) discussed 
the factors which will sustain a PPP project in the long term: risk allocation which will ensure 
accountability, cost-benefit analysis which is necessary for suitable project selection, social 
and political support, public sector knowledge and expertise, clarity in collaborations, and 
performance measurement of project outcomes. Dewulf et al. (2011, p.3) discussed PPP 
sustainability and made a link between the lack of an “enabling environment” which nurtures 
success and projects failing because of poor capacity and structure, lack of transparency and 
dispute resolution. Matos-Castaño et al. (2014) also discussed the sustainability of PPP. They 
recommended establishing an institutional environment which encompasses building capacity 
through the creation of a clear PPP policy, appropriate risk transfer, transparency and a clear 
legal framework, all of which will sustain PPP in the long term. 
Evaluations of PPP success and sustainability concentrated on capacity building in 
PPPs and improving governance in PPPs (Matos-Castaño et al., 2012). More recently, 
however, research has evolved into examining the institutional impacts on the implementation 
of PPP policies in different contexts such as the role that the institutional and political context 
plays in the process of PPP-enabling fields (Matos-Castaño et al., 2012). For example, Delhi 
et al. (2010) state that conflicts can be resolved more easily where institutions are stronger, 
where PPPs are explicitly legitimised, where processes of awarding projects are standardised 
and transparent, where contractual commitments can be quickly enforced, and where the 
capacity to select and structure projects appropriately is high. In areas where institutions are 
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stronger or where the government’s understanding of the role and responsibilities of PPP are 
greater, such conflicts may not arise at all (Delhi et al., 2010). A well-developed institutional 
environment will be more effective in implementing PPPs (Rui et al., 2008). 
The use of language is important in this research. Earlier authors talk about the success 
and sustainability of PPPs in the context of institutional capacity building (Jooste et al., 2009; 
Van Slyke and Hammond, 2003; Dutz et al., 2006). However, other authors discuss the 
capabilities of the institutional environment and this is outlined in Appendix A which 
summarises literature examining the legitimacy, capacity and trust of PPP. For example, 
Delhi and Mahalingam (2012) draw on research using six case studies to identify the key 
capabilities that need to be present in the institutional environment for the successful 
governance of PPP projects. Matos-Castaño (2011), Matos-Castaño et al. (2012) and Matos-
Castaño et al. (2014) discuss the main institutional capabilities necessary to ensure successful 
PPP programmes and project development in terms of legitimacy, capacity and trust. Verhoest 
et al. (2015) also use legitimacy, capacity and trust as core elements of their study on how 
central governments support the development of PPPs via the provision of PPP enhancing 
institutions. However, while Jooste et al. (2009) discuss a framework for PPP success in terms 
of increasing legitimacy and building capacity, instead of using “trust” they use the term 
“balancing interests”, while Delhi et al. (2010) only discuss the importance of legitimising 
PPPs in the context of measuring PPP success and sustainability. Each of the terms 
“legitimacy”, “capacity” and “trust” are now examined. 
Legitimacy 
Legitimacy within a social system has been defined as “a generalised perception or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate” (Suchman, 1995, 
p.574). Legitimacy is viewed as a perception that entities are functioning in a effective 
manner, and an entity which achieves legitimacy is likely to be more stable than one which is 
unable to legitimise itself, while an entity which is viewed as acting legitimately, is likely to 
be trusted (Kumar and Andersen, 2000). However, organisations are pressed to take actions to 
maintain their legitimacy and they have no guarantee that they will be successful (Kumar and 
Das, 2007). According to institutional theory “strategic and economic activity is embedded in 
a social and normative context and this context motivates economic actors to seek legitimacy 
or approval for their actions” (Dacin et al., 2007, p.171). The institutional environment, for 
example, “government, society and community groups”, put pressure on organisations to 
validate their decisions and this then puts pressure on organisations to “increase their 
legitimacy” (Dacin et al., 2007, p.171). 
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Jooste et al. (2009) suggest that legitimacy is significant for PPPs. A successful PPP 
will require gaining legitimacy from the public and civic sectors as the service delivery is 
moving to the private sector (Jooste et al., 2009). Strategies for building legitimacy include 
ensuring transparency throughout the PPP process and diffusing strategic information to the 
public (Jooste et al., 2009; Matos-Castaño et al., 2012; Matos-Castaño et al., 2014; Verhoest 
et al., 2015). The private sector requires trust and goodwill to be built between it and the 
government. This can be achieved by ensuring a record of consistency and fairness in 
applying legal and regulatory frameworks (Jooste et al., 2009) and providing a stable political 
environment (Jooste et al., 2009; Matos-Castaño, 2011; Matos-Castaño et al., 2012; Matos-
Castaño et al., 2014; Verhoest et al., 2015). The establishment of a PPP unit will provide 
legitimacy and support for PPP (Matos-Castaño, 2011), as will having a strong project 
portfolio (Matos-Castaño, 2011; Verhoest et al., 2015) and the support of stakeholders 
involved in PPP (Jooste et al., 2009; Matos-Castaño, 2011; Matos-Castaño et al., 2012). 
Capacity 
According to the Oxford Dictionary, capacity is defined as “the maximum amount 
something can obtain”4. The PPP literature emphasises the importance of building specialised 
institutional capacity for undertaking PPP projects and developing PPP programs (Jooste et 
al., 2009). The responsibility for ensuring PPP programme success lies with government, so it 
is up to the government to establish capacity that will ensure success such as creating PPP 
units (Jooste et al., 2009). Governments should build the necessary capacities and establish 
new institutions to implement PPP programs successfully (UNECE, 2008) and to enable them 
to monitor projects (Delhi et al., 2010). However, in their framework for ensuring PPP 
success, Jooste et al. (2009) argue that successful PPPs require capacity to be built up with 
other stakeholder groups as well, namely, the private sector and the civic sector. Thus the 
Jooste et al (2009) framework focuses on PPP success from the three stakeholders’ point of 
view.  
In terms of building capacity, new institutional structures should be established as 
there is not one-size-fits-all best practice when it comes to establishing PPP programs 
(PPIAF, 2007). This can take the form of identifying and supporting the creation of financial 
and legal skills necessary for the public sector to acquire (Matos-Castaño, 2011; Matos-
Castaño et al., 2012). Capacity building also takes the form of ensuring there is a market of 
private providers (Jooste et al., 2009; Matos-Castaño, 2011; Matos-Castaño et al., 2012) and 
ensuring that there is a coordinated PPP deal flow (Jooste et al., 2009; Matos-Castaño et al., 




2012). Additionally the literature suggest that it is important that there is ongoing PPP policy 
learning  (Jooste et al., 2009; Matos-Castaño et al., 2012; Matos-Castaño et al., 2014; 
Verhoest et al., 2015) and that the performance of PPPs is monitored (Matos-Castaño et al., 
2014; Jooste et al., 2009). Lastly, it is important that PPP projects are of high enough quality 
(Jooste et al., 2009; Matos-Castaño, 2011; Matos-Castaño et al., 2012; Matos-Castaño et al., 
2014; Verhoest el al., 2015) to ensure that PPP capacity can built. 
Trust 
Trust is defined as a willingness to rely on others, taking into account contractual 
obligations and social obligations (Smyth and Pryke, 2008). In the context of PPP Matos-
Castaño (2011, p.19) puts forward a definition of trust which includes fostering trust between 
the public and private sectors through the use of “standards and mechanisms implemented by 
government”. Specifically, they argue that the public sector can develop trust through the use 
of decision-making departments, guidance documents, a regulatory agency, dispute resolution 
mechanisms and cooperation platforms. The private sector can develop trust through the use 
of project monitoring and cooperation platforms. Verhoest et al. (2015, p.120) stipulate that 
trust is developed between the public and private sectors through the use of “clear regulations 
and standards, well defined roles of the public sector, and ex-ante evaluation”.  
However, Jooste et al. (2009) do not talk about trust but about balancing the interests 
of the various stakeholder groups: the public sector, the private sector and the civic sector. 
They suggest that there should be “give and take” between the various stakeholder groups, 
specifically, fairness in contract negotiations, regulation, preventing corruption and 
preventing opportunistic behaviour (Jooste et al., 2009, p.7). Overall they suggest that there 
should be trust between the various stakeholders involved in PPP and this will strengthen the 
sustainability of the policy (Jooste et al., 2009). 
In terms of building trust in PPP, the literature suggests that a complaints and 
arbitration process should be implemented (Matos-Castaño, 2011; Matos-Castaño et al., 
2012). By ensuring that there is fairness in PPP procurement (Matos-Castaño, 2011; Matos-
Castaño et al., 2014) and PPP programme accountability (Matos-Castaño et al., 2012; 
Verhoest et al., 2015) it is assumed that trust between the various stakeholder groups in PPP 
will be maximised. 
3.3.3 Patterns of PPP Adoption Framework 
Chapter 2 reviewed the literature on PPP and its adoption in Ireland. This chapter 
reviewed policy transfer theory and institutional theory to examine how patterns of PPP 
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adoption and aspects of institutional capacity building affect the sustainability of PPP. This 
has been combined to develop a framework to examine patterns of PPP adoption and Table 
3.2 outlines this framework. Based on the literature review, this framework proposes that the 
most sustainable PPP environment is associated with (1), voluntary policy transfer with strong 
institutional capacity building, where institutional environments and institutional capacity are 
changed and developed to meet the challenges arising from PPP procurement. This is 
followed by (2), coercive policy transfer and strong institutional capacity building; (3), 
voluntary policy transfer and weak institutional capacity building; and (4), coercive policy 
transfer and weak institutional capacity building.  
Table 3.2: Patterns of PPP Adoption Framework     
 
 































Voluntary (3) Voluntary PT & weak 
institutional capacity building 
(1) Voluntary PT & strong 
institutional capacity building 
Coercive (4) Coercive PT & weak 
institutional capacity building 
(2) Coercive PT & strong 
institutional capacity building 
(Sheppard and Beck, 2016) 
This research is proposing the combining of policy transfer theory and institutional 
theory to examine patterns of PPP adoption and this is in line with Yazan’s (2015) assertion 
that the combining of theories adds rigour to the research process. Chapter 4 will outline how 
this framework was applied in the pilot study. 
3.4 Research themes and questions 
In this research, policy transfer theory provides a means of exploring how PPP policy 
has come to be adopted in Ireland. It underpins research question 2: 
RQ 2: What is the extent of the influence of policy transfer on PPP adoption in 
Ireland? 
This establishes whether the policy transferred was conducted in a voluntary manner 
or a coercive manner. Policy transfer theory also provides a means of exploring whether 
lessons learnt have changed or enhanced the PPP policy in Ireland and whether this has led to 
more successful outcomes. There is a strong rationale for combining policy transfer and 
institutional theories (Radaelli, 2000) and this is the approach taken in this study.  




RQ 3: What is the extent to which institutional environments have been adapted to 
enable a sustainable PPP policy in Ireland?  
Jooste et al. (2009) propose a theoretical framework for the actions needed to ensure 
the sustainable implementation of PPP projects which builds on scholarly work of the 
UNECE (2008), the OECD (2008), Yescombe (2007), Aziz (2007), The Canadian Council for 
Public-Private Partnerships (2005), Kumaraswamy and Zhang (2001), Durchslag et al. (1994), 
Pongsiri (2002) and Li et al. (2005b). This framework gives an indication of the tasks for the 
successful development of a PPP program. The framework identifies 19 themes5 necessary to 
ensure the successful development of a PPP programme and groups them under the three 
main objectives of successful PPP implementation: building capacity, obtaining legitimacy 
and balancing interests (Jooste et al., 2009). By applying an adapted version of this 
framework to Ireland, it is hoped that this research will have explored the institutional 
environments arising within PPPs which lead to more sustainable and transparent PPP 
arrangements. It is not necessarily to examine policy success or failure but to explore if 
institutional environments have been changed to make PPP policy sustainable.  
A conceptual framework aims to guide a study’s design (Savin-Baden and Major, 
2010). Figure 3.1 provides a conceptual framework for this research which illustrates how, on 
examination of the literature, the researcher identified issues with PPP regarding the 
motivations for its adoption, a lack of transparency surrounding the policy, and how PPP 
success and sustainability are measured. An in-depth review of the literature identified gaps in 
the understanding and knowledge of the motivations for the continued use of PPP in Ireland 
post-financial crisis, a lack of understanding as to whether PPP was adopted on a voluntary or 
coercive basis, and whether this had changed over time. Combining policy transfer theory and 
institutional theory to develop the patterns of PPP adoption framework allows the research 
questions to be identified and provides a theoretical framework to examine these issues.  
  
                                                 
5 Increasing public awareness and understanding of PPPs; developing a market of private providers; providing 
government support for private providers; keeping line agency discretion in check; monitoring behaviour of 
private providers; increasing programme accountability; ensuring management support to public sector agencies 
on specific projects; ensuring the PPP projects promote the public interest; ensuring fairness of PPP 
procurement; improving environmental performance of projects; supportive legal framework; political 
commitment; buy-in from key constituents; good public sector knowledge of PPPs; a PPP unit; measures to 




Figure 3.1: Conceptual framework 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the literature on policy transfer theory and institutional 
theory in relation to PPP. Policy transfer theory has been examined using the Dolowitz and 
Marsh (2000) framework which provides conceptual underpinning for an exploration of PPP 
policy patterns in Ireland. Specifically, it is important whether the policy transferred has been 
conducted in a voluntary manner or a coercive manner. Policy transfer theory also provides a 
means of exploring whether lessons learnt have changed or enhanced PPP policy in Ireland 
and whether it has led to a more successful outcome.  
The theories examined in this chapter are used to structure the pilot study which is 
outlined in chapter 4 and the extended study, the results of which are outlined in chapters 5 
and 6. The next chapter  documents the methods used to conduct the pilot study and the 






Chapter 4 – Research Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to justify the research methodology in relation to the research 
questions stated earlier. Section 4.2 explores the research philosophy focusing on the 
ontological and epistemological positions. Section 4.3 discusses the design of the study and 
how the results of the pilot study informed the development of the extended study. Section 4.4 
discusses the application of the data analysis method used in the study. Finally, section 4.5 
explores questions of validity and reliability of research design and the approach taken to this 
in this study. 
4.2 Research Philosophy   
Researchers need to be aware of their assumptions about the nature of social reality 
and what it means to be human (ontology) (Morgan and Smircich, 1980), and the nature and 
purpose of knowledge (epistemology), that is, the general set of conventions about how best 
to inquire into the nature of the world (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). Only then should they 
decide which research methods might be suitable (Cunliffe, 2011). The relationship between 
data and theory has to be thought through to ensure the quality of research and research 
design (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). Specifically, researchers must examine their world view 
or “paradigm” in relation to research objectives and methodologies (Creswell 2013; Guba and 
Lincoln, 1994). 
 Epistemology relates to what constitutes knowledge (Quinlan et al., 2015). Accepting 
an epistemological stance usually leads the researcher to adopt methods that mirror their 
epistemological position (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). A research study usually adopts either 
a positivist or an interpretivist approach to epistemology. Positivism advocates that there is 
one objective reality or truth existing in the world (Bryman, 2008). It is based on the natural 
science model of dealing with facts and is more closely aligned to the quantitative method of 
analysis (Noor, 2008). Interpretivism has come about from writers opposing the application of 
natural science approaches to the study of social reality (Bryman, 2008). Interpretivism 
contends that social reality is a subjective construction based on interpretation and interaction 
(Quinlan et al., 2015) and requires the researcher to understand the subjective meaning of 
social action (Bryman, 2008), which usually involves a qualitative approach to research.  
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 Ontological assumptions are based on what is considered the nature of reality 
(Quinlan et al., 2015). The question is whether social entities can and should be considered 
objective entities (objectivism) that have a reality external to social players, or whether they 
can and should be considered social constructions (social constructionism) built up from the 
discernments and actions of social players (Bryman, 2008). Objectivism implies that social 
phenomena are a given, and that thus, are external to our research (Bryman, 2008), while 
social constructionism suggests that social phenomena are produced through social interaction 
and are continually changing (Bryman, 2008). Positivists argue that there is one true reality 
that is “apprehendable, identifiable and measurable” (Ponterotto, 2005, p.130), while 
interpretivists and social constructivists believe that there are many different realities 
influenced by the situation (Ponterotto, 2005) and each researcher interprets the work in their 
own way and thus construct their own realities (Quinlan et al., 2015). It is common in 
research that objectivism is associated with positivism and social constructionism with 
interpretivism (Bryman, 2008).  
Postpositivists, however, are dissatisfied with the positivist stance and believe that 
while there is a true reality, it “can only be apprehended and measured imperfectly” 
(Ponterotto, 2005, p.130). Positivism creates knowledge through the objective stance of a 
researcher collecting facts about the social world and arranging those facts to explain the 
social world (Noor, 2008). In contrast, with postpostivism, while they believe there is an 
objective reality the understanding of that reality is “socially constructed rather than 
objectively determined” (Noor, 2008, p.1602) and this is a position known as “critical 
realism” (Ponterotto, 2005, p.130) which is founded on the works of Roy Bhasker (1997).  
Realism is a philosophical position which encompasses naive realism and critical 
realism (Bryman, 2008). Naive realism assumes that the researcher’s conceptualisation of 
reality directly reflects that reality or is as close as can be to it (Bryman, 2008). Naive realists 
believe that there is a perfect correspondence, or as near as possible, between the reality they 
observe and the means by which they use to describe it. Critical realists, on the other hand, 
accept that the means by which they describe the reality they observe is provisional, imperfect 
and subject to change. Therefore, “critical realists recognize that there is distinction between 
the objects that are the focus of their inquiries and the terms they use to describe, account for, 
and understand them” (Bryman, 2008, p.15).  Critical realists also admit into their research 
theoretical entities which may not be immediately observable or apparent but which are 
accepted because their effects can be observed.  By making these entities, referred to by 
Bhaskar as “generative mechanisms”, explicit, critical realism affords the possibility of 
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changing or adapting them and thus altering the status quo (Bryman, 2008, p.15).  Critical 
realism assumes that to understand and change the social world, we need to identify the 
structures at work, and then by conceptualising them, we begin to understand that reality 
(Bryman, 2008). Critical realists accept that certain laws of behaviour have always existed, 
and that while we may not completely understand them, if certain events occur, they are 
brought into play. Therefore, by taking a course of action, we can change the course of events 
(Ryan and Scapens, 2002) 
If it is believed that research is intended to explore “the thoughts, feelings and beliefs 
about the phenomenon under investigation”, then a project can be developed under an 
interpretivist framework (Quinlan et al., 2015, p.62). In this case participants will respond to 
the research in a unique and individual way and will provide data which is “rich and 
descriptive” (Quinlan et al., 2015, p.63). As previously noted, qualitative research is often 
associated with an interpretivist approach (Bryman, 2008; Ponterotto, 2005). It can be 
associated with a postpositivist approach, particularly if the aim is to “describe and explore in-
depth phenomena” (Crossan, 2003, p.46). If the project aim is to establish the facts of some 
phenomenon, it may be suited to a positivist framework (Quinlan et al., 2015) where efforts 
are made to understand the social world objectively. As previously noted, quantitative 
research is often associated with a positivist approach (Bryman, 2008; Ponterotto, 2005).  
In this study, the epistemological approach taken is not purely positivist or 
interpretivist, which may be seen as a limitation. While a reality exists in that PPP is in 
operation in Ireland, the literature review in chapter 2 showed that its operation is flawed by 
aspects such as poor transparency and failure to demonstrate value for money (VFM). 
Furthermore, there is a gap in the literature explaining the motivations for the continued use 
of PPP post-financial crisis. It is not immediately obvious why PPP was adopted and why it 
has continued to be used in Ireland. As previously noted this study proposes to investigate this 
issue via research question one: 
RQ 1:What are the reasons for the adoption of the PPP policy and its continued use in 
Ireland? 
Research question two will examine how policy transfer has influenced the adoption 
of PPP adoption in Ireland using the framework put forward by Dolowitz and Marsh (1996 




RQ 2: What is the extent of the influence of policy transfer on PPP adoption in 
Ireland? 
A critical realist stance suggests that by understanding the forces at work in the introduction 
and operation of PPP in Ireland, whether observable of themselves or by their effects, a better 
understanding of the policy can be achieved and desirable change can be recommended to 
improve on the status quo (Bryman, 2008). This focus on effects is particularly important in 
relation to PPP in Ireland given that a full VFM of such projects is not possible because of 
financial information being commercially confidential.  If the observable performance can be 
objectively measured against an accepted framework, the forces at work can be made explicit, 
the performance of PPP can be evaluated and improvements, if any, can be recommended. 
The literature review in chapter 3 acknowledges the reality that PPP exists in Ireland. It also 
acknowledges that it is flawed. This brings about research question three:  
RQ 3: What is the extent to which institutional environments have been adapted to 
enable a sustainable PPP policy in Ireland? 
This question focuses on the extent to which institutional environments have been adapted to 
enable a sustainable PPP policy. The performance of PPP will be evaluated using a 
framework based on the Jooste, Levitt and Scott (2009) framework discussed in 3.4 Research 
themes and questions. 
4.3 Research Design 
Postpositivism accepts that reality can only be understood and “measured imperfectly” 
(Ponterotto, 2005, p.130) and the researcher’s goal is not to “gather facts and measure how 
often certain patterns occur but to appreciate the different constructions and meanings that 
people place on their experience” (Noor, 2008, p.1602). A postpositivist researcher may use 
semi-structured interviews adopting “raters” to attempt to identify a collective reality of 
interviewees’ experiences which may be based on identified themes (Ponterotto, 2005, p.130). 
Semi-structured interviews were used in this study and it was felt that this is the most suitable 
methodology to understand why PPP was adopted in Ireland and why it has continued to be 
used. Furthermore this data gathering approach helps examine issues related to the 
sustainability of PPP in Ireland via interviewees with experts from the public and private 
sector who are involved in PPP. 
 A qualitative research approach is considered appropriate in this study due to the 
nature of the research questions. Qualitative research focuses on describing and explaining 
people’s experiences, actions, exchanges, and social contexts (Strauss and Corbin, 1990) and 
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“developing understanding of the meaning and experience of human lives and their social 
worlds” (Fossey et al., 2002, p.730), and this reflects the type of research questions developed 
in chapters 2 and 3 in this study. A postpositivist approach is also being taken in this study 
and, as discussed in 4.2 Research Philosophy, postpositivism is suited to a qualitative 
perspective (Crossan, 2003). Although the research strategy influences the choice of research 
methods, the research questions of the study ultimately govern the research methods to be 
used, which include how data will be collected and analysed.   
Bryman (2008) writes that there five different types of recognised research design: 
experimental design, case study design, longitudinal design, comparative design, and cross-
sectional or survey design. Quinlan et al. (2015, p.145) add several additional 
“methodologies”6 to this list. They also suggest that researchers can learn from the 
methodologies of existing researchers. Policy transfer theory, outlined in chapter 3, is being 
utilised in this research. The predominant method of policy transfer analysis is case studies 
(Marsden and Stead, 2011) and most policy transfer studies have been “single-issue case 
studies” (Wolman and Page, 2002, p.477). The case study approach is therefore the approach 
adopted in this study and is further justified in the next section. 
4.3.1 Case study design 
Case studies are “a strategy of inquiry in which the researcher explores in depth a 
program, event, activity, process, or one or more individuals” (Creswell, 2013, p.135) for a 
defined period of time (Leedy and Ormond, 2005). A case study approach is useful for 
investigating “little known or poorly understood” situations and how “an individual or 
programme changes over time” as events or circumstances change (Creswell, 2007, p.135). 
Creswell (2007) writes that “a case study research method intends to survey how an issue is 
discovered through one or more cases within a bound” such as “a particular individual, 
limited programme or event” which is “deeply and thoroughly studied in a specific time 
period” (Tavallaei and Talib, 2010, p.574).   
Yazan (2015) outlines three different approaches to case study design developed by 
Yin (2002), Merriam (1998) and Stake (1995). Yazan (2015) analyses these approaches and 
outlines the differences between the three. An abstract of this analysis is summarised in Table 
4.1: 
                                                 
6 ethnography; action research; grounded theory; content analysis; discourse analysis; document analysis; 
historical analysis; life history; phenomenology; narrative analysis; semiotics, attitude research, image-based 




Table 4.1: Summary of differences between case study approaches 
 Yin (2002) Stake (1995) Merriam (1998)  
Epistemological 
commitments 




Case “a contemporary 
phenomenon within 
its real life context, 
especially when the 
boundaries between a 
phenomenon and 
context are not clear 
and the researcher has 
little control over the 
phenomenon and 
context” (Yin, 2002, 
p.13) 





which “has a 
boundary and working 
parts” and purposive 
(in social sciences and 
human services) 
(Stake, 1995, p.2) 
 
“a thing, a single 
entity, a unit around 
which there are 
boundaries” 
(Merriam, 1998, p.27) 
and it can be a person, 
a program, a group, a 
specific policy and so 
on.  
 
Designing a case 
study 
Design refers to “the 
logical sequence that 
connects the empirical 
data to a study's initial 
research questions 
and, ultimately, to its 




Flexible design which 
allows researchers to 
make major changes 
even after they 
proceed from design 
to research. 
Researchers need a set 
of two or three 
sharpened issue 
questions (research 
questions) that will 




(Stake, 1995, p.20).  
  
Exclusive use of 
qualitative data 
sources 
Literature review is an 
essential phase 





from literature review 
helps mould research 
questions and points 
of emphasis.  
 
Exclusive use of 
qualitative data 
sources 






physical artefacts  
Observation, 
interview and 






Source: Yazan, 2015, p.148. 
 
Yin’s (2002), Stake’s (1995) and Merriam’s (1998) approaches are all suitable for 
programme evaluation (Yazan, 2015), and as this study involves the evaluation of a 
programme, the PPP policy in Ireland, a case study approach is appropriate. While Yin (2002) 
postulates that case study research requires the “identification of a theoretical perspective at 
the beginning of the investigation” as it “affects the research questions, analysis and 
interpretation of findings” (Tavallaei and Talib, 2010, p.574), Stake (1995) allows a flexible 
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design which allows changes to be made as the research progresses from the design to the 
research gathering stage.  
The writer who most reflects this researcher’s description of a case is Merriam (1998) 
who describes it as being “a specific policy”, which in this research is the policy of PPP. 
Yin’s (2002) description of a case is much broader, being referred to as “a contemporary 
phenomenon”, as is Stake’s (1995) description of “a specific, a complex, functioning thing”. 
Merriam (1998) asserts that in designing a case study “the literature review is an essential 
phase contributing to theory development and research design”, and that “theoretical 
frameworks emerge from the literature review which help to shape research questions” 
(Yazan, 2015, p.148). In this study the theoretical frameworks evolved from the literature in 
chapter 3 and helped shape research questions 2 and 3, an approach which closely follows 
Merriam (1998). Merriam’s (1998) and Stake’s (1995) description of designing a case study 
makes use of qualitative data while Yin’s (2002) description utilises quantitative and 
qualitative data. This study utilises qualitative data in answering research question three. 
Yin’s (2002) epistemological position is positivist, Stake’s (1995) constructivist and 
existentialist, and Merriam’s (1998) constructivist. The researcher’s epistemological position 
in this study does not explicitly follow any of these writers as it is postpositivist based on a 
position of critical realism. Therefore, this researcher deems Merriam (1998) to be most 
closely aligned with the research in this study. 
The rationale for using a single case study approach in this research, meanwhile, arises 
from Yin (2013, p.14) who describes it as investigating a “contemporary phenomenon”. 
Merriam (1998) suggests that such phenomena can include as “a person, a programme, a 
group or, in the case of this research, a policy” (Yazan, 2015, p.148), and in this study the 
phenomenon under examination is obviously the PPP programme in Ireland. The focus of the 
research is on an evaluation of the sustainability of the PPP policy in Ireland, and three 
distinct points in time have been identified. These stages relate to punctuation points in the 
policy’s evolution where stage 1 PPPs (Pilot projects 1999 – 2002) involve the introduction of 
the policy through the development of pilot projects, stage 2 PPPs (Pre-crisis 2002 – 2008) 
involve the roll-out of this policy across different sectors until the financial crisis, and stage 3 
PPPs (Post-crisis 2012 onwards) involve the use of this policy to create jobs and stimulate the 
economy.  
It is important to recognise that a case study approach does have some limitations. 
Case studies have been criticised for their “lack of scientific rigour and reliability and that 
they do not address the issues of generalizability” (Noor, 2008, p.1603). However, they allow 
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the researcher to gain a rounded view of events or a phenomenon, particularly where the 
phenomenon under review is fast changing (Noor, 2008). 
The next section describes the decision to conduct an initial pilot study and how it was 
used to road test the extended study’s interview questions. It should be noted that the results 
of the pilot study were combined with a document analysis and informed the extended study.  
4.3.2 The Pilot Study 
A feasibility study is referred to as “small scale version[s], or trial run[s], done in 
preparation for the major study”, while, a pilot study can also be the pre-testing or “trying 
out” of a particular research instrument (Van Teijlingen and Hundley, 2001, p.1). One of the 
benefits of conducting a pilot study is that it can give “advance warning of where the main 
project could fail or methods proposed may not work” (Van Teijlingen and Hundley, 2001, 
p.1).  
The pilot study is usually carried out using a small number of respondents (Quinlan et 
al., 2015) and in this research the pilot study involved interviews with three participants. 
Participants were selected using purposive sampling which entails the researcher sampling on 
the basis of wanting to interview people who are relevant to the research questions (Bryman, 
2008). One interviewee was from the public sector (member of the Committee of Public 
Accounts), one was from the private sector (senior economist) and one form the civic sector 
(senior trade union official). Two of the interviews, with a senior member of the Committee 
of Public Accounts and a senior trade union official, were conducted face to face in 2013. 
Handwritten notes were made by the researcher at these interviews. It became apparent that 
the material gathered for the pilot study was of publishable standard but lacked input from the 
private sector. In late 2015 contact was made with a senior economist so had worked on PPP 
project financing in an investment bank on the PPP pilot projects. She was interviewed in 
January 2016 by telephone and this interview was digitally recorded with the consent of the 
interviewee. The interview tape was outsourced to be transcribed verbatim by a transcription 
service, with the consent of the interviewee. This interviewee appears as P1 on Table 4.2 in 
4.3.3 The Extended Study. However, her interview only informs the pilot study and not the 
extended study. The pilot study was published in 2016 (Sheppard and Beck, 2016), see 
Appendix S. 
The member of the Committee of Public Accounts was contacted after the researcher 
attended a number of meetings in 2012 and 2013. The trade union official was suggested as a 
potential interviewee by another member of the Committee of Public Accounts and the 
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economist was an acquaintance of the researcher. All interviewees gave verbal permission for 
the results of the interviews to be used as part of the pilot project. The benefit of carrying out 
this pilot study was that it allowed the researcher to test the research questions and to perfect 
her interview skills.  
During the pilot study interviewees were asked about nine of the themes identified on 
the Jooste et al. (2009) framework which proposes a theoretical framework for the actions 
needed to ensure the sustainable implementation of PPP projects (see 3.4 Research themes 
and questions). The pilot study interviews and the notes made during the interviews were 
triangulated with a document analysis of PPP policy documents in Ireland and the UK, 
transcripts from the Committee of Public Accounts, Comptroller and Auditor General reports 
(those of which were available up to the point of the pilot study and are included in Appendix 
B) and academic literature available at the time of the pilot study, thus ensuring that findings 
could be “cross-checked” (Bryman, 2008, p.700). This served the purpose of exploring the 
rationales for PPP policy-making, the results of which were plotted on the framework outlined 
in 3.3.3 Patterns of PPP Adoption Framework. 
4.3.2.1 Results of the pilot study   
The data generated during the pilot study was analysed using thematic analysis 
(described in 4.4 Data Analysis)and the results showed evidence of policy transfer in PPP and 
also evidence of institutional capacity building. These results are summarised in the following 
paragraphs. 
Pilot study: Evidence of Policy Transfer 
Ireland’s role as a late adopter of UK style PPP is evidenced by the nature of its policy 
guidelines (Sheppard, 2016). Irish guidelines produced to assist those engaged on PPP 
projects within the local government sector (Department of the Environment, Heritage and 
Local Government, November 2003) closely mirror the UK Green Book (HM Treasury, 
2003).  The Irish guidelines were produced in November 2003 and while the UK Green Book 
was also produced in 2003 there is no month of publication available. An assumption is 
therefore being made that as the Irish guidelines were produced late in the year that the UK 
Green Book was published first. 
The purpose of the UK Green Book was to provide guidance to promote efficient 
policy development and resource allocation across government. It is a best practice guide and 
aims to make the appraisal process more consistent and transparent. There are a number of 
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key points of similarity between the Irish report discussed above and the UK Green Book and 
are now summarised: 
(1) The use of guidance material: both documents discuss how guidance given in the 
reports will be useful to those working in PFI and PPP. The Green Book discusses 
how it should be useful “for anyone required to conduct a basic appraisal or evaluation 
of a policy, project or programme; and, people seeking to expand their knowledge in 
this area” (p.3).  The Irish report states that it “provides general guidance on how PPP 
projects are to be implemented by local authorities . . . goes through the various stages 
of the procurement cycle and details the conditions regarding the appraisal, approval, 
procurement, management and review of projects that must be met” (p.2).  
(2) Training:  both documents discuss training in PFI and PPP and how it will be available 
from government departments. The Green Book talks of guidance being available 
from “Departmental analysts, Public Services Delivery Analysis team in HM 
Treasury, and a variety of referenced sources  . . . Training on project and policy 
assessment is available from a range of sources, including the Civil Service College” 
(p.7). This can be compared with the Irish report which states that “the Department of 
Finance, put in place a PPP Training Framework which sets out the nature of the 
training required and encourages private companies to provide same” (p.22).  
(3) Expertise: both documents explain that expertise in PFI and PPP will be available 
from a government department. The Green Book states that “specialist advice can be 
sought from the procurement unit within a department or agency . . . or from 
Partnerships UK6 for PPP and PFI projects” (p.42). The Irish report speaks of “the 
proposed setting up of a central PPP unit within the Department of Finance which 
should ‘roll-out’ expertise to other Departments directly involved in the management 
of projects” (p.8).  
(4) Risk Transfer: both documents state that there should be optimal risk transfer. The 
Green Book notes that “risk should be allocated to whichever party from the public or 
private sector is best placed to manage it . . . the optimal allocation of risk, rather than 
maximising risk transfer, is the objective, and is vital to ensuring that the best solution 
is found” (p.83).  The Irish report states “PPPs should provide for optimal risk 
allocation between the public and private sectors” (p.8).  
(5) Public Sector Comparators: the UK Green Book describes this a public sector adjust 
cost which suggests that it is the cost of procurement through traditional means, which 
is similar to the Irish description of a public sector benchmark. The Green Book 
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describes this as a hypothetical risk-adjusted costing, by the public sector as a 
supplier, to an output specification produced as part of a PFI procurement exercise. 
The Irish report calls it the “Public Sector Benchmark” and describes the undertaking 
of it as “the estimated cost of carrying out the project by traditional means” (p.21). 
Similarities can also be seen between the announcements in Ireland and the reform 
measures of PF2 introduced in the UK by HM Treasury in December 2012. Among the UK 
reforms were accelerating delivery in order that the tendering phase of PF2 would be no 
longer than 18 months, the government would have discretion to make a contribution to the 
failed bid costs of shortlisted bidders, the PFI procurement process would be streamlined, and 
steps to be taken to reduce the amount of design work and resulting costs to be carried out. In 
Ireland similar measures were introduced to instil confidence such as reducing the timeframe 
from 21 months to 15 months for preparing PPP projects to the market through to contract 
award and the reimbursement of bid costs to unsuccessful bidders (Department of Public 
Expenditure and Reform, 2013). 
Similarities also exist between the C&AG’s Report on the Accounts of the Public 
Services (Comptroller and Auditor General, 2012) and a HM Treasury report (HM Treasury, 
2012). The C&AG report stated “Appropriate sharing of project risks is a requirement if PPP 
projects are to deliver value for money” (Comptroller and Auditor General, 2012, p.90). The 
UK took a similar approach (HM Treasury, 2012). It recommended a reform of the way risk 
allocation was handled. Under PF2, changes would be made to the risk allocation to improve 
value for money through the retention and management of certain risks by the public sector 
that were previously transferred under PFI. It is not clear whether either of these reports 
explicitly drew on the example of the other.  
The evidence of interviews carried out in the pilot study suggested that policy transfer 
was both voluntary and coercive to some degree. The decision to closely follow elements of 
the UK model was considered to be based on pragmatic considerations and as such voluntary 
as remarked upon by the senior member of the Committee of Public Accounts. This 
interviewee suggested, however, that assumptions borrowed from the UK were sometimes 
inaccurate and that the approach also raised issues of transparency. Noting this lack of 
transparency related to industry expectations of commercial confidentiality, the interviewee 
said this could be addressed by publishing outcome related cost figures only. This suggested 
that, while the decision to adopt UK-style PPP was largely voluntary, industry expectations 
created a coercive element with regard to the evaluation of the scheme.  
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 The senior trade union interviewee maintained that for local authorities, the adoption 
of PPP was largely coercive. He cited examples of water projects where direct public 
procurement would have been cheaper and deduced that the Department of the Environment 
was biased in favour of PPP. He felt commercial confidentiality was unjustifiably forced on 
the public by industry, since information is only commercially sensitive at the bidding stage, 
while post contract, the use of public money should mandate public disclosure. 
 The senior economist and bank representative, involved in PPP project finance 
highlighted that the initial adoption of PPPs had been largely voluntary and was difficult to 
explain on pragmatic or economic grounds, indicating that there had been potentially 
symbolic or legitimatory drivers. However, at the time of the interview in 2013, PPP adoption 
reflected the public sector’s restricted access to borrowing signifying that PPP adoption 
shifted from voluntary to coercive policy transfer. 
Pilot study: Evidence of Institutional Capacity Building 
Applying the Jooste et al. (2009) framework outlined in chapter 3 to the pilot study, 
this section focuses on institutional structures created by Ireland to support PPP procurement. 
The analysis focused on nine themes of the Jooste et al. (2009) themes: supportive legal 
framework, political commitment, buy-in from key constituents, good public sector 
knowledge of PPPs, a PPP unit, coordination of deal flow, programme transparency, and 
ensuring the quality of projects while implementing independent oversight.  
(1) Pilot study: Developing and applying a supportive legal framework  
In 2001 and 2002 Ireland passed acts to facilitate state participation in PPPs: the 
Transport (Railway Infrastructure) Act 2001; the State Authorities (Public Private Partnership 
Arrangements) Act 2002; and the National Development Finance Agency Act 2002. The last 
established the National Development Finance Agency (NDFA) which funds infrastructure 
through long-term debt and equity. The role of the NDFA was expanded through amending 
legislation which tasked it with establishing a Centre of Expertise for procuring PPP projects 
on behalf of State authorities. The NDFA was further authorised to provide contract 
management services for PPPs projects. Accordingly, at the time of the pilot study a 
consistent legal framework appeared to be in place to support the implementation of PPP.  
(2) Pilot study: Providing political commitment 
PPP was endorsed by the 1997 – 2002 government and PPP pilot projects were 
announced in 1999 (Connolly and Wall, 2009). The National Development Plan 2000 – 2006 
(NDP) confirmed the government’s commitment to PPP by highlighting its potential in 
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transport and environmental projects. This was abandoned with the financial crisis which put 
24 projects on hold (Reeve, 2013b).  
Following recommendations by the Irish Business and Employers Confederation 
(IBEC), the Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform announced a €2.25 billion domestic 
infrastructure stimulus programme in 2012 (Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, 
2012). Details were announced in 2013 regarding Phase 1 to be delivered through PPP, valued 
at €1.4 billion. The government also agreed €250 million in new PPP projects in the areas of 
schools, energy efficiency and roads.  
One motivation for this PPP programme was to create jobs and stimulate the economy. 
Moreover, the NDFA explained that it was using the PPP programme to keep borrowing “off 
balance sheet” (NDFA, 2013). This indicated that the relevance of PPP to Irish politics had 
changed significantly, with PPP no longer being a voluntary option and becoming a necessity 
in terms of maintaining adequate public investment. It also implied that political commitment 
had increased considerably from a stage where PPP was considered a fashionable approach to 
procurement which created an image of modernisation in line with UK policy, to one where 
PPP became the main (if not sole) option in dealing with capital spending shortfalls.  
 This view was confirmed by the senior economist who suggested that the PPP scene, 
at the time of the pilot study, was characterised by strong political commitment at all 
government levels as this was now seen as a tool for overcoming funding shortfalls. 
(3) Pilot study: Gaining buy-in from key constituents 
Buy-in from key constituents can be illustrated by a number of key submissions and 
reports supporting PPPs by organisations such as the Irish employers’ association (IBEC), the 
construction industry, advisory groups and, initially, trade unions and community groups. In 
January 1998, IBEC and the Construction Industry Federation (CIF) presented a report to 
government which argued for PPPs as a means of addressing the infrastructure deficit. The 
social partnership agreement, Programme for Prosperity and Fairness (Department of the 
Taoiseach, 2000) stated that PPP would contribute significantly to the implementation of the 
national development plan (NDP), drawing on the experience gained from then current PPP 
pilot projects. Mechanisms would be agreed by the relevant social partners to deliver efficient, 
transparent and fair contracts, tendering and contractual procedures for PPP procurement.  
In November 2001 a “Framework for Public Private Partnerships” (Public-Private 
Partnership Advisory Group, 2001) was launched involving an advisory group comprising 
representatives of IBEC, trade unions, the CIF and the main PPP agencies. The report 
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recognised the critical role of social partnership and stakeholder consultation, and initially 
trade unions favoured PPP. The unions interpreted the guidelines on PPP consultation as 
requiring detailed consultations on Procurement Assessment Reports (PAR), which consider 
different procurement alternatives in terms of economic, engineering and organisational 
aspects7. In the case of a replacement wastewater treatment plant, five round-table meetings 
took place where stakeholders raised questions and made changes to the PAR prior to its 2007 
submission to the Department of the Environment (Reeves, 2013a).  
In the case of another PAR of mid-2006, consultation was less cooperative and failed 
to facilitate agreement. In the case of a mixed tenure housing and urban regeneration PPP 
proposed as a design, build and finance, a plan unveiled by Dublin City Council in 2004 had 
no input from residents or community organisations. This plan was rejected and a period of 
negotiation was agreed. The council initially resisted having community representatives on 
the bid assessment panel but relented after a year. The economic crash resulted in this PPP 
project collapsing in 2008 (Reeves, 2013b).  
There appeared to have been buy-in to PPP by IBEC, the CIF and, initially, the 
unions. The trade union experience with the 2006 PAR and the experience in the development 
of mixed tenure housing indicate that, although Irish PPP may have been supported initially 
by efforts to gain buy-in from constituents, this has been less so at the time the pilot study was 
conducted. This was indicative of the increasingly coercive nature of Irish PPP at the time of 
the pilot study.  
(4) Pilot study: Improving public sector knowledge of PPPs 
In 1998 an interdepartmental group (IDG) explored the introduction of PPPs with a 
focus on roads. Farrell Grant Sparks Consultants reported to the IDG in July 1998. 
Discussions with the UK Treasury Task Force convinced the IDG to create a central PPP unit 
in 1999, as well as PPP units in the Departments of the Environment, Education and Public 
Enterprise (Connolly and Wall, 2009).    
 There was evidence of efforts to provide PPP-specific training and guidance to 
public sector staff. Also it appeared the IDG endeavoured to learn from the UK experiences, 
but it is unclear whether this was effectively communicated to key public sector managers. 
This view was echoed by the senior economist who noted there had been significant 
                                                 
7 Public Private Partnership – Stakeholder Consultation for Employees and their Representatives, January 2005. 
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opportunities for learning at specialised conferences with expert participation, which may 
have helped the ongoing learning by doing processes.  
(5) Pilot study: Establishing a PPP unit 
Founded in 2002, the NDFA can be considered to partially fulfil the functions of what 
can be described as a “dedicated PPP unit” (Burger, 2009, p.82). However, as in the UK, there 
was some initial dissatisfaction with the way this role was performed. In 2012, the UK HM 
Treasury called for a stronger government role where equity investment would be managed by 
“a commercially-focused central unit located in Treasury . . . managed by individuals with the 
appropriate professional skills to oversee the investment and make commercial decisions” 
(HM Treasury, 2012, p.7). IBEC’s call for the establishment of a “National Infrastructure 
Authority” with strategic policy responsibility for determining whether PPP is an adequate 
delivery mechanism indicates similar dissatisfaction with the existing arrangements in Ireland. 
This was mirrored by trade union calls for cross-departmental coordination of PPP activity 
(ICTU, 2011), which suggested that while Ireland has an organisation – the NDFA - it did not 
yet fulfil all the functions it ideally should pursue.  
(6) Pilot study: Coordinating deal flow 
At a PPP conference held in Dublin on 21 March 2013, the then Minister of State for 
Public Service Reform and the Office of Public Works, Mr Brian Hayes TD announced 
changes to PPP projects aimed at instilling confidence and maximising market participation. 
These were: reducing to 15 months the timeframe for preparing PPP projects to the market 
through to contract award, and reimbursing bid costs to unsuccessful bidders. The Minister 
also stated the PPP process would be streamlined, with less documentation and meetings and 
specimen designs drawn up prior to the bidding process (Hayes, 2013). This was confirmed 
by the senior economist who highlighted current measures to reduce the historically lengthy 
negotiation process which could require periods of two years and more for contract 
completion. 
There are similarities between the announcements in Ireland and the UK PF2 reform 
measures introduced by HM Treasury in December 2012. As mentioned before the UK 
reforms reduced the tendering phase of PF2, allowed the government to subsidise bid costs, 
and reduced the amount of design work to be carried out for bids (HM Treasury, 2012). 
Similarly, the UK expected the pipeline of PFI deals to stimulate national and local 
economies (National Audit Office, 2010), while Ireland’s domestic infrastructure stimulus 
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package of July 2012 envisioned €1.4 billion to be delivered through PPP (Department of 
Public Expenditure and Reform, 2012). 
Both Ireland and the UK took measures to increase the PPP deal flow post the 2008 
crisis. This highlighted the vulnerability of the PPP industry to economic shocks and indicated 
that neither Ireland nor the UK had a structured national infrastructure policy. The senior 
economist noted it was difficult initially to attract international companies and create 
sufficient market interest for scalability reasons but, at the time of the pilot study, the 
government was addressing this issue by creating a pipeline of PPP projects. The similarities 
of policy responses indicate the lasting legacy of policy transfer between the two countries.  
(7) Pilot study: Improving programme transparency 
Policies aimed at improving the transparency of the PPP process in Ireland have been 
rife with contradictions. The Report on the Accounts of the Public Services 2011 published by 
the C&AG recommended that “evaluations of the value for money expected to be achieved 
through procurement of projects by means of PPP should be published” and stated  “… a PPP 
cannot proceed unless it is found likely to deliver better value than traditional procurement” 
yet “few value for money reviews of PPP projects have been published” (Comptroller and 
Auditor General, 2012, p.79-80). The report noted that the NDFA had carried out value for 
money testing on the third schools bundle project, but the results of the final deal had not been 
disclosed as they could compromise negotiations. The Chief Executive of the National Roads 
Authority (NRA) reported to the Committee of Public Accounts in 2013 that he could not 
“reveal the individual consortia’s precise commercially sensitive information” on the M3 PPP 
motorway project (Committee of Public Account, 2013, p.15).  
There have been few value for money reviews of PPPs in Ireland yet other 
jurisdictions make such information available. At the time of conducting the pilot study there 
was a strong indication that although value for money assessments are given central 
importance by the Irish government, full evaluation was not taking place. The senior member 
of the Committee of Public Accounts stated that the Department of Public Expenditure and 
Reform should mandate how to measure value for money. Similarly, the senior trade union 
interviewee said there is no empirical evidence in the public domain that a PPP is better value 
for money. At the time of the pilot study it was concluded that as evaluations of these 
assessments were not in the public domain because of commercial sensitivity issues, neither 
Ireland nor the UK fully met the requirement for sustainability.  
(8) Pilot study: Ensuring the quality of projects 
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The decision to implement PPPs in Ireland followed the publication of the 1998 
Farrell Grant Sparks report which listed the benefits as a focus on service outcomes rather 
than the assets, optimum risk allocation, and value for money. These expectations were not 
fully confirmed by later reports. As discussed in 2.3.3 Oversight of PPPs by the Comptroller 
and Auditor General and the Committee of Public Accounts, the C&AG’s value for money 
report (No. 48) on the Grouped Schools Pilot Partnership Project initially commented 
positively on this first PPP pilot project. However, in light of the recognition that the analysis 
contained errors subsequent analysis suggested that PPP was between 13% and 19% more 
expensive than conventional procurement, with relatively little risk transfer to the private 
sector. The C&AG concluded that it was too early for a comprehensive comparison of the 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness of the school PPPs (Comptroller and Auditor General, 
2004, p.11). Also mentioned in this section was that the Department of the Environment 
preferred PPP in the water services sector and decided to proceed with PPP procurement even 
though the estimates worked in favour of traditional procurement (Reeves, 2013a). Despite 
problems, there was evidence of some success, as exemplified by a post-project review of the 
Criminal Courts of Justice PPP where a 2008 C&AG report verified 6% lower costs for the 
PPP (Irish Business and Employers' Confederation, 2011).  
On risk transfer and the quality of PPP projects in Ireland, the senior economist noted 
that the small population of the country meant road projects in particular continued to suffer 
from poor estimates of demand risk, with the government frequently accepting all of the 
downside risks without benefiting from potential upside risks. The literature supports this 
when discussing the implementation of a dedicated formal risk framework not “guaranteeing 
effective patterns of risk assessment and management” (Asenova et al., 2007, p.290). At the 
time of the pilot study there was mixed evidence of value for money and risk transfer being 
achieved, with some projects performing within or above expectations and others being 
problematic.  
(9) Pilot study: Implementing independent oversight of project development and 
execution 
At the time of the pilot study it was noted that regulatory oversight of Irish PPPs was 
problematic. Responsibility for water services and water/wastewater PPPs transferred to the 
state-owned utility Irish Water in 2014. The C&AG does not audit the accounts of 
commercial state companies and subsidiaries. The Commission for Regulation of Utilities has 
responsibility for regulating water and reviewing Irish Water’s underlying costs of provision 
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of water and wastewater services8. Whether this will involve the publication of information on 
PPPs is unclear.  
As statutory financial adviser the NDFA, has responsibility for the procurement of 
PPPs in sectors other than transport, local authorities and the direct procurement of certain 
education projects (Comptroller and Auditor General, 2013). It performs its functions through 
the National Treasury Management Agency, and, while its fees and expenses are audited by 
the C&AG, the auditor does not oversee procurement decisions nor publish performance 
monitoring results of the NDFA.  
At the time of the pilot study this suggested a high degree of fragmentation in the 
regulatory oversight of Irish PPP.  
4.3.2.2 Conclusions from the pilot study 
The pilot study examined the impact of adoption patterns on the sustainability of PPP 
in post-crisis Ireland. The findings suggested that policy transfer was initially largely 
voluntary, although specific elements of implementation, such as limits on transparency on 
account of commercial sensitivity, were perceived as coercive by the study interviewees. This 
coercive element was largely attributed to industry expectations which had developed within 
the UK PFI market. For the pre-crisis period, government announcements seem to indicate 
that PPP was seen as a means of catching up with modern procurement methods as practised 
in other English-speaking countries such as the UK, where ministers were keen to introduce 
what they saw as innovative, entrepreneurial business values into public services (Weaver, 
2003). Ireland’s 2003 PPP policy framework closely mirrored the earlier UK Green Book. 
The pilot project suggested that PPP ceased to be a voluntary option, being instead perceived 
as an economic necessity. This seems to have given rise to the accelerated development of a 
supportive legal framework and enabling measures.  
Regarding the nine factors, there was evidence of the development of a supportive and 
comprehensive legal framework that is widely utilised as well as strong political commitment 
by government. This also applies to improvements in public sector PPP skills which benefited 
from the establishment of the central PPP policy unit in 1999 and the creation of the NDFA.  
More mixed results were observed in the efforts to gain buy-in from key constituents. 
Buy-in seems to have been fairly broad in the early stages, with support being articulated by 
the employers’ association, industry bodies and trade unions. By the mid to late 2000s this 




had partially eroded, with trade unions and community groups voicing concerns over 
inadequate consultation. 
Another problem was the coordination of deal flow. Both Ireland and the UK suffered 
from delays in contract awards and financial closure, haphazard bidding processes (resulting 
in high costs and losses to bidders) and uneven demand. Efforts were made to address this in 
Ireland in 2013, with measures aimed at instilling confidence and maximising market 
participation in PPP following the UK’s PF2 reform package.  
The pilot study found that the lack of frameworks for ensuring PPP quality appeared 
to be the most significant institutional barrier to the sustainability of Irish PPP. This concerns 
objective and systematic value for money evaluations of existing and future deals, which were 
hampered by fragmentation and a lack of detailed cost and return data which allegedly arises 
from the commercial confidentiality needs of private sector interviewees. Uncertainty about 
risk allocation between partners and the costing of risk transfer seemed to affect adversely the 
accuracy and reliability of value for money calculation.  
The pilot study highlighted major difficulties in the sustainability of Irish PPPs arising 
from lack of transparency and poor oversight. Documentary evidence, literature evidence and 
interviews highlighted problems in obtaining financial data on operating costs and profits 
which would allow for a thorough assessment of existing and future projects. The results of 
the pilot study when plotted onto the “Patterns of PPP Adoption Framework” (see 3.3.3 
Patterns of PPP Adoption Framework) suggested that Ireland exhibited somewhere between 
quadrant (3), voluntary policy transfer and weak institutional capacity building; and quadrant 
(4), coercive policy transfer and weak institutional capacity building, the least sustainable PPP 
environments. Although, the evidence base of the pilot study was limited, as only three 
interviewees were involved in the study, it strongly suggested the value of a further 
examination of the sustainability of PPP in Ireland. The results of the pilot study accordingly 
informed the extended study and are referred to in chapters 5 and 6, the data analysis chapters.  
4.3.3 The Extended Study 
In 2016, the initial study was extended further to include more interviewees from the 
public sector, the private sector and the civic sector. This allowed for flexibility in 
approaching different respondents while still covering the 19 themes of the Jooste et al. 
(2009) framework9. Interviews allow the researcher to “generate deeply contextual, nuanced 
                                                 
9 Increasing public awareness and understanding of PPPs; developing a market of private providers; providing 
government support for private providers; keeping line agency discretion in check; monitoring behaviour of 
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and authentic accounts of participant’s outer and inner worlds, that is, their experiences and 
how they interpret them” (Schultze and Avital, 2011, p.1). In this research additional semi-
structured interviews were conducted which allowed the researcher to ask open-ended 
questions. This enabled interviewees to allow the direction of the interview to go to areas of 
importance to them and this is in line with the recommendations of Quinlan et al. (2015). 
Semi-structured interviews allow the researcher to compile a list of questions or topics which 
help to guide the interviewer through the interview but still allows the interviewee scope to 
answer as they would like (Bryman, 2008). They also allow the interviewer to pick up on 
topics mentioned by the interviewee which allows a great deal of flexibility (Bryman, 2008). 
However, a limitation to this approach is that there is a possibility  
In this study the interview questions were based on the themes in the Jooste et al. 
(2009) framework which had proven themselves as highly relevant in the pilot study. Nine of 
these themes were used to develop the questions in the pilot study, and after the remainder of 
the questions were developed, a set of interview questions were prepared which were 
appropriate to the public sector and adapted for the civic sector (see Appendix C). A further 
set of questions were developed which were appropriate to the private sector (see Appendix 
D). Questions were grouped under topic headings and this was in line with Bryman’s (2008) 
recommendations that interview questions be formulated in a topic order to enable them to 
flow well. The interview questions for the extended study were piloted with two members of 
the public sector with an interest in the private sector involvement in public services. This 
process was aimed at identifying ambiguities, helping to clarify the wording of questions and 
permitting early detection of necessary additions or omissions. These interviews were not 
recorded and only notes pertaining to improving the questions or clarifying wording were 
taken. The discussion arising from these two interviews were not included in the extended 
study.  
As the interview process continued, the researcher became more experienced in asking 
questions and relied less on the interview questions and instead introduced the themes laid 
down by the Jooste et al. (2009) framework as a means of opening up the conversation on 
PPP in Ireland. Bryman (2008) discusses the limitations of interviewing and states that the 
interviewer may ask leading questions. In this research, care was taken to avoid asking 
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on specific projects; ensuring the PPP projects promote the public interest; ensuring fairness of PPP 
procurement; improving environmental performance of projects; supportive legal framework; political 
commitment; buy-in from key constituents; good public sector knowledge of PPPs; a PPP unit; measures to 




leading questions during the interview process. This ensured a level of reliability and 
consistency of interview questions across all interviews. Arsel (2017) discusses another 
limitation of interviewing and writes that some interviewees may feel marginalised or in a 
lower power position than the interviewer and this may deter them from freely talking. In this 
research, care was taken to reassure interviewees that their identities would be anonymised 
and any quotes used could not be traced back to them. 
Participants were selected using purposive sampling and attendance at PPP 
conferences in 2013, 2015 and 2016 which involved public and private sector PPP actors 
enabled a database of potential interviewees to be developed. A limitation of interviewing is 
that the researcher may interview only certain people of “high status” (Myers and Newman, 
2007, p.5). Rigour was introduced into the interview process in this research by ensuring that 
a representative sample of a wide range of PPP participants from the public sector and private 
sector were approached. However, due to time constraints, only a limited number of civic 
sector participants could be approached. All potential interviewees were sent an email which 
included an outline and a statement of the purpose of the research, including the 19 themes 
upon which interview questions were based and a copy of the consent form. Some emails 
were followed up with telephone calls. Bryman (2008) recommends that interviews take place 
in a quiet setting and in this study most interviewees agreed to be interviewed at their place of 
work which was a quiet office. However, the interview with P11 took place in a hotel and 
with P15 in his work restaurant, both venues were quiet and there was no background noise 
interference on the recordings. Twenty four interviewees were interviewed for the extended 
study and data was collected through other correspondence such as emails and telephone 
conversations (see Table 4.2). Twenty three of these interviewees agreed to be digitally 
recorded. P23 declined to be digitally taped and it was decided not to use their data in this 
study. The notes made at this interview were subsequently destroyed. This is discussed further 
in the data analysis section (see 4.4.1 Data analysis used in this research study). Field notes 
were kept in the form of jotted notes after each interview. These assist in jogging the 
researcher’s memory about events, impressions and feelings to provide a rich understanding 
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After the interviews were completed interviewees were sent an email thanking them 
for their participation and they were also sent a scanned copy of the signed consent form for 
their records. At the request of one interviewee, a senior public servant involved in PPP 
decision-making (P8), a copy of the interview transcript and use of their quotes in the data 
analysis was sent to them in March 2018 for approval. This was granted by this interviewee in 
April 2018. 
Interviewees were asked if could they recommend other individuals who should be 
approached, and in some cases they helped initiate contact. This “snowball sampling” effect 
(Bryman, 2008, p.184) ensured a wide range of key PPP actors were identified and 
approached. Interviewees were assured of the confidentiality and anonymity of their 
interviews and all names and other identifying information were removed. Interviewees were 
given an identifying code consisting of “P” for participant and a unique number before being 
transcribed. Interviews lasted between 1 hour and 1.5 hours and were outsourced to be 
transcribed verbatim by a transcription service. This was performed by the same person for 
consistency and amendments were made as appropriate. The transcripts of interviews were 
compared with the interview recordings to check for accuracy and consistency. Interviewing 
ceased after a saturation point was reached when no new insights were being generated. 
Interview data generated was stored safely on a secure network. 
During the extended study a more in-depth document analysis than had taken place 
with the pilot study was carried out. Documents and literature which were included in the 
pilot study were reviewed again for more in-depth insight and were augmented with further 
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documents and also more recent literature. Appendix B lists the documents used in the 
extended study. This triangulation of data sources gave “valid insight” (Quinlan et al., 2015, 
p.162) into PPP in Ireland as it allowed the cross-checking of facts, figures and dates given by 
interviewees against an original sources.  
4.4 Data Analysis 
The analysis of interview data utilised thematic analysis which has its origin in content 
analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2016; Joffe, 2011). No particular individual or groups can claim 
to have developed thematic analysis which is unlike other qualitative approaches (Braun and 
Clarke, 2016) and there are now a number of sets of procedures for and approaches to 
thematic analysis, for example, Boyatzis (1998), Guest et al. (2011), Joffe (2011) and Braun 
and Clarke (2006). 
 Thematic analysis is particularly useful explaining the specific nature of a group’s 
conceptualisation of the phenomenon under study (Joffe, 2011) and it allows for “identifying, 
analysing and reporting patterns or themes within the data” (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p.79) 
which can provide a rich and detailed account of the data (Vaismoradi et al., 2013). This 
method of data analysis has been used by previous policy studies such as Brady and Curtin 
(2012) and O’Dolan and Rye (2012) and was deemed appropriate by this researcher. 
Thematic analysis can “be flexibly applied within any of the major ontological, 
epistemological and theoretical frameworks underpinning qualitative research” from “from 
realism … to social constructionism” (Braun and Clarke, 2016, p.87). This study has adopted 
a critical realist approach and as it fits in with Braun and Clark’s (2016) definition just 
mentioned, it was decided that the data generated in this study would be analysed using 
thematic analysis in line with Braun and Clarke (2006).  
Thematic analysis can be used “both inductively and deductively” (Braun and Clarke, 
2016, p.89) and the combination of a deductive and inductive approach has been described as 
central to contemporary qualitative research (Joffe, 2011). Pure induction is not possible 
because qualitative analysis is always guided by the researcher’s philosophical standpoint and 
analysis can be deductive in “the sense that existing theories and concepts provide a lens 
through which to read and interpret the data” (Bruan and Clarke, 2016, p.89). 
Thematic analysis does have limitations or “pitfalls” that the researcher needs to avoid 
(Braun and Clarke, 2006, p.94). First, the researcher can fail to actually analyse the data at all. 
Second, the researcher can fail to carry out analytical work to identify themes or “make sense 
of the patterning of responses”. Third, the research can make a “weak or unconvincing 
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analysis” (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p.94). This can be avoided by rigorous coding to identify 
if themes are more “data-driven” or “theory-driven” (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p.83). If the 
process of coding data is about trying to fit it into a coding frame, this is a form of inductive 
analysis and is said to be data-driven. If the process of coding data is driven by the 
researcher’s theoretical interest, the coding is thought to be more theory-driven. Researchers 
can code for a specific research question or a research question “can evolve through the 
coding process” (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p.84). There is little point in conducting qualitative 
work if one does not want to draw on naturally occurring themes evident in the data (Joffe, 
2011), and in this research, deductive elements based on the themes outlined in the Jooste et 
al. (2009) framework were utilised while more natural themes were also allowed to present 
themselves from the data. This allowed a comparison in the writing up stage with previous 
findings to highlight results that did not match up with previous findings. 
 A large amount of data was generated during the extended study and Nvivo 11 
software was used to organise the data for data analysis purposes. Nvivo software was 
developed in 1999 and was called NUD*IST. Nvivo is a qualitative data analysis software 
package that allows researchers to store and retrieve qualitative data (Bazeley, 2009). It 
allows the researcher systematically to analyse data of all forms through the use of a database. 
This introduces rigour into the data analysis exercise and allows the researcher to search the 
data, run queries and reports and examine relationships. There is precedence in using Nvivo in 
policy studies where interviews were used to gather data (Brady and Curtin, 2012; Burke and 
Demirag, 2015). There is criticism, however, of using software to analyse data as it creates a 
barrier between the researcher and the data and limits their ability to manipulate the data. The 
researcher may overly rely on the software to analyse the data and fail to interpret the data in 
a meaningful way, thereby failing to introduce rigour into the analysis process (Jackson et al., 
2018). By using a robust method of data analysis such as thematic analysis in conjunction 
with Nvivo software, the researcher in this study followed steps laid down by Braun and 
Clarke which are visible and supported by an audit trail, thus introducing rigour into the 
analysis process. 
In line with Braun and Clarke (2006), phase one of thematic analysis is to focus on 
gaining familiarity with the data. This involves reviewing interview transcripts and checking 
them against recordings for errors and omissions and making any necessary corrections. The 
researcher may have expectations about codes they may wish to develop particularly if they 
have collected the data themselves. However, looking for codes without being familiar with 
the data may lead to “analytic leaps being made prematurely” (Terry, 2016, p.106). Instead 
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the researcher should familiarise themselves with the data continually before coding (Terry, 
2016) and make notes of elements of interest while beginning to think about wider 
implications and assumptions and what they may mean (Braun and Clarke, 2016). 
Phase two of thematic analysis involves generating initial codes. Most analyses 
contain elements of both semantic and latent coding (Braun and Clarke, 2016). In thematic 
analysis, the coding of interviews involves a simultaneous examination of the semantic and 
latent levels of meaning. At the semantic level, the researcher codes what the interviewees 
were saying, and at the latent level, a search for implicit ideas is conducted while interpreting 
what the interviewees are saying. In practical terms, the process of coding requires the 
researcher to tag each segment of data with a code as he or she sequentially works through the 
data set. Every time something of interest is identified in the data, the researcher decides 
whether to use an existing code or to create a new one (Braun and Clarke, 2016). 
Phase three of thematic analysis involves searching for themes. A code relates to “a 
very specific aspect of the data while a theme identifies a general patterning of meaning” 
(Braun and Clark, 2016 p.93). The researcher will detach from the detail of the data and will 
try to identify patterns in the data (Braun and Clarke, 2016). 
Phase four involves a review of potential themes “in relation to codes and the data 
extracts associated with them and exploring whether the themes work in relation to the entire 
data set” (Terry, 2016, p.112). At this stage some themes may be rejected, divided into two, 
combined, further refined or a mixture of all of these (Braun and Clarke, 2016). It is important 
to that the themes are a suitable fit with the data and that they ultimately answer the research 
question (Braun and Clarke, 2016). 
Phase five involves defining and naming themes. This assists in helping the researcher 
to write “an analytic narrative” around the data extracts to inform the reader what the 
researcher believes is taking place in the data (Braun and Clarke, 2016, p.97). Data extracts 
which provide “clear, compelling and vivid illustrations” of the issue or point that is being 
demonstrated should be used (Braun and Clarke, 2016, p.97). At this point theme names are 
finally decided upon and theme definitions may also be provided (Braun and Clarke, 2016). 
Phase six of the data analysis focuses on producing the written report. Notes and 
extracts from interviews are combined to demonstrate the themes which is produces an 
argument to answers the research question (Braun and Clarke, 2016).  
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4.4.1 Data analysis used in this research study 
In line with phase one of thematic analysis, familiarity with the data in this study was 
gained by checking interview transcripts against recordings for errors and omissions and 
correcting where necessary. After this phase was completed, an interview folder was created 
in Nvivo which included imported interview transcripts. Folders were also created for 
literature and key policy documents, Dáil Éireann committee transcripts and reports, 
government department reports, Comptroller and Auditor General reports, business and union 
reports and UK PFI documents (see Appendix B) purely to allow for the easy retrieval of such 
documents as the analysis progressed.  
Phase two of thematic analysis involved generating initial codes. Coding depends on 
whether the themes are more  “data-driven” or  “theory-driven” (Braun and Clarke, 2006, 
p.88). As the data was approached with “specific questions in mind” (Braun and Clarke, 2006, 
p.89), based on the Jooste et al. (2009) framework and the findings of the pilot project, the 
work was largely theory driven and a thematic structure was kept in mind. Appendix E shows 
the generation of initial codes extracted from Nvivo. During phase two 513 initial codes were 
developed by deconstructing the data from its original chronology into a set of non-
hierarchical codes. The coding of interviews involved a simultaneous examination of the 
semantic and latent levels of meaning. At the semantic level, coding centred on what the 
interviewees were saying. At the latent level, a search for implicit ideas was conducted while 
interpreting what the interviewees were saying. A description was assigned to each code to 
ensure that the code remained consistent throughout the analysis. 
Phase three of thematic analysis involved searching for themes. This begins when all 
of the data has been coded and then continues with sorting codes into potential themes by 
trying to identify patterns in the data (Braun and Clark, 2006). As discussed earlier the Jooste 
et al. (2009) framework and the findings of the pilot project were kept in mind in this phase 
and the 513 codes generated in phase two were mapped to 21 categories of codes outlined in 
Appendix F.  
Phase four involved a review of potential themes by breaking down the now 
reorganised categories into sub-themes to better understand their meaning.  Here the 21 
categories of codes were examined and, in line with existing literature discussed in 3.3.2 
Measuring PPP success and sustainability, were grouped under the sub-themes: legitimacy, 
trust, capacity and others. Appendix G shows how the data analysis involved the grouping of 
categories of codes into sub-themes.  
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Some sub-categories such as transparency, fairness of PPP procurement, the National 
Development Finance Agency (NDFA) and the performance of PPPs were categorised under 
different sub-themes in the literature, so a decision was made to place these broader themes 
under main themes based on the content of the interviews. This occurred with “transparency” 
and the “NDFA” which was placed under “Legitimacy”, “coordinate deal flow” and 
“performance of PPP” were placed under “Capacity” and “fairness of PPP” was placed under 
“Trust” (see further detail in Appendix H). For example, in the literature Matos-Castaño 
(2011) categorise “transparency” under the theme of trust but Matos-Castaño et al. (2012), 
Jooste et al. (2009), Matos-Castaño et al. (2014) and Verhoest et al. (2015) categorise it under 
the theme of legitimacy (see Appendix H). However, interviewees spoke of transparency 
surrounding the decision to go down the PPP route, transparency of the bidding process, 
transparency issues surrounding publication of PPP contract information and transparency of 
PPP reviews and benchmarking. These issues increase or reduce the level of legitimacy given 
to PPPs. If there is a weakness in transparency, it creates a culture of suspicion and 
uncertainty (House of Lords, 2010), and legitimacy will suffer. This point is examined in 
5.3.2.1 Transparency. Therefore, it was decided to put transparency under the broader theme 
of legitimacy. A similar approach was adopted with the other sub-themes discussed above.  
Phase five involved defining and naming themes to conceptually mapping and 
collapsing categories into a broader thematic framework outlined in Appendix I. At this point 
the four sub-themes and their categories of codes were defined, renamed and numbered into 
three main themes: legitimacy, trust and capacity. For example, under the theme of 
Legitimacy there were six categories of codes (see Appendix G): transparency, regulatory 
framework, NDFA, Political commitment, Stakeholders and Types of projects. The NDFA 
was defined and numbered as 5.3.1 Lead Institutional Support; Regulatory Framework, 
Transparency and Political Commitment were defined and numbered as 5.3.2 Political 
support; Stakeholders was defined and numbered as 5.3.3 Stakeholder consent and Types of 
Projects were defined and numbered as 5.3.4 Project portfolio. This was repeated for Theme 2 
Capacity and Theme 3 Trust. Priority in the coding structure was given to themes in no 
particular order. However, as Theme 1 Legitimacy and Theme 2 Capacity were larger in terms 
of text blocks these come before Theme 3 Trust in the coding structure. This approach is in 
line with the interview data driven structure of the PhD. The sub-theme called “others” did 
not answer the research questions at this stage so a decision was made not to use it further in 
the data analysis. 
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It should be noted that there is an overlapping of themes and this runs throughout the 
data analysis in chapters 5 and 6. For example, in 5.3.1 Lead Institutional Support, there is a 
discussion of the role of the NDFA as a market driver and how initiatives were brought in to 
support the market as a reaction to the financial crisis. This overlaps with 6.2.1 Methods to 
encourage market demand, which further analyses the effect on the market of these initiatives. 
This proves to strengthen the overall analysis of the study as it allows results to be cross-
referenced. This occurs regularly in the data analysis and is signposted to the reader.  
The theme of Trust was an issue of concern for the researcher as it only yielded three 
broader themes: 6.3.1 PPP programme accountability, 6.3.2 Fairness of PPP procurement 
and 6.3.3 Complaints and arbitration. The reason for this could be down to the methodology 
used in this study. Jooste et al. (2009) suggest that trust is of importance to the “civic sector” 
which they define as those who have local interests at heart such as the users of the assets, 
local residents, taxpayers and civic organisations. The extended study did include interviews 
with trade unions but with no other “civic sector” groups and the main focus was on 
interviews with the public sector and private sector (see 5.3.3 Stakeholder consent).  
In Appendix I it can be seen that Theme 3 Trust had only 366 blocks of text attached 
to it while Theme 1 Legitimacy had 3527 and Theme 2 Capacity had 3615. As a result, the 
main focus of the research was on Theme 1 Legitimacy and Theme 2 Capacity. For ease of 
analysis Theme 3 Trust was added on to the data analysis in chapter 6 and does not have a 
dedicated chapter.  
Appendix I also refers to the 27 data sources used in the data analysis. These include: 
• One interview (P1) with a private sector interviewee which was included in the pilot 
study only 
• Twenty three interviews carried out with interviewees which were initially included in 
the data analysis (P2 to P24). The data gathered from one of these interviewees (P23, 
2016) was not used. This interviewee did not want to record the interview, they had a 
minute-taker in the room and they wanted editorial control over the use of their data. 
Their data did not add any further information to the study so, for expediency, it was 
decided to leave them out of the analysis. 
• An email from an interviewee who was later interviewed and with the interview being 
included in the twenty three interviews discussed above (P9, 2016) 
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• Written notes from a telephone conversation with an interviewee who was later 
interviewed, with interview data again being included in the twenty three interviews 
discussed above (P15, 2016) 
• An email received form an interviewee which was not used in the data analysis 
Phase six of the data analysis centres on producing the written report by “weaving 
together all your analytic notes and extracts you have selected to illustrate the themes into an 
argument that answers the research question” (Terry, 2016, p.115). In this study, analytical 
memos were used to conduct a systematic review of the thematic framework developed in 
phase five to analyse, report and ask questions of data. Memos were used to reduce the data 
from a series of nodes, otherwise known as codes, to a series of documents explaining the 
outcomes of the analysis of the nodes. Appendix J is an example of an analytical memo used 
to summarise the findings of notes and extracts from interviews under 6.2.2 Policy learning. 
This was combined with the relevant literature to illustrate the themes and produce an 
argument that answers the research question. Appendix K is an example of an annotation 
made during phase six which recorded the researcher’s thoughts during the data analysis 
process. 
As discussed in 4.3.1 Case study design, the focus of the research is on the evaluation 
of the sustainability of the PPP policy in Ireland, and three distinct points in time have been 
identified: 
• Stage 1 (Pilot projects 1999 – 2002); 
• Stage 2 (Pre-crisis 2003 – 2008); and  
• Stage 3 (Post-crisis 2012 onwards) 
In chapters 5 and 6 the stage which the interviewee is referring to is discussed where 
relevant.  
4.5 Validity and reliability of the research design 
Issues of validity and reliability are considered differently in qualitative and 
quantitative research (Quinlan et al., 2015). The terms have a different analytical meaning but 
they are related to each other as reliability is presumed for validity. If a measure is not 
reliable, it cannot be valid (Bryman, 2008). In a positivist approach to research, which is 
largely quantitative, findings are measurable. In contrast, with postpostivism, which is suited 
to a qualitative perspective, reality is subjective, it has multiple layers and is constructed by 
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individuals (Crossan, 2003), which can make it difficult to measure. Many researchers, 
therefore, believe that the terms “validity” and “reliability” do not fit well into qualitative 
research as they suggest measures which are quantifiable (Bryman, 2008). However, the terms 
validity and reliability have been adapted for use in qualitative research (Bryman, 2008). 
Some writers use the term “rigour” as an alternative to “validity”, and the terms “credibility, 
dependability, confirmability and transferability” are commonly used to measure rigour in 
qualitative studies (Vaismoradi et al., 2013, p.403). Other writers use alternatives to validity 
and reliability such as trustworthiness (consisting of credibility, transferability, dependability 
and confirmability) and authenticity to evaluate qualitative research (Guba and Lincoln, 
1994).  
In this research, efforts were made to introduce rigour at all stages throughout the 
research process. Rigour, for example, was introduced by ensuring that the research was 
traceable through the use of an audit trail kept of research decisions made during the process. 
Detailed records were made of the selection of interviewees, and field notes were kept during 
the interview process to record the reflections of the researcher. Interview tapes were 
uploaded onto a secure network and each given a unique code to ensure the anonymity of 
interviewees. This coding protocol was carried through from the interview tapes to the 
transcripts of interviews and the uploading of the same into Nvivo to ensure a complete audit 
trail of the data. Data analysis decisions were noted and decisions made were recorded 
through the different phases completed during the Nvivo stage and the write-up stage. 
Thematic analysis was used to give a balanced view of the data rather than attaching too much 
importance to the frequency with which codes occur in the data. 
The credibility of findings were checked by presenting at conferences (see Appendix 
R) and through the publication of findings from the pilot project as a chapter in an edited 
book on international PPPs (see Sheppard, 2016) and in a peer-reviewed journal (see 
Sheppard and Beck, 2016) (see Appendix S). Transferability was bolstered through the 
combining of theories which adds rigour to the research process (Yazan, 2015), as well as by 
building a theoretical framework based on the established theories of policy transfer theory 
and institutional theory. Multiple layers of inquiry into the sustainability of PPP were 
explored using the themes laid down in the Jooste et al. (2009) framework.  
An extensive understanding of PPP policy was attained by interviewing multiple 
stakeholders from the public and private sectors, who hold different positions within these 
sectors and who are also from different PPP sectors. This added rigour by ensuring that the 
results of the research were confirmable. During the data analysis stage the development of 
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themes was supported by excerpts from data to ensure that data interpretation remained linked 
to the words of the interviewees, thus ensuring interpretative rigour. This helped to safeguard 
that the researcher was objective and acted in good faith in the interpretation of the data. 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter provided a detailed description and justification of the research 
methodology adopted in this study to answer the research questions. First, the research 
philosophy underpinning the design of the project was discussed. The design of the study was 
then explained, as was how the results of the pilot study informed the development of the 
extended study. Then the application of the data analysis method used in the study was 
mapped out. Finally, the question of research validity and reliability was discussed and the 
approach used in this study was described. The research methodology chosen in this chapter is 




Chapter 5 – Theme 1: Legitimacy 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 5 demonstrates the research methods applied in this study and their outcomes 
using the method of data analysis outlined in chapter 4. The data collected during the 
extended study was analysed in line with the institutional theory and policy transfer theory 
which underpin this study. As discussed in chapter 4 the thematic analysis of this study 
focuses on generating data on themes of legitimacy, capacity and trust. Chapter 5 concentrates 
on examining theme 1, the legitimacy of PPP and its contribution to the sustainability of this 
policy. Theme 2 Capacity and Theme 3 Trust are analysed in chapter 6. 
The analysis evaluates data gathered from the extended study in relation to policy 
transfer theory, which was outlined in detail in the literature review of chapter 3. Accordingly, 
policy transfer can increase the effectiveness of government operations (Marsh and Sharman, 
2009) and help organisations gain legitimacy (Connolly et al., 2009). Research has found that 
cross-national policy transfer is not necessarily “rational, mechanical or automatic” as policy-
makers operate within “bounded” contexts due to poor resources, unclear objectives and weak 
understanding of “imported policies” (Dolowitz and Medearis, 2009, p.686). This has led to 
the introduction of further refinements where policy transfer has been described as voluntary 
or coercive (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996). As regards coercive policy transfer, the literature 
distinguishes direct and indirect coercive forces (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996). Research has 
found that a country can be indirectly pushed towards policy transfer if political actors 
perceive it as falling behind neighbours or competitors (Keating et al., 2012). It has also been 
found that, where there are similarities in policy between countries explained by policy 
transfer, there may also be policy learning (Keating et al., 2012). Overall, the literature on 
policy transfer tends to be “process oriented, focusing on how, when, and why adopters use 
diffused information rather than on networks or patterns of diffusion” (Mossberger and 
Wolman, 2003, p.429). The Dolowitz and Marsh (1996 and 2000) framework reflects this 
process focus and elements of it has been used in this research to analyse PPP policy transfer 
in Ireland.  
The analysis also relies on institutional theory in the analysis of data gathered from the 
extended study with institutional theory, which was outlined in chapter 3. Institutional theory 
assumes that pressure to conform to a set of expectations is exerted by external and internal 
influences. When external and internal expectations are successfully negotiated, an 
organisation gains legitimacy and is able to “secure access to resources” and ultimately 
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ensuring its long-term survival (Brignall and Modell 2000, p.288). In this context it has been 
argued that organisational structure, policies and procedures stem from social expectations 
and “myth” about what is socially and economically acceptable, such as private sector 
efficiency (Khadaroo, 2005, p.72), which are rationalised and gain legitimacy (Brignall and 
Modall, 2000; Dimaggio and Powell, 1983).  
In the context of PPP institutional theory suggests that more sustainable PPPs were 
ones where the government understood the complexity of PPP and where institutional 
capacity was built. Following this lead, this research builds on institutional theory to examine 
the legitimacy, capacity and trust of PPP in order to evaluate whether institutional capacity 
has been created around Irish PPPs. This will in turn ensure the sustainability of this policy, 
which is in line with a similar framework proposed by Matos-Castaño et al. (2012) and Jooste 
et al. (2009). Specifically, this study utilises the Jooste, Levitt and Scott (2009) theoretical 
framework for the actions needed to ensure the sustainable implementation of PPP. This 
framework is particularly helpful as it gives an indication of the tasks for the successful 
development of a PPP programme. The framework identifies 19 themes10 to describe 
prerequisites for the successful development of a PPP programme and groups them under the 
three main objectives of a successful PPP implementation: building capacity, obtaining 
legitimacy and balancing interests. However, other researches use the term trust instead of 
balancing interests (Matos-Castaño et al., 2012; Verhoest et al., 2015) which indicates that 
these classifications are to some degree fluid. 
5.2 Data analysis 
Chapter 4 outlines the data analysis approach taken in this research. Thematic analysis 
in line with Braun and Clarke (2006) is utilised in conjunction with Nvivo software. The steps 
taken in analysing the data are outlined in 4.4.1 Data analysis used in this research study. 
This chapter continues with section 5.3 which is devoted to the analysis of Theme 1 
Legitimacy. This is sub-divided into 5.3.1 Lead Institutional Support, 5.3.2 Political support, 
5.3.3 Stakeholder consent and 5.3.4 Project portfolio. 
                                                 
10 Increasing public awareness and understanding of PPPs; developing a market of private providers; providing 
government support for private providers; keeping line agency discretion in check; monitoring behaviour of 
private providers; increasing programme accountability; ensuring management support to public sector agencies 
on specific projects; ensuring the PPP projects promote the public interest; ensuring fairness of PPP 
procurement; improving environmental performance of projects; supportive legal framework; political 
commitment; buy-in from key constituents; good public sector knowledge of PPPs; a PPP unit; measures to 




5.3 Theme 1 Legitimacy 
Appendix I shows the thematic framework which is reflected in Table 5.1. This table 
shows how the theme 5.3.2 Political support was further analysed and this will be explained 
in that section. Theme 1 Legitimacy is analysed in the remainder of this chapter. Appendix L 
shows the process carried out in Nvivo of conceptually mapping codes to categories to themes 
for Theme 1 Legitimacy. The order of analysis is based on the number of text blocks identified 
against each sub-theme in the data analysis. The number of text blocks does not necessarily 
reflect the importance of the theme. 
Table 5.1: Theme 1 Legitimacy 
Name Number of text 
blocks 
Number of text 
blocks 
5.3 Theme 1 Legitimacy:  3527 
5.3.1 Lead institutional support  990 
5.3.2 Political support:  
 
- 5.3.2.1 Transparency 441  
- 5.3.2.2 Legal and regulatory framework 285  
- 5.3.2.3 Political commitment 226 952 
5.3.3 Stakeholder consent  413 
5.3.4 Project portfolio  1172 
 
5.3.1 Lead Institutional Support examines the role of the PPP unit in providing 
support for PPP, provided by the NDFA in Ireland. In 5.3.2 Political support is analysed in 
terms of the transparency of PPP, the legal and regulatory framework and political 
commitment to PPP. In 5.3.3 Stakeholder consent focuses on stakeholder participation and 
consultation in PPP and 5.3.4 Project portfolio examines whether there is an active portfolio 
of projects. In numbering these sections no particular priority was given to where they lie in 
the coding structure. However, this sequence reflects the theoretical framework of 
institutionalisation discussed earlier. 
5.3.1 Lead Institutional Support 
Chapter 3 examined the literature on institutional theory and noted that, in the context 
of PPP, the more sustainable PPPs were ones where governments understand the complexity 
of PPP and where institutional supports are built. The literature suggests that the role of the 
lead institutional support, also known as a PPP supporting unit or simply a PPP unit, is a 
prime means of creating institutional support. Matos-Castaño (2011) asserts that the existence 
of a PPP unit will increase the legitimacy of PPP by supporting a belief in the benefits and 
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value for money that private sector involvement will bring, in line with the projects 
procurement being transparent and consistent. 
The PPP units are usually established by governments within existing ministries 
(Matos-Castaño, 2011) or within a national treasury department (Burger, 2009). The  unit is a 
point of coordination, quality control, accountability and an information provider, it can be 
more active in some environments where it plays a direct role in managing PPP procurement 
and management, whereas in other PPP units it will only be an adviser (Matos-Castaño, 
2011). It will also monitor and judge the affordability of a project and act as a regulatory body 
(Burger, 2009). Van den Hulk et al. (2016) describe an expanded role for PPP units which 
includes launching, supporting and evaluating PPP projects, providing guidelines and 
coordinating PPP activity across government departments.  
In Ireland the National Development Finance Agency (NDFA) is situated within the 
National Treasury Management Agency (NTMA) and can be considered as a “dedicated PPP 
unit” as defined by Burger (2009, p.82). The findings of the pilot study outlined in chapter 4 
indicated there were demands for the NDFA to take responsibility for PPP policy and a call 
for cross-departmental coordination of PPP activity. This indicated that the NDFA only 
partially fulfilled the functions of a PPP unit (Sheppard and Beck, 2016). However, when the 
pilot study was extended in 2016, this research found that the role of the Lead Institutional 
Support, the NDFA, was more involved than that had been suggested, initially by the 
literature.  
A number of roles of the NDFA were identified during the main data analysis process 
within the Lead Institutional Support theme and these are outlined in Figure 5.1. This section 
focuses on their contribution to the legitimacy of PPP in Ireland. Some of the roles of the 
NDFA were already suggested by the literature, namely, adviser and expert, decision-maker, 
policy developer, promoter of policy, regulatory body and leader. Other roles described by the 
literature have been found to evolve during the interview analysis. For example, the NDFA’s 
role of disseminator of knowledge, market consultant, and project driver has evolved to a 
market driver, and another role that of leader diminished in importance from originally stated 
in the literature, to supporter. The research also identifies a new role of the Lead Institutional 
Support as a bureaucracy. The analysis of 5.3.1 Lead Institutional Support: Roles of the 
NDFA is summarised in Figure 5.1. 
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Figure 5.1: Lead Institutional Support: Roles of the NDFA
 
Figure 5.1 shows the varying degrees of the NDFA’s involvement in each of the roles 
identified during the data analysis. For example, during the data analysis it became apparent 
that the NDFA exhibits a strong role as adviser and expert, promoter of policy and also as a 
PPP bureaucracy. However, it was also noted that it exhibits a mixed role as decision-maker, 
policy developer, regulatory and supporter of PPP. Its role as a market driver meanwhile is 
weak. Figure 5.1 visualises these patterns in graphic form with a view towards drawing the 
readers eye to the key issues identified in the data analysis. This approach is also deployed in 
5.3.2 Political support, 6.2.1 Methods to encourage market demand, 6.2.2 Policy learning, 
6.2.3 Public sector expertise, 6.2.4 Quality of projects and an overall summary of the 
sustainability of PPP in Ireland. However, in other areas of the data analysis such as 5.3.3 
Stakeholder consent a different form of visual representation is employed in order to 
accommodate the nature of that data. In 5.3.4 Project portfolio, 6.2.5 Coordination of deal 
flow, 6.2.6 Performance of PPP, 6.3.1 PPP programme accountability, 6.3.2 Fairness of PPP 
procurement and 6.3.3 Complaints and arbitration no visual representation is used as a 
written description is sufficient to represent key findings for the data analysis.  
In the context of 5.3.1 Lead Institutional Support it is worth briefly examining the 
origins, organisational structure and staff structure of the NDFA. The National Development 
Finance Agency Act 2002 created the NDFA originally as an agency that reported to the 
Minister for Finance as the statutory financial adviser on capital projects in excess of €20 
million. The agency is under the umbrella of the National Treasury Management Agency 
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(NTMA)11 and it is divided into a Finance and Operations section and a Project Management 
section, as outlined in Figure 5.2. 
Figure 5.2: Organisational Structure of the NDFA
Source: 
https://www.ndfa.ie/about/organisation-structure 
The role of the NDFA was expanded with the National Development Finance agency 
(Amendment) Act 2007. This extended the functions of the NDFA to allow it to establish a 
Centre of Expertise for procuring PPP projects on behalf of State authorities. Through this 
legislation, the NDFA was allocated a new procurement function, giving the Agency the 
power to enter into PPP contracts with a view to transferring them to the relevant State 
authority, or to act as agents for State authorities in relation to PPP procurement.  
The remit of the NDFA was again extended in September 2012 to allow it to provide 
contract management services in respect of PPP projects (National Development Finance 
Agency, 2012, p.9). Where contract management services are provided by the NDFA, the 
contracting authority generally retains responsibility for certain activities, such as approval 
and payment of invoices, approval of changes to the project agreement, issuing warning or 
termination notices to the PPP company, determination of benchmarking and market testing 
of “testable” services, and approval of changes to the ownership structure of the PPP company 
(Comptroller and Auditor General, 2013, p.132). This was at the request of the Department of 
Education and Skills as there were resources issues there and it was viewed that the NDFA 
had the necessary expertise and skills to manage PPP projects (Comptroller and Auditor 
General, 2013, p.132). 




Verhoest et al. (2015) apply scores to 20 European countries, using a PPP 
Governmental Support Index (GSI) which uses a variety of indicators to measure the presence 
or absence of PPP supporting arrangements. One of these indicators measures the size of the 
PPP unit and awards the highest score to those that have 20 or more staff. The NDFA has 
more than 60 staff working in the organisation12, an indication on the PPP GSI of 
governmental institutional support for PPP. The European PPP Expertise Centre (EPEC) 
noted that the NDFA has no difficulty in recruiting staff with PPP expertise (2014). 
The NDFA will be merging with Transport Infrastructure Ireland (TII), at a  date 
which is unknown at the time of writing. The TII carries out its own procurement of PPPs but 
uses the NDFA as financial adviser.  
In the extended study conducted in 2016, concern was expressed by interviewees that 
merging the NDFA and TII may weaken the legitimacy of both agencies. For example, a 
public sector interviewee who is working on a stage 3 PPP project said: 
 I’d have serious concerns about that because they are going to separate the 
financial from the project management and really you can’t, the two things go 
hand in hand  (P5, 2016) 
Aziz (2007, p.926) states that it is essential that a PPP unit has knowledgeable staff 
who are “responsible for policy development, dissemination of PPP knowledge, and 
implementation of PPPs”. The NDFA provides expertise and advice in the areas of PPP 
delivery and non-PPP delivery. The extended study indicated that a strength of the NDFA is 
its staff, as interviewees note in the following paragraphs.  
The mobility of staff within agencies and the hiring in of additional expertise is seen 
by interviewees as strengthening the role of the NDFA. The senior public sector interviewee 
involved in PPP decision-making said that staff move within the NTMA (P8, 2016) and the 
public sector interviewee working on an Education project explained that expertise is 
supplemented by the hiring of consultants where needed (P5, 2016). 
There is also mobility of staff between the NDFA and the private sector, as explained 
by an interviewee who formerly worked with the NDFA:  
NDFA staff all come from … banks and places … between private sector, 
public sector entities (P4, 2016) 
Both interviewees from the public and private sectors saw mobility between the public 
and private sector as useful. It was seen by both sectors as allowing learning to take place 




across projects. This was explained by a senior public sector interviewee involved in PPP 
decisions as follows: 
 you’ll see some of those people are leaving NDFA now and moving out into 
the private sector, they’ll recruit others from the private sector, I think that’s 
not a bad thing because I think if there’s a constant flow of people you get 
people who have been closer to the market. If people are always in the NDFA 
they kind of get, become a bit removed from what’s actually happening out 
there so it’s probably not a bad thing if people move in and out  (P8, 2016) 
This was corroborated by a public sector interviewee who previously worked in the 
private sector who emphasised that there is staff movement, but not at the director or senior 
level (P14, 2016). 
This mobility of staff between the private sector and the NDFA is also seen as a 
benefit by the private sector, as discussed by a private sector interviewee working on Primary 
Care projects: 
 When people have crossed the board it’s much easier because they understand 
the constraints, we understand theirs as well, we know that there’s policies and 
there’s certain political things that they need to be out for, that some things 
may not sound logical but that’s the way it has to be and it worked I think  
(P18, 2016) 
However, mobility of staff between the private and public sectors does lead to 
questions on how the public sector benchmark (PSB) and sensitive information held within 
the NDFA is protected when staff move. The PSB is a single monetary value that represents 
the full estimated cost, taking income and risks into account, of delivering projects using 
traditional public sector procurement. It is meant to ensure a like for like comparison of  
traditional procurement with the PPP method of procurement (Department of Education, 
2018). 
Concerns were voiced by a public sector interviewee who previously worked in the 
private sector, (s)he drew a question mark over how the PSB is protected if there is movement 
of staff between the private sector and the NDFA: 
 If people move great … the more fluidity of movement you have the better, 
now how they protect … the public sector benchmark … is a separate story for 
another day  (P14, 2016) 
At senior governmental level there also seems to be uncertainty as to how the PSB is 
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protected when staff leave the NDFA. The senior public sector interviewee involved in PPP 
decision-making stated:  
I presume there must be clauses in contracts, gardening leave and all that kind 
of stuff (P8, 2016) 
Using the data analysis method outlined in chapter 4, it was found that the NDFA was 
referred to most by interviewees involved in Justice, Education and Primary Care, the busiest 
PPP sectors. It is interesting that the NDFA was most spoken about by stage 2 and 3 PPP 
interviewees and least spoken about by stage 1 PPP interviewees. The probable reason for this 
is that even though the NDFA was launched in 2002 on a non-statutory basis (P4, 2016), and 
it only became a centre of expertise for procuring PPP in 2007 when its powers were 
expanded, which corresponds with stage 2 and 3 PPPs.  
The literature suggests that having institutional capacity in the form of  strong lead 
institutional support will contribute to the legitimacy of PPP. This research identifies the 
expected roles of the NDFA outlined in the literature such as adviser and expert, policy 
developer, regulatory body, decision-maker, promoter of policy, leader and disseminator of 
knowledge. However, the research also highlights a role that has evolved beyond the existing 
literature, that is, the role of disseminator of knowledge which has evolved to that of a market 
driver. The expected role of leader seems to deviate from the literature in that it has evolved 
into that of a supporter. The research also identifies a new role of the PPP unit as a 
bureaucracy. The following analysis will discuss the relatively greater complexity of the role 
of the NDFA as compared to that attributed to PPP units in the literature.  
NDFA as a PPP adviser and expert 
Burger (2009) asserts that the role of the PPP unit is to create a centre of knowledge 
and expertise that can provide advice and assistance to individual departments. Jooste (2010) 
extends the role to provide technical advice and support for projects. Van den Hulk et al. 
(2016) further extend this role to assert that the PPP unit should play a role in policy guidance 
and policy evaluation. 
The extended study found that interviewees indeed saw the NDFA as a centre of 
knowledge and expertise and that it acts as a procuring adviser, financial and technical adviser 
to government departments and that it manages contracts over their life. For example, the role 
of the NDFA was described by a public sector interviewee working on Justice projects: 
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 they will explain what’s behind everything and … advise us as to what their 
view is because that’s part of their role, but we approve it or not as the case 
may be (P2, 2016) 
The general consensus among the interviewees was that the NDFA is the expert in 
PPP. One private sector interviewee involved in Education projects made the point that if the 
NDFA did not exist, then the private sector would have to deal with individual departments, 
leading to a more fragmented approach (P12, 2016). The senior public sector interviewee 
involved in PPP decision-making supported this point: 
 the NDFA obviously are the common factor with all of them … they are in all 
of the PPPs, so what they learn on one they can apply on the other ones as well 
(P8, 2016) 
However, there were negative views regarding the NDFA from a PPP consultant who 
has worked on stage 1 and 2 PPP projects in Ireland. Ireland was viewed as needing a centre 
of excellence and they felt that the NDFA was not providing it (P6, 2016). It should be noted 
that the role of the NDFA, as discussed earlier, was extended in 2012 which corresponds to 
stage 3 PPPs and this interviewee only worked on stage 1 and 2. A private sector interviewee 
involved in bidding on the Grangegorman project, one of Europe’s largest tertiary education 
PPPs, and who has worked on stage 1, 2 and 3 PPPs was also critical of the NDFA:  
they’ve just bitten off too much in trying to set up what the process should be 
(P19, 2017) 
The NDFA does not have a role in the final decision. It is purely an adviser. This was 
emphasised by a senior public sector interviewee involved in PPP decision making:  
NDFA are advising them all along but the Departments are the ones that have 
to make the decisions (P8, 2016) 
Burger (2009) states that the role of the PPP unit is to create a centre of knowledge 
and expertise, a role which has a positive effect on legitimacy. Despite some negativity 
towards the NDFA, the organisation does appear to play a strong role as a PPP adviser and 
expert and therefore contributes to the legitimacy of PPP. However, if taken in the context of 
the findings of 5.3.2.1 Transparency where a lack of transparency surrounding the NDFA’s 
value for money testing of projects is identified, it is clear that the true role of adviser and 
expert cannot be investigated. 
NDFA as a decision-maker 
Burger (2009) contests that a PPP unit should monitor and judge the affordability of a 
project, as would be the case in other countries. For example, in South Africa, the role of the 
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PPP unit is to protect the government against irresponsible commitments made by sponsoring 
departments (Dewulf et al., 2011).  
Decisions regarding whether to proceed with PPP involve the calculation of value for 
money tests. The NDFA carries out these tests, and as part of this, is involved in the 
calculation of the PSB.  
However, the affordability of PPPs is a matter for the procuring body, not the NDFA 
(Farrell Grant Sparks et al., 1998). The NDFA advises as to the likely success of a project 
procured through PPP and whether there is a market for it, but the decision is made by the 
sponsoring departments and the government. The NDFA does not decide on how much of a 
project or how many projects should be procured through PPP (Sean Burgess, NDFA, PAC, 
13 December 2012). This pattern is in conflict with the role of the PPP unit suggested by 
Burger (2009).  
The extended study found that within government departments there is confusion as to 
the exact role of the NDFA in the decision-making process. For example, the public sector 
interviewee involved in Justice projects explained that the NDFA had an involvement in the 
decision to proceed with the building and refurbishment of Garda stations through PPP:   
 the NDFA assessment is that they are not suitable for PPP (P7, 2016) When asked 
about this the senior public sector interviewee involved in PPP decision-making said:  
That’s still in the plan … it remains to be firmed up because the final decision 
on exactly the composition of it is a matter for the Minister for Justice (P8, 
2016) 
The NDFA’s preparation of value for money assessments, which are included in the 
calculation of the PSB, are very misunderstood notions amongst the interviewees participating 
in this study. There is confusion about the makeup of the value for money assessments and 
concern of overestimation. Individual government departments prepare business cases to 
justify the building of new infrastructure. These business cases contain a mix of projects and a 
mix of procurement methods. The NDFA then carries out a value for money assessment of 
projects. A private sector interviewee involved in stage 2 and 3 PPP projects and currently 




 I think the NDFA is probably instrumental in looking at a value for money 
options for how you procure … they have to put forward business cases … to 
give a clear view as to what the value for money solution is procuring  (P11, 
2016) 
However, this was purely a private sector view. A public sector interviewee involved 
in the Primary Care projects discussed the significance of their role in the decision-making 
process and the less significant role of the NDFA: 
 there are key value for money tests that have to be done all the way along the 
line…the NDFA do the tests but I guess we produce all the information  (P22, 
2016) 
The NDFA’s lack of a role in decision-making was discussed by interviewees in the 
context of what happens if the project fails the value for money test. For example, a public 
sector interviewee working on Primary Care projects said: 
 it hasn’t happened but my understanding is in accordance with what’s in the 
PPP guidelines that if the project fails the value for money test it then goes 
beyond the level of the project board it goes up and ultimately it’s the Minister 
who decides whether or not the project proceeds or not as the case may be 
(P22, 2016) 
Ultimately, the NDFA does not have the authority to allow a project to proceed. A 
senior public sector interviewee involved in PPP decision-making emphasised that there was 
some discretion, with decisions ultimately resting with the Minister:  
it’s not pass/fail, certainly the new guidance will be very clear that it’s not a 
pass/fail and it was never intended to be pass/fail, but it is a value for money 
test …then it’s a matter for the sanctioning authority to decide, what do they 
do…the Department … and the Minister (P8, 2016) 
This role contrasts with the UK equivalent of a PPP unit, as a private sector 
interviewee working on Primary Care projects and has worked on UK PFI said:  
in the UK they do the options appraisal and they have to prove the value for 
money, is always the route that they’re taking is best value for money (P18, 
2016) 
However, for the UK the research has shown that this seeming rigour has encouraged 
manipulation of these calculations (Scottish Parliament Finance Committee, 2008). 
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Interviewees raised issues with the PSB, which is prepared by the NDFA. The PSB, 
despite its importance in the overall value for money tests, appears to be only a notional test 
that is carried out and which quickly goes out of date. For example, the interviewee working 
on Primary Care projects said: 
 do your initial PSB test [it] could be two or three years before you’re actually 
getting your tenders in … The market might have changed quite significantly 
(P22, 2016) 
This also raises the question as to how, or if the methodology, behind the value for 
money tests has evolved. It would appear that the methodology was updated in 2006, as 
confirmed by the senior public sector interviewee involved in PPP decision making: 
 [there] were interim guidelines that would have been introduced around 2000 
or early 2000s and then those guides, they were updated in 2006 and I think 
that was the last time they were formally updated (P8, 2016) 
However, the methodology does not appear to have evolved since then. This is 
significant considering the financial crisis that occurred in the intervening time along with the 
market evolving. 
 
Mistakes can also occur in the calculation of the PSB, suggesting that there may be 
problems with the overall methodology behind the PSB. When asked about the PSB and value 
for money tests, the senior public sector interviewee involved in PPP decision-making 
advised that mistakes occur that need to be corrected and the NDFA is involved in this 
process. This interviewee confirmed that: 
 there’d been an underestimation in the PSB…we were satisfied that there had 
been a mistake in it…that was very unusual and it’s not the kind of thing we’d 
normally like to see happen…It was something to do with the calculations on 
one of the elements of the project … something had been left out when they 
were doing it or they’d been using out of date information or something…it 
was allowed to go ahead but as I say, it’s not a pass/fail test (P8, 2016) 
However, other interviewees remain sceptical about the PSB calculation, and the lack 
of transparency surrounding it fuels speculation about it. For example, a public sector 
interviewee currently working on Justice projects who has worked on pre and post-crisis 
projects said:  
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The PSB – is it real? The PSB is moved around by the NDFA to suit their 
purposes (P15, 2016) 
This interviewee told a story that in a meeting with the NDFA: 
 they come in and tell me, oh we’ve met the benchmark…but you moved it… 
yes but it was appropriate to move it in this occasion…no we’ve looked at the 
whole detail and the one we were looking at was too simple of an example, we 
needed to look at a more complicated example and we reckon that would add 
an extra 20% so we’ve added that to the baseline figure and that’s what it gives 
us and we’re just below that… for instance they would have got costs from us 
for different courthouses so they did an update of them…But then the figures 
would be adjusted, as they say, in the process of saying, we’ve updated them 
and the level of complexity was different  (P15, 2016)  
Previous research has highlighted that there is a lack of public disclosure around the 
PSB and value for money testing in Ireland (Caperchione et al., 2017), and the 
aforementioned conflict between the various actors in PPP serves to emphasise the lack of 
transparency surrounding how decisions are made to procure through PPP. Ultimately, the 
decision to procure through PPP is not a pass/fail decision and the Minister has the power to 
make the final decision. Burger (2009) states that the PPP unit should monitor and judge the 
affordability of a project which is a decision-making role. If this is done properly, the role of 
the PPP unit as a decision-maker has a positive effect on the legitimacy of PPP.  
However, it seems that the NDFA does not have the power to make such decisions. 
Also, the lack of transparency would suggest that existing practices of the NDFA in assessing 
value for money and preparing the PSB do not encourage a rigorous and critical application of 
value for money criterial to PPP procurement. Overall, the NDFA seems to occupy a weak 
role as a decision-maker and therefore seems unlikely to contribute to the perceived 
legitimacy of PPP.  
NDFA as a policy developer 
Jooste et al. (2009) assert that the role of the PPP unit is to develop PPP policy. The 
NDFA is an adviser and its role encompasses that of finance, operations and project 
management as well as an implementor PPP policy. EPEC states that the NDFA has “medium 
priority activity” when it comes to policy (2014, p.41). The extended study found the NDFA 
is not mandated to develop PPP policy. This was emphasised by the senior public sector 
interviewee involved in PPP decision-making who stated:  
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They don’t make policy. They are advisers (P8, 2016) 
However, there is a difference of opinion on the part of others regarding the role of the 
NDFA in policy development in stage 2 and stage 3 PPP projects. For example, interviewees 
involved in stage 2 PPPs, such as a private sector interviewee working on the Convention 
Centre Project (P10, 2016), procured before the financial crisis, spoke of the NDFA as being 
advisers but not being involved in the development or promotion of PPP policy. A private 
sector interviewee involved in the Criminal Courts of Justice project, procured before the 
financial crisis, explained the role of the NDFA, as follows:  
they are supposed to implement policy rather than design policy…they’re 
instrumental in defining the procurement route (P11, 2016) 
However, those involved in stage 3 PPPs do consider the NDFA to be involved in PPP 
policy development. For example, a private sector interviewee who has worked on stage 2 and 
3 PPPs and is hoping to be involved in Social Housing PPPs said of the NDFA’s role in 
policy development:  
I would say they certainly contribute to it … Yeah in terms of advertising (P13, 
2016) 
This reflects a change in the role of the NDFA. Jooste et al. (2009) state that the PPP 
unit should have a role to play in policy development and this will have a positive effect on 
the legitimacy of PPP. The views as to whether the NDFA is a policy-maker are mixed. The 
senior public sector interviewee involved in PPP decision-making and an interviewee 
involved in projects procured before the financial crisis say the agency is not a policy 
developer while those involved in post-crisis PPP procurement say it is. Overall, the NDFA in 
this regard seems to be unlikely to contribute to the legitimacy of PPP. 
NDFA as a promoter of policy 
Burger (2009) argues that there is a risk that a PPP unit may promote PPP because it 
knows the government will pick up the tab. This is also known as a PPP free rider effect. 
EPEC states that the NDFA is a promoter of PPP. This runs counter to the recommendations 
of Jooste (2010) that a PPP unit should retain neutrality and independence from the private 
sector.  
The extended study revealed that a number of interviewees considered the NDFA to 
be too involved in PPP policy. It has a self-interest in PPP continuing, it advocates for PPP 
and it pushes it above other methods of procurement. For example, a PPP consultant who 
worked on stage 1 and 2 PPP projects in Ireland beginning in 2006 but who observes the 
market closely said that the NDFA is a promoter of PPP (P6, 2006). A public sector 
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interviewee involved in current Justice projects was explicit in stating that the NDFA had an 
interest in the PPP policy: 
 they are too involved in policy and have a self-interest…without that policy 
there’s no need for the NDFA … so there is a lot of self-survival 
involved…without it they don’t exist  (P15, 2016) 
This interviewee even went as far as to suggest that the NDFA will advocate for PPP:  
 we want it and we don’t care how we get it (P15, 2016) 
This was supported by another public sector interviewee also involved in the Criminal 
Courts of Justice PPP and stage 3 Justice PPPs who said the NDFA:  
 would be always advocating PPP (P7, 2016)  
The NDFA also exhibits self-interest in perpetuating PPP policy as discussed by a 
public sector interviewee working on current Justice projects: 
 they are publicly funded so they can’t be seen to be promoting one thing over 
the other and yet their raison d’être is to be facilitating PPPs so the temptation 
would obviously be to proselytise because that’s what keeps them in jobs and 
yet as a public body … they can’t necessarily promote them but they can react 
when things are done (P2, 2016) 
Interviewees linked promotion of PPPs with the NDFA’s involvement in political and 
governmental lobbying for PPP. The NDFA lobbies for political support for PPP, as discussed 
by a private sector interviewee whose company was successful in winning Primary Care 
projects:  
to get the pipeline you need political commitment on a higher level which I 
know NDFA are working very hard on (P18, 2016) 
Another interviewee from the public sector involved in Justice PPPs also spoke of the 
NDFA and governmental lobbying:  
I think they push it…and I think they’d even go as … a bit of soft lobbying of 
[the] D[ept] of P[ublic] E[exp] and R[eform] … when they see what projects 
are out there as to what’s suitable and what’s not (P7, 2016) 
The government is aware of the NDFA’s vested interest in promoting PPP, as was 




 NDFA’s job is about advising on PPPs, procuring PPPs, managing them 
afterwards so it is in their interest for PPPs to continue and they are advising us 
whether we should or not continue them so … they’re not impartial, they do 
have a vested interest but we’re fully aware of that  (P8, 2016) 
This interviewee explained that ultimately, it is the government’s decision on what the 
level of investment in PPP should be: 
 there’s been coverage in the paper last week where Brian Murphy [then 
Director of the NDFA] was saying that the latest Capital Plan isn’t adventurous 
enough and we should be doing more and we’re going to suffer and we’re 
going [to] pay for not investing… it’s the government’s job to decide what the 
appropriate level of investment should be and … we have to bear in mind who 
says what when they are advising us and what their background is so … we do 
have to take that into account (P8, 2016) 
An interviewee who formerly worked with the NDFA (P4, 2016) and who left before 
the financial crisis said that the NDFA will always base its decision on value for money: 
 they will argue quite strongly that [they] are not ideological at all, they are into 
value for money and if they believe a project doesn’t have value for money … 
they won’t recommend its procurement [in the case of] Thornton Hall Prison 
project  (P4, 2016) 
This suggests that the views of the NDFA as a promoter of PPP are ambiguous. Jooste 
(2010) states that the PPP unit should remain neutral. If the PPP unit is a promoter of PPP, 
this can have a negative effect on the legitimacy of PPP. The NDFA is now widely seen as a 
promoter of stage 3 PPPs and a political lobbyist for PPPs. This has serious implications as 
the agency carries out the value for money testing on PPP projects about which there is a lack 
of transparency (see 5.3.2.1 Transparency). Apart from issues relating to the potential lack of 
objectivity of these tests there is also concern with regard to PPP “free rider” effects as 
identified by Burger (2009, p.83). Overall, the NDFA as a promoter of PPP policy mitigates 
against it being a major contributor to the legitimacy of PPP. 
NDFA as a regulatory body 
Burger (2009) states that the role of the PPP unit is to act as a regulatory body and this 
regulatory role can have a positive effect on the legitimacy of PPP. The extended study found 
that none of those interviewed identified the NDFA as a regulatory body for PPP. This again 
weakens the role of the NDFA in terms of its potential legitimacy enhancing role for PPP. 
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NDFA as a market driver 
Matos-Castaño et al. (2014) state that it is important that the PPP unit use mechanisms 
to support the development of PPPs, which include market consultation. They argued that this 
will alleviate misunderstandings and conflict that can arise between the public and private 
sectors. Measures should also include “opportunities for dialogue” to resolve conflicts and 
solve problems that may arise (UNECE, 2008, p.21). This is similar to the Van den Hulk et al. 
(2016) assertion that the PPP unit be a disseminator of knowledge. However, Jooste (2010) 
extends the role of the PPP unit to one that drives project delivery leading to a more efficient 
project development and delivery process. 
The extended study found that the role of the NDFA has evolved from being a 
disseminator of knowledge to one of a market driver since the financial crisis when PPPs were 
cancelled. However, the following analysis will indicate that instead of reacting to the market 
and following up with actions, the NDFA is actively managing the market by making 
announcements of initiatives which support the legitimacy of Irish PPP. However, it seems to 
fail to follow through on these initiatives with real action.  
The NDFA runs consultation meetings with bidders. These meetings are well  
organised and welcomed by the private sector, especially as they show the NDFA as reacting 
to the market. These meetings follow a pattern which strives to ensure the process is 
transparent and thus mitigates against litigation. The NDFA does appear to keep bidders up to 
date on the bidding process, as evidenced by a private sector interviewee involved in stage 2 
and 3 PPP projects and currently involved in a Justice project (P11, 2016). 
The NDFA drives project delivery and deals with queries and clarifications at regular 
meetings and through correspondence. This was noted by a private sector interviewee who 
has worked on stage 2 and 3 PPPs: 
I think that there is very good project management from the point of view of 
the NDFA (P13, 2016) 
A private sector interviewee involved in bidding on the Grangegorman project said of 
consultation meetings:  
it’s very highly organised and they’re probably judging you also on your ability 
to organise your team and deliver to the schedule (P19, 2016)  
A former private sector interviewee now working in the public sector discussed how 
well the NDFA runs the bidding process:  
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I think having the predictability of bid programmes is important … the NDFA 
are very tuned into that (P14, 2016) 
However, one interviewee noted that documentation from the NDFA and 
correspondence from the NDFA lacked clarity. This was illustrated by a private sector 
interviewee from a construction company which failed on the Primary Care bid. They said 
that during the bidding process: 
 the documentation you get … there’d be a process of queries and clarifications 
(P16, 2016)  
Further criticisms noted that the NDFA can be condescending to bidders. A private 
sector interviewee who is working on Justice projects and also has experience of PFI in the 
UK said: 
 I think treating bidding consortia like children isn’t really needed, it’s the only 
place it’s ever happened is over here… There’s just no need to say it (P11, 
2016) 
However, the private sector appears to be willing to accept the NDFA’s practices. A 
private sector interviewee who was successful in winning Primary Care projects defended the 
NDFA’s modus operandi:  
I think that’s part of the litigious background that they’re operating in, they 
have to make sure that there is a strict procedure and it’s adhered to … very 
closely (P18, 2016) 
The reason for this may be due to the PPP market having been very slow during the 
financial crisis and only becoming more buoyant since 2012 when the stimulus programme 
was announced. The private sector may be willing to put up with this attitude from the NDFA 
if it leads to future work for it. 
In 2012, as a reaction to the financial crisis, the  NDFA introduced initiatives to 
stimulate the market, analysed in 6.2.1 Methods to encourage market demand. A private 
sector interviewee who has worked on stage 2 and 3 PPPs and is hoping to work on social 
housing projects pointed out: 
 from our point of view the NDFA would have helped a lot in that way. We 
know what’s coming, we know when it’s coming. There may not be enough 
coming but I think that, it’s transparent from that perspective  (P13, 2016) 
The market suffered after PPP schemes were cancelled during the financial crisis and 
the NDFA has tried to recover from this. As one private sector interviewee involved in PPP 
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since the pilot project said:  
[the NDFA] listened to market concerns (P19, 2016) 
The NDFA evolved from disseminator of knowledge to market driver by introducing 
new initiatives to stimulate the market and to reassure the market that Ireland is committed to 
PPP. For example, a former private sector interviewee now working in the public sector spoke 
about how the NDFA reacted to the financial crisis:  
certainly they reacted well through the crisis… so generally speaking I think 
their role has been a positive and a success from a market point of view (P14, 
2016) 
A private sector interviewee involved in PPP since the pilot project also spoke highly 
of the NDFA and its reaction to the financial crisis and summarised the initiatives that the 
NDFA introduced as follows: 
 they said, look we listened to market concerns which they did…they made sure 
that everything was off-balance sheet… they’ve reduced bid costs and bid 
timelines and they did… reduce the procurement schedule to fifteen to eighteen 
months from OJEU [The Official Journal of the European Union] to financial 
close…now six months of that is financial close. What they also did was they 
took out of it the funding  (P19, 2016) 
The agency introduced banking competitions: 
 they have gone out, they’ve really sold it, after they kind of, the programme 
where there was a lot of schemes cancelled they then reassessed, they went out, 
they did road shows, they presented, they said ok we’ve changed our ways, you 
know we’re going to keep to our programme, we’re going to deliver, we’re 
going to give you money … they … introduced banking competitions post 
award (P13, 2016) 
An initiative brought in as a reaction to the financial crisis was the introduction of 
design-led PPPs, analysed further in 6.2.1 Methods to encourage market demand. A public 
sector interviewee who is currently working on Justice projects spoke about the introduction 
of design-led PPPs and how the NDFA was initially concerned about this: 
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 the NDFA at one stage said, the developers won’t like… it doesn’t allow them 
design everything but in fact the developers responded quite well [to] the 
clarity, we know what we’re being asked to do…Now they’ve come around 
they see the benefit of it (P15, 2016) 
Overall, this raises the question as to whether the NDFA is working on behalf of the 
private sector or whether it is a neutral organisation.  
A private sector interviewee involved in a consortium also commented on design-led 
PPPs commented on this a follows:  
I don’t think they’ll ever go back to bidders having design again (P24, 2016) 
Despite these new initiatives, the lack of a clear PPP pipeline, analysed in 5.3.4 
Project Portfolio, has damaged the NDFA’s reputation with the private sector. For example, a 
private sector interviewee who has worked on stage 2 and 3 PPPs and is hoping to be 
involved in Social Housing commented on the initiatives introduced by the NDFA: 
 we’ve been left in this hiatus afterwards which is … starting to probably hurt 
what good work they did (P13, 2016) 
Van den Hulk et al. (2016) state that a PPP unit should be a disseminator of 
knowledge and Matos-Castaño et al. (2014) contend that the PPP unit should be a market 
consultant. Jooste (2010) extends the role of the PPP unit to one that drives project delivery 
leading to a more efficient project development and delivery process. All of these activities 
are considered to have a positive effect on the legitimacy of PPP. The extended study 
indicates that in the case of the NDFA these roles have evolved from merely being a 
disseminator of knowledge, market consultant and project driver into that of a market driver. 
The NDFA is instrumental in keeping the market informed and reassuring the market about 
the continuation of the PPP programme, a factor which contributes to the legitimacy of PPP. 
Superficially, the reaction of the NDFA to the financial crisis and the initiatives it introduced 
suggests that the role of the NDFA has strengthened which in turn helps to stimulate the 
market and hence potentially contributes to the legitimacy of PPP. However, in 5.3.4 Project 
portfolio it appears that the NDFA announced new PPP pipelines but there were delays and 
confusion surrounding the materialisation of projects and 6.2.5 Coordination of deal flow 
indicates there is mixed evidence of a coordinated deal flow. This suggests that the NDFA is 
announcing PPP pipelines to drive the market, but is failing to following through with a clear 
pipeline of projects. This weakens legitimacy and deal flow, which in turn weakens capacity.  
As discussed earlier, the role of the PPP unit is to monitor and judge the affordability 
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of a project. Yet evidence from the extended study indicates that the focus of the NDFA is 
shifting from striving for value for money to managing market optics by making PPP 
announcements to stimulate the market, with poor follow-up of projects and deal flow. This 
suggests that the potential contribution of the role of the NDFA as market driver to the 
legitimacy of PPP in Ireland is also relatively weak. 
 
NDFA as a supporter 
Jooste (2010) states that the PPP unit should facilitate the PPP process and provide 
leadership. In the extended study there were mixed opinions from interviewees on the role of 
the NDFA in providing leadership in PPP and the research indicates that this role has 
diminished to that of supporter. The view that the NDFA had a role as leader was met with 
agreement by some private sector interviewees. For example, a private sector interviewee who 
works for a successful bidder on the Primary Care projects, a stage 3 PPP, but who was also 
involved in failed bids pointed out:  
the NDFA would be the leading party (P18, 2016).  
When the public sector interviewees were asked the same question, they responded 
differently, suggesting a supportive role rather than a leadership role. For example, a public 
sector interviewee working on stage 3 Justice projects commented:  
certainly support is my understanding more than leadership…my experience of 
them certainly is that they are very supportive (P2, 2016) 
The senior public sector interviewee involved in PPP decision-making also 
commented on leadership:  
Well I suppose leadership is probably more our Minister really (P8, 2016) 
There was a reluctance among the public sector interviewees to suggest that the NDFA 
provides leadership. This is in line with Jooste (2010) proposition that a PPP unit that drives 
delivery will struggle with acceptance among government departments.  
Jooste (2010) states that the PPP unit should facilitate the PPP process and provide 
leadership. The role of the PPP unit as a leader has a positive effect on the legitimacy. 
However, the role of the NDFA appears to have diminished to that of a supporter of PPP, 
certainly among the public sector. This weakens the role of the NDFA and does not contribute 
to the legitimacy of PPP. 
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NDFA as a bureaucracy 
A new role for the PPP unit identified in the extended study is that of bureaucracy, a 
role not previously identified in the literature. The NDFA was described by interviewees as 
being process driven, rigid and bureaucratic. This was seen as having both a positive and 
negative effects on the legitimacy of PPP. Those who spoke of the NDFA negatively tended 
to be public sector interviewees. For example, a public sector interviewee working on a stage 
3 Education project spoke of the NDFA being process driven in critical terms:  
they can be sometimes overly process driven…sometimes it feels like their job 
is to deliver the project no matter what (P5, 2016)  
A public sector interviewee who is working on stage 2 and 3 Justice projects said of 
the NDFA: 
it’s far too bureaucratic (P15, 2016)  
Also, a public sector interviewee involved in Justice projects was critical of meetings 
held between the NDFA and the private sector provider when projects are up and running: 
 it’s far too bureaucratic … there’s far too many meetings … like it’s totally 
disproportionate methodology over delivery, like the process is almost more 
important than the product  (P15, 2016) 
A private sector interviewee working on the stage 3 Convention Centre project was 
also critical of the NDFA: 
 they’re a stickler for detail… they often literally go to the letter of the contract 
and say, this report is meant to have ten pages, you only gave me nine pages, 
put another page in  (P10, 2016) 
A possible explanation for this rigidity was put forward by a private sector interviewee 
involved stage 2 and 3 PPPs: 
 I think there are a number of issues around how rigid they are against the rules 
… and therefore you lose a bit of control of how they develop … the market  
(P11, 2016)  
Those interviewees who spoke more positively about the NDFA tended to be from the 
private sector. They tended to defend the rigidity of the NDFA as it made the whole process 
more transparent. For example, a former private sector interviewee working in the public 
sector who has been involved in stage 2 and 3 PPPs said: 
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 I think there’s no doubt that the Irish bidding process will be deemed to be very 
fair and very consistent by bidders (P14, 2016) 
A private sector interviewee involved in stage 2 and 3 Education projects and a 
successful bidder on the Grangegorman project explained that the NDFA:  
have a responsibility, if they issue a timeline … they have to stick to that (P12, 
2016)  
The NDFAs adherence to rigid processes was also justified by a private sector 
interviewee involved stage 2 and 3 PPPs:  
they have a bunch of project managers who … are basically instructed to keep 
it standard and they do (P11, 2016) 
However, a public sector interviewee working on stage 3 Justice projects was negative 
initially about the NDFA’s process-driven approach but then supported it: 
 if there was a negative it’s that there’s a huge concern over protecting the 
process over the outcome…it’s documented… who made the decision … the 
basis on which they made the decision, so from a transparency point of view, 
on the … assumption that they release all the information  (P2, 2016) 
When the successful bidder has been appointed, the NDFA arranges to “meet the 
buyer” (P13, 2016), which is commonly known as “meet the bidder” meetings where contact 
is made between suppliers and the successful bidder. A private sector interviewee who has 
worked on stage 2 and 3 PPPs and is hoping to work on Social Housing projects pointed out 
that the NDFA has been promoting such meetings (P13, 2016). However, these meetings have 
been criticised for being overly bureaucratic. Interviewees spoke of how at the beginning of 
these meetings the “rules of engagement” are read out but one interviewee justified this as the 
NDFA showing that they don’t favour one party over another (P11, 2016). 
The reason for the NDFA’s rigidity was summed up by a private sector interviewee 
working on the stage 3 Convention Centre project:  
they’re just trying to do their job (P10, 2016) 
It appears that the NDFA is focused on rules with some private sector interviewees 
and not with others, and despite it being so process driven, it was ultimately challenged on a 
technicality. BAM took a High Court action against the National Treasury Management 
Agency (NTMA) over the awarding of the Grangegorman contract13. The winning bidder, 
                                                 
13 BAM PPP PGGM Infrastructure Cooperatie U.a v National Treasury and Finance Agency and Minister for 
Education and Skills, (2016), 2015 176JR & 2015 35COM. 
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Eriugena, did not submit its tender before the specified time, a violation of the rules. 
However, the High Court ruled in favour of the NTMA and stated that it had discretion to 
accept documents submitted after the tender deadline14. At the time of this study there were 
no appeals to the High Court ruling. The interviewees’ assertions that the rules-based 
approach is to protect the process is shown to be flexible in this case. 
According to the interviewees of this study the NDFA is rigid, bureaucratic and 
process driven, acting in a way not identified in the literature on PPP units. The negativity of 
the public sector and more positive attitude of the private sector towards the bureaucratic 
nature of the NDFA suggests that the NDFA is working to make the PPP process more 
streamlined for the private sector but that this is adding to the workload of the public sector. 
Despite some interviewees trying to justify this as the NDFA’s way of ensuring the rules are 
followed, the High Court action taken by BAM illustrates that there may be strict rules for 
some private sector organisations and more fluid rules for others. The NDFA’s approach 
seems to lack clarity and is confusing for the private sector. It creates a weakness in the 
NDFA’s potential contribution to the legitimacy of PPP. 
Summary 5.3.1 Lead Institutional Support 
The literature asserts that the existence of a lead institutional support, or a PPP unit, 
will increase the legitimacy of PPP by creating a belief in the benefits and value for money 
that private sector involvement will bring, brought about through increased transparency and 
consistency (Matos-Castaño, 2011). The literature outlines the expected roles of the PPP unit 
as expert/adviser, policy developer, regulatory body, decision-maker, leader and promoter of 
policy, all of which, are said to have a positive effect on the legitimacy of PPP. 
Van den Hulk et al. (2016) describe three groups of PPP units with varying degrees of 
institutional support. First is one which is responsible for technical support, capacity 
building/promotion and knowledge dissemination. Second is one that is likely to play a role in 
policy guidance and policy evaluation. Third is one which serves as a  “gate-keeper” where 
projects require advice or judgement from the PPP unit to be approved (Van den Hulk et al., 
2016, p.6).  
The NDFA is the centre of knowledge and expertise of PPP in Ireland. While it is a 
well-staffed expert unit, there are concerns over mobility of staff between the public and 
                                                 





private sector in stage 3 projects and its implications for protecting the public sector 
benchmark (PSB). The findings of the pilot study outlined in chapter 4 were that the NDFA 
was considered to fulfil partially the functions of a PPP unit (Sheppard and Beck, 2016). 
However, the findings of this study in the context of the NDFA depict a role that has 
evolved beyond what is described in the literature on PPP units. Accordingly, the literature 
notes the role of disseminator of knowledge, market consultant and project driver while the 
data analysis shows these to have evolved to a role of market driver. The role of leader, 
described in the literature, during the data analysis has diminished in importance to supporter. 
The research also identifies a new role of the PPP unit as a bureaucracy. Table 5.2 
summarises the degree of the NDFA’s involvement in the role and its contribution to the 
legitimacy of PPP. 
Table 5.2: The degree of the NDFA’s involvement in the role and its contribution to the 
legitimacy of PPP 
















































Policy developer Adviser and expert 
 
The role of PPP unit as adviser and expert has a positive effect on the legitimacy of 
PPP. Despite some negativity towards the NDFA, it appears to have a strong role to play as a 
PPP adviser and expert and in this capacity it therefore contributes to the legitimacy of PPP in 
this sense. 
The role of the PPP unit as a decision-maker has a positive effect on the legitimacy of 
PPP. The NDFA does not have the power to make decisions. Also, the lack of transparency 
suggests that the role of the NDFA in assessing value for money and preparing the PSB casts 
doubt on the true value for money of PPP. The NDFA demonstrates a weak role as a decision-




Views as to whether the NDFA is a policy-maker are mixed. The senior public sector 
interviewee involved in PPP decision-making and an interviewee involved in projects 
procured before the financial crisis suggest it is not a policy developer, while those involved 
in post-crisis PPP procurement say it is. Either way the NDFA in this regard does not seem to 
contribute significantly to the legitimacy of PPP. 
While the NDFA demonstrates a strong role as a promoter of PPP, and this does not 
seem to contribute to the legitimacy of PPP. Interviewees did not identify the role of the 
NDFA as a regulatory body for PPP. Again this weakens the perceived role of the NDFA and 
reduces its potential contribution to the legitimacy of PPP. 
The NDFA is instrumental in keeping the market informed and in reassuring the 
market about the continuation of the PPP programme. The role of disseminator of knowledge, 
market consultant and project driver evolved to a market driver during the financial crisis 
which helps to stimulate the market and thus contributes to the legitimacy of PPP. However, 
when taken in the context of 5.3.4 Project portfolio and 6.2.5 Coordination of deal flow the 
contribution of the role of the NDFA to the legitimacy of PPP is weak. 
The role of the NDFA has diminished from that of a potential leader to that of a 
supporter of PPP. Again it is likely to weaken the role of the NDFA and reduces its 
contribution to the legitimacy of PPP. The NDFA is rigid, bureaucratic and process driven, a 
role not identified in the literature for other PPP units. Existing approaches of the NDFA are 
confusing for the private sector. This again indicates a weakness which undermines the 
potential contribution of the NDFA to the legitimacy of PPP. 
In terms of Van den Hulk et al. (2016) categorisation of three groups of PPP units 
outlined above, this study suggests that the NDFA is responsible for knowledge dissemination 
and provides policy guidance but that it does not exhibit the strong degree of institutional 
support characteristics of a “gate-keeper”. 
Overall it was found that the role and function of the NDFA were more complex than 
suggested by the literature. The NDFA’s involvement in the roles of decision-maker and 
policy developer were found to be mixed and its role as regulatory body, supporter and 
market driver were found to be weak, all roles which have a positive effect on the legitimacy 
of PPP. Overall this suggests that the NDFA is weak in its contribution to the legitimacy of 
PPP which should cause serious concerns for the sustainability of this policy. 
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5.3.2 Political support 
The literature discusses the importance of providing a stable political environment 
(Jooste et al., 2009; Matos-Castaño et al., 2012; Matos-Castaño et al., 2014), political 
willingness for PPP (Matos-Castaño, 2011) in the form of a political champion, a transparent 
and consistent PPP unit which disseminates information, all of which are said to contribute 
towards the legitimacy of PPP. 
Table 5.3 shows how 5.3.2 Political support is analysed and sub-divided into 5.3.2.1 
Transparency, 5.3.2.2 Legal and regulatory framework and 5.3.2.3 Political commitment. The 
order of analysis is based on the number of text blocks identified against each sub-theme in 
the data analysis, as outlined in Table 5.3. The number of text blocks does not necessarily 
reflect the importance of the theme. 
Table 5.3: Order of analysis of 5.3.2 Political support 
Name Number of text 
blocks 
Number of text 
blocks 
5.3 Theme 1 Legitimacy  3527 
5.3.1 Lead institutional support  990 
5.3.2 Political support:  
 
- 5.3.2.1 Transparency 441  
- 5.3.2.2 Legal and regulatory framework 285  
- 5.3.2.3 Political commitment 226 952 
5.3.3 Stakeholder consent  413 
5.3.4 Project portfolio  1172 
 
 It is interesting that the three elements of political support were discussed the most by 
interviewees who had been involved in stage 3 PPPs of Justice, Education and Primary Care, 
the busiest PPP sectors at the time of data collection.  
The sub-themes of Political Support are summarised in Figure 5.3 which outlines the 
differing degrees of strength that each sub-theme has in relation to the legitimacy of PPP 
which in turn provides institutional capacity and will contribute to the sustainability of this 
policy. As a brief overview it is worth noting that transparency weakens the legitimacy of PPP 
in Ireland as does political commitment, while the results for the legal and regulatory 
framework are mixed. Each of these sub-themes is now analysed in detail. 
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Figure 5.3: Political support
 
5.3.2.1 Transparency 
The literature suggests that ensuring the transparency of projects and project 
development will increase the legitimacy of the PPP programme (Jooste et al., 2009) and is 
critical for the success of the policy (Li et al, 2005b). Matos-Castaño (2011, p.7) argues that a 
strong institutional environment surrounding PPP arrangements where there is “a coherent 
PPP policy, supportive risk sharing, reciprocal support, transparency [and] sustainable 
development” will lead to sustainable PPP arrangements. 
Matos-Castaño (2011, p.19) maintains that for there to be transparency in the PPP 
decision-making process, there should be “predictability in decision-making” with relevant 
information being readily available for all interested parties. Accordingly, there is a need for 
transparency in the choice of projects for PPP (Matos-Castaño et al., 2012) and the decision-
making surrounding this should also be transparent (Jooste et al., 2009). In particular, Jooste 
et al. (2009), Matos-Castaño et al. (2012) and Matos-Castaño et al. (2014) argue that 
procurement and negotiations should be conducted in a transparent way, as should the 
eventual awarding of projects. Khadaroo (2008),  Boardman and Vining (2012) and Vining 
and Boardman (2008a) recommend that there should be transparency and public availability 
of all PPP contracts. Jooste et al. (2009) contend that it is also essential that the public are 
well informed regarding project details such as targets and performance indicators. Ensuring 
transparency will strengthen the legitimacy of PPP procurement which will lead to a more 
sustainable policy in the long run. 
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The findings of the pilot study outlined in chapter 4 indicated that, although value for 
money assessments are given central importance by the Irish government, full evaluation has 
not taken place because of commercial sensitivity issues and this has sustainability 
implications for PPP in Ireland (Sheppard and Beck, 2016). The pilot study also found mixed 
evidence of value for money being achieved (Sheppard and Beck, 2016).  
When the pilot study was extended in 2016, the research found that there is 
transparency in some areas of PPP and a lack of transparency in others. Specifically, 
transparency themes are investigated in this section. Using the data analysis method outlined 
in chapter 4, it was found that transparency was the most frequently discussed by interviewees 
in relation to political support. It was most frequently discussed in relation to Primary Care, a 
new area of PPP post crisis and to a lesser extent in Justice which spans pre- and post crisis. It 
was less frequently discussed in the more established PPP areas of Transport, Education, the 
Convention Centre and Environment. Transparency was seen as relevant by interviewees in a 
number of contexts: 
• Transparency of the decision to go down the PPP route 
• Transparency of the bidding process 
• Transparency issues surrounding the publication of PPP contract information 
• Transparency of PPP reviews and benchmarking 
As a brief overview it is worth noting that the data analysis found that all of these contexts 
were weak in their contribution to the legitimacy of PPP in Ireland apart from “Transparency 
of the bidding process” which was mixed. The subsequent analysis of 5.3.2.1 Transparency is 




Figure 5.4: Transparency 
 
Each of these is now examined in the paragraphs that follow. 
 
Transparency of the decision to go down the PPP route 
For there to be public accountability there should be transparency around PPP 
decision-making (Aziz, 2007). Research carried out by the Canadian Council for Public 
Private Partnerships (CCPPP) calls for “fair and transparent” publication of value for money 
reports (CCPPP, 2005, p.4) and in particular transparency with regard to the way value for 
money is measured (Dixon et al., 2005). In Ireland the Comptroller and Auditor General has 
called for more transparency in the PPP value for money appraisals necessary to justify 
proceeding to build through PPP (Comptroller and Auditor General, 2012). Ensuring 
transparency and well-documented and consistent decision-making in the public sector will 
attract market participants to the PPP process (Delhi and Mahalingam, 2012), thus increasing 
the legitimacy of PPPs. A private sector interviewee involved in Justice who emphasised the 
importance of transparency in creating sustainability:  
if you’re trying to build a market … you can never be criticised for having too 
much transparency, it is, in the long term, probably … sustainable … there’s 
sort of a paranoia to be seen to be pure but then they don’t have a transparent 
system or showing everything in terms of the decision-making  (P11, 2016) 
Transparency surrounding the decision to go the PPP route was more of a concern for 
the public sector interviewees than private sector interviewees. It was felt that there is a clear 
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lack of transparency in how projects are chosen to be built through PPP. For example, a 
former private sector interviewee now working in the public sector said:  
Whether it goes PPP or goes traditional procurement in the first place is 
probably where there isn’t any transparency (P14, 2016) 
There is also a lack of understanding as to why the decision-making process is opaque, as this 
interviewee went on to mention:  
that whole benchmarking thing is a bit of a … black hole from those of us 
looking in from the outside. Maybe it needs to remain like that I don’t know 
(P14, 2016) 
Possibly one of the reasons for this is political expediency, as suggested by a public sector 
interviewee working on an Education project:  
the lack of transparency is choosing the projects, in terms of what gets picked 
to be funded you know that’s … a political decision (P5, 2016)  
Another reason is that PPP is seen as a means to an end and being more transparent may delay 
the process, as suggested by a public sector interviewee working on Justice projects:  
when people want something like [a] … building built they may say, well … 
look we want it just get on with it (P15, 2016) 
However, this lack of transparency can result in speculation about decision-making, as an 
interviewee who formerly worked with the NDFA discussed:  
 value for money test is done on a project by project basis and the Minister is 
supposed to not sign off on the project until it is … proved that it is value for 
money but do they do that?  I don’t know, and I doubt if you’ll find out  (P4, 
2016) 
This was a concern also shared by a public sector interviewee involved in Transport projects, 
who said:  
[I] don’t like the idea that people think it’s …secretive either … from my 
perspective I’ve nothing to hide (P3, 2016) 
Regarding transparency surrounding the value for money testing that is carried out on 
these projects, this clearly seems to be lacking even though it is crucial for the justification of 
this procurement method to the taxpayer. This is of concern to the public sector as discussed 
by a public sector interviewee working on a stage 3 Education project. This interviewee 
acknowledged that publishing data has been considered on other projects but rather this was 
subject to disagreement:  
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there have been a regular debate on other PPPs whether to publish (P5, 2016)  
This point was also acknowledged by a public sector interviewee working on Justice, who 
advocated for limited transparency: 
 if they are receiving State money they have to know that at some point the 
taxpayer is entitled to know the basis on which they are running for the next 25 
years has been committed … I don’t think these things should be made 
available immediately (P2, 2016) 
Another possible reason for the lack of transparency that was mentioned by this interviewee 
was the complexity of the methodology used in the value for money testing: 
 that evaluation of PPP as a methodology [it’s] very hard to make a comparison 
… because … PPP guarantees the asset will be well maintained over the life of 
the project and … the State does not maintain its assets  (P5, 2016) 
A possible reason for the lack of transparency surrounding the publication of a value 
for money test was noted as far back as 2007 (Dáil Éireann, 2007). The report discussed 
“commercial-in-confidence clauses” and noted that they prevent the full disclosure of details 
such as the value for money comparison and the expected return on investment (Dáil Éireann, 
2007, p.4). This report mentions the Public Accounts and Estimates Committee of Victoria, 
Australia and quotes its report on Commercial in-Confidence Material and the Public Interest 
which emphasised that the public are entitled to know what contracts have been entered into 
on their behalf and what the terms and conditions are. However, it was also noted that in 
Ireland the balance has tipped in favour of confidentiality to help protect “commercially 
sensitive information” (Siemiatycki, 2006, p.145). 
The NDFA is protecting the interests of the private sector by not releasing information 
on value for money testing. An interviewee who formerly worked with the NDFA was asked 
about transparency surrounding the NDFA’s value for money testing of projects questioned 
the current approval. The interviewee said the NDFA could provide information on value for 
money:  
once it’s not commercially sensitive … I mean they are not a secret, 
clandestine organisation (P4, 2016)  
This problem was highlighted by the public sector interviewee involved in Environment 
projects who made the point that the NDFA oversees value for money testing on behalf of the 
taxpayer but there is little transparency as:  
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they’re commercial documents and they’re generally not available for scrutiny 
(P9, 2016) 
Clearly there is a conflict of interest here. The NDFA is protecting the private sector’s 
commercial interests but it also need to protect the taxpayers’ interests. The result of this lack 
of transparency is speculation on how decisions are made, as noted by a public sector 
interviewee involved in Justice projects:  
 it’s really the NDFA is saying, well we say that stuff’s right (P15, 2016)   
Lack of transparency is speculation about whether decisions are well reasoned. For 
example, a public sector interviewee with more than 15 years’ experience of working on 
Transport projects suggested that at times an inappropriate approach to decision criterion 
based on the PSB is used rather than a decision based on what’s needed and affordable (P3, 
2016). However, as the basis for the decisions made is not published, this is not further 
examined. 
Lack of transparency surrounding decision-making has been a concern for the 
Committee of Public Accounts where a TD said that members of the committee have asked 
for evidence that PPPs represent value for money. This TD said that they were told there is a 
PSB but they had not seen one yet (Dáil Éireann, 2016). 
There is an inherent conflict between transparency and commercial sensitivity. The 
NDFA seems to be primarily concerned about commercial sensitivity and protecting the 
interests of the private sector, yet the private sector is concerned about demonstrating value 
for money to the taxpayer. For example, a private sector interviewee who works for a 
successful bidder on the Primary Care projects was concerned about transparency surrounding 
value for money and how this may be demonstrated to the taxpayer: 
 both the private sector and the public sector can do more to just demonstrate 
the benefits [of PPP] (P18, 2016) 
There was confusion regarding transparency and how much information was available 
through freedom of information (FOI). A public sector interviewee involved in stage 3 Justice 
projects was under the impression that contract information loses its commercial sensitivity 
after a period of time and would be available under FOI (P7, 2016). This point was negated by 
a senior public sector interviewee involved in PPP decision-making who said regarding the 
public availability of value for money assessments:  
No I don’t think we’d, no  (P8, 2016) 
There are differing opinions within the public sector as to how much information 
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should be published resulting in an ad hoc approach and a lack of cohesion. For example, a 
public sector interviewee who is working on a stage 3 education PPP explained that 
publishing some data can work in favour of the State. On the stage 3 Education project that 
this interviewee worked on, they published the capital expenditure envelope:  
the first time ever on a PPP the State did publish its capital expenditure 
envelope, what we expected it to cost and they all did bid under that (P5, 2016) 
However, the senior public sector interviewee involved in PPP decision-making was 
concerned over revealing the State’s resources for procurement:  
 we don’t think we should tip our hand (P8, 2016) 
The PPP Policy Framework overseen by the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, a 
role previously undertaken by the Department of Finance, does not allow for the calculation 
of the PSB to be made public. This was clarified by a public sector interviewee working on 
Transport projects:  
There’s Department of Finance guidelines where PSBs should not be released 
(P3, 2016)  
There is also a lack of consensus on the policy of transparency across different 
sections of the state. For example, a senior public sector interviewee involved in PPP decision 
making acknowledged that the Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG) advised that the 
PSB be published:  
Now actually the C&AG recommended that maybe we should publish the PSB 
so that people could see (P8, 2016)  
but said that they have not accepted that recommendation. Despite this the Department of 
Education and Skills has published its PSB for Schools Bundle 1 and 2. 
Lack of transparency has caused a public sector interviewee working on Primary Care 
projects to cast doubt over whether this figure was the PSB. They said of the Schools Bundle 
1 and 2 PSB figures published:  
Well that’s only the unitary charge payment that they publish (P22, 2016) 
However, this cannot be confirmed because the figure published by the Department of 
Education and Skills is a single figure not broken down into its various cost components. The 
lack of transparency surrounding the PSB was summed up by a private sector interviewee 
now working in the public sector who discussed that the PSB is “a black hole” (P14, 2016). 
The consequence of this lack of transparency is a suspicion that the PSB may be 
subject to manipulation. This is not the first time that the use of quantitative analysis used to 
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assess decisions is questioned. For example, in the UK such type of analysis has been 
reported to be “prone to mistakes, manipulation and misuse” (House of Lords, 2010, p86). 
This committee also found that value for money comparisons had been manipulated but a lack 
of transparency made it difficult to disclose the true value for money result to the taxpayer 
(House of Lords, 2010, p130). Another finding of this committee was that the use of 
“optimism bias” in the public sector comparator (similar to the public sector benchmark) 
calculation worked in favour of PFI and in “a very large number of cases” if it was removed 
from the calculations, the public sector comparator would have been in favour of traditional 
procurement (House of Lords, 2010, p124).  
The pilot study revealed that policy transfer has taken place between Ireland and the 
UK (Sheppard and Beck, 2016), and this was also confirmed in 6.2.2.1 Learning from UK 
PFIs. However, interviewees spoke of learning from the UK in terms of different sectors such 
as roads, courts, education and health projects but no interviewees spoke of learning from the 
UK in terms of value for money calculations. It is quite likely that the problems highlighted in 
the UK have been replicated in Ireland and there is unease about this aspect of transfer. As in 
the UK the role of accounting calculations in the form of the PSB has been questioned in 
Ireland but the particular lack of transparency surrounding it makes more detailed 
examination difficult.  
A PPP consultant who has worked on stage 1 and 2 PPP projects in Ireland beginning 
in 2006 (P6, 2016) spoke of clever accounting where figures in the PSB are moved around to 
favour PPP, an exercise carried out by financial advisers. This was corroborated on by a 
public sector interviewee working on Justice projects and who has worked on pre- and post-
crisis projects. This interviewee expressed concern about the validity of the PSB:  
is the public service benchmark that they claim a real benchmark? (P15, 2016)  
The interviewee said that in their experience of PPP:  
I’ve seen them move the figures just to like, where do you want it? (P15, 2016)  
This interviewee claims that when asked why the PSB was changed they were told:  
it was appropriate to move it in this occasion … it was moved to suit (P15, 
2016) 
When asked about the lack of transparency surrounding the PSB, interviewees 
discussed various reasons why this information was not made widely available. Fear of 
criticism of what goes into the calculation was discussed by a public sector interviewee 
involved in Transport projects: 
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 if we put it out there won’t everyone try and say, ah that’s all wrong and 
whatever type of thing, what do you do like type of thing…we can have the 
whole world looking over our shoulder and saying, change that, change that  
(P3, 2016) 
Problems identifying risks, a key element of the PSB, was also discussed by a public sector 
interviewee involved in Transport projects as a reason for not being more transparent: “you 
can’t quantify all risks” (P3, 2016). 
Commercial sensitivity was discussed also as a reason for the lack of transparency. 
This was expressed also by a public sector interviewee working on Primary Care projects who 
said that they would not be providing any detail of costings on any project, traditionally 
procured or procured through PPP, because:  
the market doesn’t want that out there … in terms of their own commercial 
sensitivities you know (P22, 2016) 
Transparency of the bidding process 
Transparency of the PPP procurement process is of the utmost importance for public 
accountability (Aziz, 2007; Li et al., 2005a). It ensures fair competition, reduces criticism of 
the selection process and accusations of political favouritism (Kumaraswamy and Zhang, 
2001) and thereby makes corrupt practices more difficult (PPIAF, 2007), ultimately 
enhancing legitimacy. To ensure transparency in the bidding process, it is important that 
“supplier evaluation and contract award criteria would be made known to all parties in 
advance” (UNECE, 2008, p.46). These are the themes discussed in this section. 
Discussions of the transparency of the bidding process featured very heavily in the 
extended study. This analysis indicates that public sector interviewees are more concerned 
about litigation in the bidding process and the transparency surrounding the bid evaluation 
criteria, while private sector interviewees is more concerned with transparency surrounding 
the bidding process, feedback and the debriefing of unsuccessful bidders. Convincing bidders 
of transparency in the bidding process is particularly important for the unsuccessful bidders. 
This was demonstrated with the awarding of the Grangegorman contract to Eriugena 
consortium, which is discussed later in this section. 
The NDFA is very eager to demonstrate transparency surrounding the bidding process 
to the industry. For example, a private sector interviewee from a construction company which 
failed on a Primary Care bid noted:  
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the NDFA did a presentation when this was being promoted … they were keen 
to make sure that the industry [know] … there was transparency (P16, 2016) 
However, the lack of transparency surrounding how contracts are actually awarded has 
led to speculation and suspicion by the private sector. For example, a private sector 
interviewee involved in stage 2 and 3 PPP projects and currently involved in a Justice project 
made the point about publishing information on the winning bid:  
there’s a paranoia over here … because there’s such a small margin between 
winning and losing that, and the lack of transparency does lead to … concern 
by bidders that they don’t know why they’ve lost or don’t know why they’ve 
won for that matter  (P11, 2016) 
This interviewee was adamant that there was very little transparency in the bidding 
process:  
No, complete black box in my view, they will tell you how they award marks 
at a macro level but then when you get into the detail it’s all … based on 
hearsay, it’s coming from other people … that’s an area that could be more 
transparent (P11, 2016) 
The interviewee went on to contrast the Irish situation with that in the US where there 
is complete transparency surrounding winning bids which losers love and the winners hate. 
The interviewee said that publishing this information in Ireland would be of help to the losing 
bidders (P11, 2016).  
However, transparency in the bidding process is a complex matter. The United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) requires that bid information should be 
kept secret as it could contain information that could benefit a competitor, particularly if 
procurement involves the protection of patents and copyrights, or for national security reasons 
(UNECE, 2008). Yet, if these rules were strictly enforced, then the bidding processes will 
never be fully transparent, as explained by a former private sector interviewee now working in 
the public sector, as there are always reasons for commercial confidentiality (P14, 2016). 
However, this interviewee emphasised that the main concern for unsuccessful bidders is that 
they get sufficient feedback on their bids (P14, 2016).  
In the absence of full transparency on all aspects of procurement, it would appear that 
transparency surrounding the running of the bidding process is of utmost importance, and here 
there is general consensus among the private sector that the process is transparent. This was 




I think the fact the bidders keep coming back in itself says it’s a transparent 
market (P14, 2016) 
This point was discussed by a private sector interviewee who has worked on stage 2 
and 3 PPPs and is hoping to be involved in Social Housing PPPs. This interviewee said that 
the bidding process is:  
one that has to be followed rigidly to make sure that no one can accuse anyone 
of any wrongdoing so you have certain people present, confidentiality is of the 
utmost importance (P13, 2016) 
A former private sector interviewee now working in the public sector pointed out that 
they felt the Irish bidding process was fair: 
 to the point sometimes of rigidity but rigidity is better than perception of 
skulduggery, lack of transparency or jobs for the boys or whatever…It’s … 
transparent [the] scoring system is very clear, if anything it’s a bit rigid  (P14, 
2016) 
It is interesting that even unsuccessful bidders feel that the bidding process is 
transparent. A private sector interviewee from a construction company who failed on a 
Primary Care bid said: 
 I suppose it’s transparent as it can be because it is very strict rules … it’s very 
closely watched and I know the awarding authorities are very conscious of 
their obligations and the rules and what they’re meant to do and contractors are 
watching it like a hawk and you see the challenges and you know there is that 
process that happens … it’s pretty transparent because the awarding authority 
is very conscious that if they don’t do it right there’ll be a challenge…my sense 
is that it’s reasonably transparent  (P16, 2016)  
Another private sector interviewee involved in PPP since the pilot projects also agreed 
that there is transparency surrounding the bidding process:  
they run a very good bidder process, debriefs … are very above board, there’s 
no skulduggery or favouritism going on at all (P19, 2016)  
The bid evaluation process is run by the NDFA and the general consensus from public 
sector interviewees who commented on this was that the process was clear and transparent. A 
public sector interviewee working on Justice projects pointed out: 
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the process in which we actively participate … it’s very rigorous (P2, 2016) 
This was also the view of a public sector interviewee with more than 15 years’ 
experience of working on Transport projects:  
there’s no hidden evaluation criteria or any of those kind of things it’s all set 
out exactly (P3, 2016) 
This view was shared by a public sector interviewee who is working on a stage 3 
education PPP project:  
the procurement to my mind was very fair in terms of all bidders … there was 
no preferential treatment of anyone, the information was all made … freely … 
the process itself was very rigidly run (P5, 2016) 
This was also confirmed by a public sector interviewee who has worked on stage 2 
and 3 Justice projects:  
the rules of the competition, what the marks are for each bid etc… Yeah they 
get all that in advance so … that’s available (P7, 2016) 
Interestingly, an interviewee from a construction company which failed on the 
Primary Care bid also thought the bid evaluation was transparent: 
 any public sector award … the end user is obliged to tell you …the criteria … 
of the winning bid … and then how you compared to [it]…because it’s a 
competition and it’s got to be a level playing field … there’s a lot of 
transparency with that  (P16, 2016) 
However, from an oversight point of view, it is questionable why the sanctioning 
authority, the government department procuring the project, is not present at the opening of 
bids. This was discussed by a public sector interviewee who is working on Justice projects 
and attends the opening of bids:  
No, NDFA keep that to themselves (P15, 2016) 
Although it is not all that surprising that there is clear transparency in the running of 
the bidding process and the availability of bid evaluation criteria as this is regulated under EU 
legislation, it is surprising that there are no provisions for government departments to 
participate at the opening of bids, particularly given the recent issues in the Grangegorman bid 
opening process. 
Transparency of feedback given to bidders at different stages of the bidding process 
and the debriefing of unsuccessful bidders was most spoken about by interviewees from stage 
3 Primary Care projects and the more established Transport projects. In terms of meetings that 
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take place between bidders, the NDFA and the procuring authorities, the level of transparency 
was seen to be mixed. The meetings were described as very formal with a disclaimer being 
read out at the start of the meeting (P18, 2016). This private sector interviewee felt that this 
was due to the litigious nature of Ireland: 
 part of the litigious background that they’re operating in, they have to make 
sure that there is a strict procedure and it’s adhered to very, very closely so that 
if somebody makes a challenge along the way they have that to go back to and 
demonstrate how they’ve been transparent and impartial to everyone  (P18, 
2016) 
The meetings are key to bidders but the formal process can dilute the benefit, as 
explained by a private sector interviewee who works for a successful bidder on the Primary 
Care projects, but who was also involved in failed bids: 
 because of everybody trying to guard their interests, it might be a bit skewed in 
terms of the authorities trying to make sure that they were absolutely crystal 
clear in selection and there wasn’t any room for manoeuvre … but generally 
feedback is good and they have … to give you the … ratings of everybody  
(P18, 2016) 
Feedback and especially the lack of it can be confusing to bidders as they may be told where 
something does not meet requirements but are not given suggestions on how it can be 
rectified:  
but then it’s up to you to figure out what is really the best thing you can do 
(P18, 2016) 
It was noted is that there is transparency in terms of feedback given to unsuccessful 
bidders after the bid has been awarded. This, of course, is standard in public procurement, as 
one interviewee from a construction company which failed on the Primary Care bid noted:  
this would be standard in any public sector [award] … that you get given the 
reasons why you didn’t [win] (P16, 2016) 
Feedback is given to bidders by letter and this interviewee noted that: 
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 it’s very detailed. You get a, you either get a letter tells you you’re successful 
or unsuccessful or you get initial scoring of where you are in the tender and if 
you’re successful you get an appendix to that letter which sets out a list of 
things that have to be clarified within a very short timeframe  (P24, 2016) 
Unsuccessful bidders are also allowed a debrief with the NDFA, as explained by a private 
sector interviewee involved in a consortium:  
you’re welcome to come to a debrief where … it’s explained in a lot more 
detail (P24, 2016) 
It is interesting to analyse the view of an interviewee from the construction company which 
failed on the Primary Care bid, who also states that there is transparency surrounding the 
feedback given to unsuccessful bidders: 
 there’s … transparency about what won it and why you didn’t win it and you 
get [a] breakdown and you get [a] detailed analysis of the whole bid … broken 
down into all different sections  (P16, 2016) 
The importance of transparency in feedback to unsuccessful bidders was emphasised 
by a former private sector interviewee now working in the public sector with experience of 
stage 2 and 3 PPP who specified the transparency of the feedback given to unsuccessful 
bidders: 
 I think Ireland would have a very good name for that in terms of people 
knowing why they did and didn’t win … they get … [a] clear marking systems 
… the fact that bidders keep coming back suggests they’ll never be happy 
when they lose but at least when they lose they know why, they see the 
marking systems and the scores and they get their feedback (P14, 2016) 
However, there is tension in the process from the public sector’s point of view. A public 
sector interviewee with more than 15 years’ experience of working on Transport projects 
spoke of the delicate balance of providing useful feedback to unsuccessful bidders and 
providing too much information which leaves the door open to litigation: 
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 they’ll always want to meet you … but it’s a very tricky process, if you give 
out a debrief letter and then they meet you two months later and … you’re nice 
to them and you say something that you didn’t say in your letter that will be 
latched on, oh that’s new information now and therefore will we see could we 
do a challenge … you’re on guard all the time unfortunately, it’s the nature of 
… public procurement … there is confidentiality, you can’t say … that guy 
there bid 100 and you bid a 150 you know you don’t go that, but you do say 
look you were more expensive in this area … you were a lot more expensive 
… it gives him a guide…we give them the scores so they can see, they can 
work out on an NPV basis how they ranked  (P3, 2016) 
Despite transparency in the bidding process and feedback to unsuccessful bidders, 
decisions are challenged, as discussed by a PPP consultant who has worked on stage 1 and 2 
PPP projects in Ireland beginning in 2006. This interviewee said that bidders are aware of 
award criteria and that there are more challenges by bidders now than in the early days (P6, 
2016). The public sector interviewee with more than 15 years’ experience of working on 
Transport projects said that the appropriate level of transparency can be difficult to determine 
and spoke of a litigation case brought by an underbidder: 
 they say that our … requirements weren’t sufficiently clear as far as they’re 
concerned … we give them the breakdown … they will go to court and we’ll 
go to court and we’ve nothing to hide  (P3, 2016) 
Delays in commencing projects can be experienced due to litigation by unsuccessful bidders:  
people are so happy to sue you as well or to try to sue to you delay contracts 
(P3, 2016) 
The High Court action taken by BAM against the NTMA and the Minister for 
Education and Skills (see the discussion under the NDFA as a bureaucracy in 5.3.1 Lead 
Institutional Support) highlighted inconsistencies and a lack of transparency in the bidding 
process. A private sector interviewee involved in bidding on the Grangegorman project said 
with respect to this litigation case:  
[I] thought it was a really cheeky to be honest and I’ve said it to their face but 
in a nice way because we’re all friends together, but BAM were very cheeky to 
try and challenge on a technicality (P19, 2016) 
This interviewee speculated on why BAM took the High Court challenge, suggesting that it 
was not in BAM’s interest to appeal, and surmised:  
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 I thought to try and win it that way when clearly the other people had been 
evaluated as the best value for money and cheap was cheeky but you know 
maybe they think there’s compensation that’s coming their way and they don’t 
worry about reputation because they’re so big they can ride over that. I 
wouldn’t do it because we want to be, keep in with the government and 
everybody else  (P19, 2016) 
The interviewee from BAM did not wish to comment on the High Court action other than 
saying :  
 That process is in the public domain (P24, 2016) 
 
Transparency issues surrounding the publication of PPP contract information 
The main theme in this section is transparency issues surrounding the publication of 
PPP contract information and subsequent commercial sensitivity issues. This is of interest as 
commercial sensitivity is most spoken about in the stage 3 PPP areas of Primary Care, 
followed by Justice and then Education and least spoken about in the stage 1 and 2 PPP areas 
of Transport, Environment and the Convention Centre. The research highlights a complex 
attitude to transparency by different stakeholders and reveals that the drive for transparency is 
nuanced and not at all straightforward.  
In contrast to Ireland, some jurisdictions make PPP contract information publicly 
available. For example, as was discussed in chapter 2, the Committee of Public Accounts 
(PAC) report on PPP in 2007, noted that in Victoria, Australia sometime after the PPP 
contract is signed, it is put on the “Partnerships Victoria” website, although some information 
can be redacted if it is assessed to be “commercial in confidence” (Dáil Éireann, 2007, p.17). 
Chapter 2 also discussed the recommendations made by the Committee of Public Accounts in 
2007, to adopt a similar approach in Ireland (Dáil Éireann, 2007) to Victoria, Australia where 
the onus of proof of  “commercial in confidence” is on the tenderer to prove that it will 
adversely affect their business. The report also noted that in Victoria, Australia the 
parliamentary committee and the Auditor General should have authority to report such 
commercially sensitive information when it is in the public interest for the information to be 
revealed (Dáil Éireann, 2007). This research reveals that none of these recommendations has 
been implemented. 
This research indicates that the general concern about publishing PPP contract 
information centres on commercial sensitivity issues and neither the public nor the private 
sector interviewees want to publish information on contracts. In the US all public contracts 
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are publicly disclosed. This was discussed by a private sector interviewee involved in Justice 
projects:  
 every bit of information of what the winning bidder bids (P11, 2016) 
The interviewee explained that in the US all publicly procured work is made public.  
There is a conflict of interest in terms of revealing information on contracts. The 
Department of Public Expenditure and Reform is the promoter of freedom of information 
(FOI), yet, there limited availability of information on contracts under a FOI request, as a 
private sector interviewee working on the Convention Centre project said:  
There have been various people over the years who have put in a freedom of 
information request, so certain information has been given out, obviously not 
commercially sensitive information (P10, 2016) 
Despite being the promoter of FOI, the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, is 
withholding information, as explained by a public sector interviewee working on a Justice 
project (P2, 2016). Lack of transparency here has consequences in terms of the ability to 
communicate value for money on PPP projects to the taxpayer. This interviewee made the 
point that: 
 you can be overly principled about FoI, in other words you can’t say, oh 
absolutely every detail of everything must be out there immediately [but] at 
some point the taxpayer is entitled to know (P2, 2016) 
Unsurprisingly, as a private sector interviewee involved in a consortium said, there is a 
tendency where the private sector wishes to withhold contract information:  
I’m sure the consortium would want to keep that information fairly confidential 
(P24, 2017) 
However, not all private sector interviewees in this study were equally in favour of 
withholding contract information. The private sector interviewee who discussed the disclosure 
of all publicly procured projects in the US explained that if this were to be the case in Ireland, 
there would be mixed reaction:  
bidders …who are winning will hate it and the guys who are bidding behind it 
love it (P11, 2016) 
Interestingly, this interviewee felt that this information should be available: 
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You shouldn’t need a freedom of information request to go and look and see 
what a public body has procured publicly (P11, 2016) 
The public sector is not in favour of disclosing contract information, despite the 
importance of transparency, in particular when it comes to justifying value for money aspects 
to the taxpayer. The public sector seems eager to withhold contract information, citing 
commercial sensitivity reasons. This was explained by a private sector interviewee working 
on Primary Care projects: 
 I think because it’s so competitive and everybody feels they need to protect 
themselves as best as they can and if you’ve done something clever on the life 
cycle it might be the principles not just the numbers and you don’t want to 
expose this because you’re going to do it on the next project and people might 
just easily get it but there still has to be a way (P18, 2016) 
Another concern is that publishing contract information will interfere with the 
workings of the market and will deter private companies entering the market. For example, 
one public sector interviewee working on Justice projects said:  
certain things have to be deemed commercially sensitive because the harsh 
reality of life is that commercial companies won’t come in (P2, 2016) 
This concern was also shared by a public sector interviewee working on an Education project 
who felt that revealing information on contracts, particularly where there is a pipeline of 
projects, could be commercially damaging to the private sector: 
 if you’re in a pipeline of projects … for an underbidder to see the details of the 
successful bidder’s bid … giving away competitive advantage … you’d want 
to have quite a lapse of time … for fairness to the bidders  (P5, 2016) 
Another public sector interviewee working on Primary Care projects said of transparency that:  
 it only interferes with the normal working of the markets (P22, 2016) 
However, in Victoria, Australia, a state with six million people compared with 4.7 
million in Ireland, the publication of this data does not appear to have interfered in the 
workings of the market.  
There is still a lack of transparency surrounding contract information even in well-
established contract areas. A private sector interviewee working on Education projects 
discussed that even on projects that are well established, there is still a commercial sensitivity 
issue surrounding the maintenance and facilities (P12, 2016). This was emphasised by an 
interviewee who formerly worked with the NDFA who said that commercial sensitivity could 
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extend up until the end of the contract and even beyond where the operating life of the asset 
continues to be managed by the private sector (P4, 2016). 
A public sector interviewee working on Environment projects stated that it is 
important that commercial documents are not made public regardless of whether they are for 
projects built through traditional procurement or through PPP:  
they’re commercial documents and they’re generally not available for scrutiny 
… it’s not clear to me that there is that much transparency around it (P9, 2016) 
This point was confirmed by a senior public sector interviewee involved in PPP decision 
making: 
 we don’t publish contracts, PPP contracts but then we don’t publish traditional 
Exchequer contracts…[I] don’t think we’re any less transparent than we are on 
other things  (P8, 2016) 
However, some interviewees did suggest solutions to overcome this lack of 
transparency. For example, a private sector interviewee working on Primary Care projects 
discussed ways of bypassing the release of sensitive information:  
I think condition surveys are one, customer satisfaction surveys would be 
another that are not commercially sensitive but can still prove the value of the 
asset and the value of what’s been got (P18, 2016) 
The interviewee explained that the condition of the asset built under PPP could be compared 
with the condition of a similar asset built under traditional procurement to assess value for 
money (P18, 2016). 
Taking into account the commercially sensitive information of contracts recently 
awarded, a former private sector interviewee now working in the public sector suggested 
releasing information on stage 1 and 2 projects:  
the principle of retrospectively reviewing them and sharing that information … 
would make sense (P14, 2016) 
Several interviewees had similar opinions on releasing information on stage 1 and 2 projects. 
A private sector interviewee who failed to win a bid on Primary Care projects said: 
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 I don’t know … any benefit of how you approach pricing ten or fifteen years 
ago would serve any purpose because we’ve moved on, … there’s a whole 
different way of doing things … what the commercial realities were say twelve 
years ago they’re only relative to the rules that applied then  (P16, 2016) 
Transparency of PPP reviews and benchmarking 
There has been a scarcity of post-project reviews of PPP in Ireland, the rationale being 
“commercial sensitivity” (Dáil Éireann, 2012a, p.26). The exception to this has been the value 
for money review carried out by the C&AG on the Pilots Schools Project in 2004 
(Comptroller and Auditor General, 2004), a “path-finder” project and the review of the 
Criminal Courts of Justice (CCJ) project in 2012 (Mazars, 2012).  
Caperchione et al. (2017) argue that post-project reviews allow examination of risk 
transfer and performance evaluation and ultimately the examination of value for money, and 
Demirag et al. (2011) contend that this results in better management of projects and 
accountability, thus increasing legitimacy. In the absence of such measures the greater 
involvement of the private sector in public service delivery can weaken the accountability to 
citizens and parliament of those responsible for service delivery. Reeves (2013b, p.14), in a 
presentation to the Nevin Economic Research Institute, has commented forcefully on the 
serious consequences for public accountability of “the dearth of detailed analysis of PPP” 
which again gives citizens little to be confident of that PPP arrangements are serving the 
public interest. The Comptroller and Auditor General has also called for publication of 
appraisal results to “help improve understanding of the factors that influence obtaining value 
in public investment projects” and also the publication of post-project reviews to learn lessons 
for the next project (Dáil Éireann, 2012b, p.7). The Comptroller and Auditor General 
explained that post-project reviews are a statutory obligation. Specifically, there is a 
requirements in the guidance from the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform on 
capital projects that there should always be a “look-back exercise” (Dáil Éireann, 2016, p.29).  
Transparency and the publication of post-project reviews are of concern to the public 
sector. When asked about transparency, the senior public sector interviewee involved in PPP 
decision-making stated that reviews of projects should be published but not contract details: 
I don’t know whether the Department intend to publish it but I think it would 
be our view that they should be published yeah, there should be transparency 
(P8, 2016) 
There was a plan to carry out a review of schools projects and this was also confirmed 
by the senior public sector interviewee involved in PPP decisions (P8, 2016). This review will 
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examine the quality of the buildings but will not examine value for money by way of a 
published cost comparison between the traditional public procurement approach versus the 
PPP approach. 
The private sector interviewee involved in a consortium spoke about a post-project 
review of schools and said: 
 it could be a difficult exercise to do because … you’d have to put a cost on, a 
subjective cost on all those things … the evidence may not be favourable on 
PPP but you talk to the stakeholders on the ground they think it’s absolutely 
excellent and how they are able to continue on with the day to day services 
(P24, 2016) 
The interviewee concluded that a post-project schools review may be a difficult undertaking 
and may not be favourable towards PPP. Perhaps this contributes to the reluctance of the 
Department of Education and Skills to undertake such an exercise. 
It is interesting that a private sector interviewee who works for a successful bidder on 
the Primary Care projects was anxious that value for money be demonstrated to the taxpayer 
and suggested that Ireland follow the lead of Canada in being more transparent:  
I think there has to be a way to publish more and maybe if you look … at … 
value reports … in Canada that [are] … done at the end of the project  (P18, 
2016) 
The interviewee went on to say: 
 I think sometimes people are scared that if they just show numbers and the 
numbers are too big they … get negative reaction, I think … that the model is 
viable and sustainable  (P18, 2016) 
The public sector interviewee involved in Primary Care projects spoke of their 
intention to carry out a post-project review: 
we’ll do one …, between now and possibly the next PPP project so even 
though we haven’t concluded this one yet I think before we sit down and start 
to plan the next one in detail we will look at what we did on this project and 
what we have learnt … what mistakes we made, what we could do differently 
this time and … it will certainly influence how we develop the next project 
going forward (P22, 2016) 
When asked about whether this will be published, this interviewee said:  
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we wouldn’t traditionally publish post-project reviews … they are very much 
internal things (P22, 2016) 
Summary of 5.3.2.1 Transparency  
The pilot study outlined in chapter 4 indicated that although value for money 
assessments are given central importance by the Irish government, full evaluation has not 
taken place because of commercial sensitivity issues and this has sustainability implications 
for Ireland (Sheppard and Beck, 2016). However, when the pilot study was extended in 2016, 
the research found that there is transparency in some areas of PPP and a lack of transparency 
in other areas (see Appendix O for further detail). There is a clear lack of transparency 
surrounding the decision to go down the PPP route and this weakens the predictability in 
decision-making, which is strongly recommended by Matos-Castaño (2011). A lack of 
transparency surround the publication of the basis on which PPP proposals are evaluated and 
published, beyond some tentative publication of the capital envelope on a stage 3 Education 
project. There is also a lack of transparency surrounding value for money testing which would 
appear to be a concern for the private sector in stage 3 projects, with the private sector being 
eager to demonstrate value for money to the taxpayer at this stage.  
There is a lack of transparency surrounding the PSB despite a call from the C&AG 
who advised that the PSB be published. Publishing this is also recommended in the literature 
by, for example, Jooste et al. (2009). There is criticism of the PSB from some of those 
involved in PPP since stage 1 PPPs. This may have led to a reluctance to publish it, resulting 
in an evolving culture of secrecy in the public sector around this issues and an ongoing 
suspicion about the calculation of the PSB. The Department of Education and Skills has gone 
some way to address this by publishing the PSB as a total figure, but the absence of the 
breakdown of this figure limits its usefulness. A lack of transparency weakens legitimacy as it 
makes it difficult to demonstrate value for money to the taxpayer. 
Regarding the transparency of the bidding process, which Jooste et al. (2009), Matos-
Castaño et al. (2012) and Matos-Castaño et al. (2014) argue should be conducted in a 
transparent way, the findings of this study are mixed. There is transparency surrounding the 
bidding process and interviewees believe the bidding process to be fair to those involved, 
although that is just for the bidders involved as there is little or no transparency for the 
taxpayer. Some of this transparency is due to the procurement process being governed by EU 
legislation and this being, therefore, normal practice in public sector procurement. Views are 
mixed on transparency in terms of feedback given to bidders at meetings with the NDFA, the 
reason being fear of litigation on the part of the NDFA. There is transparency in feedback 
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given to unsuccessful bidders. This is due to the need for transparent reasoning as a means to 
discourage potential litigation by unsuccessful bidders. There is mixed transparency in terms 
of feedback given to bidders. This may be due to the NDFA’s wish to be fair or to be seen to 
be fair and again its fear of litigation from the bidders involved. In the bidding process 
transparency can increase or decrease. If it decreases, bidders may feel the process is not open 
and transparent and this may interfere with their inclination to bid. However, if transparency 
increases and there may be a perception by bidders that there is too much transparency, this 
may deter them from bidding as they do not wish their bids to be published.  
There is a lack of transparency surrounding the publication of PPP contract 
information, which obviously weakens the overall transparency of PPPs. Most interviewees 
were of the opinion that there should be transparency surrounding the publication of PPP 
contract information so that the taxpayer could understand value for money based decisions. 
However, as the market is very competitive, this concern for transparency is overridden by 
commercial sensitivity. Both the public and private sector interviewees maintain that the 
publishing of commercially sensitive information would interfere with the workings of the 
market. This concern covers new PPP contracts as well as those that are well established, even 
though sharing information on stage 1 and 2 PPP projects would make sense. Transparency 
surrounding the publication of PPP data increases the overall transparency, which should lead 
to increased political support and ultimately increasing legitimacy. If there is a lack of 
transparency surrounding contract information, this impedes oversight, leads to suspicion and 
thus weakens the legitimacy of PPP. 
In terms of the transparency of post-project reviews, the only sector to have carried out 
such reviews and published them is the Courts Service and to a limited extent the C&AG who 
conducted a value for money review of the Pilot Schools Project. However, there was 
criticism from public sector interviewees and a private sector interviewee that the CCJ review 
was carried out too soon after the project became operational. The scarcity of such published 
reviews weakens the overall transparency of PPPs 
It is the intention of the Department of Education and Skills to carry out a post-project 
review of the Pilot Schools Bundle but the publication of costings is unlikely to be as part of 
this review. In terms of Primary Care, a post-project review will be carried out and it will be 
an internal review and the interviewee from this sector does not know if it will be published.  
The Criminal Courts of Justice (CCJ) complex is a one-off PPP project and there was 
eagerness by interviewees to demonstrate VFM. However, the Schools and Primary Care 




Where there is transparency, it certainly increases the likelihood of legitimacy, as in 
the case of the CCJ. However, in the case of the Schools bundles and the Primary Care 
projects where no post-project review has been carried out, the failure to do so leaves a 
question mark over their value for money and is clearly out of sync with the views laid down 
by Jooste et al. (2009) and other researchers who contend that it is essential to keep the public 
well informed. 
The withholding of contract information due to commercial sensitivity may be a 
legacy from the UK. There is a similar lack of transparency and little external scrutiny in UK 
PFI projects (Shaoul et al., 2009, p246). Other countries such as Canada and Australia are not 
as concerned about commercial sensitivity and find ways to circumvent it. The pilot study 
revealed evidence of policy transfer in that Ireland adopted virtually all aspects of UK style 
PPP (Sheppard and Beck, 2016) and it appears that this could have been transfer without 
reference to lessons learnt from countries such as Australia and Canada. As 6.2.2.1 Learning 
from UK PFIs will reveal, Ireland has drawn mainly on the experience of the UK in 
implementing PPP. This suggests that mimetic isomorphism has taken place with little 
adaptation of the policy or little learning, particularly with regard to value for money 
calculations. This potentially weakens the legitimacy of PPP in Ireland and gives rise to 
concerns over the sustainability of this policy. 
5.3.2.2 Legal and regulatory framework 
The literature suggests that a well-supported legal and regulatory framework is 
necessary to create favourable investment environments leading to successful and sustainable 
PPP programs (Jooste et al., 2009). Verhoest et al. (2015) argue that this framework should 
have clear policies which support the implementation of PPP and which are applied 
consistently. Previous research has shown that if countries adopting policies do not adapt 
them to suit their institutional environment, this can lead to problems with legitimacy 
(Sheppard and Beck, 2016). This lends legitimacy to PPP implementation. A legal and 
regulatory framework should take the form of standardised contracts and documents. It should 
ensure policies are able to accommodate change, that the public and market are consulted in 
policy development, that there is political commitment and that there is legal capacity to 
handle PPPs (Jooste, 2010). Petersen (2011) contends that policies and guidance materials 
should clearly set out regulations such as accounting regulations, EU regulations on public 
procurement, risk transfer and on/off-balance sheet accounting. The creation of a clear legal 
and regulatory framework for PPP has been a problem in other countries, such as Denmark. 
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Verhoest et al. (2015) also states that it is imperative that there are regular updates of PPP 
policy documents. Vrangbaek (2008) maintains that the lack of a clear legal and regulatory 
framework can be an impediment to creating a buoyant PPP market because it can act as a 
deterrent to the private sector.  
Ireland has a well-established legal and regulatory framework for PPP procurement in 
place which is supported by PPP legislation and has been amended and updated. Petersen 
(2011) and Bovis (2010) argue that since PPP was introduced into Ireland in the late 1990s, 
the introduction of policy and regulation has supported the roll-out of large-scale use of PPP. 
The pilot study outlined in chapter 4 found evidence of a consistent legal framework which 
appears to be in place to support the implementation of PPPs (Sheppard and Beck, 2016). 
When the pilot study was extended in 2016, the research found that there were problem with 
this framework.  
Two policy windows occurred which changed Ireland’s PPP policy and regulation. 
First, in 2002, policies were introduced which gave control of PPP deals and risk transfer to 
government. Second, in 2005, the NDFA was established to take over the planning of PPP 
projects. Petersen (2011) purports that these policy windows led to a centralisation of 
Ireland’s PPP policy, regulation and procurement functions within a few central government 
departments and agencies. The senior public sector interviewee involved in PPP decision-
making confirmed that amendments to Acts have since taken place:  
the 2007 NDFA Act … [has] now been overtaken by the NTMA Amendment 
Act of last year which officially gave the NDFA the procurement function and 
… project management (P8, 2016) 
A PPP consultant who worked on stage 1 and 2 PPP projects (P6, 2016) spoke of 
guidelines being developed with a large accounting firm at the beginning of the PPP project. 
However, the Irish guidance material has not undergone an overhaul since 2006, as confirmed 
by a senior public sector interviewee involved in PPP decisions: 
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 we are hoping to do that this year [2016] because a lot of things have changed 
since 2006 even in terms of capital appraisal guidelines are discussed in it 
whereas now it’s the public spending code and it’s just to update all those, 
basically look at the whole thing afresh, update it for all the things that have 
changed but also for all the lessons we’ve learned in the meantime because 
we’ve issued a lot of clarifications since the guidelines were out where people 
think they mean one thing and we say no, that’s not what they mean and we 
clarify (P8, 2016) 
This has led to a very segmented approach to updating guidelines, as this interviewee 
discussed: 
 there’s still tweaks we need to make to the guidance to reflect changes that 
have been applied since … they were originally written, but effectively they 
are being enforced with the tweaks now because when we give guidance we 
update it, so we hope that the rules and procedures and everything that are 
there are working ok (P8, 2016) 
Interviewees discussed the origination of PPP contracts but there is no discussion of 
their evolution. For example, a public sector interviewee who worked on Environment 
projects described the origination of the PPP contracts as:  
a suite of documents for PPP contracts were drawn up, probably about 15 years 
ago (P9, 2016) 
A public sector interviewee involved in Justice projects spoke of the current contract 
format as: “a version of the original one we developed” (P7, 2016). Another public sector 
interviewee working on Justice projects and who has worked on pre- and post-crisis projects 
also spoke of how the contract format:  
got bedded down I suppose after that first initial wave (P15, 2016) 
None of the interviewees spoke of how the contract format has changed or evolved. 
Considering that the original contract format had been developed more than 15 years ago at 
the time of the interviews, the market has evolved and Ireland has experienced a financial 
crisis, it would be expected that the PPP contract format would have gone through numerous 
iterations. This is of concern, as previous research has shown that if countries adopting 
policies do not adapt them to suit their particular environment, this can lead to problems with 
legitimacy (Sheppard and Beck, 2016).  
The NDFA has now taken over the running of PPP contracts, which leads to a 
perception by the public sector that the NDFA’s involvement leads to a consistent and 
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standard approach to contract application, as discussed by a public sector interviewee working 
on Justice projects:  
the NDFA as you know have been taking a central role in procurement of these 
projects and they like rigidly adhering to the standard contract (P7, 2016) 
This was also confirmed by a public sector interviewee working on Education: 
 I’d have to …admit that the National Development Finance Agency, which are 
there as the state advisers in this … have a very well-established set of 
documents and procedures at this stage (P5, 2016) 
There is a belief in the public sector that the NDFA’s involvement in the application 
of the contract process leads to fairness. The assertions made by the interviewees above 
support the earlier claims that the NDFA is process driven. However, its process-driven 
approach was flexible when it came to the awarding of the Grangegorman contract which led 
to the High Court action taken by BAM (see 5.3.1 Lead Institutional Support). It does not 
always follow, therefore, that the NDFA’s involvement necessarily leads to a strong legal and 
regulatory framework. 
The PPP contract formats and documents that are in place appear to be predictable and 
consistent and interviewees are familiar with the whole contract process. A public sector 
interviewee involved in Justice PPPs said: 
 in the recent bundle those bidders that have been active in the Irish market 
seem to have an advantage over those bidders who are not or who are new 
entrants because they are familiar with the contract documentation, the 
procedures, the marking schemes etc. (P7, 2016)  
This predictability of contract formats is considered to be an advantage to the private sector, 
in particular to bidders and bankers (P14, 2016). This is confirmed by a private sector 
interviewee working on Education projects: 
 I mean we live by the contract … It runs everything we do … everything we 
schedule on the help desk, it runs how often we have to respond to that … It 
tells us what’s available what is unavailable, it tells us a penalty for every room 
(P12, 2016) 
However, other private sector interviewees spoke of PPP contracts being restrictive. 
For example, a private sector interviewee working on the Convention Centre project said: 
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all the way through there are certain clauses within our contract that because 
they’re standard and they weren’t adjusted for us, are then a bit restrictive 
(P10, 2016) 
Another private sector interviewee who has worked on stage 2 and 3 PPPs and is hoping to 
work on Social Housing projects pointed out that they would not consider current contract 
formats to be “standard”: 
 standardised contracts no … the lawyers make a lot of money each time round 
… in terms of working out what the actual agreement is, I’m not so sure what 
jurisdictions do have standard contracts in that regard (P13, 2016) 
There are criticisms of the contract process being cumbersome, particularly in PPPs 
with more complex builds. A public sector interviewee working on projects pre- and post-
crisis spoke of contracts being “elaborate” (P15, 2016). The same interviewee spoke of a 
contract process that they were involved in as: 
 a very complicated and slow process ... almost over documented (P15, 2016)  
Views of the contracting process appear to differ according to whether an interviewee 
won or lost a bid. For example, a failed private sector bidder on the Primary Care project 
spoke of the contract process being “convoluted” (P16, 2016), whereas another private sector 
interviewee who works for one of the successful bidders on Primary Care spoke in more 
accepting terms of the contract, saying: 
 that’s the contract like it or not, if you want to be part of that process you have 
to accept that contract (P18, 2016) 
Another private sector interviewee involved in Education projects and a successful 
bidder in the Grangegorman project spoke of the contract process in more sanguine terms: 
sometimes there can be quite a contentious … situation you know if you’re 
talking about penalties [but] there is an opportunity to put your position (P12, 
2016) 
It is interesting to note that this interviewee is involved with Justice projects which include 
historic buildings and which have architectural risks associated with them, making the 
contractual process more complex. A public sector interviewee involved in the Primary Care 
PPPs, where buildings were built on greenfield sites indicated issues related to contractual 
specifications did not arise in this context. 
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There is confusion among interviewees about sharing profits between the public and 
private partners in a contract. For example, one private sector interviewee involved in the day-
to-day running of a PPP facility said:  
I don’t know, I’d have to check that. That hasn’t been seen because that was 
based on revenues (P10, 2016) 
The same interviewee highlighted confusion about profit sharing and financial 
penalties associated with the unitary charge: 
there’s a sort of profit share arrangement whereby the OPW are entitled to 
money back on the unitary charge but that’s very much based on financial 
targets (P10, 2016) 
Contracts have been used successfully to establish service level agreements, which are 
used for accountability purposes and which form the basis of awarding penalties for non-
delivery of services. One public sector interviewee involved in Environment projects said: 
Generally the contract provides the accountability. The service must be fully 
defined in it as regards customer/user outcomes. Thereafter, the supervision 
was by way of audit (P9, 2016) 
There does appear to be scope to amend contracts, particularly service level 
agreements in facilities contracts, as a senior public sector interviewee involved in PPP 
decision-making discussed:  
there are areas where there is some rebalancing for instance I think on the 
schools on most of the recent contracts there’s a five year review of kind of the 
soft services (P8, 2016) 
One public sector interviewee involved in Justice PPPs spoke of negotiating contracts 
four years in advance of operation and how there need to be scope to amend the opening 
hours of the facility during the downturn to save money (P7, 2016). Another private sector 
interviewee involved in the Convention Centre project spoke of their public sector partner in 
the context of changing contracts as being:  
nervous about anything being proposed because they think, well are we trying 
to gain an advantage over them and in many respects that’s not the case we’re 
just trying to make something more straightforward (P10, 2016) 
There is the facility to terminate a contract, but as one private sector interviewee involved in 
Primary Care PPPs said:  
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I think even when we’re negotiating we spend so much time making sure that 
we’re not terminated and the reality is that’s really a super last resort (P18, 
2016) 
Summary 5.3.2.2 Legal and regulatory framework 
The pilot study outlined in chapter 4 found evidence of a consistent legal framework 
which appears to be in place to support the implementation of PPPs (Sheppard and Beck, 
2016). However, when the pilot study was extended further in 2016, the research found there 
were problems with this framework. Policy guidelines were introduced in 2006, but there has 
been a very segmented approach to updating these guidelines. Interviewees discussed the 
origination of PPP contract formats largely in positive terms, but it appears that very little 
evolution of these contract formats has taken place, suggesting a weak institutional 
environment leading to problems with legitimacy. While the involvement of the NDFA in the 
running of PPP contracts is seen positively, in light of the earlier assertions (see 5.3.1 Lead 
institutional Support) that the NDFA’s process-driven approach is inflexible, this involvement 
does not necessarily create a strong legal and regulatory framework. Similarly, while the 
contract formats that are in place are predictable and provide consistency for the private 
sector, they have been criticised for being elaborate and convoluted. Overall, there are mixed 
results in terms of the legal and regulatory framework. The involvement of the NDFA in the 
process and its flexible approach to applying rules along with its fragmented approach to 
updating guidelines and contracts, has the capacity to weaken the legitimacy of PPP. 
5.3.2.3 Political commitment 
The literature suggests that ensuring political commitment is essential for a successful 
PPP programme (Verhoest et al., 2015)  (Matos-Castaño, 2011). Jooste (2010) and the Public-
Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (2007), housed within the World Bank, contend that 
PPP units will tend to struggle when senior politicians do not support the PPP programme. 
This makes it essential for governments to demonstrate political willingness to undertake 
PPPs (Matos-Castaño et al., 2012) as this will support project success and sustainability 
(Matos-Castaño 2011), (Jooste et al., 2009), (Matos-Castaño et al. Matos-Castaño; Verhoest 
et al. 2015). Matos- Castãno et al. (2012, p.12) argue that one way of ensuring political 
commitment is to have a PPP programme supported by a “political champion” who will assist 
in identifying potential PPPs and ensuring they are procured efficiently. 
Political commitment to PPP may be based on ideological grounds (Vrangbaek, 2008), 
by being for instance part of a “Third Way” ideology or  a modernisation agenda that seeks to 
bring elements of the public and private sectors together (Flinders, 2005, p.218). Vrangbaek 
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(2008) asserts that politicians often favour PPP as it focuses on service delivery, leaving the 
concerns of accountability and control to government bureaucrats. However, Flinders (2005) 
states that other politicians are opposed to PPP on ideological grounds as they inherently 
reject a profit-making motive in certain core public service delivery.  
Political commitment to PPP should be long term (Verhoest et al., 2015) as a short-
term focus can foster a lack of transparency and a lack of accountability. It is necessary to 
reassure the private sector that in the event of a change in government, PPP support will 
continue (Mahalingam, 2011) because PPPs represents a long-term contractual commitment 
(Vrangbaek, 2008). Verhoest et al. (2015) propose that it is necessary, therefore, for political 
commitment to PPP to be expressed by the main political parties. Also, a lack of political 
consensus on policy issues such as PPP can affect the degree of policy transfer (Birrell, 2012). 
The pilot study outlined in chapter 4 found evidence of strong political commitment to 
PPP in Ireland (Sheppard and Beck, 2016). However, when the study was extended in 2016, it 
was found that political commitment to PPP is nuanced and influenced by more factors than 
had initially surfaced in the pilot study.  
Ireland’s historically poor infrastructure compared with other European countries 
made PPP attractive for government (Petersen, 2011), and initially it would appear that there 
was political commitment to PPP. PPP was introduced primarily on an ideological basis and 
there was a political champion. When asked about political commitment to PPP, only six 
interviewees spoke of when it was first introduced, and all six agreed that there was political 
commitment and its introduction was on ideological grounds:  
I mean there are certainly ideological reasons … it was Charlie McCreevy was 
the Minister at the time so I mean and Charlie kind of was a big fan of the 
private sector (P4, 2016) 
It was also noted by another interviewee that PPP was championed by Charlie McCreevy:  
it was an option that he chose ideologically but I think it was an option that 
politically found resonance (P17, 2016) 
As discussed in chapter 2, PPP formed part of the implementation of the economic 
liberalisation policies of the then Minister for Finance, Mr. Charlie McCreevy TD. 
Interestingly, PPP was promoted at a time when the country could borrow easily, as discussed 
by the public sector interviewee who has worked on PPP Transport projects since stage 1: 
151 
 
we were fairly flush in terms of the money at the time of the economy, we were 
getting big exchequer grants every year and then PPP was … an additive … 
thing so we did it at a time when it wasn’t necessary (P3, 2016) 
PPP was seen as an alternative procurement model, as an interviewee who formerly worked 
with the NDFA noted:   
I think it’s fair to say though kind of that it was something, it certainly wasn’t 
pushed on us, right I mean there’s no external force saying, you have to do this 
right, kind of that I am aware of anyway kind of, I think it was very much the 
government seen this as something that they would like to try and something 
they’d like to do in a limited way (P4, 2016)  
Political commitment continued until the financial crisis, when PPPs were cancelled 
by government. As this interviewee noted:  
once you got to 2008 government realised it couldn’t continue with some of the 
schemes that they’ve had on the bid because of financial difficulties (P11, 
2016) 
There seemed to be consensus among interviewees that later on PPP became a 
politically expedient procurement method. This was the case particularly during and after the 
financial crisis. Thus a private sector interviewee involved in Justice projects noted that:  
there hasn’t really been that many alternative options for government (P11, 
2016) 
which has made PPP a means to an end: 
 I think there is political drive to deliver the projects they want to deliver and 
they’re not afraid to use PPP to do that … think they are happy enough to have 
themselves photographed shaking the hand of the new school head teacher 
when they get the keys to the brand new school (P11, 2016) 
However, the private sector interviewees tended to be uncertain about the level of 
political commitment to PPP. As one interviewee noted, in one case it required the Minister to 
show up at a PPP announcement to demonstrate commitment: 
when we were bidding [on] the court scheme one of the reasons we bid it was 
because when the Minister for Justice showed up actually in this hotel, to say, 
I’m standing behind this project it’s going to happen (P11, 2016) 
The general consensus among interviewees was that there is still political commitment 
to PPP. This was noted by a public sector interviewee involved in Primary Care projects who 
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spoke about PPP post crisis and discussed the stimulus programme and Infrastructure and 
Capital Investment Plan 2016 – 2021 as being an example of political commitment:  
yes there would have been a huge amount of political emphasis on this 
stimulus package (P22, 2016) 
This view was supported by a senior public sector interviewee involved in PPP decision-
making who said:  
I think Ministers are committed (P8, 2016) 
Interviewees spoke of the reasoning behind political commitment to PPP post crisis. It 
would appear that political commitment now is due less to an ideology and more to political 
pragmatism. Politicians will choose the method of delivery that better suits their aims and 
objectives. For example, a public sector interviewee working on Transport projects stated that 
PPP is a way for Ministers to get things done:  
Ministers want schemes done, they don’t particularly care how it’s done but I 
don’t believe there is support for PPP (P3, 2016) 
This interviewee suggested that PPP is seen as an alternative procurement method and 
there is less of an ideology around choosing it: 
it’s not even an ideological thing it’s more just a lack of championing and lack 
of really seeing what the benefit would be (P14, 2016)  
The interviewees also indicated that there is currently no longer a clear political 
champion of PPP. A former private sector interviewee now working in the public sector stated 
that PPP:  
[is] certainly lacking a champion among the political ranks (P14, 2016) 
Interestingly the private sector considers there to be far less political commitment to 
PPP than the public sector. For example, a former private sector interviewee now working in 
the public sector gave an interesting insight into political commitment to PPP:  
No it hasn’t had the political buy-in (P14, 2016) 
It is also interesting to consider how the sectors the interviewees are working in and 
how this reflects their perception of existing political commitment to PPP. For example, a 
public sector interviewee working on Transport projects expressed the view that there is no 
political commitment to PPP:  
I wouldn’t think there’s huge support for … it’s been a means to do things … 
it’s not that people like it (P3, 2016) 
This interviewee is working in the area of Transport and there were no new Transport 
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projects in the recent Infrastructure and Capital Investment Plan 2016 - 2021. However, those 
working on Justice projects, of which new projects feature in the plan, spoke more positively 
about political commitment, with a public sector interviewee saying: 
 the current Minister Frances Fitzgerald, she’s a background as a social worker 
working in the family support area, so for her because the, we’ve got very poor 
family law facilities at the moment the idea of actually having a dedicated 
family law centre there is very attractive politically (P7, 2016) 
This could be perceived as PPP being seen as a means to an end rather than political 
commitment. It supports the point made earlier that PPP is now perceived as a useful 
pragmatic procurement method and there is less ideology driving it.  
A private sector interviewee who has worked on stage 2 and 3 PPPs and is hoping to 
be involved in Social Housing PPPs nonetheless spoke of favourable political commitment to 
PPP. This interviewee gave as examples of political commitment new initiatives, banking 
competitions and having planning permission and design in place introduced by the 
government post crisis to stimulate the PPP market (P13, 2016). However, this interviewee 
was speaking of political support in Justice projects and the interviewee hoping to work on 
Social Housing PPPs may interpret pragmatism in using PPP as a procurement tool as 
evidence of political support.  
Ireland’s political commitment to PPP can perhaps be summed up by a member of the 
Committee of Public Accounts who said that many on the committee remain to be convinced 
that PPP is “the right way to go” (Dáil Éireann, 2016, p.37), suggesting there is only weak 
political support for PPPs.  
The extended study found that there are distinct factors which influence the degree of 
political support for PPP and these are the on-off balance sheet commitment to PPP; political 
support and understanding of PPP; the speed of PPP project delivery; and political planning, 
decision-making and attitude to risks in PPP. The following sections explore these themes in 
further detail. 
On-off balance sheet commitment to PPP 
The interviews drew light on factors that influence political commitment to PPP. One 
such influence on political commitment is the off-balance sheet nature of PPPs. As discussed 
in 5.3.2.2 Legal and regulatory Framework, PPP policies and guidance materials should 
clearly set out regulations regarding on/off-balance sheet accounting. There have been 
problems in the past and also recently with off-balance sheet rules. Ireland experienced 
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problems with EU regulations regarding on/off-balance sheet issues with the first pilot PPP 
projects, but this was rectified with legislation introduced in 2002 and 2005 (Petersen, 2011). 
There does appear to be continued political commitment to keeping PPPs off-balance sheet, as 
discussed by a private sector interviewee who has worked on stage 2 and 3 PPPs and is 
hoping to be involved in Social Housing projects. This interviewee said there is: 
political commitment to moving money off-balance sheet (P13, 2016)  
However, in 2016, Eurostat indicated that a large portion of Irish PPPs should be 
brought back on-balance sheet15. This suggestion was discussed by a public sector interviewee 
working on Primary Care projects who surmised that if PPPs were to move back on-balance 
sheet, then many projects may not move forward as PPPs (P22, 2016). This would have 
significant implications for the whole PPP project and would adversely affect political 
commitment and the legitimacy of PPPs in Ireland. 
Political support and understanding of PPP 
Political support and understanding of PPP is another influencer of political 
commitment identified in the research. There was a consensus among both the private sector 
and public sector interviewees that there is a lack of understanding of PPPs on the part of 
politicians. It was acknowledged by a private sector interviewee, who had failed in their bid 
for Primary Care projects, that political support for PPPs is required for it to happen (P11, 
2016).  
The research indicates that there appears to be a lack of understanding of PPP on the 
part of politicians. Even though there appears to be commitment to PPP in the current 
infrastructure and Capital Investment Plan 2016 – 2021 and PPP thus showed itself to be a 
useful procurement method during the financial crisis, there does appear to be a lack of 
political understanding of PPP. A former private sector interviewee now working in the public 
sector noted that there is: 
                                                 
15 Irish Times, “EU statistics agency move could limit government spending”, Fiach Kelly, 6 May 2016. 
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 a lack of understanding … and … a lukewarmness at best from the politicians 
… it’s hard for politicians to get their heads around the complexity and the 
time involved … is a lack of understanding, people don’t understand what a 
Public Private Partnership is, what the different types of PPPs are, what they 
really mean, what the risk transfer is really about and it’s a hard one for a 
politician to get his head around or her head around (P14, 2016) 
This was supported by a private sector interviewee who was successful in winning Primary 
Care projects and who discussed of politicians:  
I’m not convinced that they get … the benefits or it’s high on their agenda 
(P18, 2016) 
Similarly, a public sector interviewee involved in Justice projects said in relation to 
politicians’ understanding of PPP:  
they just talk off the top of their heads (P15, 2016) 
This lack of political support and understanding of PPP has significant implications for the 
whole PPP project, and as the final decision lies with the Minister, it would call into question 
whether informed decisions are being made.  
Speed of project delivery 
Another influencer of political commitment to PPP is the speed of project delivery and 
how this affects PPP procurements fit into the short political cycle. Political support is 
connected to the speed of delivery of new projects as politicians want to be seen as bringing 
projects on stream. Interviewees noted that politicians are not averse to using other 
procurement methods if the project is delivered faster. The PPP process was described by a 
public sector interviewee as being: “slow and tortuous” (P15, 2016) and by a former private 
sector interviewee working in the public sector as:  
having a name for being slow (P14, 2016)  
This results in PPPs not always being favoured by politicians. 
An example of the lack of political support for PPP due to slow delivery is the case of 
new Garda stations. Originally they were to be delivered through PPP but now they are to be 




 the previous Minister for Finance or Expenditure and Reform found out how 
long they were taking [and] … he asked me, could they be done quicker?  And 
I said, yes we can do them quicker and in fact we did (P15, 2016) 
Another example of this is Primary Care. A private sector interviewee involved in 
Primary Care explained that originally all Primary Care Units were to be delivered through 
PPP but this was reduced as politicians wanted the units built promptly. Eventually the 
number to be delivered through PPP: 
 got chopped down … they have the site but of course … every local TD 
wanted it … on the[ir] list … and I think there’s infighting politically (P19, 
2016) 
However, a senior public sector interviewee involved in PPP decision-making 
commented on the speed of PPP procured projects as follows: 
 I think there’s a certain element of frustration because you know government 
announces these projects and they think they’re going to deliver them and 
PPPs, because of the kind of contract they are, they’re like a lightning rod for 
issues … the more recent ones have been bundles of projects rather than one 
big project, and therefore the project can only move at the pace of the slowest 
(P8, 2016) 
Political commitment to PPP is affected by the political cycle which in turn is 
weakened when project delivery is slow. Politicians’ influence can only be demonstrated in a 
very short window of time, that is, while in office. Thus politicians tend to make decisions 
that will be implemented within their term of office. Some interviewees noted that PPP is 
considered to be a slow method of delivery and politicians prefer a quicker method of 
delivery, that being traditional procurement. This can cause problems for the public sector 
which plans for the long term, as one public sector interviewee working on Justice projects 
explained:  
politicians think in time spans of the next election … we’ve to think wider than 
that (P15, 2016) 
A private sector interviewee working on Justice projects was of the view that PPPs 
offer a long-term way of dealing with procurement and effectively overcoming the short 
political cycles that politicians operate in (P11, 2016). This represented an interesting scenario 
in that PPP was seen as a means of fostering a long term perspective on policy-making. 
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Political planning, decision-making and attitude to risks 
Political commitment to PPP is also influenced by political planning, decision-making 
and attitude to risks. Announcements of new capital projects in Ireland have been unclear as 
to how much will be developed through PPP, leading to confusion and uncertainty among the 
private sector. A former private sector interviewee now working in the public sector described 
the uncertainty of the delivery of new capital projects: 
 Sometimes the announcements can be driven by political announcements 
around overall programmes (P14, 2016) 
This point was reiterated by another private sector interviewee who has worked on 
stage 2 and 3 PPPs and is hoping to work on Social Housing projects. They discussed the 
announcement of Social Housing projects in the infrastructure and Capital Investment Plan 
2016 - 2021. The interviewee described the lack of information on the specifics of project 
delivery as follows: 
 there are quite a number of moving parts to housing and I don’t think they’re 
all fully understood. Well there certainly isn’t a … rounded commitment there 
but hopefully … with Coveney behind it he may do something (P13, 2016) 
Another influencer of political commitment to PPP is political risk. This includes 
factors such as overcommitting to delivering through PPP and a change in government. It is 
interesting that political risks were not as important an influencer of political commitment to 
PPP for interviewees as might have been expected considering the short-term nature of the 
political cycle and the long-term nature of PPP.   
A private sector interviewee who has worked on stage 2 and 3 PPPs and is hoping to 
work on Social Housing projects expressed concern that the government has overcommitted 
to a programme of delivering though PPP and spoke of the fallout from the cancelled PPPs 
during the financial crisis:  
I think the risks from the government’s point of view are they commit to a 
programme which they can’t follow up on and that is reputational damage 
(P13, 2016) 
A change of government and in particular a change of political party was also a 
concern to interviewees. For example, a private sector interviewee working on Education 
projects during the 2016 general election said: 
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 I mean they’ve published that Capital Plan … I don’t see them rowing back on 
it, I can’t see Fianna Fáil wanting them to row back on it, it would be more if 
not less (P12, 2016) 
Another former private sector interviewee now working in the public sector spoke of 
political risks in terms of certain political parties being “anti-private sector” (P14, 2016). For 
example, one private sector interviewee working on Justice projects discussed a concern if 
Sinn Fein were to get into power:  
the new political parties like Sinn Fein I think you’ll find that they will be quite 
against a private element in the public infrastructure (P11, 2016) 
Summary 5.3.2.3 Political commitment 
The PPP programme in Ireland would not have commenced had there not been 
political commitment to it. Initially this support was largely ideological. The pilot study 
outlined in chapter 4 found evidence of strong political commitment to PPP in Ireland 
(Sheppard and Beck, 2016). However, the PPP programme stalled during the financial crisis 
as projects were cancelled. The PPP programme has resumed post crisis and the extended 
study in 2016 has found that political commitment to PPP has continued, albeit in a weak 
form, and without a political champion, which puts PPP on a less ideological and more 
pragmatic track. Verhoest et al. (2015), and Matos-Castaño (2011) highlighted the need for 
political commitment and this research finds this to be weakened by the ongoing controversy 
surrounding the on-off balance sheet debate, weak political support and a lack of 
understanding of PPP. Moreover, an existing short political cycle, which is not suited to the 
slow nature of PPP delivery, and uncertainty, a confusing political planning and decision-
making process, and political risks all add ambiguity to long-term commitment-making. This 
in turn weakens the potential legitimacy of PPP and seriously questions the long term 
sustainability of this policy. 
Summary 5.3.2 Political support 
The literature discusses the importance of providing a stable political environment 
(Jooste et al., 2009; Matos-Castaño et al., 2012; Matos-Castaño et al., 2014), political 
willingness for PPP (Matos-Castaño, 2011) in the form of a political champion, and a 
transparent and consistent PPP unit which disseminates information, all of which contribute 
towards the legitimacy of PPP. 
In 5.3.2.1 Transparency it was found that there is transparency in some areas of PPP 
and a lack of transparency in others. There is a clear lack of transparency surrounding the 
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decision to go down the PPP route, the need for which transparency is considered important 
by writers such as Matos-Castaño (2011). There is also a lack of transparency surrounding 
value for money testing.  
 There is also a lack of transparency surrounding the PSB, and this continues to be the 
case despite a call from the C&AG who advised that the PSB be published. There are mixed 
results in terms of transparency of the bidding process which Jooste et al. (2009), Matos-
Castaño et al. (2012) and Matos-Castaño et al. (2014) argue should be conducted in a 
transparent way. There is transparency surrounding the bidding process and interviewees 
believe the bidding process to be fair to those involved, although that is just for the bidders 
involved as there is no transparency for the taxpayer.  
There is a lack of transparency surrounding the publication of PPP contract 
information, which is out of line with recommendations by Khadaroo (2008), Boardman and 
Vining (2012) and Vining and Boardman (2008a). In terms of the transparency of post-project 
reviews, the only sector to have carried out a post-project review and published it is the 
Courts Service and to a limited extent the C&AGs’ value for money review of the Pilot 
Schools Project. In summary the overall lack of transparency weakens the legitimacy of PPP 
in Ireland and causes serious concerns over the sustainability of this policy. 
In 5.3.2.2 Legal and regulatory framework it was found that there are issues with the 
legal and regulatory framework surrounding PPP. Policy guidelines were introduced in 2006, 
but there has been a very segmented approach to updating these guidelines. Interviewees 
discussed the origin of PPP contract formats but it appears that very little evolution of these 
contract formats has taken place, suggesting a weak institutional environment which could 
contribute to problems with legitimacy. While the involvement of the NDFA in the running of 
PPP contracts is seen positively, in light of the earlier indications, in 5.3.1 Lead institutional 
Support, that the NDFA’s process-driven approach is inflexible, its involvement does not 
necessarily contribute to a strong legal and regulatory framework. The contract formats that 
are in place are predictable and provide consistency for the private sector, but they have also 
been criticised for being elaborate and convoluted. Overall, there are mixed results in terms of 
the existing legal and regulatory framework. The involvement of the NDFA in the process and 
its flexible approach to applying rules along with the fragmented approach to updating 
guidelines and contracts seems to weaken the legitimacy of PPP. 
In 5.3.2.3 Political commitment it was found that the PPP programme stalled during 
the financial crisis as projects were cancelled, but the PPP programme has resumed post 
crisis. The study found that political commitment to PPP has continued, albeit in a weak form, 
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without a political champion and in a less ideological and more pragmatic way. While 
Verhoest et al. (2015) and Matos-Castaño (2011) point to the necessity of strong political 
commitment to PPP, political commitment to PPP is weakened by the ongoing controversy 
surrounding the on-off balance sheet debate in Ireland, as well as weak overall political 
support and a limited understanding of PPP. A lack of political consensus on a policy such as 
PPP will affect the degree to which that policy is adopted (Birrell, 2012). Also noted is a short 
political cycle, which is not suitable to the slow nature of PPP delivery, uncertain and 
confusing political planning and decision-making, and political risks, which add ambiguity to 
long-term commitment-making. This in turn is again likely to weaken the legitimacy of PPP 
and seriously questions the sustainability of this policy. 
In summary, 5.3.2 Political support suggests that the contribution of political support 
to the legitimacy of PPP is limited with serious concerns regarding transparency, a flexible 
approach to applying rules along with a fragmented approach to updating guidelines and weak 
political commitment to PPP.  
 
5.3.3 Stakeholder Consent 
Reeves (2013a) argues that stakeholder participation in PPP is important and should 
be meaningful. The literature suggests that PPPs are more likely to gain legitimacy when 
governments have the support of stakeholders (Mahalingam, 2011). Matos-Castaño et al. 
(2012, p.5) argue that public support and advocacy for PPP is brought about through 
“effective communication” and knowledge dissemination and Opara (2014, p.85) suggests 
that his requires highlighting PPP success stories, developing “a history of projects with 
private sector involvement” and through the development of regulation and oversight. This is 
referred to in the literature as an enabling environment where all the relevant stakeholders are 
“convinced and well-informed” through the development of an effective communication 
strategy (Delhi and Mahalingam, 2012, p.1485). The United Nations Economic Commission 
for Europe (UNECE) (2008) advises that this consultation process should include information 
on what PPPs are for those unfamiliar.  
Jooste et al. (2009) state that stakeholder consultation is imperative in the PPP 
process, and will improve accountability of PPPs. Reeves (2013a) argues that it will lead to a 
transparent and more successful PPP process and Mahalingam (2011) states that consultation 
will clarify expectations among stakeholders, prevent misunderstandings and mitigate against 
unrealistic expectations of what PPP can achieve. Matos-Castaño (2011) and Jooste et al. 
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(2009) assert that a consultation process should take place at every stage of the PPP process. 
In November 2001, an Irish  PPP Advisory Group published a “Framework for Public 
Private Partnerships - Working together for quality public services”. This group initially 
involved representatives of IBEC, trade unions, the Construction Industry Federation and the 
main agencies engaged in PPP. The principal features of the framework included the 
recognition of the critical role of social partnership and stakeholder consultation. Further 
discussions took place on employee and employee representative consultative arrangements 
culminating in the publication of Guidelines for State Authorities entitled “Stakeholder 
Consultation for Employees and their Representatives” in early 2005 (ICTU, 2005). These 
documents gave clear recognition of the critical role of social partnership and stakeholder 
consultation in underpinning the success of PPPs (ICTU, 2005). This process was supported 
by the UNECE as enabling the PPP programme in Ireland to be implemented successfully 
(UNECE, 2008) and also by IBEC which stated “greater buy-in is needed from all 
stakeholders” (IBEC, 2011, p.3).  
The pilot study outlined in chapter 4 found that when PPPs were first introduced in 
Ireland, it was the intention that stakeholders would be consulted on them, and this appears to 
have happened with unions in early PPP projects such as in water and wastewater PPPs 
(Sheppard and Beck, 2016).  
Initially, the trade unions were in favour of PPP. The Department of Finance central 
guideline on PPP consultation between stakeholders (2005) was interpreted by the trade 
unions as allowing for detailed consultations on the Procurement Assessment Report (PAR) 
which considers different procurement alternatives in terms of their economic, engineering 
and organisational aspects16. In the case of a replacement wastewater treatment plant, five 
round-table meetings took place where stakeholders raised questions and made changes to the 
PAR, prior to submission to the Department of the Environment in November 2007 (Reeves, 
2013a).  
However, in the case of another water and wastewater PAR submitted in mid-2006, 
consultation was less cooperative and failed to facilitate agreement. Key issues raised by trade 
unions included concerns about the data underpinning of cost estimates; the extent to which 
value for money estimates depended on risk transfer; and omissions such as the cost of 
providing for redeployment of existing labour. A consultation process followed which ended 
in a round-table discussion at which the local authority communicated its final decision to 
adopt the PPP model of procurement (Reeves, 2013a, p.384).  
                                                 
16 Public Private Partnership – Stakeholder Consultation for Employees and their Representatives, January 2005. 
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In the case of a mixed tenure housing and urban regeneration PPP proposed as a 
design, build and finance project, a plan unveiled by Dublin City Council in summer 2004, 
there was no participation or input from residents or community organisations and the plan 
was rejected. It was followed by a period of negotiation in late 2004. The council initially 
resisted having community representatives on the bid assessment panel but relented after a 
year. The consequences of the economic crash and the decline in the property market resulted 
in this PPP project collapsing in 2008 (Reeves, 2013a).  
The literature gives importance to the categorisation of stakeholders, and in the 
extended study, interviewees identified different stakeholder groups. Jooste et al. (2009, p.2) 
use an expanded definition of stakeholders, given by El-Gohary et al. (2006) as “individuals 
or organizations that are either affected by or affect the development of the project”. Jooste et 
al. (2009) provide a topography of stakeholder groups and categorise them into three broad 
groups: the public sector, the private sector and the civic sector. They describe this as not 
being a completely novel approach and cite a number of streams of literature which categorise 
stakeholders in this manner. Jooste et al. (2009) suggest that for purposes of simplification it 
can be said that the “public sector” includes all governmental organisations; the “private 
sector” as the market of private companies or organisations that are directly involved in PPP 
projects; and the “civic sector” as those who have local interests at heart such as the users of 
the assets, local residents, taxpayers and civic organisations.  
In the extended study, interviewees identified stakeholder groups involved in PPP 
sectors. For the purposes of stakeholder-focused data analysis, these were categorised in line 
with Jooste et al. (2009) as outlined in Table 5.4. The trade union stakeholder group proved 
difficult to categorise as in two cases the trade unions in question represented public servants. 
However these interviewees were minor contributors to the research as very little of their 
interviews were used in the data analysis. In the case of the most important trader union 
contributor, P4, this contributor is a member of a trade union which describes itself as a civic 
society organisation. Hence the trade unions are categorised under the civic sector. The main 





Table 5.4: Stakeholders by PPP sector 
Education PPPs Justice PPPs Primary Care PPPs 
Public sector stakeholders 
Grangegorman Development 
Agency 
Judges Clinical staff 
Teachers Office of Public Works (OPW)  
School principals   
Private sector stakeholders 
Bidders: construction companies, 
banks and equity investors and their 
advisers 
Bidders: construction companies, 
banks and equity investors and 
their advisers 
Bidders: construction companies, 
banks and equity investors and 
their advisers 
Civic sector stakeholders 
Community groups  Community groups 
Trade unions   
 
It appears that the understanding of stakeholder consultation has become fragmented 
since PPPs were first introduced. During the extended study only four interviewees explicitly 
discussed the taxpayer as a stakeholder in PPP. Two of these interviewees were from the 
public sector – one an interviewee who formerly worked with the NDFA and one from the 
Courts Service with less than five years’ experience of PPP. One private sector interviewee 
and one former private sector interviewee now working in the public sector also discussed the 
taxpayer as a stakeholder in PPP. A further search was carried out to see if variations of 
“taxpayer” were referred to in interviews. The terms “members of the public” and “the 
general public”, however, were generally not discussed by interviewees.  
This is in contrast to the early days of PPP when there was an emphasis on stakeholder 
consultation, as discussed by a representative from one of the Trade Unions: 
 it wasn’t kind of a blanket agreement that we agreed with Public Private 
Partnerships but we accepted … that there was a value or a role for them in a 
particular context providing that the consultation process with local 
stakeholders happened (P4, 2016) 




 we … used our participation within the social partnership system in order … to 
make sure that we got hold of the information and were consulted at an early 
stage on a project by project basis as opposed to being told afterwards (P4, 
2016) 
This interviewee also spoke about the importance of consultation and value for money for the 
taxpayer: 
consultation … was very important to us…from a wider perspective we also 
have an interest in ensuring …that taxpayers’ money is well spent and you are 
getting value for money from the project (P4, 2016)  
The more recent lack of importance given to the taxpayer and the emphasis and 
importance given to the private sector was illustrated by a comment made by a former private 
sector interviewee now working in the public sector. When asked about stakeholders in PPP, 
this interviewee said: “the market is a key” (P14, 2016). 
The NDFA also talks about stakeholders in terms of the private sector. Mr Brian 
Murphy, then Director of the NDFA, spoke of working closely with stakeholders to ensure a 
competitive PPP environment that generates value for money for the taxpayer (Dáil Éireann, 
2012b). He stated that the NDFA was commencing market engagement with stakeholders but 
went on to identify only private sector stakeholders. There was no mention of engagement 
with the public, taxpayers or unions. This raises questions about whom the NDFA is serving – 
is it legitimising PPP for the taxpayer or is it serving the interests of the private sector? 5.3.1 
Lead institutional support noted that the NDFA primarily is a promoter of PPP and a political 
lobbyist for PPPs and this has serious implications as the agency carries out the value for 
money testing on PPP projects. In 5.3.2.1 Transparency the NDFA was identified as having a 
lack of transparency. The lack of transparency surrounding PPP decision-making would 
suggest that monitoring PPP activity on behalf of the taxpayer is not a priority. 
Overall there are indications that stakeholder consultation in PPP has been patchy. 
This is illustrated by the following sectoral analysis of the extended study which is in no 
particular order. This analysis indicates that stakeholder consultation differs with PPP sector, 
there is a pecking order of stakeholders within sectors and stakeholder consultation differs 




Table 5.5: Stakeholder consultation at different stages of the PPP cycle 
Type of stakeholder 
























































5.3.4 Project portfolio, which will be analysed later in this chapter, outlines the 
education PPPs conducted since the Pilot Schools Bundle in 2001. Education projects seem to 
have shown a mixed pattern in terms of stakeholder consultation, with involvement varying 
across the type of stakeholder and the phase that the PPP is at. The following analysis 
indicates that consultation at the design and construction stage is weak with teaching staff, 
mixed with school principals and strong with local communities. Lastly, consultation at the 
operational stage is strong with school principals. Also, while there has been a lack of 
consultation with unions, there also appears to be an indifference to PPP on the part of the 
teachers’ unions, that is, the Association of Secondary School Teachers of Ireland (ASTI) and 
the Teachers Union of Ireland (TUI) .  
During the extended study conducted in 2016, an interviewee from the ASTI spoke 
about the lack of consultation with the teachers’ unions: 
 There was no consultation with teachers unions around … the commencement 
of building new schools under the PPP. There obviously would have been 
discussion with the patrons of these schools … when it comes to buildings 
really the unions aren’t at the table … There really wasn’t a brouhaha about 
PPPs in the education sector…It was never an issue subjected to any critical 
discussion (P17, 2016) 
This interviewee recalled the introduction of PPP and the unions’ reaction to it: 
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 from my recollection apart from a few dissident voices there wasn’t a critical 
opposition to it because it was seen as a way of getting things done. It was seen 
as a way of actually mobilising resources to build up the infrastructure (P17, 
2016) 
This indifference to PPP appears to be shared by the TUI, with an interviewee from that 
organisation saying when asked about their policy on PPP that it was not that they did not 
have a policy on PPP, it was just that he could not find one (P20, 2016). 
A lack of consultation led to initial concerns among school principals, as discussed by an 
interviewee from the ASTI: 
 at the beginning there was … concern about that and a clash of roles and I 
remember … one principal in particular in a PPP school…they were concerned 
about roles, role conflict and their legal standing (P17, 2016) 
Since then limited consultation with education staff appears to have remained the rule. As a 
public sector interviewee working on a stage 3 Education project said of meeting staff who 
will be working in the facility: 
it’s very limited the engagement with them, we met them a couple of times (P5, 
2016) 
Where there is consultation with education staff it differs across different stages of a 
PPP and across the occupational hierarchy. In this context education staff refers to teaching 
staff and school principals. For example, in the early days of PPP there was little involvement 
of school principals in the construction stage. This was explained by a private sector 
interviewee involved in PPP since the pilot project by the fact that PPP procurement in that 
sector had not bedded down:  
it was unlike England...[large builder] never allowed the head or anybody on to 
site until it was finished (P19, 2016) 
The reason for this was explained by a private sector interviewee involved in a consortium, 
who commented on the involvement of school principals in schools bundle 1: 
 the authority kept the schools at arm’s length from the contractor … they didn’t 
even tell the schools, it looked like, they told them the day they moved in. 
There were good reasons for that because if you give somebody a design 
they’ll come back with a hundred questions (P24, 2016) 
However, the same interviewee noted that consultation with school principals seems to have 
changed in later projects: 
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 That did evolve over time … we would rarely have a teacher coming into our 
sites unannounced, they would have to go through the NDFA…we would have 
three monthly meetings with the principal of the school telling the principal 
what was going on and giving them a tour of the school (P24, 2016) 
Consultation at the operational stage is stronger and the private sector recognises the 
importance of engaging with education staff when it comes to operations and maintenance 
conducted through the Operations & Maintenance Company (O&M Co.). However, this is 
also hierarchical as even though the private sector interviewees emphasise the importance of 
maintaining a relationship with the public sector, the relationship is with school principals and 
not teaching staff. In the context of legitimising PPPs, this could be interpreted as the private 
sector trying to keep school principals on their side by giving them a role in PPP regardless of 
how meaningful it actually is. This was exemplified by a private sector interviewee working 
on Education projects who spoke of interaction with school principals: 
 the interface with the principals is very interesting. They are the people who 
are putting stuff on the help desk all the time … they do have quite a bit of 
control but they don’t manage the contract in any meaningful way ... but … 
how we operate on each of the schools will forge how easy or how difficult our 
life is going to be for 25 years… you’ve got to have a relationship with the key 
stakeholders (P12, 2016) 
It is, however, the O&M Co. that interfaces with the NDFA and not school principals, 
and this suggests that school principal consultation is an afterthought and unlikely to be 
meaningful. The O&M Co. attends meetings with the NDFA, as explained by a private sector 
interviewee involved in Education projects and a successful bidder on the Grangegorman 
project: 
 we … attend meetings with the NDFA on a monthly basis. Sometimes in other 
PFIs … in the UK I understand from my colleagues that O&M Co. doesn’t 
always get a seat at the table, that sometimes it’s PPP Co. [who is] the SPV … 
that does all of the interface with the authority and then … delivers back 
down… to O&M Co.(P12, 2016) 
PPP learning among school principals is also taking place which in turn helps increase 
the legitimacy of PPP. For example, the extended study interviews conducted in 2016 suggest 
that school principals from different schools help each other out when it comes to interacting 
with the private sector partner. School principals involved in early schools bundles and those 
who are experienced in dealing with the help desk advise those involved in later schools 
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bundles. This also strengthens PPP capacity outlined in 6.2.2 Policy learning, which will be 
analysed in chapter 6, as learning from prior school projects is shared between school 
principals. 
The hierarchical nature of consultation with stakeholders, however, does not preclude 
engagement with local communities. While there is no consultation with teaching staff and 
limited consultation with school principals, there is consultation with communities affected by 
the building of schools through PPP, particularly at the construction phase. For example, a 
private sector interviewee involved in a consortium spoke of stakeholder consultation, as 
follows: 
 We tell the community about the schools … get people up to speed and we do 
these two or three times during the project… we do a leaflet drop every three 
months to the local community, explain the project … because there is a lack 
of knowledge … but it’s up to us the … the people who are building these 
things and operating them to educate the local stakeholders and we do that very 
well … we find out the open night for the schools … and we will have a stand 
(P24, 2016) 
Despite the limited consultation and its hierarchical nature, teachers and principals 
appear to be satisfied with PPP. This was emphasised by an interviewee from the ASTI who 
spoke of PPPs meeting the needs of those working in Education: 
 The principal is happy, the teachers are happy, they have far better services, 
their state of the art buildings, they are well maintained and so we have never 
had a criticism… Teachers don’t have to do as much administrative duties … 
like basically housekeeping duties because there are ancillary staff to do it and 
very significantly the school principal doesn’t have to be theoretically within 
calling distance of the school in case something happens because if the boiler 
breaks down you have a caretaker … from those points of view teachers seem 
to be very happy (P17, 2016) 
The objective of the original schools pilot project was to “relieve school principals of 
the responsibility for managing school buildings, allowing them instead to concentrate on 
their core educational and school management functions” and there is nothing to suggest that 
this has not happened (Comptroller and Auditor General, 2004, p.16).  
Consultation with local communities can be contrasted with that of the Convention 
Centre, where consultation was mixed. A private sector interviewee working on the project 
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made the point that there was not a lot of involvement with the community but they do 
employ local people: 
 there isn’t that much involvement with a sort of community … we have 
employment policies where we have quite a lot of hosts who … are the … 
people you see when you come in for an event …we have employment policies 
around employing local people view (P10, 2016) 
This suggests that there is a concerted effort to engage with local communities in 
educational PPPs, an issue perhaps more controversial and closer to local communities’ hearts 
than the Convention Centre PPP. 
It appears that consultation with stakeholders is far from that laid out in the 
Department of Finance central guideline on PPP consultation between stakeholders (2005). 
Consultation with teaching staff and trade unions is weak at the construction phase. 
Consultation with school principals at the construction phase is mixed. However, consultation 
is strong with local communities at the construction phase. Consultation with school 
principals is stronger at the operational phase.  
Justice PPPs 
5.3.4 Project portfolio, which is analysed later in this chapter, includes Justice PPPs, 
of which there have been the Criminal Courts of Justice Building and a stage 3 Courts bundle. 
A review of the Criminal Courts of Justice (CCJ) project found that there is evidence that the 
stakeholders were all adequately engaged in the decision-making process (Mazars, 2012). 
Stakeholder groups identified in the review were: the Judiciary; court registrars, clerks and 
other administrative staff; service personnel; victim support; the Bar Council; the Law 
Society; An Garda Síochána; the Prison Service; and the Director of Public Prosecutions.  
However, the extended study found that, while there is engagement with stakeholders 
in Justice projects, it is complex as there are multiple users. As a public sector interviewee 
who has worked on stage 2 and 3 Justice projects explained: 
 the Judges’ staff, the internal ones … defendants … solicitors, barristers, legal 
aid, probation service, the prison service, Gardai, some of the other support 
groups, the victims groups … you get about ten or twelve major stakeholders, a 
lot of whom are on the opposite sides (P7, 2016) 
The public sector interviewee involved in Justice projects was adamant that PPP built 
facilities are better for stakeholders: 
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the experience in the CCJ universally … would be yes, we’re getting … better 
facilities than we’ve ever had before, the service level is better than ever 
before… there’s a comfort among our stakeholders as to what can be delivered 
by PPP and when they see a big swathe of buildings being delivered they are 
all happy (P7, 2016) 
Another private sector interviewee who worked on Justice projects also confirmed this, 
saying: 
I think it’s … of huge benefit to… the community that it’s putting stuff into 
(P11, 2016) 
A public sector interviewee who has worked on stage 2 and 3 Justice projects confirmed that 
consultation with stakeholders does take place:  
you may at a stakeholders meeting have one or two stakeholders who, say oh I 
read about them PFIs in England and aren’t they terrible? (P7, 2016) 
However, again there is a hierarchy in terms of stakeholders as several interviewees 
spoke about judges and were concerned that their needs be met, but did not mention any other 
stakeholder groups. For example, a public sector interviewee who worked on the CCJ 
explained that judges made a trip to the Manchester courts to see how a PFI worked (P7, 
2016). Another public sector interviewee spoke of judges’ involvement in the design process 
(P15, 2016). There was no mention of meeting the needs of other court staff and other users. 
This mirrors other PPP sectors such as education, where consultation with school teaching 
staff was weak, consultation with school principals was mixed and consultation with local 
communities was strong at the design and construction stages. Clearly there is a hierarchy of 
stakeholder consultation in PPP. 
The OPW appeared to feel threatened by PPP. A public sector interviewee involved in 
Justice PPPs made the point that the OPW, a procuring authority, felt unease about PPP: 
 the OPW…don’t like PPPs … they see it as … threatening some of their role in 
… the State’s estate…the OPW, on an individual basis the people who work in 
the PPP area with us would be quite happy with it and like doing PPPs but 
when you got up to say commissioner level it’s not … as strong (P7, 2016) 
This also demonstrates a lack of commitment at senior public servant level. However, 
the researcher recognises that this interviewee was perhaps unique in terms of documenting 
the view of an individual who is not a strong supporter of PPP. 
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Overall in Justice PPPs there is again a hierarchy of stakeholders with particular 
importance given to ensuring that judges are satisfied with the design stage of PPPs but no 
mention of meeting the needs of other court staff and court users.  
Primary Care PPPs 
Section 5.3.4 Project portfolio outlines the extent of health PPPs. During the financial 
crisis, a stage 2 PPP project, referred to as the National Plan for Radiation Oncology, was 
postponed. The first stage of the stimulus programme announced in 2012 included a plan to 
build Primary Care units though PPP, and a third phase announced in 2015 includes a plan to 
build a National Forensic Mental Service, also though PPP. 
In the UK research has found that the evolution of National Health Services (NHS) 
Primary Care Trusts into NHS Local Improvement Finance Trusts (LIFT), a form of private 
finance initiative (PFI), has resulted in a move towards a private sector health delivery with 
“private sector personnel with generic business experience but often little specialist health 
knowledge” (Aldred, 2008, p.14). Research has found that the private sector has a stronger 
hand as it can walk away from the partnership and only lose its original investment while the 
public sector is the weaker partner as it cannot afford to lose health facilities (Aldred, 2008). 
The research also found that there was little engagement with community organisations, 
which led to legitimacy problems and a backlash from “anti-corporate activities”, which 
damaged the legitimacy of the LIFT policy as it was seen to “threaten small providers” with 
construction companies being used instead of local builders (Aldred, 2008, p.18). Beck et al. 
(2009) also found that for smaller builders LIFT projects were risky, and overly bureaucratic, 
resulting in the use of a least mid-size construction companies over smaller builders. 
The extended study presented here found that engagement with stakeholders is strong 
in stage 3 Primary Care projects at the design and procurement stage. The extended study did 
not cover the operational stage as Primary Care projects were still under construction at this 
time. Again it is clear that some stakeholders have more power than others and there is a fine 
balance to be struck between stakeholders and their demands. For example, a private sector 
interviewee from a construction company that failed on the Primary Care bid made the point 
that it could be difficult to decide between what is possible and what it is not possible: 
 I suspect there’s that constant tussle between the end user wanting … to know 
what it looks like or [that] it doesn’t cost much to run (P16, 2016) 
However, interaction between the Health Service Executive (HSE) and local communities 
where Primary Care projects are being built seems considerable, as discussed by the public 
sector interviewee involved in the Primary Care projects: 
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 at every stage of the process … we go … right down to the level of the 
clinician to review … is this going to meet their requirements? … And … 
trying to understand where the clinical service is going … and I think … that’s 
probably more unique to healthcare than it potentially is to other sorts of areas 
… because it has … a fundamental …impact on the service that you deliver to 
patients (P22, 2016)  
It is notable that this interviewee is concerned about the clinician’s requirements being 
met. A private sector interviewee working on Primary Care projects told an anecdote of a 
clinician who wanted a sink in a treatment room to be put on the opposite side of the wall to 
the way all other treatment rooms were set up and this was allowed (P18, 2016). 
As a result of clinicians’ consultation being strong, a lot of consideration is given to 
design in Primary Care projects. A private sector interviewee who works for a successful 
bidder on Primary Care projects explained that they cooperated with a UK provider to assist 
them in the design and layout of rooms. This was done with the end user in mind, namely, 
patients: 
 We teamed up with … a big provider of primary care in the UK, PRIME, and 
they knew how these buildings need to operate and how they are best laid out 
for patients and the health provision (P18, 2016) 
Consultation with local communities is also strong. Interaction takes place with local 
communities affected by the opening of a Primary Care facility, with some communities 
being more interested than others. This was explained by the public sector interviewee 
involved in the Primary Care projects: 
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 we recognise that there’s a huge value of bringing people in on the inside at the 
early stages because even if people are not happy at least if you’ve had the 
consultation process it’s a little bit easier to manage than if you don’t at all…in 
certain areas people aren’t remotely interested, in other areas there would be 
local community groups and our design team would go out and do 
presentations to the local community…give them the chance to throw their two 
cents worth in…our local site contractors go around all the schools…issue 
community newsletters for each site… on the acute hospitals sites or on a 
project that’s going to be in the middle of a residential community or close to 
we would always offer the opportunity of local residents to come in (P22, 
2016) 
Consideration is given to employment in the local communities, as the public sector 
interviewee involved in the Primary Care projects discussed:  
there’s a requirement to take on a certain number of apprentices, trainees (P22, 
2016) 
This is likely to strengthen support of the local community. 
Summary 5.3.3 Stakeholder consent 
The findings of the pilot study outlined in chapter 4 were that there appears to have 
been buy-in to PPP from stakeholder groups but this is less so in recent years (Sheppard and 
Beck, 2016).  
The study found that stakeholder engagement differs across PPP sectors, the type of 
stakeholder and different stages of the PPP process. There is more stakeholder engagement in 
Justice and Primary Care projects than in Education projects.  
Within stakeholder groups consultation is stronger with clinicians, judges and local 
communities affected by schools and Primary Care projects. Consultation is mixed with 
school principals and weak with teaching staff and trade unions. When analysed by the stage 
of the PPP, consultation is stronger with school principals at the operational stage than at the 
design and construction stages. Also consultation is stronger with local communities affected 
by Education and Primary Care projects at the design and operational stages than those 
affected by the Convention Centre at the operational stage. 
This suggests that more importance is put on legitimising PPP for local communities 
affected more directly by PPPs such as Education and Primary Care facilities, than on a one-
off project such as the Convention Centre which has less impact on the local community. 
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It also suggests that more importance is put on legitimising PPP for those stakeholder 
groups that are more influential such as clinicians and judges compared to schoolteachers and 
trade unions. Consultation with school principals appears to be mixed at the design and 
construction stages but strengthens at the operational stage. However, the real power of 
decision-making at the operational stage lies with the O&M company and the NDFA and 
school principals have very little influence. Where school principals seek influence, at the 
design and construction stage, their involvement seems to be limited.  
It is also important that to highlight the lack of discussion by interviewees of another 
major stakeholder in PPP, namely, the taxpayer. There is a correlation here between the lack 
of importance given to the taxpayer and the lack of transparency, highlighted in 5.3.2.1 
Transparency which discusses the publication of PPP contract information essential for the 
taxpayer to make a value for money assessment. This indicates that the taxpayer is of limited 
relevance to the PPP stakeholder pecking order. This deviates from the recommendations of 
Delhi and Mahalingam (2012, p.1485) who suggest that all the relevant stakeholders be 
“convinced and well-informed” of PPP. Evidently, legitimising taxpayer consent in PPP is not 
considered important, which may be attributed to the fact that taxpayers are not an important 
feature of Irish politics. 
This fragmented approach also runs counter to the recommendations by Jooste et al. 
(2009) that stakeholder consultation should be imperative in the PPP process and will 
improve accountability of PPPs, as well as the views of Reeves (2013), who contends that it 
will lead to a transparent and more successful PPP process. Overall, stakeholder consent and 
hence its possible contribution to the legitimacy of PPP is mixed. 
5.3.4 Project portfolio 
The literature suggests that it is essential that there is an active PPP project portfolio 
and Matos-Castaño (2011, p.24) emphasises that this will “generate knowledge and improve 
capacity” in both the public and private sectors. Increasing the number of projects and 
keeping a reasonable and active project portfolio is essential for the legitimacy of PPP. This 
requires political support which in turn provides confidence to the private sector (Matos-
Castaño, 2011). 
Prior to the financial crisis, Ireland had a substantial active portfolio of PPP projects 
and was therefore described as a “leading practioner” in transport, education, housing/urban 
regeneration and water/wastewater (Northoff, 2008, p.7). The extended study carried out in 
2016 found that during the financial crisis Ireland suffered reputational damage in the PPP 
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market from cancelling projects, and despite a pipeline of projects announced in 2012, there 
has been limited activity in the Irish market and it is fragmented. 
It should be noted that this analysis ignores water and wastewater PPPs, as these are 
exchequer financed and have now moved under the control of Irish Water. It should also be 
noted that the Social Housing bundles contracted in 2017 are outside of this research.  
Figure 5.5 depicts the number of PPP projects signed, awarded or at financial close 
since the first project was approved in 1999 and Appendix M also provides a detailed list of 
these projects: 
 
Figure 5.5: Number of PPP projects signed, awarded or at financial close 
 
Source: www.ndfa.ie/project_sectors and Comptroller and Auditor General, Annual Report 2008 and 2011. 
Prior to the financial crisis, there was a steady flow of PPP projects in Roads, 
Education and two major projects in the forms of the Convention Centre and the Criminal 
Courts of Justice (CCJ). In fact, Ireland was considered to be a rapid follower of PPP 
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(Deloitte, 2006). This culminated in the awarding of further Transport projects, the 
Convention Centre and the CCJ building in 2007.  
The extended study carried out in 2016 indicated that there was considerable interest 
from the market for the CCJ. An interviewee who formerly worked with the NDFA said: 
 There were four consortia that bid for that … courts project so … there is a 
market appetite for it … there was … four bidders for that project and that 
would seem to indicate … that there is market interest but the market interest is 
… predominantly dictated by the scale of the project (P4, 2016)  
However, the financial crisis beginning in 2008 brought about the cancellation of 
planned projects, some at an advanced stage, which resulted in some bidders losing 
substantial sums of money (see Appendix N). There is acknowledgement within the public 
sector in Ireland that the cancellation of these planned projects adversely affected the private 
sector, a factor which has damaged the legitimacy of PPP. As one public sector interviewee 
working on Education projects said, private sector firms:  
had the projects cancelled very late in the day so at this stage they’ve lost … 
many millions of euro through projects being cancelled … but I can’t blame 
them for being a bit cautious (P5, 2016)  
This interviewee made an interesting comment when reflecting that these firms are still 
around and interested in current projects: 
 you have to say ultimately they’re in the game so they must view that there’s 
money to be made and … the question for the State is, if they still think it’s 
worth such an expensive bid that the prize is a very rich one, which questions 
… what are we paying for? (P5, 2016) 
However, a PPP consultant who has worked on stage 1 and 2 PPP projects in Ireland 
beginning in 2006 said that the cancellation of these projects affected Ireland’s reputation in 
the PPP market and there is a lack of state credibility due to cancelled projects and a lack of 
interest by the markets. This interviewee went on to say that interest may come back but at a 
higher price due to the private sector having been burnt, and there will also be a lack of 
private sector capacity such as builders (P6, 2016). 




 I think we suffered …a credibility loss during the recession when projects like 
the Metro collapsed … companies put a lot of money into the Metro projects. I 
was part of one of the consortia and when things like that happen that’s 
damaging… people would be slow again …to come back in…until they are 
sure that there’s political commitment to it (P9, 2016) 
A public sector interviewee involved in stage 3 Justice projects also commented on the 
effect of cancelled projects in relation to one private sector company that had bid: 
 it hadn’t been announced but they reckon they’d won the Concert Hall and they 
put millions into that and I know they were very annoyed … [when] Brian 
Hayes announced the current bundle they actually stood up at the meeting and 
lambasted the government (P7, 2016) 
A private sector interviewee referred to above confirmed: 
 we’ve had a few schemes cancelled on us where we’ve spent, in a consortium 
… probably half a million quid…in…2008/9/10 when the government had to 
cancel projects the NDFA said, very sorry, we’ve been engaged with you 
around this project but we have to cancel it now (P11, 2016) 
Another private sector interviewee who has worked on stage 2 and 3 PPPs and is 
hoping to be involved in Social Housing PPPs spoke of their involvement in the cancelled 
PPPs and the effect it had on the private sector:  
private sector had spent millions on bids, like they never got any money back 
(P13, 2016) 
This interviewee warned that Ireland: 
 will only get away with that once or twice … when all the PPP projects were 
pulled, that damaged us internationally and it burned a lot of potential bidders 
(P13, 2016) 
As a result of cancelled projects, there was very little PPP activity during the financial 
crisis from 2008 to 2012. To stimulate the market and to show that Ireland was open for 
business again, a pipeline of projects was announced in 2012. These included Roads, Schools, 
new and refurbished Courthouses, Primary Care centres and the Grangegorman third level 
education facility. A second phase of the stimulus programme was announced in 2014 which 
included two bundles of Social Housing. In 2015, a third phase in the Infrastructure and 
Capital Investment Plan 2016 – 2021 (Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, 2015) 
included the projects listed in Table 5.6: 
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Table 5.6: Third phase of the Infrastructure and Capital Investment Plan 2016 - 2021 
Justice Health Education 
New Garda Stations National Forensic Mental 
Health Service in Portrane 
Third Level Education 
facilities 




As discussed in 5.3.1 Lead Institutional Support, the NDFA is a market driver and is 
instrumental in keeping the market informed and reassuring the market about the continuation 
of the PPP programme, a factor which contributes to the legitimacy of PPP. Despite the plans 
for more PPPs, there is criticism that there is little activity in the Irish market. A former 
private sector interviewee working in the public sector said: 
 [the] current programme is being good … the roads and schools are being good 
… there’s a couple of schools hanging around compared to having four and 
five school bundles, four and five road programmes. That’s what the market 
really needs to get … excited (P14, 2016) 
This was reiterated by a private sector interviewee working on Primary Care projects, 
who said: 
 the one thing that will come out eventually this year is one project which is 
definitely not a pipeline. Up to now it was very good because they had schools, 
they had the primary care, the Garda, Grangegorman (P18, 2016) 
A former private sector interviewee working in the public sector also spoke of the 
fragmented nature of the PPP project pipeline:  
 there are some projects but they’re all a little bit bitty (P14, 2016) 
However, the public sector interviewee who has worked on stage 2 and 3 Justice 
projects spoke of market interest in the Courts bundle:  
we got good interest … for the bundle we’d five bidders and they were all 
credible bidders (P7, 2016) 
There is frustration in the private sector regarding the Social Housing bundles. Despite 
being included in the second phase of the stimulus programme in 2014, at the time of the 
interviews there had been no announcement of when these bundles would go to the market. A 
private sector interviewee who has worked on stage 2 and 3 PPPs and is hoping to be 
involved in Social Housing PPPs said: 
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 social housing…has not been followed up on…yes we’ve got a 2.25 billion … 
two years ago … we’ve nothing behind it… at the moment we’re waiting for 
the next PPP announcement in terms of the next slew of projects that are 
coming out, and if you are a bidder and you’re spending half a million to a 
million euro for a bid and you’re one of four and you don’t get it, that’s normal 
practice. You want to be in for a shout in the next one you’ll say,… they’re 
going to be busy on those so I’m strategically set myself up to get the next one. 
If there’s none there, you don’t get a chance to recoup and then if it … waits 
five years … and it’s a whole different range of projects you … go, well I’ve 
lost the team I had, the consultants I had have lost interest in me and they’ve 
gone on to do different things (P13, 2016) 
This interviewee suggested that: 
 what you need to do is have the schools bundles, third level bundles, the 
primary cares … just coming out on a conveyor belt. That’s the bit we’re 
missing … we’ll rile up the whole market by saying we’re doing this massive 
social housing programme, which we don’t do … [because] announcements … 
aren’t followed up (P13, 2016) 
A former private sector interviewee working in the public sector predicted when the 
Social Housing Bundles were to be announced:  
I’m hoping to see launched in about January formally these PPP social housing 
projects … whet people’s appetites (P14, 2016) 
A private sector interviewee involved in a consortium also commented on the Social 
Housing Bundles: 
 We are waiting to hear … we believe there’s a … housing due probably in 
March, April, we’re all waiting to see …what’s happening with the overall 
stimulus package (P24, 2016) 
There also appears to be confusion about the new Garda station projects announced in 
the third phase of the stimulus programme in 2015. A private sector interviewee involved in 
PPP since the pilot project suggested that the Garda stations were not going to be procured 
through PPP: 
there were originally going to be three Garda stations done. They were pulled 
but they may be bringing a couple of those back (P19, 2016) 
The reason for this was explained by a public sector interviewee who is currently 
working on Justice projects. This interviewee explained this as follows: 
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 There were three big Garda Stations to go by PPP. And when the Minister … 
found out how long they were taking … he asked me, could they be done 
quicker … I said, yes we can do them quicker…the only reason those Garda 
stations came back is when they saw they weren’t going to be ready for the 
election … I was called down for a meeting and they said, we have to have 
them … I said … I can do them traditionally you have it next week I was told 
you have the money off you go do it. The NDFA were very annoyed, they 
thought I had lobbied to take the project back (P15, 2016) 
A public sector interviewee who has worked on stage 2 and 3 Justice projects 
confirmed that some Garda stations are to be built through traditional procurement and some 
will still be through PPP, and suggested that they should not have been announced as possible 
PPP projects: 
 so those Garda stations, well they were converted through traditional builds … 
I think that reflects sort of more political lack of knowledge of PPP announcing 
stuff without knowing whether you have a suitable project or no (P7, 2016) 
The situation regarding the Garda stations was confirmed by the senior public sector 
interviewee involved in PPP decision-making who said: 
 that’s in Phase 3… that’s still in the plan … it remains to be firmed up because 
the final decision on exactly the composition of it is a matter for the Minister 
for Justice…but the latest indication we have is that it’s the Hammond Lane 
complex and a number of Garda HQs (P8, 2016) 
This confusion echoes concerns raised earlier around the transparency in PPP 
decision-making (see 5.3.2.1 Transparency). There is a lack of clarity among public and 
private sector interviewees about the Garda stations and whether it is Department or the 
NDFA making the decision. Again, as mentioned in 5.3.1 Lead Institutional Support, there is 
confusion regarding the role of the NDFA in decision-making.  
Summary 5.3.4 Project portfolio 
Prior to the financial crisis there was a steady flow of PPP projects in Ireland. 
However, the financial crisis brought about the cancellation of planned projects which 
resulted in some bidders losing substantial sums of money. There was very little PPP activity 
from 2008 to 2012. A pipeline of projects was announced in 2012, a second phase in 2014 
and a third phase in the Infrastructure and Capital Investment Plan 2016 – 2021 (Department 
of Public Expenditure and Reform, 2015). As discussed in 5.3.1 Lead Institutional Support, 
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the NDFA is a market driver and is instrumental in keeping the market informed and 
reassuring the market about the continuation of the PPP programme, a factor which 
contributes to the legitimacy of PPP. Despite these announcements, there is criticism in the 
private sector that there is little activity in the Irish market and that the PPP pipeline is 
fragmented. There also appears to be confusion about the launch of the Social Housing 
bundles and new Garda stations. This is related to the issue as to whether the procuring 
Department or the NDFA are making the decision. This echoes concerns raised earlier around 
the transparency in PPP decision-making (see 5.3.2.1 Transparency) and also supports the 
suggestion that the role of the NDFA in decision-making is unclear (see 5.3.1 Lead 
Institutional Support). 
Having a strong portfolio of projects across different sectors with a clear pipeline 
keeps the market engaged, and a strong market contributes to the legitimacy of PPP. Matos-
Castaño (2011) contends that an active PPP project portfolio will generate knowledge and 
improve the capacity of the public and private sectors. However, it appears that despite the 
public sector’s assertion of a pipeline of projects, the private sector considers this to be 
patchy, and in this respect it is weakening the legitimacy of PPP. 
Conclusion of Theme 1 Legitimacy 
The literature on institutional theory was examined in chapter 3 and in the context of 
PPP it was found that more sustainable PPPs were the ones where the government understood 
the complexity of PPP and where institutional capacity was built. Institutional theory is used 
in this research to examine the legitimacy, capacity and trust associated with PPP in order to 
gauge whether institutional capacity has been built around Irish PPPs. This will in turn ensure 
the sustainability of this policy. 
This analysis is in line with a similar framework proposed by Matos-Castaño et al. 
(2012) and Jooste et al. (2009). The data collected during the study was analysed with a focus 
on theory and themes on the three areas of: legitimacy, capacity and trust. Theme 1 examines 
the legitimacy of PPP under 5.3.1 Lead institutional support, 5.3.2 Political support, 5.3.3 
Stakeholder consent and 5.3.4 Project portfolio. Each of these sections examines the strength 
of the aspects contribution to building institutional capacity. 
Theme 1 Legitimacy was divided into sub-themes during the data analysis. In 5.3.1 
Lead Institutional Support it was found that the role and function of the Lead Institutional 
Support, that is the NDFA, were more complex than suggested by the literature. Firstly, the 
research found that some of the roles of the NDFA as Lead Institutional Support have evolved 
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beyond that described in the literature. For example, it was found that the role of disseminator 
of knowledge, market consultant and project driver has evolved to the role of market driver 
and the role of leader has diminished to that of supporter. The research also identifies a new 
role of the Lead Institutional Support, that of a bureaucracy. 
Secondly, the NDFA exhibited a strong role as adviser and expert, a role which has a 
positive effect on the legitimacy of PPP. However, the NDFA’s involvement in the roles of 
decision-maker and policy developer were found to be mixed and its involvement in the role 
of regulatory body, supporter and market driver were found to be weak. As all roles have a 
positive effect on the legitimacy of PPP this suggests that overall the NDFA is weak in its 
contribution to the legitimacy of PPP. The NDFA exhibited a strong role as promoter of 
policy and as a  bureaucratic institution. However, these roles are found to have a negative 
effect on the legitimacy of PPP. Overall this suggests that the NDFA is weak in its 
contribution to the legitimacy of PPP which should cause serious concerns for the 
sustainability of this policy. 
5.3.2 Political support was sub-divided during the data analysis. In 5.3.2.1 
Transparency it was found that there is transparency in some areas of PPP and a lack of 
transparency in others. There is a clear lack of transparency surrounding the decision to go 
down the PPP route and also surrounding value for money testing. There is also a lack of 
transparency surrounding the PSB which weakens legitimacy as it results in a difficulty to 
demonstrate value for money to the taxpayer.  
There are mixed results in terms of transparency of the bidding process. There is 
transparency surrounding the bidding process and interviewees believe the bidding process to 
be fair to those involved, although only for the bidders involved as there is no transparency 
for the taxpayer. There is mixed transparency in terms of feedback given to bidders at 
meetings with the NDFA, and there is transparency in feedback given to unsuccessful bidders 
in general. There is mixed transparency in terms of feedback given to bidders. This is due to 
the NDFA’s wish to be fair or to be seen to be fair and its fear of litigation by unsuccessful 
bidders. 
There is a lack of transparency surrounding the publication of PPP contract 
information. Transparency surrounding the publication of PPP data increases the overall 
transparency, thus promoting increased political support and ultimately increasing legitimacy. 
If there is a lack of transparency surrounding contract information, this can impede oversight 
and lead to suspicion and thus weaken legitimacy. In terms of the transparency of post-project 
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reviews, the only sector to have carried out a post-project review and published it is the 
Courts Service and to a limited extent the C&AG’s value for money review of the Pilot 
Schools Project.  
In 5.3.2.2 Legal and regulatory framework it was found there were several 
problematic issues. Policy guidelines were introduced in 2006, but there has been a very 
segmented approach to updating these. It appears that very little evolution of contract formats 
taking place, suggesting a weak institutional environment leading to problems with 
legitimacy. While the involvement of the NDFA in the running of PPP contracts is seen 
positively, in light of the earlier assertions (see 5.3.1 Lead Institutional Support) that the 
NDFA’s process-driven approach is inflexible, this involvement does not necessarily lead to a 
strong legal and regulatory framework. Similarly, the contract formats that are in place are 
predictable and provide consistency for the private sector, but they have been criticised for 
being elaborate and convoluted. Overall, results in terms of the legal and regulatory 
framework are mixed. The involvement of the NDFA in the process and its flexible approach 
to applying rules along with the fragmented approach to updating guidelines and contracts has 
the capacity to weaken the legitimacy of PPP. 
In 5.3.2.3 Political commitment it was noted that the PPP programme stalled during 
the financial crisis as projects were cancelled, but as the PPP programme has resumed post 
crisis, political commitment to PPP has continued, albeit in a weak form and without a 
political champion. The study has found that political commitment to PPP is now weakened 
by the ongoing controversy surrounding the on-off balance sheet debate, very weak political 
support and limited understanding of PPP. Also noted is a short political cycle which is not 
suited to the slow nature of PPP delivery, uncertain and confusing political planning and 
decision-making, and political risks, which add ambiguity to long-term commitment-making. 
This in turn weakens the potential legitimacy of PPP and seriously questions the long term 
sustainability of this policy legitimacy of PPP. 
In 5.3.3 Stakeholder consent it was found that stakeholder engagement differs across 
PPP sectors, with the type of stakeholder and the stages of the PPP process, a concept not 
identified in the prior literature. There is more stakeholder engagement in Justice and Primary 
Care projects than in Education projects. This emphasises that more importance is given to 
legitimacy of stakeholder groups in the sectors of Primary Care and Justice than in Education.  
Within stakeholder groups, consultation is stronger with clinicians, judges and local 
communities affected by schools and Primary Care projects. Consultation is mixed with 
184 
 
school principals and weak with teaching staff and trade unions. When analysed by the stage 
of the PPP, consultation is stronger with school principals at the operational stage than at the 
design and construction stages. Also, consultation is stronger with local communities affected 
by Education and Primary Care projects at the design and operational stages than 
communities affected by the Convention Centre at the operational stage. This suggests that 
more importance is put on legitimising PPP for local communities affected more directly by 
PPP such as Education and Primary Care than those affected by a one-off project such as the 
Convention Centre. 
It also suggests than more importance is put on legitimising PPP for those stakeholder 
groups that are more influential such as clinicians and judges as compared to schoolteachers 
and trade unions. Consultation with school principals is mixed at the design and construction 
stages but strengthens at the operational stage. However, the real power of decision-making at 
the operational stage lies with the O&M company and the NDFA, and school principals have 
comparatively little influence. Where school principals seek influence at the design and 
construction stage, their involvement is mixed.  
It is also important to highlight the lack of discussion by interviewees of a major 
stakeholder in PPP, that is, the taxpayer. There is correlation here between the lack of 
importance given to the taxpayer and the lack of transparency, highlighted in 5.3.2.1 
Transparency where this was observed in connection with the publication of PPP contract 
information essential for the taxpayer to make a value for money assessment. This indicates 
that the taxpayer is very low down the stakeholder pecking order. Evidently legitimising 
taxpayer consent in PPP is not important. Overall, stakeholder consent and its possible 
contribution to the legitimacy of PPP are mixed. 
In 5.3.4 Project portfolio it was found that Ireland suffered reputational damage in the 
PPP market from cancelling projects, and there was very little PPP activity from 2008 to 
2012. A pipeline of projects was announced in 2012, a second phase in 2014 and a third phase 
in the Infrastructure and Capital Investment Plan 2016 – 2021 (Department of Public 
Expenditure and Reform, 2015). As discussed in 5.3.1 Lead Institutional Support, the NDFA 
is a market driver and is instrumental in keeping the market informed as well as reassuring the 
market about the continuation of the PPP programme, a factor which contributes to the 
legitimacy of PPP. Despite these announcements, there is criticism in the private sector that 
there is little activity in the Irish market and that it is fragmented. There appears to be 
confusion about the launch of the Social Housing bundles and new Garda stations and 
whether it is the procuring Department or the NDFA making the decision. 
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Having a strong portfolio of projects across different sectors with a clear pipeline 
keeps the market engaged, and a strong market contributes to the legitimacy of PPP. 
However, it appears that despite the public sector’s assertion of a pipeline of projects, the 
private sector considers this to be patchy, and which is likely to weaken the legitimacy of 
PPP. 
In conclusion, the results of the study found that the contribution of 5.3.1 Lead 
Institutional Support and 5.3.3 Stakeholder consent to the legitimacy of PPP is mixed and the 
contribution of 5.3.2 Political support and 5.3.4 Project portfolio to the legitimacy is weak. 






Chapter 6 – Theme 2: Capacity and Theme 3: Trust 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 examined the literature on institutional theory and this research suggested 
that PPPs require a new type of institutional capacity (Jooste et al., 2009) and governments 
should develop the necessary capacity to ensure that projects are brought to fruition 
successfully (Matos-Castaño et al., 2012). Jooste et al. (2009) state that capacity not only 
refers to the building of the capacity of government, which includes the public sector, but also 
the building of the capacity of the private sector. The literature contends that capacity to 
undertake PPPs will strengthen the ability to structure and govern PPP projects which is 
necessary for PPP development (Jooste et al., 2009; Matos-Castaño et al., 2012). 
There is overlap between Theme 1 Legitimacy and Theme 2 Capacity as Jooste et al. 
(2009) and Verhoest et al. (2015) also state that capacity requires the establishment of lead 
institutional support or a specialised PPP unit. As addressed in 5.3.1 Lead Institutional 
Support, a specialised PPP unit can help legitimise PPP. Verhoest et al. (2015) also state that 
capacity, in the context of PPP, requires systems for learning and knowledge diffusion. As 
addressed in 5.3.1 Lead Institutional Support, knowledge diffusion is important for 
legitimising PPP. 
Both Theme 2 Capacity and Theme 3 Trust are analysed in a similar manner to Theme 
1 Legitimacy in chapter 5. Section 6.2 begins with the analysis of Theme 2 Capacity. This is 
sub-divided into 6.2.1 Methods to encourage market demand, 6.2.2 Policy learning, 6.2.3 
Public sector expertise, 6.2.4 Quality of projects, 6.2.5 Coordination of deal flow and 6.2.6 
Performance of PPPs. Later on in the chapter section 6.3 will analyse Theme 3 Trust. This 
section is sub-divided into 6.3.1 PPP programme accountability, 6.3.2 Fairness of PPP 
procurement and 6.3.3 Complaints and arbitration.  
6.2 Theme 2 Capacity 
The approach to the analysis of data under Theme 2 Capacity is similar to the 
approach adopted in Theme 1 Legitimacy which is outlined in 4.4.1 Data analysis used in this 
research study. Appendix H shows how the literature groups the broader themes under the 
main themes. Appendix I shows the thematic framework which was reflected in Table 5.1 
shown earlier and this is now repeated for Theme 2 Capacity in Table 6.1. This table shows 
how the theme 6.2.2 Policy learning was further analysed and this will be explained in that 
section. The order of analysis is based on the number of text blocks identified against each 
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sub-theme in the data analysis. The number of text blocks does not necessarily reflect the 
importance of the theme. 
Table 6.1: Theme 2 Capacity 
Name Number of text 
blocks 
Number of text 
blocks 
6.2 Theme 2 Capacity:  3615 
6.2.1 Methods to encourage market demand  1695 
6.2.2 Policy learning:  
 
- 6.2.2.1 Learning from UK PFIs 258  
- 6.2.2.2 Learning from Irish PPPs 189  
- 6.2.2.3 Public sector learning 53  
- 6.2.2.4 Learning from PPP projects in other 
countries (apart from the UK) and from other 
entities 
47  
- 6.2.2.5 Private sector learning 10 557 
6.2.3 Public sector expertise  737 
6.2.4 Quality of projects  431 
6.2.5 Coordinate deal flow  141 
6.2.6 Performance of PPPs  54 
 
In the analysis which follows, 6.2.1 Methods to encourage market demand examines 
interviewees’ reactions during the extended study to the methods put in place by the Irish 
government to encourage the market. 6.2.2 Policy learning examines policy learning from a 
number of different sources. 6.2.3 Public sector expertise examines knowledge of PPP and 
training given in government departments.  6.2.4 Quality of projects specifically examines 
risk transfer, quality, step-in rights and performance specifications in PPP. 6.2.5 Coordination 
of deal flow examines whether a market environment exists, particularly where there is a 
consistent and coordinated flow of PPP deals. Finally, 6.2.6 Performance of PPPs analyses 
whether there is independent oversight of PPP. 
6.2.1: Methods to encourage market demand 
A successful PPP programme requires a strong and vibrant market of providers which 
will create competition, contribute to quality work (UNECE, 2008) and thus enhance the 
capacity of PPP. Matos-Castaño (2011) writes that in times of uncertainty in the financial 
market, government needs to create confidence and support to solve difficulties. Jooste et al. 
(2009) suggest that actions to make the market more attractive for the private sector during 
such times could increase private sector capacity in PPP. These actions involve applying a 
legal framework (examined in 5.3.2.2 Legal and regulatory framework), coordinating the PPP 
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deal flow to avoid the bunching of projects (Jooste et al., 2009) and developing a domestic 
capital market (Jooste, 2010).  
Verhoest et al. (2013) emphasise that it is imperative to have a clear pipeline and 
timetable of PPP projects which government is committed to procuring. Opara (2014) argues 
that this will ensure that the motivation of the private sector remains high and Matos-Castaño 
(2011) contends that this will contribute towards competition in the market which is necessary 
for successful PPPs.  
The findings of the pilot study outlined in chapter 4 indicated that prior to the financial 
crisis, Ireland suffered from delays in contract awards and financial closure and uneven 
demand. It was also found that it was initially difficult to attract international companies and 
to create sufficient market interest for scalability reasons, but that the government was 
addressing this issue by creating a pipeline of PPP projects (Sheppard and Beck, 2016). 
However, the extended study conducted in 2016 indicates that there are still concerns in this 
area. 
This theme examines interviewees’ reactions as documented in the extended study to 
the methods put in place by the Irish government to encourage the market with a focus on 
whether they have been successful in building capacity, and the analysis also highlights issues 
surrounding these methods. For example, the Irish government introduced initiatives to put 
design-led PPPs with planning in place, to reduce PPP timeframes, to partially refund bid 
costs, and put a pipeline of projects in place. Other issues which arose during the analysis 
were the small scale of the Irish PPP market and the concern with the lack of contractor 
capacity in Ireland.  
International interest in Irish PPPs was very positive prior to the financial crisis. 
Ireland had received expressions of interest in PPP competitions from Australian, British, 
Dutch, French, German, Portuguese and Spanish companies (NDFA, 2006). 
The financial crisis, beginning in 2008, resulted in a downgrading of Ireland’s credit 
rating which presented difficulties for the private sector in financing capital investment 
projects. During the early part of the financial crisis, PPP projects in Ireland continued to 
reach financial close and the PPP model was still considered to be robust (NDFA, 2009). 
However, as the financial crisis escalated, securing foreign capital became more 
difficult for Irish-based investments (IBEC, 2011) coupled with a public finance crisis 
(Reeves, 2013b) and a sovereign debt crisis (NDFA, 2012). Jooste et al. (2009) noted that this 
was a global problem, with the large international project finance banks refocusing activities 
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on home markets in the European PPP market (C&AG, 2012) and the number of banks 
providing funding for infrastructural projects decreasing significantly (NDFA, 2010). This 
culminated in a very weak fiscal position in Ireland in 2011 where the capital available to the 
government to spend on infrastructure projects was significantly reduced (NDFA, 2012). 
During this time, the market was tense and any “project delay [was] interpreted as the 
Government stalling or withdrawing its support for a project. The … high profile 
cancellations of Thornton Hall Prison and the Decentralisation Offices [did] not help market 
confidence in this regard” (IBEC, 2011, p.29).  
In the extended study, the consensus among interviewees was that the cancellation of 
PPP projects and uncertainty in the Irish PPP market during the financial crisis severely 
affected state creditability and in turn weakened PPP capacity. With the financial crisis in 
2008 leading to a very weak fiscal position in 2011, the government stalled or withdrew its 
support for some PPP projects and in other cases cancelled projects (see 5.3.4 Project 
portfolio). As an interviewee who formerly worked with the NDFA said:  
the number of PPPs that were initiated during 2008 to 2014 … there’s none… 
might be one or two in the schools area … they are only coming back into 
vogue because the private sector … is interested again (P4, 2016) 
Interviewees spoke of this period of uncertainty in the Irish PPP market. A private sector 
interviewee from a construction company who failed on the Primary Care bid contrasted 2016 
with this period:  
the market is busy so the margins are back to sustainable margins which three 
or four years ago … were cutthroat prices and people were pricing jobs at cost 
or below cost hoping that they get the job and hoping that they can get money 
out of it (P16, 2016) 
Another private sector interviewee involved in PPP since the pilot projects felt fortunate that 
during this period they:  
never got on the shortlist so I didn’t suffer in the crash of the NDFA pulling all 
those jobs (P19, 2016) 
A private sector interviewee involved in a consortium and with experience of education 
projects spoke about the cancelled third level bundle and discussed a company that:  
 completely exited the market as a result of that project (P24, 2016) 
The effect on the market as a whole was devastating as one private sector interviewee 
involved in PPP since the pilot project said:  
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I’ve built a lot of relationships with many contractors … who aren’t here now 
sadly after the crash (P19, 2016) 
Public sector interviewees also spoke of this uncertainty in the Irish PPP market. A public 
sector interviewee involved in the Primary Care projects spoke of a cancelled Health project 
and how all their work had been to no avail:  
we were at the point when we were just ready to go to market (P22, 2016) 
The consensus among interviewees was that during this period there was a loss of state 
credibility in the Irish PPP market. A PPP consultant who has worked on stage 1 and 2 PPP 
projects in Ireland spoke of the lack of state credibility due to cancelled projects resulting in a 
lack of interest in Irish PPPs by the market. This interviewee went on to say that the market 
might come back but it will be at a higher price (P6, 2016). A private sector interviewee who 
was successful in winning the Primary Care projects and who has experience of the 
international PPP market spoke about the effect cancelled projects had on their company:  
I think in my organisation, people were so put off Ireland that they were not 
prepared to go ahead with it so we pulled out then (P18, 2016) 
Another  private sector interviewee involved in a consortium and with experience of 
education projects said that this time was a:  
very frustrating period … [and experienced a] loss of appetite (P24, 2016) 
A number of public sector interviewees spoke of the loss of state credibility and 
expressed concern of the effect that cancelling projects had on the private sector. For 
example, a public sector interviewee involved in the Grangegorman project said: 
 what’s been hugely damaging … the number of PPPs that the State itself 
cancelled … the Metro North obviously has left a very sour taste but also the 
cancelling of the Third Level bundle, the National Concert Hall, Thornton Hall 
Prison, each of those projects somebody, somewhere spent several million 
before they were cancelled… we’ve had among the teams bidding on our 
project … who have been badly stung on previous projects (P5, 2016) 
The effect of the cancellation of projects on the private sector was expressed by a private 
sector interviewee who has worked on stage 2 and 3 PPPs:  
 the private sector had spent millions on bids, like they never got any money 
back (P13, 2016) 
A public sector interviewee involved in Justice projects also spoke of the effect of 
cancellations on the private sector. This interviewee told a story of how a private sector 
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interviewee stood up at a meeting with the then Minster of State for Public Service Reform 
and the Office of Public Works, Mr Brian Hayes TD, who announced new measures to instil 
confidence and maximise market participation: 
[the] company who were in the CCJ … they reckon they’d won the Concert Hall and 
they put millions into that … they were very annoyed … when that was … cancelled 
… their chief executive …  actually stood up at the meeting and lambasted the 
government for [it] (P7, 2016) 
Another public sector interviewee involved in Environmental projects expressed concern at 
the financial losses incurred by the private sector during this time:  
I think we suffered a bit of a credibility … during the recession when projects 
like the Metro collapsed … companies put a lot of money into the Metro 
projects… clearly we’ve lost some credibility (P9, 2016)  
However, a public sector interviewee with more than 15 years’ experience of working in 
transport projects said: 
 State credibility then was an issue, it’s not an issue today (P3, 2016) 
In recognition of the damaging effect this period had on the Irish PPP market, a 
domestic infrastructure stimulus package was announced in 2012 (Department of Public 
Expenditure and Reform, 2012). During this period the EU examined alternative ways of 
funding Europe’s future investment in infrastructure (IBEC, 2011). Ireland took this into 
account and secured funding from a combination of the National Pensions Reserve Fund, the 
European Investment Bank/Council of Europe Bank, domestic banks and private investment 
sources. Details of this are examined in 5.3.4 Project portfolio. In the Minister Brendan 
Howlin own words: “Although the public finances are severely constrained, it is important 
that we build for the future” (Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, 2013). 
A motivation for this PPP programme, apart from developing infrastructure, was to 
create jobs and stimulate the economy. This was quite different from the objectives of 
previous PPP programmes. Tenders for projects were required to participate in job-creating 




1 There was a borrowing requirement to be “off balance sheet” in accordance with 
Eurostat rules so as not to affect the general government balance; 
2 It would enable risks such as design or construction risk and availability or demand 
risk to be transferred to the private sector; 
3 It was important in the context of the deficit reduction programme and the EU-IMF 
Programme of Financial Support for Ireland; 
4 The programme was sized so that the unitary payment obligations were affordable 
within budgetary arithmetic; 
5 It would have a multiplier effect of investment to stimulate jobs and growth; 
6 There would be social and community benefit provisions included; 
7 It would have features incorporated to assist SMEs. 
(National Development Finance Agency, 2013) 
The government was called on to identify a clear pipeline of projects and to keep the 
market informed to facilitate formation of bidding consortia and workload planning (IBEC, 
2011). The reason for this was that “the market is broadly aware of the pipeline of projects but 
there is no accurate information or up-to-date source, in particular, on timing. The PPP project 
tracker is not updated very regularly” (IBEC, 2011, p.21). 
The findings of the pilot study discussed in chapter 4 were that in 2013, the Minister 
of State for public service reform and the Office of Public Works announced changes to PPP 
projects aimed at instilling confidence and maximising market participation. These changes 
included reducing to 15 months the timeframe for preparing PPP projects to the market 
through to contract award, and reimbursing bid costs to unsuccessful bidders. The Minister 
also stated that the PPP process would be streamlined, with less documentation and meetings, 
a “design-led” approach where specimen designs are drawn up prior to the bidding process 
(Sheppard and Beck, 2016). The aim was to instil confidence and maximise market 
participation.  
 When the study was extended in 2016, it was found that design-led PPPs with 
planning in place are useful to the private sector but were stifling innovation. Despite an effort 
to reduce PPP timeframes, they were still very long. Moreover, it was felt that the partial 
refund of bid costs was a gesture and not significant in building private sector capacity; there 
was still a lack of a pipeline of PPP projects; the scale of the Irish PPP market was a problem; 
and there was a lack of contractor capacity in Ireland. This is summarised in Figure 6.1 which 




Figure 6.1: Methods to encourage market demand 
 
Design-led PPPs with planning in place 
In Schools Bundles 4 and 5, stage 3 Justice projects and Primary Care projects, there 
has been a move to design-led PPPs with planning in place as distinct from stage 1 and 2 
PPPs where the design and planning were part of the bidding process. The aim of having 
design-led PPPs with planning in place is that it reduces the time it takes PPPs to go to market 
and it also helps to reduce planning risk. However, as Aziz (2007) explains, a reason given for 
PPP is that it brings innovation by the private sector in service delivery, and if the design 
element is taken away from the private sector, there is concern that this will restricts 
innovation. 
The extended study indicates that design-led PPPs with planning in place have indeed 
stifled innovation in some PPP sectors and the justification for this measure seems to be 
mostly based on pragmatic grounds. A private sector interviewee involved in Justice 
explained that the NDFA introduced this initiative in 2010-11 (P11, 2016). A private sector 
interviewee working on Primary Care projects explained that having planning in place was to: 
reduce the procurement lines because the industry was complaining about the 
cost … it was a key thing for the NDFA to say… we’re reducing the 
timeframes which means you spend less money, you have planning which 
reduces your risks, we give you a little bit of your costs so it made … attractive 
(P18, 2016) 
This was introduced despite the NDFA having reservations about it as explained by a 
public sector interviewee working on Justice projects:  
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the NDFA at one stage said, the developers won’t like this because it led, it 
doesn’t allow them design everything (P15, 2016)  
However, the consensus among the private sector interviewees is that they are in favour of 
this approach, as a public sector interviewee involved in Justice projects said:  
 the developers responded quite well (P15, 2016) 
An interviewee from a construction company who failed on a Primary Care said:  
all the contractor then had to do was … the final detailed design …make it 
attractive to bidders [by] trying to cut down hugely on the bidding costs…we 
still engaged a design team but the costs were dramatically lower (P16, 2016) 
There was criticism of this approach from interviewees in certain PPP sectors to the 
effect that it can stifle innovation, but other sectors welcomed it. A private sector interviewee 
who has worked on stage 2 and 3 PPPs and is hoping to be involved in Social Housing PPPs 
said this approach is useful for straightforward PPPs in that it:  
took a lot of risk out of things for cookie cutter stuff like schools (P13, 2016) 
Another private sector interviewee involved in PPP since the pilot project speculated that this 
approach would be used in Social Housing as:  
social housing is perhaps quite straightforward and easy … because it’s so 
prescriptive … they’ve said here’s a site, here’s [the] amount [of] units you 
want … there’s no innovation there (P19, 2016) 
A public sector interviewee working on Justice projects explained that it was also appropriate 
in heritage buildings: 
 there are some advantages to it in … the bundle we’re doing now is unique in 
that there’s a lot of heritage components in it which wouldn’t be normal 
…we’ve a mixture of new builds and heritage buildings so it’s probably better 
for heritage building because consideration of conservation has been given … 
and that’s all been passed by the various heritage organisations and groups at 
planning stage (P7, 2016) 
This approach was also favoured in the Primary Care sector. For example, a private 
sector interviewee working on Primary Care project said: 
primary care … all came with the planning … you can be innovative only to a 
certain extent … you’re … limited in terms of your build form [and] materials 
(P18, 2016)  
However, the interviewee did say that innovation can be introduced in other ways: 
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it doesn’t mean you can’t do absolutely anything with it. I think we did a lot of 
clever things around landscaping, around built environment in terms of patient 
benefits…we were more innovative in terms of the layout of the building (P18, 
2016) 
A private sector interviewee from a construction company which failed on the Primary Care 
bid said:  
how much innovation do you get out of a primary care centre in the first place? 
(P16, 2016) 
However, it is useful to bear in mind that this interviewee failed in their Primary Care bid. 
This approach was also favoured by the Courts Service with a public sector 
interviewee involved in Justice projects being of the view that:  
[if] the PPP failed they would still own the design (P7, 2016) 
It is an approach favoured by another public sector interviewee who is currently working on 
Justice projects, and who stated that:  
 actually it did work … fine (P15, 2016) 
It should be noted that this interviewee works in the OPW and has called for more control by 
the public sector of PPP. 
However, other PPP sectors felt that it restricted innovation. For example, the lack of 
innovation in Education projects was spoken about by a public sector interviewee working on 
Justice projects: 
 I spoke to someone in Education about… it’s probably higher cost doing it that 
way for us because … if you’re a PPP company designing a building from 
scratch, you’d be building in your own FM [facilities management] procedures 
into the size, shape, layout of the building which would …. drive costs down so 
when you’re given a building that’s at planning stage … you can tweak with 
internals [but] you can’t … completely change it. It means it’s probably less 
efficient than if you matched it to your own procedures (P7, 2016) 
This interviewee also said:  
you don’t get the innovation you’d get from a blank piece of paper (P7, 2016) 
A private sector interviewee involved in a consortium and with experience in Education 
projects does not prefer one approach over the other but did comment that this type of PPP is 
here to stay: 
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our own architects would prefer their own approach… I suppose the authority 
try and bring everyone up to a similar level … I’ve done both, it wouldn’t 
bother me if I had to go back to designing, monitoring design…I don’t think 
they’ll ever go back to bidders having design again (P24, 2016) 
Despite design-led PPPs stifling innovation, and innovation being seen as a reason for 
PPP by Aziz (2007), they appear to be here to stay. It is recognised that these PPPs are 
appropriate for straight forward PPPs such as Primary Care and also heritage buildings which 
are suitable for design and planning to be controlled by the public sector. However, this 
initiative was primarily introduced to stimulate the market and the consensus among the 
private sector is that it has been useful. Design-led PPP therefore can be seen as having 
contributed towards building capacity in the private sector.  
Reduction of PPP timeframe 
Another measure introduced for Phase 1 of the stimulus programme was to reduce the 
timeframe from 21 months to 15 months for preparing PPP projects from the time they go 
from market through to contract award. This complete PPP procurement process is slow prior 
to construction, as explained by the senior public sector interviewee involved in PPP decision 
making: 
 it’s the signing up, getting the contracts, getting the funders on board, running 
the …  competitions for the funders and for the project and then the funders’ 
due diligence … it’s just [a] very slow process. But once it goes into 
construction it will be faster (P8, 2016) 
Despite introducing measures to reduce the procurement timeframe, the process is still 
very long. This was confirmed by a failed private sector bidder on the Primary Care project 
who said of the bidding process:  
it’s going to cost me a fair bit of money … it’s going to tie up those people for 
quite a long time and the job itself could take another year to get … to financial 
close (P16, 2016)  
This interviewee explained that PPP has become less attractive to the private sector compared 
with other types of procurement:  
in the context of … the private sector it’s not attractive… the alternative is one 
of the developer rings up and says, look I’ve a job here we don’t even have to 
bid it (P16, 2016) 
This interviewee also noted that now they will probably not bid on PPP projects:  
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we probably wouldn’t be too pushed about it … there’s a lot of work out there 
now and attractive work … the tender process is … more straightforward … if 
that primary care centre job came out today there’s a good chance we probably 
wouldn’t go for it (P16, 2016) 
The introduction of a reduced timeframe for preparing PPP projects to market has not 
had a significant effect on encouraging the market and the private sector still considers the 
current reduced timeframe to be too long making PPP less attractive than other forms of 
procurement. The contribution of a reduction of PPP timeframes has therefore had a mixed 
effect on building the capacity of PPP in Ireland. 
Partial refund of bid costs 
It was recognised by both public and private sector interviewees that the partial refund 
of bid costs in Phase 1 of the stimulus programme to unsuccessful bidders was a useful 
gesture and has helped in a limited way in encouraging bidding activity. However this is seen 
only a temporary measure. A private sector interviewee who has worked on stage 2 and 3 
PPPs and is hoping to work on Social Housing projects referred to the refund as “token” (P13, 
2016). Another private sector interviewee involved in PPP since the pilot project and who 
failed on a bid for Primary Care said:  
it didn’t pay for your bid costs but it went maybe a long way towards them … 
but we did get it at primary care (P19, 2016) 
This interviewee went on to state that on the recent bids: 
 I’ve lost … nearly seven figures … doing these three or four bids…All we 
wanted to do was win one … but we haven’t lost an appetite if only the process 
was a bit cheaper or better (P19, 2016) 
A private sector interviewee who works for a successful bidder on the Primary Care 
projects compared the various initiatives introduced. The interviewee spoke of the cheque that 
the NDFA will raise, funded by them, to refund part of the bid costs to unsuccessful bidders. 
This interviewee said that it was not the most significant measure introduced: 
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I personally think that the fact that they would refund €300,000 is not as key as 
the fact that they had a pipeline … because if you’re in that game you’re 
spending the money, you have the budgets, they’re committed up front at the 
start of the year or five years ahead in the long-term plan. It’s good to get 
something back if you lose (P18, 2016) 
There was consensus among the public sector interviewees that the partial refund of 
bid costs was only a gesture. A public sector interviewee involved in the Primary Care 
projects said:  
it’s probably a drop in the ocean … I suppose that was introduced … based on 
the broader research that the NDFA would have done with the market (P22, 
2016)  
A public sector interviewee involved in an education project spoke of bid costs being high and 
concluded that the private sector will only bid if they can afford to:  
it’s a very risky game to be playing particularly if you’re not a multi-billion 
corporation … because the cost is just so high … the … odds aren’t great (P5, 
2016)  
However, an interviewee who formerly worked with the NDFA was of the mind that the 
private sector always complained of bid costs, and that even if they lost bids they gained from 
experience: 
 you’d hear … through the board about the NDFA being complained to about, 
we’re spending three or four million quid on developing this bid and then we 
lose …And is that fair to us?  … the private sector … actually gain from … 
participation even if we lose because we bring ideas to the table that then you 
can use (P4, 2016) 
This interviewee suggested that partial bid costs should not be refunded:  
but look I always took the view that, we shouldn’t give in to this … if they 
want to bid for it let them bid for it … it’s completely voluntary (P4, 2016) 
The partial refund of bid costs is a measure introduced only in Phase 1 of the stimulus 




 It was announced as a one-off, temporary measure on the basis that we were 
launching a new PPP programme and we wanted to make sure people did come 
in for it … it wasn’t something we’d be doing permanently, so that really ends 
now with the… projects from that first phase are, we still have the Health PPP 
…  then we’ve Schools Bundle 5 and we’ve Grangegorman and then that’s the 
end of Phase 1 (P8, 2016)  
A public sector interviewee currently working on Justice projects and who has worked on pre- 
and post-crisis projects commented on the wisdom of the partial refund of bid costs being 
only for Phase 1:  
 if you introduce it it’s very hard to take it back (P15, 2016) 
There seems to be consensus among the interviewees that the partial refund of bid 
costs is a useful gesture but not the most significant measure introduced and as such has not 
had a significant effect on encouraging the market. Its contribution to building the capacity of 
PPP in Ireland is therefore limited or mixed.  
Pipeline of projects 
Aligned with the scale of the PPP market in Ireland is the visibility of a pipeline of 
projects. Verhoest et al. (2013) argue that it is imperative to have a clear pipeline of PPP 
projects with a timetable for procurement to which the government is committed to procure. 
The Infrastructure and Capital Investment Plan  2016 – 2021 discusses the improvements of 
the Irish economy and outlines a pipeline of projects: “Ireland’s exit from the EU/IMF 
programme, continuing improvements in the economy generally and the successive upgrades 
of the Irish sovereign by the credit rating agencies” and goes on to explain that “together with 
a good pipeline of projects, [this] has firmly put Ireland back in the project finance markets” 
creating “increased levels of market interest” (Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, 
2015, p.41). 
During the extended study, a PPP consultant explained that the private sector needs to 
have several projects on the go so that any bids they win will carry them through the failed 
bids. The cost involved is called the development cost (P6, 2016). This requires a clear 
pipeline of projects. The significance of having a pipeline to the private sector was also 
explained by a public sector interviewee working on a stage 3 education project:  
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PPP is not viable unless there’s a steady stream of projects … you need to be 
certain that somewhere over a long period of ten or fifteen years that you’re 
going to be winning enough to cover the bid costs of the ones you don’t win 
(P5, 2016)  
A former private sector interviewee now working in the public sector also spoke of the 
significance to the private sector of a pipeline of projects:  
it costs them a lot to bid, it’s a long, timely cost so they like to bid knowing  … 
if they don’t win this one, there’s another one following (P14, 2016) 
However, the number of projects, their timelines and information on the projects are 
not clear, and there is consensus among private sector interviewees that the existing pipeline 
of projects is insufficient. When asked about the pipeline, a private sector interviewee 
involved in stage 2 and 3 Education projects and a successful bidder on the Grangegorman 
project said:  
they publish the capital plan so people like us read the capital plan and say … 
maybe the timelines are a bit fluid but this is coming up (P12, 2016) 
This interviewee explained the implications of this unclear pipeline: 
You can’t decide on a Monday that you’re actually going to share with the 
world what you’ve been working on for six months on a Friday and expect 
them to get on board and bid from the following Monday. People have to 
understand what the project is about, what the timelines are, they have to be 
able to go back and look at what’s happening in their own business in their 
own world (P12, 2016) 
Another private sector interviewee was critical of the pipeline in the Infrastructure and 
Capital Investment Plan  2016 - 2021. This private sector interviewee, who is working on 
Education projects, said: 
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 It could have been clearer … and it probably still could be clearer … in that 
some of these announcements are made, are driven by political announcements 
and the exact clarity is to what it all means, what does that mean in projects?  
How many projects?  Are they the same projects that were announced last 
time?  Is it a new programme?  How many of them will be PPP?  It’s often a 
bit of sleuthing work when you are sitting on the outside … so I’d … not really 
know what it is that’s being announced … they’ll put a sub amount of PPPs in 
there but you can’t identify specifically which one it is, it often takes a couple 
of months to get to the bottom (P14, 2016) 
A private sector interviewee working on Primary Care projects summed up the private 
sector’s concern over the lack of a sufficient pipeline when they discussed that in 2016 the 
only significant announcements were Primary Care projects:  
 one project which is definitely not a pipeline (P18, 2016) 
The lack of a clear pipeline of projects has created uncertainty among the private 
sector. The pipeline of projects referred to in the Infrastructure and Capital Investment Plan 
2016 – 2021 is opaque and confusing to the private sector. This has implications for Ireland in 
attracting private sector interest in PPP. The contribution of the pipeline of projects to 
building the capacity of PPP in Ireland is therefore weak. 
Scale of the Irish PPP market 
The findings of the pilot study discussed in chapter 4 were that it was difficult to 
attract international companies to Ireland and to create sufficient market interest for 
scalability reasons (Sheppard and Beck, 2016).  
When the study was extended in 2016, this still seemed to be the case as there is a lack 
of ability for Ireland to attract international bidders. The significance of the scale in the 
market was explained by an interviewee who formerly worked with the NDFA:  
market interest is … predominantly dictated by the scale of the project (P4, 
2016) 
The issue of scale is an ongoing problem for the Irish market. A private sector 
interviewee involved in PPP since the pilot project explained that because of Ireland’s size, it 
only attracts Irish bidders, while the costs involved in bidding require a large international 
company to bid: 
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 Ireland … abuse the bidder process… Ireland are going to be stuck with the 
fact that it’s going to be home grown bidding teams and … because of the size 
of the bid costs you need big players who can afford these things so there’s a 
balance to be had about putting a bid out, making it affordable to do so to me 
the answer is to do it locally and therefore I will always try and find local 
contracting partners in Ireland to align with (P19, 2016) 
This was also highlighted by the public sector interviewee involved in Justice projects when 
referring to international companies:  
we have so few of them that are active here … there’s probably three or four 
more worldwide who could potentially be active here … there is a significant 
barrier to entry here to a market that isn’t that big in the first place (P7, 2016) 
There was a concern with the Primary Care projects that there may not be a company 
in Ireland that could handle the project, as expressed by a public sector interviewee who 
worked on the Primary Care projects: 
 we didn’t believe there was a single firm out there that was going to be able to 
design that … there were no firms with that level of resource really left in 
Ireland …  you’d have been looking at external firms … looking [at] … our … 
knowledge of the market and who was out there and who was left and who 
could handle this size of job (P22, 2016) 
The interviewee explained that they felt that by awarding it to an external company it was: 
an opportunity … to actually spread this work around (P22, 2016)  
However, a private sector interviewee involved in PPP since the pilot project and 
based in the UK spoke of how difficult it is to get contractors to come to Ireland:  
there doesn’t seem to be any appetite among the dozen or so top contractors 
that we deal with over here to go to Ireland (P19, 2016) 
The size of the Irish market also was a concern for the senior public sector interviewee 
involved in PPP decision-making who said:  
we’re small, you know we’re on the periphery and our programme isn’t as big 
and as continuous as some … the Germans can … keep everyone going for 
decades so yeah … it’s a challenge for us (P8, 2016) 
However, a public sector interviewee with more than 15 years’ experience of working on 
Transport projects said that they believe the NDFA will say:  
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they are getting expressions of interest from loads of foreigners (P3, 2016) 
The scale of the Irish PPP market is an ongoing problem in attracting foreign bidders. 
A vibrant market is required to build private sector capacity and Ireland is too small to supply 
this and therefore this weakens the ability to build capacity of PPP. 
Contractor capacity 
There is a concern that there is a lack of contractor capacity in Ireland. The consensus 
of the public and private sector interviewees was that the NDFA is trying to encourage local 
contractors and suppliers to become involved in PPP. For example, a public sector 
interviewee spoke of this as follows:  
obviously you are open to the full EU market when you tender … but it was 
also important … that the firms in Ireland had an opportunity to compete the 
same as everyone else…[yet] there were no firms with that level of resource 
really left in Ireland (P22, 2016) 
A private sector interviewee from a construction company which failed on a Primary Care bid 
also said that:  
 the NDFA they were trying to encourage … more local contractors and 
suppliers … there’s a political thing to that where the big contractors are the 
only ones capable of pricing the big part, they want to make sure that the 
smaller contractors have a chance to get parts of it … SMEs [small medium 
enterprises] would be frustrated at times that they can’t price on these big jobs 
(P16, 2016) 
There is scope for Irish contractors to team up with bigger international companies, as 
discussed by the senior public sector interviewee involved in PPP decision making: 
 there’s lots of scope for … capacity building … it’s a matter of linking ... the 
foreign guys [who] don’t want to have big teams over here and the local people 
[who] can’t do the big things so there must be a way … to marry those two and 
I think that’s our challenge for the next phases as they get launched … working 
with the NDFA and with the construction sector … to see how we deal with 
this issue (P8, 2016) 
As discussed earlier one of the aims of the PPP programme announced in 2012 was to 
stimulate jobs and growth. A private sector interviewee who works for a successful bidder on 
the Primary Care projects said that their:  
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focus has been more about employing people that have been on an employment 
register and making sure that local contractors are involved (P18, 2016)  
The emphasis on local employment was also discussed by a private sector interviewee 
involved in a consortium, who said:  
 it’s a huge part of our local employment strategy (P24, 2016) 
There was criticism that the PPP awards are not being shared out fairly as suggested 
by a private sector interviewee involved in stage 2 and 3 PPPs:  
the procurement has not resulted in a fair share … going to a wide range of 
contractors …  there’s been a quite narrow group of winners (P11, 2016) 
A further criticism that arose during the interviews was that the Irish PPP market is dominated 
by one player. For example, a private sector interviewee involved in stage 2 and 3 PPP 
projects and currently involved in a Justice project said:  
BAM have been winning quite a lot, I think the industry would say they might 
be winning too much for the health of the overall sector and that might just be 
down to the fact that they’re very good at bidding (P11, 2016)  
BAM is very familiar with the Irish  PPP market, as a public sector interviewee who 
has worked on stage 2 and 3 Justice projects said: 
 in the recent bundle those bidders that have been active in the Irish market 
seem to have an advantage over those bidders who are not or who are new 
entrants because they are familiar with the contract documentation, the 
procedures, the marking schemes … that’s not a bias to do with how things are 
set up it’s a bias to do with … your own familiarity with the market. … BAM 
have won a very high percentage of projects (P7, 2016) 
However, when asked about, this the representative from BAM pointed out that while it has 
won a lot of bids, it has been over a long period:  
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 I firmly believe that we were just a better consortium but I don’t think that’s 
the case anymore … we’re delighted with that because … if we were to have a 
monopoly in the market there just wouldn’t be a pipeline … we like to win as 
much as we can but we’re conscious that there has to be a market as well for 
this … I can understand … how people would be … conscious that we have 
been successful in the past but that was a period of time where … there wasn’t 
a lot of players in the market (P24, 2016) 
The senior public sector interviewee involved in PPP decision-making commented on this 
also: 
 if they want to bid for everything you can’t stop the bidding, if they’re the best we 
can’t not give it to them so we have to follow the procurement rules… it is 
something that, that could be problematic for us because people say, there’s no 
point in going over there you just won’t beat them. And yet if that happens and no 
one else comes then you don’t have competitive tension and we don’t know we’re 
getting value from them so it is a problem and because we’re a small market and 
because we don’t have as big projects as some of the others have that is a problem 
for us that we have to try and manage … PPPs need to have competitive tension, 
need to have a market (P8, 2016) 
The NDFA is trying to encourage local contractors to engage with PPP but a problem 
highlighted later in 6.2.4 Quality of projects is that as the public sectors tries to pass risk on to 
the private sector, this results in the private sector passing risk down the line to smaller sub-
contractors, which is prohibitive to smaller contractors. 
The Irish market is dominated by one player yet, as noted under the discussion about 
the scale of the Irish market, local contractors need to align with larger contractors. This is a 
catch-22 situation as there are only three or four international companies willing to bid in 
Ireland and newer entrants to the market are at a disadvantage as compared to those who 
regularly bid are familiar with the bidding process. Creating market demand requires a market 
that is easily entered into, but the Irish market appears to be a difficult market to enter, which 
in turn weakens the building of capacity of PPP in Ireland. 
The current market 
Despite issues with the pipeline and scale of Irish projects, there is interest from the 
market. This is the case notwithstanding the fact that construction still has not recovered in 
Europe to pre-crisis levels. A public sector interviewee who is working on a stage 3 education 
PPP project said: 
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you know by the time we actually came to market things had improved hugely 
(P5, 2016) 
A possible reason for this is that the international PPP market is quiet at the moment, as 
suggested by a private sector interviewee involved in Justice projects:  
there’s insufficient demand from other countries so you’ll find a lot of 
international contractors coming to Ireland to bid (P11, 2016) 
The NDFA engages in market testing so see if there is an appetite, as explained by a 
private sector interviewee involved in a consortium:  
the NDFA will tell you that they put a lot of work into … market soundings 
and market testing (P24, 2016)  
Certainly in the case of Primary Care the public sector interviewee involved confirmed:  
we were doing the market soundings, long before … we even went to market 
there was a high level of interest from what we could see (P22, 2016) 
Another private sector interviewee involved in Primary Care said that despite delays:  
Ireland should hold their head high… they’ve brought out a programme of 
when they were getting the procurement papers ready … maybe there’s been a 
quarter or four or five months’ slippage but they have actually achieved that 
programme (19, 2016) 
A public sector interviewee involved in Primary Care projects spoke of the increased interest 
in these projects:  
there was no shortage of takers in terms of this project…to say the place was 
sold out was an understatement … you had people almost packing the car park 
(P22, 2016) 
However, there are concerns that, as the market is currently quiet, private sector 
capacity will diminish. The senior public sector interviewee involved in PPP decision-making 
acknowledged that the lack of activity in the Irish PPP market was a concern: 
there’s a bit of a lull now … we’ve announced two phases … they’re all at the 
planning stage now and it will take some time before they actually go to market 
and the question is, will the funders have gone away because we’re not issuing 
one every couple of months or something? (P8, 2016) 
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Summary 6.2.1 Methods to encourage market demand 
Matos-Castaño et al. (2012) contend that governments should develop the necessary 
capacity to ensure that projects are brought to fruition successfully. They write that capacity 
to undertake PPPs will strengthen the ability to structure and govern PPP projects which is 
necessary for PPP development. The findings of the pilot study outlined in chapter 4 indicated 
that, prior to the financial crisis, Ireland suffered from delays in contract awards and financial 
closure and uneven demand. It was also found that it was initially difficult to attract 
international companies and to create sufficient market interest for scalability reasons but that 
the Government was addressing this issue by creating a pipeline of PPP projects (Sheppard 
and Beck, 2016). 
The extended study indicates that the cancellation of projects during the financial 
crisis and subsequent loss of state credibility in the PPP market has weakened Ireland’s 
capacity to undertake PPPs. The stimulus package announced in 2012 and new measures 
announced in 2013 have had mixed results in terms of contributing to building capacity in 
PPP. The introduction of design-led PPPs with planning in place has been welcomed by the 
public and private sector for so called “cookie-cutter” PPPs and also heritage PPPs. However, 
there is concern that this has resulted in a lack of innovation, which may be a problem as this 
is one of the motivating factors given for PPP. 
The reduced timeframe for preparing PPP projects to the market through to contract 
award has not been significant and the process is still seen as too long and is making PPP less 
attractive than other forms of procurement. The partial refund of bid costs to unsuccessful 
bidders in Phase 1 of the stimulus programme was welcomed by interviewees. However, 
interviewees tended to see this as a gesture and as insufficient in terms of overall bid costs and 
has not had a substantial effect on encouraging the market.  
The pipeline of projects introduced in the Infrastructure and Capital Investment Plan  
2016 – 2021 has been unclear and the timelines confusing for the private sector. This has 
implications for Ireland in attracting private sector interest in PPP. Another capacity weakness 
identified by interviewees was the difficulty in attracting foreign companies to bid in Ireland 
due to the relatively small scale of the market. The NDFA is trying to encourage local 
contractors to engage with PPP but the transfer of risk down the line to sub-contractors is 
prohibitive. The Irish market is dominated by one company, yet local contractors need to 
align with larger contractors. International companies willing to bid in Ireland are at a 
disadvantage as they are not familiar with the bidding process.  
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There is currently interest in the Irish market, but market activity is limited and the 
concern is that the private sector capacity built up will diminish which will have adverse 
effects on the sustainability of PPP. 
6.2.2: Policy learning 
The literature suggests that capacity to manage PPPs is enhanced by the 
institutionalisation of expertise and systems for learning and knowledge diffusion (Verhoest 
et al., 2015), all of which are key to PPP success (Matos-Castaño et al., 2014). This 
requirement to learn about the policy was recognised by the central PPP policy unit, the 
forerunner to the NDFA, which was situated in the former Department of the Environment, 
Heritage and Local Government. Accordingly the government stated: “It was recognised that 
PPPs are complex and that in the early years … there was a ‘steep learning curve’ for the 
public authorities” (Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government, 2003, 
p.7).  
The findings of the pilot study discussed in chapter 4 were that, although the 
interdepartmental group tasked with exploring the introduction of PPP in 1998 endeavoured 
to learn from UK PFI experiences, it was unclear whether this was effectively communicated 
to public sector managers (Sheppard and Beck, 2016). 
When the study was extended in 2016, interviewees spoke of PPP policy learning 
drawing on a number of different sources and Table 6.2 shows how 6.2.2 Policy learning is 
analysed and subdivided into 6.2.2.1 Learning from UK PFIs, 6.2.2.2 Learning from Irish 
PPPs, 6.2.2.3 Public sector learning, 6.2.2.4 Learning from PPP projects in other countries 
(apart from the UK) and from other entities, and 6.2.2.5 Private sector learning. The order in 
the following analysis is based on the number of text blocks identified against each sub-
theme, as outlined in Table 6.2. The number of text blocks does not necessarily reflect the 
importance of the theme. 
Table 6.2: Order of analysis of 6.2.2 Policy learning 
Name Number of text 
blocks 
Number of text 
blocks 
6.2 Theme 2 Capacity  3615 
6.2.1 Methods to encourage market demand  1695 
6.2.2 Policy learning  
 
- 6.2.2.1 Learning from UK PFIs 258  
- 6.2.2.2 Learning from Irish PPPs 189  
- 6.2.2.3 Public sector learning 53  
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Table 6.2: Order of analysis of 6.2.2 Policy learning 
Name Number of text 
blocks 
Number of text 
blocks 
- 6.2.2.4 Learning from PPP projects in other 
countries (apart from the UK) and from other 
entities 
47  
- 6.2.2.5 Private sector learning 10 557 
6.2.3 Public sector expertise  737 
6.2.4 Quality of projects  431 
6.2.5 Coordinate deal flow  141 
6.2.6 Performance of PPPs  54 
 
Further detail is given in Appendix P of the order of analysis of 6.2.2.1 Learning from 
UK PFIs and Appendix Q of the order of analysis of 6.2.2.3 Public sector learning. 
Policy learning was most spoken about by interviewees involved in stage 3 PPPs in 
the areas of Education, Justice and Primary Care. This suggests that learning from previous 
PPPs is considered important. As would be expected, policy learning was also most 
frequently spoken about by those with more than 15 years’ experience of PPP. Obviously the 
long time-frame spent by these interviewees meant that they had more to say about what 
learning has taken place over the years. 
Figure 6.2 outlines the varying strengths of different types of lesson learning that has 
taken place in relation to PPP and their contribution to building capacity in PPP. For example, 
the analysis found that learning from UK PFIs, learning from the public sector and learning 
from the private sector strongly contribute to building capacity in PPP. Learning from Irish 
PPPs and its contribution to building capacity in PPP is mixed, and learning from PPP 
projects in other countries, apart from the UK, and other entities is weak in its contribution to 





Figure 6.2: Policy learning 
 
6.2.2.1 Learning from UK PFIs 
The UK introduced PFI in 1992. Countries introducing PPP or a form of PPP 
subsequently have availed of  UK knowledge of this policy. For example, Matos-Castaño et 
al. (2012) write that the Dutch government hired advisers from the UK to help it draft its PPP 
contract and learnt from the UK experience. Ireland has also learnt from the UK as explained 
by Brian Murphy, then Director of the NDFA in a Dáil speech:  
My colleagues and I maintain extensive dialogue with our opposite numbers in 
the United Kingdom, both in the Treasury and the various procurement 
authorities, including Scottish Futures. The book on public private partnerships 
was written in the United Kingdom. The rest of the world has been learning 
from the United Kingdom (Dáil Éireann, 2012b, p.9) 
Brian Murphy also confirmed that policy learning continues to take place:  
We have studied closely the findings of the National Audit Office’s report … 
and also the introduction of the PF2 model which attempts to implement some 
of these conclusions and the lessons to be learned (Dáil Éireann, 2012b, p.9) 
The extended study confirmed that Ireland relied heavily on the UK for guidance 
when the policy was first introduced. For example, a private sector interviewee involved in 
Justice projects and who has worked on stage 2 and 3 PPP projects said:  
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All you have to do is look at the amount of stuff that they’ve done to date to 
understand that there’s a very clear structure in place … it’s heavily based on 
the … UK model (P11, 2016) 
An interviewee who formerly worked with the NDFA also confirmed this:  
I mean it certainly wasn’t an initiative … that we had pioneered … they were 
looking at Britain (P4, 2016) 
The extended study indicated that Ireland learnt from some the mistakes made with PFI in the 
UK: 
 we were very … influenced [by] … what went on with the PFI initiative in 
Britain and some of the mistakes that were made in Britain and we tried very 
hard not to replicate the mistakes…I think the Passport Office in Britain…was 
done by way of a PFI … threw-up huge financial questions … that as a case 
study I think that’s been … a very informative one…we looked at Britain … to 
see the mistakes that were made in the Private Finance Initiative and not 
replicate them here (P4, 2016) 
A public sector interviewee with more than 15 years’ experience of working on 
Transport projects confirmed that UK advisers were hired when the policy was initially 
introduced: 
there was certainly direct contact with the UK housing agencies … the UK was 
one of the leaders then … so that’s where everyone … looked to…[we] looked 
at what they had done in the UK, we got in our legal advisers, we got in our 
financial advisers and we brought in… UK advisers (P3, 2016)  
UK advisers were also hired for the development of the Convention Centre Project. This was 
explained by the private sector interviewee working on the Convention Centre: 
we got a firm of advisers from the UK to advise on … the market (P10, 2016) 
 and learning from the UK is also ongoing with this project: 
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 we’re…trying to speak to the Belfast office of [redacted] … because there’s a 
process which is in a lot of UK PPP contracts called Benchmarking Market 
Testing but hardly in the Irish ones … in the first instance on certain dates you 
benchmark your services … you … get comparable evidence from similar 
contracts [to ensure] … what you’re paying for a sub-contracting service is 
reasonable … [that] hasn’t been done much in Ireland (P10, 2016) 
Learning has clearly taken place from the UK experience of PFI. This theme is now 
analysed further with a focus on learning from different UK sectors including education, 
health, financing of projects, roads and courts in the UK, including Scotland and Northern 
Ireland. The last text block “Learning from PFI in general” is not analysed specifically but 
integrated in the other sections where appropriate. 
Learning from Education Projects 
The extended study indicates that learning from UK education projects is very strong, 
with both the public and private sectors learning from UK Education PFIs. For example, a 
private sector interviewee involved in stage 2 and 3 Education projects confirmed that 
learning from projects in the UK carried out by the UK segment of their company: 
 it’s about sharing … the centre of excellence … the subject matter experts were 
based in the UK because they had negotiated all of those NHS contracts and all 
… healthcare contracts … and the justice services contracts… when I speak 
with my colleagues in the part of the segment that runs PFIs for schools in the 
UK and I’ll talk to my boss … he’ll say to me, our contract is exactly the 
same…Or it’s different here but it’s the same there (P12, 2016) 
Another private sector interviewee who has worked on stage 2 and 3 PPPs and is 
hoping to work on Social Housing projects also looked to PFI Schools in the UK: 
 Scotland are probably ahead of the curve when it comes to here so I was 
actually on site on a PFI school in Scotland…I took a tour around some of 
them because I was meeting one of the PFI people over there (P13, 2016) 
A private sector interviewee involved in PPP since the pilot projects pointed out that 
the company they work for is involved with PFI in the UK: 
 we do an awful lot of PFIs so we know all the ins and outs and the financial 
models and how you maximise those and … [how to] get a winning bid so it 
works quite well from that point of view (P19, 2016) 
The public sector has also learnt from UK Education PFIs. For example, a public 
sector interviewee involved in one of the cancelled education PPP projects pointed out that at 
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the time of planning, discussions took place with counterparts in Northern Ireland who were 
involved in PFI education projects: 
 We were guided by what happened up North … we got good advice and good 
guidance … they had done a number of PFIs or PPPs and he was extremely 
helpful … we were over there a few times with him (P21, 2016) 
The extended study indicates that learning from UK education projects has been very 
strong with both the public and private sectors learning from UK Education PFIs. 
Learning from Health Projects 
Learning that has taken place from UK Health projects also appears to be strong and 
both the public and private sectors interviewees pointing to lessons learnt. In particular, there 
is evidence that the HSE has sought to learn from the UK. For example, learning took place 
on stage 2 PPP projects, referred to as the National Plan for Radiation Oncology, which was 
subsequently postponed. This was confirmed by the public sector representative from the 
HSE who spoke about information gathering:  
when we were doing the radiation oncology project, we would have visited a 
number of projects there (P22, 2016) 
Learning from the UK is continuing on stage 3 Primary Care projects. This was 
confirmed by a private sector interviewee who was successful in winning Primary Care 
projects. This interviewee noted that the HSE was open to hearing about how other countries 
are doing similar types of projects and what improvements can be made: 
 the HSE has a model and it has an idea of how it wants to operate but … it was 
open to hear how other people are doing it and to bring in ideas on 
improvements (P18, 2016) 
The importance to the private sector of PFI knowledge in the UK was expressed by 
the private sector interviewee who was successful in winning the Primary Care projects. The 
private sector companies involved teamed up with experienced UK partners to form a 
consortium that won the Primary Care projects: 
 we teamed up with people who worked in … a big provider of primary care in 
the UK, PRIME, and they knew how these buildings need to operate and how 
they are best laid out for patients and the health provision (P18, 2016) 
Learning from the UK is ongoing as confirmed by this interviewee who pointed out areas that 
the UK has implemented and where further learning by Ireland could take place: 
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 I think in Ireland it’s not as well done yet in the UK it’s done better because in 
the UK we would subscribe to economic benefits, KPIs… In Ireland … I think 
that’s probably the next step (P18, 2016) 
 Learning also took place with bidders who were unsuccessful. For example, a 
private sector interviewee from a construction company which failed on the Primary Care bid 
said:  
one of our partners … would have had experience in the UK particularly in 
Scotland (P16, 2016) 
Learning that has taken place from UK Health projects is also strong, and both the 
public and private sectors have drawn lessons from UK experiences. 
Learning from Financing 
Learning has taken place from UK financing of PFI as well. This was confirmed by a 
public sector interviewee with more than 15 years’ experience of working on Transport 
projects: 
we were able to draw upon … for refinancing and stuff we did (P3, 2016) 
This has created a consistency that bidders will be familiar with from being involved in the 
UK financing of PFI. A former private sector interviewee now working in the public sector 
with experience of stage 2 and 3 PPP projects spoke about the importance of UK approaches, 
when it came to financing: 
 I think Ireland traditionally followed the UK, looked at market standards from 
the UK … We were attracting a lot of the same bidders so when they arrived 
they were expecting to find something that looked and smelled the same so 
why not make it the same … don’t reinvent the wheel. Sometimes there were 
arguments around … we need to make it our own model, actually you don’t, if 
it works … I think we have followed it … I think we’ve learned the positive 
lessons …  We’ve adapted and developed a standard form of contracts that 
looks and smells and feels like a model that worked in, the UK PFI worked 
very well (P14, 2016) 
This was confirmed by the public sector interviewee with more than 15 years’ experience of 
working on Transport projects: 
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 because all of the funders coming in were all … UK based … they had all seen 
this before (P3, 2016) 
Learning has taken place from UK financing of PFI and this has created a consistency 
that bidders will be familiar with from being involved in the UK financing of PFI. 
Learning from Road Projects 
Learning has also taken place from UK road projects, particularly by the public sector. 
For example, the public sector interviewee with more than 15 years’ experience of working on 
Transport projects said: 
 I always think we benefited greatly from coming after … the UK … and we 
were able to learn the lessons that they learned … there was certainly direct 
contact with the UK housing agencies … the UK was one of the leaders … 
everyone … looked to (P3, 2016) 
Not only was UK policy followed in Transport projects, it was also adapted for Ireland: 
 there was no point in small Ireland to come in and try to do something 
wonderful … we had to localise it and obviously theirs didn’t deal with tolling, 
all of our primary schemes or our first wave of schemes were toll schemes. So 
we had to adapt them ... so we took the UK model and it worked as it should 
have worked (P3, 2016) 
Interestingly lesson drawing from UK road projects, was justified by the public sector 
interviewees, but no private sector interviewees spoke of learning from UK road projects. 
Learning from Courts Projects 
Interviewees noted learning from Northern Ireland Courts Projects. Accordingly the 
public sector interviewee who has worked on stage 2 and 3 Justice projects said: 
 I think also we went up and had a lot of discussions with the people … in the 
North then from Laganside. We went for a couple of visits … there and talked 
to their staff … before we started (P7, 2016) 
Learning has also taken place from English Courts Projects:  
I think we had a couple of people … [who] talked to them … the judges went 
to the Manchester Courts …fact finding trip (P7, 2016) 
Learning took place from Northern Ireland Courts Projects, particularly by the public sector. 




Summary 6.2.2.1 Learning from UK PFIs 
Overall, there is consensus that learning from the UK has taken place and continues to 
take place. Learning from the UK by the public and private sectors seems to be strongest from 
Education and Health projects and also from UK financing of projects. The analysis also 
indicates that public sector interviewees are more likely to mention learning from Road 
projects and from Courts projects than those from the private sector. Perhaps a reason for the 
strength of public sector learning in Road projects is that these were some of the earliest PPPs 
and while learning has taken place from the UK, it has been adapted for the Irish market, 
albeit at a slow pace. This is analysed further in 6.2.2.2 Learning from Irish PPPs. Another 
possibility is that policy learning has refined over time. Initially when policies are 
transplanted there is mimicry, but as the policymakers and implementers become more 
experienced and confident, mimicry becomes less prevalent. This would appear to be the case 
with road projects where learning initially took place, but the policy then was adapted for the 
Irish market. This also ties in with 6.2.2.2 Learning from Irish PPPs as this theme finds that 
as projects moved through the various PPP stages 1 – 3, increasingly stage 3 projects are 
learning from Irish stage 1 and 2 projects. Therefore it appears that Ireland relied on learning 
from the UK initially, but more recently has started to draw lesson from indigenous projects. 
The literature suggests that reviewing previous projects increases the capacity of PPPs. 
The research confirms that learning from UK projects that has taken place is strong, therefore 
increasing PPP capacity and contributing to the success of PPPs in Ireland. 
6.2.2.2 Learning from Irish PPPs 
The literature suggests that learning from previous PPPs has been a key factor for 
successful PPP programme implementation (Matos-Castaño et al., 2014). When the study was 
extended in 2016, interviewees spoke about learning from stages 1, 2 and 3 PPPs. The 
analysis indicates that Education project interviewees, in particular the stage 3 interviewees, 
and Justice project interviewees, in particular stage 3 interviewees, spoke most about learning 
from the pilot projects, a stage 1 project. Primary Care interviewees, a stage 3 project, spoke 
most about learning from the cancelled National Plan for Radiation Oncology project, a stage 
2 project. Thus Education and Justice interviewees learnt from a stage 1 project and Primary 
Care learnt from a stage 2 project. Transport projects learnt from stage 1 projects but were 
slow to implement learnings.  
The NDFA and the Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG) consider learning from 
stage 1 and 2 projects to be very important learning experiences. For example, Stephen 
Burgess, then Head of Procurement and Project Management at the NDFA stated in the Dáil: 
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“We have learned lessons from schools bundle 1, which we have carried through to our most 
recent contracts” (Dáil Éireann, 2012b, p.29). Brian Murphy, then Director of the NDFA, also 
spoke about the importance of these projects as a learning experience: 
It is important to remember that the project was called a pilot schools project 
for a reason. It was a path-finder project, a trailblazing project. It was 
effectively the first PPP in Ireland and it was done at a time when there was not 
a body of understanding, expertise, procedures or policy developed. We have 
moved on a good deal since then … Within the NDFA we have developed a 
huge body of policy and procedure supported by the Department’s guidelines, 
which have evolved over the years and are based on lessons learned not only 
locally but internationally (Dáil Éireann, 2012b, p.11) 
The C&AG, Seamus McCarthy, also spoke in the Dáil of learning from early transport 
projects, in particular demand risk, when he said: “there was a learning point there and 
subsequent projects have not seen that risk being left with the State party” (Dáil Éireann, 
2016, p.44). 
When the study was extended in 2016, there was consensus from interviewees that the 
pilot schools project was very much a path-finder project for the public sector. The senior 
public sector interviewee involved in PPP decision-making spoke about learning from this 
project and that there: 
were huge changes made after that because it was the first one we did and we 
didn’t know an awful lot about it and we learned a lot from it (P8, 2016)  
Learning from the Maritime College and Cork School of Music has influenced the 
Grangegorman project, as discussed by the public sector interviewee involved:  
there was some learnings from previous accommodation projects such as The 
Maritime College and the Cork School of Music … things like how ICT/AV 
were treated (P5, 2016) 
Fact-finding missions to these early PPPs, such as the Maritime College and the Cork School 
of Music, were undertaken by a public sector interviewee involved in a third level stage 2 
cancelled PPP:  
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We … went to the Cork School of Music as a group of estates managers … we 
were shown around … a few technicians went down to Cork to have a look at 
the Maritime College (P21, 2016) 
Information sharing also took place between those involved in the Cork School of Music and 
pilot projects, as a public sector interviewee involved in the Criminal Courts of Justice PPP 
and stage 3 Justice PPPs discussed:   
We … talked to people about them … just to get their experience … the PPP 
world is quite small here (P7, 2016) 
A public sector interviewee who is working on a stage 3 PPP project spoke of how the NDFA 
was eager for the Grangegorman project to draw lessons from these stage 1 and 2 projects:  
 from early on the NDFA were steering us in that direction (P5, 2016) 
Learning has also taken place from early transport projects, in particular the Limerick 
Tunnel and the M3, both stage 1 PPPs, but it has been slow to be implemented. This ties back 
to 6.2.2.1 Learning from UK PFIs which indicated that while the public sector learnt from the 
UK, in terms of toll schemes and traffic guarantees, it was slow to adapt it for the Irish 
context in stage 1 and 2 Irish projects. This relates back to comments made by a private sector 
interviewee involved in stage 2 and 3 PPP projects and currently involved in a Justice project. 
This interviewee discussed the West Link and East Link projects. Although they were not 
PPPs, they did involve a traffic guarantee. The interviewee explains that there were a lot of 
problems with this scheme, yet the early transport PPP projects continued to use it: 
there’s some very interesting studies around demand-based transportation 
infrastructure, some of them being wildly profitable for the private sector and 
some have been wildly unsuccessful for the private sector and I think the 
history of it in Ireland is mixed … the West Link and the East Link [were] 
goldmines for the developers … nothing in the contracts to properly restrict the 
upside and then you go to the wider road network you have a financial disaster 
for bidding consortia mainly because it’s very difficult to predict traffic. Why 
somebody who builds a road or why somebody who finances a road should be 
better able to predict traffic is bizarre and therefore there’s limited appetite 
these days for green field demand risk (P11, 2016) 
The public sector interviewee with more than 15 years’ experience of working on Transport 
projects admitted that this type of scheme was a mistake:  
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 we didn’t put in a threshold …we’ve learned over the years (P3, 2016) 
This interviewee seemed very concerned about the language used and said that they learnt that 
certain phrases can be inflammatory and they do not use them now:  don’t use the word 
guarantee, don’t use the word bonus (P3, 2016) 
However, private sector interviewees spoke about learning very little from stage 1 and 2 
projects. A private sector interviewee involved in a consortium with experience of education 
projects suggested that the pilot project was not a good project to learn from:  
I don’t think it’s a good benchmark to start with … I would say schools bundle 
one is probably the best example to start with (P24, 2016) 
This interviewee emphasised how the schools bundle one is a better example and is currently 
being used as a learning project. Market testing has now been completed on this bundle and 
that it is: “certainly a path-finder for everybody else” (P24, 2016) involved in subsequent 
schools bundles who will have to undertake a similar process soon.  
A PPP consultant who has worked on stage 1 and 2 PPP projects in Ireland beginning 
in 2006 went even further to suggest that there is very little to be learnt from “poor projects” 
(P6, 2016), suggesting that these stage 1 and 2 projects were not successful projects.  
Learning has also taken place from the cancelled National Plan for Radiation 
Oncology project (a stage 2 project). The public sector interviewee involved in the Primary 
Care projects also worked on this cancelled project. The interviewee discussed whether 
learning had taken place from the cancelled project:  
[there were] lessons that we learned from that process to bring forward into this 
one … there was [a] … huge breadth of experience that we had gained 
ourselves (P22, 2016) 
This is discussed further under heading 6.2.2.3 Public sector learning.  
Summary 6.2.2.2 Learning from Irish PPPs 
The literature suggests that learning from previous PPPs has been a key factor for 
successful PPP programme implementation. However, learning in Transport projects has been 
patchy.  
The research also indicates that learning has taken place in Education, Justice and 
Primary Care projects from stage 1 and 2 projects. This ties back to 6.2.2.1 Learning from UK 
PFIs where it was found that earlier stage 1 projects relied on learning from UK PFI projects 
but later stage 3 projects now rely on learning from indigenous stage 2 and 3 projects. This 
suggests that when policies are transplanted there is mimicry, but as the policymakers and 
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implementers become more experienced and confident, mimicry becomes less prevalent. The 
research therefore confirms that learning from Irish PPPs is varied and its contribution to 
increasing PPP capacity mixed. 
6.2.2.3 Public sector learning 
The literature suggests the PPP capacity required from government goes beyond just 
technical skills (Jooste et al., 2009) to building the necessary capabilities within the public 
sector such as “in-house PPP knowledge, training workshops, cross-project knowledge and 
guidance notes” (Matos-Castaño et al., 2012, p.7). These capabilities can be scaled up to 
ensure new roles within the public sector with specific expertise in PPP are developed 
(Matos-Castaño et al., 2014) to manage PPPs effectively (Willens et al., 2011). 
This expertise has been developed by the NDFA, as explained in the Dáil by Brian 
Murphy, then Director of the NDFA: 
One only has to look at the enormous body of guidance which has been 
developed and issued by the Department of Finance and now by the 
Department of Public Expenditure and Reform. That reflects the evolution of 
the market and best practice in the market. The policies and procedures that we 
apply internally reflect what we have learned from delivering projects. When 
we come to the next project we try to incorporate best practice and improve on 
what we believe is already a very robust and rigourous process (Dáil Éireann, 
2012b, p. 12) 
During the extended study, this was confirmed by an interviewee who formerly worked with 
the NDFA who said that the NDFA “learned an awful lot” (P4, 2016). 
However, governments departments have had to build up PPP expertise, as 
acknowledged by a senior public sector interviewee involved in PPP decision-making who 
said that there has been a steep learning curve: 
 each of the Departments … have their PPP unit in place…. So it’s a steep 
learning curve and that’s why it’s kind of a bit daunting for Departments who 
haven’t been involved, but for the ones who have … I think they’re happy (P8, 
2016) 
During the extended study, the interviewees spoke about learning in the public sector, 
in particular in the Office of Public Works (OPW), the Health Service Executive (HSE), the 
National Development Finance Agency (NDFA), and the Department of Public Expenditure 
and Reform (DPER). This material is now analysed in detail. The order of analysis chosen is 
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based on the number of text blocks accumulated under each heading during the data analysis 
stage. Appendix Q outlines the order of analysis of 6.2.2.3 Public sector learning. The last 
text block “PPP steering committee” is not analysed specifically but contributes to the other 
analysis when appropriate. 
OPW learning 
The OPW has learnt from the experience of the stage 2 Criminal Courts of Justice 
PPP, which in turn drew lessons from the stages 1 pilot schools project (Mazars, 2012). 
Lessons learning has taken place with regard to the form of design and maintenance. 
In the extended study, a public sector interviewee involved in Justice projects said that 
the: 
 OPW in particular learned from their involvement in the CCJ (P2, 2016) 
This was also confirmed by a public sector representative from the OPW with experience of 
stage 2 and 3 Justice projects. This interviewee explained that they have a lot of experience 
and learning from managing design and maintenance of:  
2,400 buildings, some of them would be monuments … historical buildings to 
brand new buildings (P15, 2016) 
According to this interviewee this has been invaluable in dealing with PPPs:  
we knew then where the pitfalls were and we closed them off (P15, 2016)  
This experience gained in the CCJ has been particularly invaluable in stage 3 Justice 
projects. The interviewee explained how the OPW learned from the CCJ as they:  
produced a … generic courthouse design guide … had the wealth of knowledge 
built up and … used it (P15, 2016) 
The OPW learnt from the issues with the design of the CCJ, and lessons are now applied to 
stage 3 PPPs. This was explained by a public sector interviewee working in the OPW stage 2 
and 3 Justice projects who said that the design of the CCJ was not owned by the public sector:  
the Courts Service realised they’d been caught badly with that … after a three 
year process [they] didn’t even own the drawings …we’re not getting caught 
like that again (P15, 2016) 
The OPW also learnt about maintenance costs from the CCJ and this interviewee explained 
that the OPW will be scaling back on the cost of maintenance in the new Courts programme 
(P15, 2016).  
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It should be noted that there appears to be a clash between the NDFA and the OPW. In 
explaining how the OPW manages politicians, the public sector representative from the OPW 
provided an insight into its attitude towards the NDFA:  
 the NDFA would lack political insight …Whereas we’ve learned … how 
politics works, when you’re in OPW … you’re dealing with Ministers all the 
time so you know … their brain and you can almost … second guess them, 
whereas they [NDFA] would [say] … no this is what’s happening and … 
dictate and that never goes down well with a political person. … if you go in 
and tell them… the first reaction you get back is, you’re trying to force me into 
doing that, I’m the Minister, I want to make the decision (P15, 2016) 
This may explain the attitude of public servants in the OPW towards PPP and the 
private sector, an attitude that is not always appreciated by the NDFA. The interviewee from 
the OPW told an anecdote of how, in their opinion, the developers in the CCJ had designed 
out all the risk by future proofing airconditioning units and lifts by unnecessarily including 
extra ones in the design. The interviewee, who has vast experience in design and construction 
noticed this, informed the NDFA but was told: “you’re rocking the boat” and it remained in 
the design (P15, 2016).  
The conflict between the OPW and the NDFA draws on the point made earlier that 
there is a sense that the NDFA believes it is in charge of government departments. If this is 
correct, it ties back to 5.3.1 Lead Institutional Support which discusses the NDFA as being a 
market driver and how it is trying to manage the public and private sectors. On the one hand 
the NDFA is trying to legitimise PPP by encouraging the policy, but on the other hand it is 
managing government departments and thus stifling capacity. 
HSE learning 
The HSE has learnt from the postponed stage 2 National Plan for Radiation Oncology 
project and from the private sector. The public sector representative from the HSE spoke 
about learning from the postponed project which has been useful in the Primary Care projects:  
many of the things that we learnt from that project we’ve been able to adopt 
into this project (P22, 2016) 
Specifically, the interviewee said the HSE team:  
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learned a huge amount ourselves so it was very important that we didn’t just 
start again with a blank sheet of paper … we used everything that we had learnt 
to date … learning was brought into this project (P22, 2016) 
The interviewee gave an example of learning that was brought forward into the 
Primary Care project: 
 one of the key things that we did in the radiation oncology facility was 
bringing all the different clinical and operational groups together to come up 
with a standard design, a standard format and that’s important in terms of the 
PPP process … things like having the same rooms, the same FM services … 
we brought all the different clinical and operational staff together to agree on 
… a standard format for OT rooms, physiotherapy rooms, GP rooms … we 
certainly had lessons that we learned from that process to bring forward into 
this one (P22, 2016) 
There is also learning in the HSE from the Primary Care projects and the interviewee 
said: 
we would be doing a post-project review mostly to make sure that the next 
project benefits … before we sit down and start to plan the next one in detail 
we will look at what we did on this project and what we have learnt …what 
mistakes we made, what we could do differently this time … it will certainly 
influence how we develop the next project … to all intents and purposes you 
could say there is an expertise in here (P22, 2016) 
The HSE has also drawn lessons from the private sector. For example, the private 
sector interviewee who was successful in winning Primary Care projects acknowledged that 
the HSE is open to suggestions and wishes to learn from the private sector:  
it was open to hear how other people are doing it and to bring in ideas on 
improvements (P18, 2016) 
Overall it appears that the HSE is open to learning from both the public sector and 
private sector. Apart from the cancelled stage 2 project the HSE is only involved in stage 3 
projects. Perhaps because it is late to PPP compared with other sectors that have more of a 
culture of sharing learning. This suggests that a pathway to learning has evolved as PPP has 
matured. 
NDFA learning 
The literature suggests that the PPP unit should establish a national PPP training 
programme to build expertise within government departments (UNECE, 2008) in the form of 
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“on-the-job training” as opposed to theoretical classroom lecturing (UNECE, 2008, p. 27). In 
Ireland, learning is ongoing in PPP and is led by the NDFA, as discussed by Brian Murphy, 
then Director of NDFA: 
In regard to each project we do, the procurement people and finance people sit 
down together and do a thorough look-back audit, an evaluation of how the 
process went, what we could have done better and what we did well, and our 
policies and procedures are updated continuously to reflect best practice (Dáil 
Éireann, 2012b, p.12) 
Learning also takes place from completing post-project reviews. The importance of 
carrying out post-project reviews by government departments was emphasised by the 
Comptroller and Auditor General, Seamus McCarthy who said they allow others to see: 
the value that was expected was actually achieved and where the value came 
from. How is it that the thing was able to deliver value? If there is some kind of 
innovation in the development of building schools, why would the State sector 
not learn from that point as well where it is doing direct build? Why would it 
not incorporate the same money-saving technology and design? (Dáil Éireann, 
2016, p.44) 
The extended study found that learning from past projects has enabled the NDFA to 
build up experience and expertise. This learning was shown at the tender assessment stage of 
a project discussed by a public sector interviewee working on Justice:  
the technical people … the architecture people … they talked all the time 
among one another about remember that was tried in such and such and that 
didn’t work (P2, 2016) 
The NDFA sits on the PPP steering committees, as explained by the senior public 
sector interviewee involved in PPP decision making: 
the NDFA obviously are the common factor with all of them [PPPs], and even 
with the roads the NDFA are the financial advisers on the roads, so again they 
are in all of the PPPs, so what they learn on one they can apply on the other 
(P8, 2016) 
The public sector shares information at the PPP steering committee level, but the 
private sector only learns from projects that it has been involved in. However, the NDFA is 
across all projects so the private sector can learn from the NDFA’s involvement in other PPP 
projects. This point was made by a private sector interviewee involved in schools bundles 1 
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and 2 and a successful bidder on the Grangegorman project. This interviewee speculated that 
the UK does not have an equivalent of the NDFA and so information is not as readily shared: 
we have the NDFA … who … is managing other PPPs, we only see the people 
who are involved in schools bundle one and two, they [NDFA] are also 
managing three and four and the pilot bundles … there’s a level of expertise 
being developed in that very specialist area of PPPs whereas … each 
[government] department in the UK runs their own PPP (P12, 2016) 
This was confirmed by a private sector interviewee who works for a successful bidder in the 
Primary Care project. This interviewee explained that they have access to advisers in the 
NDFA:  
the knowledge that we build and the fact that they do have access to advisers as 
well with knowledge by doing projects … it’s a really good model (P18, 2016) 
The extended study also found that in Ireland, training is indeed more on the job rather 
than classroom-based, as confirmed by a public sector interviewee who has worked on stage 2 
and 3 Justice projects:  
there is the odd seminar that’s run domestically now and then … I think most 
people working in it it’s learn on the job (P7, 2016) 
With regard to post-project reviews and learning from them, the extended study found 
that they are not published, apart from the one disseminated by the Department of Justice 
(Mazars, 2012). The transparency surrounding the publication of such reviews is discussed in 
5.3.2.1 Transparency.  
DPER learning 
Learning has also taken place in the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform 
(DPER), a government department which manages public spending. The senior public sector 
interviewee involved in PPP decision-making said that learning in DPER is ongoing:  
if there are lessons to learn, we learn them and we apply them to the next ones 
(P8, 2016) 
This interviewee explained how PPP has evolved since 2006 and their intention is to: 
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 look at the whole thing afresh, update it for all the things that have changed but 
also for all the lessons we’ve learned in the meantime because we’ve issued a 
lot of clarifications since the guidelines were out where people think they mean 
one thing and we say no, that’s not what they mean and we clarify … we’re 
finalising a review of [the] public sector benchmark, we did a review of that 
looking at some projects and lessons learned again so we can take on board the 
lessons learned from that and the recommendations and we can build that into 
the guidance now as well (P8, 2016) 
DPER chairs a monthly PPP steering committee attended by all government 
departments involved in PPP. The purpose of this steering committee is to learn from other 
departments:  
 we talk about the issues that are coming up (P8, 2016)  
This is particularly beneficial for departments that have not been involved in PPP before: 
 the Department of the Environment have just joined the group because they’re 
going to do social housing by PPP so they are able to learn and they make 
contacts with the others and they can talk bilaterally to the other units and find 
out what do they need to know (P8, 2016) 
Summary 6.2.2.3 Public sector learning 
Overall the research indicates that learning within the public sector is strong, with 
learning taking place between departments and the PPP steering committee. The HSE is open 
to learning from both the public sector and private sector. Perhaps because it is late to PPP 
compared with others it has more of a culture of sharing learning. This suggests that a 
pathway to learning has evolved in Ireland as PPP has matured. 
The OPW has learnt from the experience of the stage 2 Criminal Courts of Justice 
PPP, which in turn draw lesson from the stages 1 pilot schools project (Mazars, 2012). 
However, there appears to be conflict between the OPW and the NDFA and there is a sense 
that the NDFA believes it is in charge of government departments. If this is correct, it ties 
back to 5.3.1 Lead Institutional Support which discusses the NDFA as being a market driver 
and how it is trying to manage the public and private sectors. On the one hand the NDFA is 
trying to legitimise PPP by encouraging the policy but on the other hand it is managing 
government departments and thus stifling capacity. 
The NDFA has not established a national PPP training programme to build expertise 
within government departments as recommended by the UNECE (2008). Instead the public 
sector shares information at the PPP steering committee level. There is a sense that the NDFA 
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believes that it is in charge of the PPP activities of government departments and wants to keep 
it this way. This confirms the point made earlier in the section on the OPW. The NDFA acts 
as a common link between the public and private sectors and thus shares its learning with the 
private sector. This suggests that Ireland has developed a unique national pathway to policy 
learning that has evolved organically. Overall the research indicates that learning within the 
public sector is strong which in turn increases its contribution to PPP capacity. 
6.2.2.4 Learning from PPP projects in other countries (apart from the UK) and 
from other entities 
Ireland is a member of the European PPP Expertise Centre (EPEC). This is an 
initiative involving the European Investment Bank (EIB), the European Commission and 
European Union member states and candidate countries. EPEC aims to strengthen the 
capacity of its public sector members to enter into PPP transactions by sharing members’ 
expertise and experience17. The NDFA is a member of EPEC and it recognises the importance 
of learning from other countries, experiences of PPP. Brian Murphy, then Director of the 
NDFA, said:  
We also liaise extensively with our opposite numbers overseas in other markets 
and understand exactly what they are doing. We try to incorporate best practice 
in so far as it suits the market because there are different nuances in different 
markets (Dáil Éireann, 2012b, p.12) 
Despite commenting on the role of the NDFA, EPEC has never carried out a review of the 
NDFA and its institutional framework, as it has done with other member countries. During the 
extended study, none of the interviewees mentioned EPEC, suggesting that it is of little 
importance to the public and private sectors involved in PPP in Ireland. It appears that the 
NDFA also does not consider EPEC to be a significant contributor to PPP in Ireland. EPEC, 
meanwhile, seems to have a positive view of the NDFA. In fact, in EPEC’s 2014 review of 
PPP units the NDFA is commented on as an agency with “a clear focus on delivering 
specified outputs within a framework of accountability to ministers or parliament, allowing 
the ministry or department to focus on policy issues” (EPEC, 2014, p.64). 
During the extended study, public sector interviewees had very little to say about 
learning from other countries apart from the UK, suggesting that they rely on the NDFA to 
learn on their behalf. The exception to this was a public sector interviewee involved in Justice 
projects who had worked in other countries (P15, 2016). 




Private sector interviewees had more to say about learning from other countries but 
this related to issues over which they have no control. For example, the private sector 
interviewee who was successful in winning the Primary Care projects spoke about learning 
from Canada and explained how they are more transparent in their PPP dealings: 
in Canada … they’re doing these value reports at the end of the project … they 
demonstrate the value and there’s more information out there for people to see 
why this was the best way forward and I think it’s more widely acceptable … I 
think there has to be a way to publish more (P18, 2016) 
This interviewee has worked in Canada and explained that the public is more trusting of 
decisions made. For example, planning is not as big an issue in PPP as it is in Ireland: 
they don’t need planning, they just accept that planning would come through 
… planning for them is not a key risk at all because of the mindset of people, 
they don’t think that somebody would challenge it at all whereas here you 
always think … there is an oddball nearby … that can delay you nine months 
and then derails the whole project (P18, 2016) 
A former private sector interviewee now working in the public sector with experience 
of stage 2 and 3 PPP projects warned about how Ireland should heed the experiences of 
Portugal in overextending itself:  
Portugal ended up in a problem where they’d too many obligations, they’d too 
many commitments to PPPs relative to their size … Ireland does need to be 
careful of that (P14, 2016) 
Overall public sector learning from other countries apart from the UK is weak, with no 
interviewee from that sector mentioning learning from EPEC. This is despite the fact that the 
NDFA sits on the Irish PPP steering committee and interviewees who are members of the 
steering committee were interviewed for this study. Also EPEC has never reviewed the 
NDFA as it has done so with other member countries PPP unit. It is reasonable to conclude 
that the NDFA is seen as a leader of PPP units and does not consider itself a follower of other 
PPP units. This suggests that policy transfer is taking place in the opposite direction, the 
NDFA is now one of the examples that other countries are following and policy transfer is 
now taking place from Ireland to other countries. This suggests that Ireland has entered a 
maturity phase with PPP. 
Those in the private sector who have worked on PPP in other countries spoke of 
learning but this concerns experiences which are beyond immediate implementation. The 
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research confirms that learning from other countries and European entities is poor and its 
contribution to increasing PPP capacity is weak.  
6.2.2.5 Private sector learning 
During the extended study, interviewees spoke about private sector learning in terms 
of what the private sector has learnt about PPP. For example, a private sector interviewee who 
failed to win a bid on Primary Care projects said that they teamed up with another company 
that had PFI experience:  
what helped was one of our partners, [redacted] … had experience in the UK 
particularly in Scotland… in PPP… they would have that experience to bear … 
they were able to advise us (P16, 2016) 
Another private sector interviewee involved in a consortium discussed that as their 
company was experienced in education, they would stick to bidding on these types of 
projects:  
we had a winning formula which we hope will continue again … future 
projects like social housing wouldn’t be …our expertise … education certainly 
was our expertise (P24, 2016) 
Another private sector interviewee involved in PPP since the pilot projects spoke 
about learning from the experience of bidding on a project where: 
if I did something wrong I put three sets of designers and three contractors 
together rather than just two (P19, 2016) 
Learning in the private sector is concentrated on lesson learning from their past 
experience of PPP, which is seen as important and also through the formation of consortia so 
that they can team up with experienced PPP participants. The private sector also learns from 
the NDFA, as discussed in 6.2.2.3 Public sector learning. Overall, private sector learning is 
strong, which in turn contributes to the building of capacity in PPP. 
Summary 6.2.2 Policy learning 
The literature suggest suggests that capacity to manage PPPs is enhanced by the 
installation of expertise and systems for learning and knowledge diffusion (Verhoest et al., 
2015), all of which are key to PPP success (Matos-Castaño et al., 2014). The findings of the 
pilot study discussed in chapter 4 were that, although the interdepartmental group tasked with 
exploring the introduction of PPP in 1998 endeavoured to learn from UK PFI experiences, it 
was unclear whether this was effectively communicated to public sector managers (Sheppard 
and Beck, 2016). 
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When the study was extended in 2016, it was found that, as outlined in 6.2.2.1 
Learning from UK PFIs, learning from the UK has taken place and continues to take place. 
Learning from UK road projects was particularly strong, the reason being that these were 
some of the earliest PPPs. While learning has taken place from the UK, it has been adapted 
for the Irish market, albeit at a slow pace. Another possibility is that policy learning is refined 
over time. Initially when policies are transplanted policy there is mimicry, but as the 
policymakers and implementers become more experienced and confident mimicry becomes 
less prevalent. This would appear to be the case with road projects where there was 
isomorphism but the policy has been adapted for the Irish market. It appears that Ireland 
relied on learning from the UK initially but more recently is relying on learning from 
indigenous projects. The research confirms that learning from UK projects that has taken 
place is strong, and this has increased PPP capacity and contributing to the success of PPPs in 
Ireland. 
The research also indicates that, as outlined in 6.2.2.2 Learning from Irish PPPs, as 
projects have moved through the various PPP stages 1 – 3, increasingly stage 3 projects are 
drawing lessons from stage 1 and 2. This ties back to 6.2.2.1 Learning from UK PFIs which 
confirmed that when policies are transplanted, there is mimicry but as the policymakers and 
implementers become more experienced and confident, mimicry becomes less widespread. 
However, the research confirms that overall learning from Irish PPPs is varied and its 
contribution to increasing PPP capacity mixed. 
In 6.2.2.3 Public sector learning the research indicates that learning within the public 
sector is strong, with learning taking place between departments and the PPP steering 
committee. The HSE is open to learning from both the public sector and private sector, 
perhaps because it is late to PPP there is a culture of sharing learning between the parties 
involved. This suggests that a pathway to learning has evolved in Ireland as PPP has matured.  
The OPW has learnt from the experience of the stage 2 Criminal Courts of Justice 
PPP, which in turn learnt from the stages 1 pilot schools project. However, there appears to be 
conflict between the OPW and the NDFA and there is a sense that the NDFA believes it is in 
charge of government departments. If this is correct, it ties back to 5.3.1 Lead Institutional 
Support which identifies the NDFA as being a market driver and how it is trying to manage 
the public and private sectors. On the one hand the NDFA is trying to legitimise PPP by 
encouraging the policy, but on the other hand it is managing government departments and 
thus stifling capacity. 
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The NDFA has not established a national PPP training programme to build expertise 
within government departments as suggested by the UNECE (2008). Instead the public sector 
shares information at the PPP steering committee level. As alluded to earlier, there is a sense 
that the NDFA believes that it is in charge of government departments and wants to keep it 
this way. The NDFA acts as a common link between the public and private sectors and thus 
shares its learning with the private sector. This suggests that Ireland has developed a unique 
national pathway to policy learning that has evolved organically. Overall, the research 
confirms that learning within the public sector is strong which in turn increases its 
contribution to PPP capacity. 
In 6.2.2.4 Learning from PPP projects in other countries (apart from the UK) and 
from other entities it was confirmed that public sector learning from other countries apart 
from the UK is weak, with no interviewee mentioning learning from EPEC. Also EPEC has 
never reviewed the NDFA as it has done with the PPP units of other member countries. It 
appears that the NDFA does not consider EPEC to be a significant contributor to PPP in 
Ireland. Those in the private sector who have worked on PPP in other countries spoke of 
learning but having no power to implement it. The research confirms that learning from other 
countries and other entities is poor and its contribution to increasing PPP capacity is weak.  
The 2014 EPEC review of PPP units said the NDFA had “a clear focus on delivering 
specified outputs within a framework of accountability to ministers or parliament, allowing 
the ministry or department to focus on policy issues” (EPEC, 2014, p.64). It is arguable that 
the NDFA is seen as a leader of PPP units and is not considered to a follower of other PPP 
units. This suggests that while policy transfer initially took place between the UK and Ireland, 
it has now evolved to a situation where Irish PPP policy is being transferred to other 
countries. This suggests that Ireland has entered a maturity phase with PPP.  
In 6.2.2.5 Private sector learning it was confirmed that private sector learning is 
concentrated on learning from their past experience of PPP, which is strong, and also through 
the formation of consortia so that small private sector interviewees can team up with 
experienced PPP participants. However, in 6.2.1 Methods to encourage market demand, the 
scale of the Irish market, an uncertain pipeline of projects and contractor capacity were 
considered impediments to attracting private sector interest. If this is considered in the context 
of the potential to form consortia in which learning can take place, there are serious concerns 
that learning in the private sector, certainly for smaller contractors, will not take place. The 
private sector also learns from the NDFA, as discussed in 6.2.2.3 Public sector learning. 
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Overall, private sector learning is strong, which in turn contributes to the building of capacity 
in PPP. 
The contribution of policy learning to building the capacity of PPP is mixed. 6.2.2.1 
Learning from UK PFIs, 6.2.2.3 Public sector learning and 6.2.2.5 Private sector learning all 
exhibit strong policy learning. 6.2.2.2 Learning from Irish PPPs is mixed and 6.2.2.4 
Learning from PPP projects in other countries (apart from the UK) and from other entities is 
weak. 
6.2.3: Public sector expertise 
The literature suggests that PPP does not simply substitute private sector capacity for 
public sector capacity but rather requires new public sector capacity to be developed (Jooste, 
2010). Once this new capacity is developed, this creates an environment where both the 
public and private sectors have confidence to invest and cooperate together (Matos-Castaño, 
2011) and leads to a sustainable environment for PPP to flourish.  
Jooste et al. (2009) maintain that constraints in public sector capacity may be 
overcome by developing the resources and specialised expertise to develop, manage and 
operate PPP infrastructure. As stated in 6.2.2.3 Public sector learning this can be achieved 
through public sector training programmes and workshops, communicating cross-project 
knowledge, and producing guidance notes (Matos-Castaño et al., 2012). Jooste (2010) 
emphasises the importance of communicating lessons learnt on previous projects, developing 
pilot projects and understanding private finance. Other authors call for PPP advocacy to be 
built up in the public sector through the establishment of PPP units within government 
departments or as new agencies (Dutz et al., 2006; Petersen, 2011).  
The findings of the pilot study outlined in chapter 4 were that there was evidence of 
PPP-specific training and guidance to public sector staff (Sheppard and Beck, 2016). The 
need for public sector capacity was acknowledged at the beginning of the PPP process in 
Ireland through the then Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government 
putting in place a PPP Training Framework which set out the nature of the training required 
for the public and private sectors (Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local 
Government, 2003). More recently, guidance material has been published by the Department 
of Public Expenditure and Reform and this is discussed under 5.3.2 Political support. 
However, when the study was extended in 2016, it was found that public sector capacity in 
relation to PPP is patchy and mixed across government departments and state authorities.  
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The extended study conducted in 2016 examines the knowledge of PPP and training 
given in government departments and agencies to establish if public sector capacity has been 
built up and to gauge the strength of their contribution to creating capacity in PPP 
procurement and management. A central PPP unit was set up in the Department of Public 
Expenditure and Reform and individual PPP units were set up in some of the government 
departments, so it is logical that this section would examine the knowledge of PPP and 
training given by government departments. During the extended study, the interviewees spoke 
about the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform (DPER), the Department of 
Education and Science (DoES) (including Grangegorman), the Courts Service, Transport 
Infrastructure Ireland (TII), the Office of Public Works (OPW), the Department of Health and 
the Health Service Executive (HSE) . The order of analysis chosen is again based on the 
number of text blocks accumulated under each heading during the data analysis stage and is 
outlined in Table 6.3. The number of text blocks does not necessarily reflect the importance of 
the theme. The last two text blocks “Comptroller and Auditor General” and “Other 
comments” are not analysed specifically but contribute to the other analysis when appropriate. 
Table 6.3: Order of analysis of 6.2.3 Public sector expertise 
6.2.3 Public sector expertise Number of text 
blocks 
DPER 221 
DoES (including Grangegorman) 88 
Courts Service 55 
TII 48 
OPW 41 
Department of Health and the HSE 38 
Comptroller and Auditor General 22 
Other comments 224 
Total 737 
 
This theme is now analysed further along these lines with enquiries into public sector 
expertise in the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform (DPER), Department of 
Education and Skills (DoES) which includes Grangegorman, Courts Service, Transport 
Infrastructure Ireland (TII), the Office of Public Works (OPW), the Department of Health and 
the Health Service Executive (HSE) and the Comptroller and Auditor General. Figure 6.3 
outlines the different degrees of strength that each government department or state authority 




Figure 6.3: Public sector expertise 
 
 
Department of Public Expenditure and Reform (DPER) 
DPER was established in 2011 to reduce public spending to more sustainable levels 
and to reform and improve public services18. The central PPP unit is situated in DPER and 
facilitates the PPP process centrally, including developing the PPP policy framework and 
providing central guidance to Departments and other State authorities. The central PPP unit 
also chairs a high level Steering Committee which oversees PPP projects announced by 
government19.  
During the extended study the senior public sector interviewee involved in PPP 
decision-making explained the role of the steering committee as being an overseer: 
 we don’t want all these commitments building up without anyone really being 
aware of it (P8, 2016) 
DPER is highly influential in deciding projects that are suitable for consideration for 
PPP. A public sector interviewee who previously worked in the private sector explained that 
if DPER does not think that PPP is a “good idea”, then Departments are not going to go 
against it (P14, 2016). This was also spoken about by a public sector interviewee involved in 
Justice projects (P15, 2016), by an interviewee who formerly worked with the NDFA (P4, 
2016) and also by a public sector interviewee involved in Justice projects (P7, 2016).  





However, one of the public sector interviewees involved in Justice projects and who 
sits on the steering committee was critical of DPER, its knowledge of PPP and the way it 
decides which projects are suitable for PPP and which are not: 
there’s a lack of understanding of PPP at that level and the implications of 
budget decisions…I’ve got the impression from being at some meetings 
where… all the sectors have been present…there may be lists of projects in 
total given in but it’s not identified which are PPP and which are traditional 
build and maybe DPER at political level are picking off a list, I will do that by 
PPP and that by PPP (P7, 2016) 
However, the senior public sector interviewee involved in PPP decision-making 
explained that work is carried out behind the scenes to establish which projects are suitable: 
we would have been working with the Departments behind the scenes… in 
terms of what options there were and what kind of projects different 
Departments would have that might form part of a new programme so a lot of 
preliminary thinking would have been done and certainly checking that there 
are kind of projects that are PPP-able… in some cases we knew exactly what 
the projects were, in other cases we didn’t, we had a good idea that it was, 
there were a few different things that could be PPP-able and we had a good 
idea what it might be…So yes I think we’re broadly happy with PPPs as a tool 
that’s available to us, a minority procurement tool though you know…It has its 
place and it shouldn’t be too big in the overall procurement range…But for 
where it is yeah we’re happy with it (P8, 2016) 
The importance of establishing a PPP unit within departments was emphasised by the 
same interviewee: 
 So it’s a steep learning curve and that’s why it’s kind of a bit daunting for 
Departments who haven’t been involved [in PPP], but for the ones who have… 
I think they’re happy…once … you’ve got your PPP unit in place and people 
know it is what they are doing I think then they are open [to] do more (P8, 
2016) 
However, despite the establishment of PPP units in departments, there is still a belief 
that there is a lack of PPP champions as described by a public sector interviewee who 
formerly worked in the private sector: 
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 [there are] little bits of negativity around the place…more importantly [a] lack 
of champions amongst the line departments (P14, 2016) 
Overall DPER is hugely influential in PPP decision-making and convenes regular PPP 
Steering Committee meetings. Despite criticism by one public sector interviewee, DPER 
appears to be knowledgeable of PPPs which in turn strengthens PPP capacity. The existence 
of a PPP Steering Committee suggests that PPP advocacy has been built up in DPER and that 
the department’s contribution to building capacity in PPP is strong.  
The Department of Education and Skills (DoES) 
The DoES is the sanctioning authority (P5, 2016) for schools and third level colleges. 
A lot of PPP experience has been built up in the DoES, as explained by a former private 
sector interviewee now working in the public sector: 
The Department of Education had a couple of champions in the … early to 
mid-2000s who … drove … the whole schools programmes (P14, 2016) 
The DoES had a PPP unit which was closed down during the financial crisis (P21, 
2016). It has since opened a Planning and Business Unit which incorporates a Third Level 
Building and PPP Section20. The PPP unit is responsible for the delivery of the Department’s 
PPP programme with the NDFA being a procuring agency (P24, 2016). 
The perception among interviewees is that the DoES has expertise in PPP, as 
explained in an email from a public sector interviewee involved in Environment projects: 
The Department of Education have good experience and users are benefiting 
from the services (P9, 2016) 
A private sector interviewee involved in a consortium also commented on the PPP expertise 
within the DoES to the extent that it could probably build a PPP template for schools (P24, 
2016).  
The support of the DoES given to other public sector interviewees was commented on 
by a public sector interviewee who is working on a stage 3 PPP project:  
 Support of the Department of Education … [is] essential so the attitude of the 
Minister and the senior civil servants in the Department are essential … they 
are the ones who ultimately will be pushing… the bid (P5, 2016) 
This interviewee explained that within the DoES there is support for PPP and in relation to 
one project: 




 people chatted and met people and cups of coffee were had … to build support 
(P5, 2016) 
There is a PPP unit within the DoES and staff working there are experienced and are 
considered to be champions of PPP. This suggests that there is PPP advocacy within the 
DoES which strengthens PPP capacity. 
Grangegorman – DIT Campus Planning Team 
The DIT Campus Planning Team was set up to manage the planning and delivery of 
the new Grangegorman campus21 part of which is to be delivered through PPP. The extended 
study involved an interview with a public sector interviewee closely involved with this 
development. The interviewee explained that the use of PPP was very much a pragmatic 
decision: 
 so I think the driver for why it’s PPP is very much … the state finances rather 
than an underlying rationale or ideology … it was … the only way to finance it 
right now, either you can have that or not at all (P5, 2016) 
This would suggest that there was not an alternative to PPP and, as a result, there is no PPP 
champion as would exist in other departments or state authorities. This interviewee explained 
that there was training given by the NDFA in PPP: 
 they effectively gave us a set of master classes (P5, 2016) 
A PPP unit has not been set up for the development of the Grangegorman/DIT campus 
and there is a sense that PPP has been imposed rather than chosen as a method of 
infrastructure delivery. However, the NDFA is supporting the DIT Campus Planning Team 
and providing training as required. Overall, PPP advocacy and capacity within the DIT 
Campus Planning Team seems to be mixed.  
Courts Service 
The Courts Service was established in 1999 with responsibility for managing court 
administration, supporting the judiciary and providing court buildings and accommodation 
(Mazars, 2012). Within the Courts Service Infrastructure and Services Directorate lies the 
PPP unit.22 This unit is responsible for: 
• The implementation of the Courts Service Public Private Partnership Programme 
• Planning and developing projects and services to be delivered by PPP 
• The delivery of the Criminal Courts Complex 





The extended study revealed that the role of this unit is wider than actually 
documented and includes recommending projects suitable for PPP. This was explained by a 
public sector interviewee involved in the Criminal Courts of Justice PPP and stage 3 Justice 
PPPs, who said: 
 we’ve a fair idea what’s … suitable for PPP because we’ve done it 
before…when we suggest a project we’d know whether it’s PPP suitable and 
we’ll discuss it with the NDFA… is this an appropriate PPP?  Is it the right 
scale?  Is it the right type of project?  We would have discussed that with the 
NDFA and got their opinion on that before we even throw in a project (P7, 
2016) 
This public sector interviewee described the Courts Service as having had a very good 
experience of PPP with the Criminal Courts of Justice building (P7, 2016).  
However, another public sector interviewee who is working on stage 2 and 3 Justice 
projects was critical of Courts Service PPP unit staff: 
I think some of the officials involved would be lacking in expertise (P15, 2016) 
This interviewee also implied that Courts Service PPP unit staff are very pro-PPP: 
It’s actually the Courts Service again insisting that this is a much better system 
(P15, 2016) 
This interviewee went on to suggest that someone in the PPP unit has: 
 an interest in getting buildings done…they try to keep other people out 
and…they ponder about it themselves (P15, 2016) 
When asked about PPP training, the public sector interviewee involved in the Criminal 
Courts of Justice PPP and stage 3 Justice PPPs explained that they receive emails about 
training courses mainly given by international groups and delivered abroad. There is the: 
odd seminar that’s run domestically… but I think most people working in it it’s 
learn on the job (P7, 2016) 
This was confirmed by a public sector interviewee working on stage 3 Justice projects who 
said: 
I’m not aware of any formal training, but [redacted] was involved in the CCJ as 
well so [s/he] may have received training then, I certainly didn’t (P2, 2016) 
Overall, the fact that there is a PPP unit in the Courts Service that experience has been 
built through the Criminal Courts of Justice complex, that there is criticism that the staff 
working there are biased in favour of PPP, and that there is a lack experience and no formal 
PPP training for staff, suggests that PPP advocacy within the Courts Service is mixed. 
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Transport Infrastructure Ireland (TII) 
TII, a government agency, delivers transport infrastructure and services in Ireland. TII 
is an amalgamation of the former National Roads Authority (NRA) and the former Railway 
Procurement Agency (RPA). TII carries out its own procurement of PPPs and uses the NDFA 
as financial adviser. PPP road projects commenced with the N4 Kilcock/Kinnegad contract 
signed in 2003.  
The extended study found that TII was an early adopter of PPP, as a public sector 
interviewee with more than 15 years’ experience of working in transport projects explained:  
we were left to do our own procurement whereas other bodies procured 
through the NDFA (P3, 2016) 
When it was the NRA, the agency set up a specialised PPP unit with a team to deliver 
its PPP programme which involved the development of a suite of PPP documents (P9, 2016). 
A former private sector interviewee now working in the public sector with experience of stage 
2 and 3 PPP projects spoke of the NRA as being: “a champion of it … and … really 
professional” when it came to PPP projects (P14, 2016). However, when asked about PPP 
training for staff the public sector interviewee with more than 15 years’ experience of 
working in transport projects explained: 
 we don’t have staff to do it (P3, 2016) 
Overall, despite the lack of formal PPP training, there is a PPP champion and a PPP 
unit within TII. This suggests that there is PPP advocacy within TII which in turn strengthens 
PPP advocacy and capacity. 
Office of Public Works (OPW) 
The OPW manages and maintains the State’s property portfolio23 and was involved in 
the Convention Centre and, along with the Courts Service, in the Criminal Courts of Justice 
PPP and the Courts Bundle PPP.  
The extended study found that that the OPW is the planning authority for the Courts 
Bundle (P15, 2016). Yet despite its extensive involvement in PPP, a PPP unit has not been set 
up within the OPW and the NDFA procures on its behalf (P7, 2016). The reason for this is not 
clear and the public and private sectors have differing opinions about this. A public sector 
interviewee involved in Justice projects explained: 




 The OPW … don’t like PPPs. I think they see it as a sort of threatening … of 
their role in you know the State’s estate (P7, 2016) 
This suggests a tension between the OPW and the Courts Service regarding PPP yet the 
interviewee from the OPW said of the Courts Service: 
they have a very good working relationship with us and they know we know 
their methods of working (P15, 2016) 
A private sector interviewee who works on the Convention Centre was of the opposite 
opinion. This interviewee said of the OPW: 
 there are people within the OPW that have got different backgrounds … I 
couldn’t criticise them for not being … in complete understanding of what we 
need to do (P10, 2016) 
There is no PPP unit within the OPW but staff working there are very experienced in 
PPP. The findings of 6.2.2.3 Public sector learning suggest that there is a tension between the 
NDFA and the OPW. This, combined with the lack of a PPP unit, the lack of a PPP champion 
and the suggested negative attitude to PPP within the OPW suggest that PPP advocacy has not 
been achieved within the OPW which weakens PPP capacity. 
Department of Health/Health Service Executive (HSE) 
The HSE was established by the Health Act 2004 and is responsible for the provision 
of health and social services to everyone living in Ireland 24. The Minister for Health has 
responsibility for the HSE in government. The NDFA is the financial adviser to the HSE for 
Primary Care projects (P22, 2016). 
A PPP unit has not been established within the HSE despite the cancelled stage 2 
National Plan for Radiation Oncology PPP project, the stage 3 Primary Care units and the 
planned National Forensic Mental Service PPP. However, within the HSE, the HSE Estates 
section manages capital projects which include Primary Care units25. 
In the extended study carried out in 2016 a public sector interviewee who formerly 
worked in the private sector noted that: 
 there hasn’t been a champion in Health (P14, 2016) 
However, despite the lack of a formal PPP unit within the HSE, a public sector interviewee 
working in the HSE described the management of Primary Care units within the HSE as:  
 very hands on in terms of this project (P22, 2016) 





The interviewee explained that the HSE’s approach to managing PPPs differs from Education 
PPPs in that the NDFA does not manage the Primary Care units in the same way as it 
manages schools (P22, 2016). This confirms the observation in 6.2.2.3 Public sector learning 
that as the HSE is late to PPP compared with others, there is now more of a culture of sharing 
learning between the parties involved. This suggests that the HSE has observed the 
involvement of the DoES in PPP, has learnt from its experiences and is using PPP in a way 
that suits Primary Care. 
A private sector interviewee working on Primary Care projects described their 
involvement with the HSE and their involvement with “two … project directors from the 
HSE” and the “head of the estates” (P18, 2016), suggesting that the PPP set-up in the HSE is 
small. This was corroborated by the interviewee from the HSE who said: 
 we wouldn’t have as many projects … myself and my colleague would have 
been involved in PPP in HSE … since 2006 when we looked at the first PPP 
project which was on the National Plan for Radiation Oncology … whilst we 
wouldn’t necessarily be called a PPP unit …you could say there is an expertise 
in here, albeit that we’re not called the PPP unit of the HSE (P22, 2016) 
Despite there not being a formal PPP unit, there is a network of staff involved in PPP, as 
described by this interviewee: 
 there would have been myself and [redacted] at a national level, we would then 
work through our regional estates colleagues who were all involved in the 
project and then we would have had a service representative, a lead service 
representative who then would have been involved in engaging with all the 
different clinical groups…there’s probably fifty people across the HSE directly 
involved…then all the clinical people below that…so it’s quite a huge network 
(P22, 2016) 
There is not a PPP unit within the HSE but there is knowledge and expertise built up 
through experience of various projects and also a positive attitude to PPP. This suggests that 
there is PPP advocacy and capacity within the HSE which strengthens PPP sustainability. 
Summary 6.2.3 Public Sector expertise 
There is an understanding that PPP does not “simply substitute private sector capacity 
for public sector capacity” but rather requires new public sector competence to be developed 
(Jooste, 2010 p.4). The pilot study outlined in chapter 4 indicated there was evidence of PPP-
specific training and guidance to public sector staff had been provided in Ireland (Sheppard 
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and Beck, 2016). However, when the study was extended in 2016, different government 
departments and state authorities were examined to see if a PPP unit had been set up, if there 
was formal PPP training and if there was a PPP champion. The results of this analysis were 
mixed. 
DPER is influential in PPP decision-making, convenes regular PPP steering meetings 
and appears to be very knowledgeable about PPP. The DoES has a PPP unit, and staff 
working there are considered to be champions of PPP. The TII lacks formal PPP training but 
there is a PPP unit and a PPP champion within the authority. Despite the lack of a PPP unit, 
the HSE has built up PPP knowledge and expertise through experience of various projects and 
it also has a positive attitude to PPP. 
Results were mixed for the Grangegorman/DIT Campus Planning Team which suffers 
from a lack of a PPP champion. Despite receiving PPP training from the NDFA the 
interviewee felt that that PPP is being imposed on them. Results were also mixed for the 
Courts Service which does have a PPP unit. There was criticism that the staff working there 
are biased in favour of PPP and that there is a lack experience and no formal PPP training for 
staff. Results were weak for the OPW where there is no PPP unit, a lack of a PPP champion 
and generally a negative attitude to PPP. 
New public sector capacity will create an environment where both the public and 
private sectors have confidence to cooperate and invest (Matos-Castaño, 2011) thus creates a 
sustainable environment for PPP. In line with Jooste et al.’s (2009) suggestions, specialised 
expertise to develop and operate PPP infrastructure has developed in DPER, the DoES, the 
TII and the HSE but the picture is mixed for the Courts Service and the Grangegorman/DIT 
Campus Planning Team, and there is evidence of weak PPP support in the OPW. 
Dutz et al. (2006) and Petersen (2011) call for the establishment of  PPP units, and 
such units have been established in DPER, the DoES, the TII and the Courts Service but thus 
have not been developed for stage 3 type PPPs in the HSE and the Grangegorman/DIT 
Campus Planning Team. Matos-Castaño et al. (2012) advocate for public sector training 
programs and workshops. The only department or state agency that has received this is the 
Grangegorman/DIT Campus Planning Team. 
Overall, the study suggests that public sector capacity building has been patchy and 
mixed across government departments and state authorities. This is likely to lead to 
sustainability issues for the future of PPP  in Ireland. 
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6.2.4: Quality of projects  
As discussed earlier in this chapter, successful PPPs require the building of capacity in 
the form of a vibrant market of private providers which will ensure competition and also 
increase the quality work (Joost et al. 2009). Matos-Castaño (2011, p.3) points to the 
advantages of PPP which include “higher quality service at lower cost and more and better 
projects” and reduced risk. She also contends that commitment to quality is so important that 
it should be enforced by contracts. 
The literature mentions quality in different contexts. For example, the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) (2008) discusses quality in the context of value 
for money, that is, achieving quality outcomes for less money and ensuring that a low cost 
design does not result in high maintenance and operating costs. The UNECE (2008) also 
discusses quality in terms of risk sharing. The main risks are those that arise from technical 
obsolescence, changing regulation and demand (Shaoul, 2002). 
Jooste et al. (2009) expand on the definition of quality to include: 
• Identifying the best projects and executing them in a way that takes local context into 
account 
• Selecting a strong consortium 
• Ensuring that government understands the objectives of private finance 
• Identifying all risk early, transferring the optimum level of risk to the private partner 
and be willing to mitigate or retain some risk 
• Ensuring good project management and contract management on all projects 
• Making use of performance specifications on PPP projects 
• Providing clear contract clauses for “step-in” rights 
• Assessing value for money when assessing a delivery system 
(Jooste et al. 2009, p.10) 
During the data analysis a number of elements pertaining to quality were identified by 
interviewees. These largely fall in line with the elements identified in the literature, in 
particular, Jooste et al. (2009). The order of analysis chosen is based on the number of text 
blocks accumulated under each heading during the data analysis stage as outlined in Table 
6.4. The number of text blocks does not necessarily reflect the importance of the theme. The 
last text block “Other” is not analysed specifically but contributes to the other analytical 
sections when appropriate. 
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Table 6.4: Order of analysis of 6.2.4 Quality of projects 
6.2.4 Quality of projects Number of text 
blocks 
Risk transfer 221 
Quality of projects 157 
Step-in rights 31 




These elements of risk transfer, quality of projects, step-in rights and performance 
specifications are summarised in Figure 6.4 which outlines the differing degrees of strength 
that each element has in contributing to the quality of PPPs, again seen from the perspective 
of building capacity. It should be noted that assessing value for money overlaps with Theme 1 
Legitimacy. It was examined in the context of 5.3.1 Lead Institutional Support in terms of 
how the NDFA prepares value for money assessments and also in 5.3.2.1 Transparency in 
terms of the transparency surrounding how value for money is used to make decisions. The 
literature advocates for a strong consortium to be selected with a government which 
understands the objectives of private finance. However, during the extended study no 
interviewees discussed selecting a strong consortium or the need for the government to 
understand the objectives of private finance, the absence of which suggests a weak 
significance attributed to this.  




The findings of the pilot study conducted in chapter 4 found that there was mixed 
evidence of value for money in existing projects (Sheppard and Beck, 2016). However, when 
the study was extended in 2016, a broader approach to examining quality was applied and the 
following analysis comments on each individual element in turn. 
Risk transfer 
The literature states that risks should be held by the party best able to manage them 
(Burger and Hawkesworth, 2011; De Bettignies and Ross, 2004; Murphy, 2008; Hodge, 2004; 
Vining and Boardman, 2008b; Burke and Demirag, 2015; Reeves and Palcic, 2017). The 
literature also notes that to be competitive, bidders sometimes underprice risks to win a 
contract, and concerns have been raised as to whether the Irish government “cares how 
accurately risk is priced in PPP” (Burke and Demirag, 2015, p.202). This critical analysis also 
supports the view that the allocation of demand risk may be based on suboptimal risk 
allocation, with stakeholders tweaking the process to “diffuse risk to their advantage” (Burke 
and Demirag, 2015, p.202). The private sector may also seek to protect their income from 
uncertainty so if uncertainty exists it is unlikely that risk transfer will occur (Gaffney et al., 
1999). Moreover it has been argued that it is not always easy to judge if risk transfer occurred 
for commercial confidentiality reasons (Gaffney et al., 1999). 
The findings of the pilot study outlined in chapter 4 support the view of the literature 
regarding demand risk transfer in Ireland (Sheppard and Beck, 2016). Accordingly it was 
found that due to the small population of Ireland, road projects, in particular, suffered from 
poor estimates of demand risk. There was mixed evidence of risk transfer being achieved, 
with some projects performing within or above expectations and others being problematic. 
The uncertainty about risk allocation between partners and the costing of risk transfer 
adversely affected the accuracy and reliability of value for money calculations. In particular, 
the Clonee-Kells (M3) and Limerick tunnel PPPs suffered shortfalls in traffic volumes, 
resulting in Transport Infrastructure Ireland (TII) making guaranteed payments to the PPP 
companies (Sheppard and Beck, 2016). 
During the extended study, interviewees spoke about risk transfer in Ireland and it is 
interesting that only one interviewee referred to the literature’s postulate (P18, 2016), that risk 
should be transferred to the party best able to manage it. Indeed this “classical” view contrasts 
with how the interviewee who formerly worked with the NDFA spoke of the NDFA’s 
approach to risk transfer: 
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The NDFA … will say, the more risk you [the private sector] take the more 
likely you are to win this contract (P4, 2016) 
This issue was also discussed by a public sector representative from the OPW with 
experience of stage 2 and 3 Justice projects who suggested that risk transfer is not real (P15, 
2016), meaning it does not happen. Another public sector interviewee with more than 15 
years’ experience of working on Transport projects suggested that the government’s 
motivation in transferring demand risk is so that the PPP can be off balance sheet, but the 
problem with this is: 
in taking it off balance sheet they [the government]… increase the cost for the 
consumer (P3, 2016) 
The public sector is motivated to move risk to the private sector, often to the detriment 
of the private sector and to the goal of achieving value for money. This was explained by a 
public sector interviewee involved in Environment projects: 
Irish public sector clients tend to want to move risks across to contractors … 
we have not got a very risk friendly approach to construction contracts, that 
hasn’t necessarily got us value for money (P9, 2016) 
Another issue with the public sector’s policy of passing as much risk to the private 
sector is that the private sector then passes the risk down the line to sub-contractors. This was 
explained by a public sector interviewee involved in Transport projects who said of the 
private sector that: 
they always want to diminish their responsibilities as much as they can, they 
don’t want to be responsible for their subbies (P3, 2016) 
The danger of this is that sub-contractors will not be motivated to get involved in PPP, thus 
affecting market demand, an issue raised earlier in 6.2.1 Methods to encourage market 
demand. This point was confirmed by a private sector interviewee from a construction 
company which failed on a Primary Care bid:  
for a contractor a lot of that risk is passed down … the chain from the original 
… bidder … the entity or … the special purpose vehicle… they’re taking all 
the risk on but they’re feeding it down (P16, 2016) 
There was also a suggestion that, as the private sector is encouraged to take on as 
much risk as possible, this is to the detriment of value for money. This was explained by an 
interviewee who formerly worked with the NDFA:  
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the private sector take the risk … away from us [the public sector]… that has a 
value (P4, 2016) 
This view was confirmed by a PPP consultant who has worked on stage 1 and 2 PPP projects 
in Ireland beginning in 2016. This interviewee suggested that the government is risk averse 
and passes on risks that it could easily manage itself. As a reaction to this, the private sector 
charges a premium on the risk. This interviewee explained that the government pays the 
premium because it does not want the hassle of building infrastructure and in some cases it 
does not even spot that this is happening (P6, 2016).  
A public sector representative from the OPW with experience of stage 2 and 3 Justice 
projects explained that the private sector accepts risk but protects its interests by including 
extras. This interviewee discussed an extra air conditioning unit and extra lifts included in a 
project which were not necessary but were included to mitigate against breakdowns, the cost 
of which would be borne by the private sector (P15, 2016). This was confirmed by a public 
sector interviewee involved in a cancelled third level stage 2 PPP, who explained that: 
if you leave risks in there they’ll [the private sector] price that risk and they’ll 
cover themselves (P21, 2016) 
Risk transfer has proven to be problematic and contentious in PPP with the 
government motivated to transfer as much risk to the private sector to ensure that projects are 
off balance sheet. The issues with this is that the private sector in accepting risk is then 
motivated to pass it down to sub-contractors. There is also a suggestion that the approach to 
risks is being manipulated and generally not well managed. 
Quality of projects 
The literature indicates that capacity is built through the identification of the best 
projects and their execution in such a way that takes into account of the local context (Jooste 
et al., 2009). There is overlap here with 5.3.2.1 Transparency where the examination of value 
for money in decision-making is analysed. 
When asked about quality in relation to PPP during the extended study, interviewees 
discussed the quality of PPP built infrastructure in comparison with conventionally built 
infrastructure in terms of quality of materials, service and the end product. No interviewees 
spoke about PPP quality in the context of how projects are selected, suggesting that this is not 
high on their agenda.  
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The motivation of the private sector to provide high-quality assets is that ultimately it 
reduces maintenance costs. For example, a public sector interviewee involved in Justice 
projects said: 
So the specifications of materials that the buildings are built from is much 
higher than the traditional build because … maintenance costs money ... so you 
put in the best kit you can on day one so that it doesn’t break down (P7, 2016) 
Another public sector interviewee working on Justice projects explained that the 
Criminal Courts of Justice building flooded shortly after it was opened but reopened two days 
later. This interviewee explained that if this has been another non-PPP courthouse, it would 
have been shut for a month (P2, 2016). The design and quality of service provided by the PPP 
operator ensured that the building reopened as soon as possible. 
 Other interviewees spoke of the fact that PPP buildings involve the updating and 
replacement of elements of the building not found in conventionally procured and operated 
buildings. The consensus among public sector interviewees is that PPP buildings are well 
maintained which creates a benefit that they will be handed back in mint condition. For 
example, a public sector working on Justice projects explained:  
in principle … in 25 years time we will still have the equivalent of a brand new 
building, certainly well functioning plant, replaced, renewed, serviced … 
whereas if you go around the country now and you look at buildings that were 
either built or refurbished 25 years ago… an awful lot of them need work done 
(P2, 2016) 
This interviewee compared this with the Dun Laoghaire-Rathdown County Library opened in 
2014, a conventionally built building: 
It’s not a PPP, I was in that building six to eight weeks after it opened … there 
were serious scuff marks on the floor that had been obviously there for quite 
some time … hadn’t been properly cleaned .. the anti-slip … edge of … desk[s] 
… one … was loose … toilet roll holders were broken…[with] PPP they are 
fixed (P2, 2016) 
The benefit of replacement and updating of PPP buildings was also spoken about by 
the public sector interviewee working on transport PPPs (P3, 2016) and the public sector 
interviewee involved in education (P17, 2016). This interviewee suggested: 
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if you ask me, are teachers happy?  They are very happy. The principal is 
happy, the teachers are happy, they have far better services, their state of the art 
buildings, they are well maintained and so we have never had a criticism (P17, 
2016) 
This is also the view held, of course, by private sector interviewees (P11, 2016), (P12, 2016) 
and (P24, 2016). However, it is interesting that an interviewee who formerly worked with the 
NDFA stated that the motivation for PPP is: 
more to do with kind of the availability of finance rather than particularly the 
quality they bring to a particular project … we wouldn’t support the idea … 
that [the] private sector [are] necessarily … the better deliverer of public 
services, we don’t see any evidence of that (P4, 2016) 
It is possible that this interviewee is evaluating this from the point of view of being a public 
sector representative seeking to protect jobs and not as an NDFA representative. The senior 
public sector interviewee involved in PPP decision-making also avoided talking about PPPs in 
terms of providing better quality and spoke about this in terms of having: “lots of 
innovations” (P8, 2016). 
Interviewees were positive in their discussions about the quality of the PPP built 
infrastructure but no interviewees spoke about PPP quality in terms of the how projects are 
selected, suggesting that this is not an issue which is thought about frequently.  
Step-in rights 
Jooste et al. (2009) discuss the importance of contract clauses providing for step-in 
rights in the context of quality. Step-in rights are clauses in contracts that give lenders the 
right to take control of the contract in case of a “default on payments” (Aziz, 2007, p.924). 
During the extended study, private sector interviewees confirmed that step-in clauses 
exist in PPP contracts (P10, 2016), (P11, 2016). However, a private sector interviewee 
working on Primary Care projects confirmed that invoking such clauses is a last resort: 
step-in rights …[are the] last resort … if it goes down to [that] they [funders] 
are already losing money so their key objective is to guarantee there is 
somebody who can deliver but that if they don’t deliver there are certain things 
that get the step-in rights, they have a long stop date if you don’t reach or if it 
doesn’t look as if you’re going to get it they can turn to the contractor and find 
another contractor (P18, 2016) 




Jooste et al. (2009) discuss quality in terms of the use of performance specification on 
PPP projects. In the extended study, private sector interviewees spoke of key performance 
indicators (KPIs) built into contracts. For example, a private sector interviewee involved in 
stage 2 and 3 Education projects spoke of KPIs: 
a measurable KPI that we could be penalised on …[is how] often things are to 
be maintained and to what standard (P12, 2016) 
A private sector interviewee who was successful in winning Primary Care projects and 
who has international experience of PPP also spoke of KPIs. This interviewee was critical of 
the approach of focusing on KPIs in contracts and explained: 
in Scotland if you look at the … [KPI] model they went really out for it to the 
point where they put in some … hard to achieve KPIs (P18, 2016) 
This interviewee suggested that Ireland is lagging behind the UK, as the UK has a different 
approach to measuring performance of PFI: 
I think in Ireland it’s not as well done yet … in the UK it’s done better because 
in the UK we would subscribe to economic benefits, KPIs, we would say 80% 
of the materials or the supplies would come in within a fifty mile radius of the 
project. We will employ say ten apprentices and whatever and these things are 
written in the contract with penalties (P18, 2016) 
This analysis suggests that the contribution of performance specifications to project quality is 
mixed. 
Summary 6.2.4 Quality of projects 
The literature discusses quality in terms of risk transfer and commitment to quality 
(Matos-Castaño, 2011). The UNECE expands this definition of quality to include achieving 
value for money (UNECE, 2008) and Jooste et al. (2009) also set out a definition of quality.  
In terms of the study, interviewees discussed risk transfer, the use of performance 
specifications and step-in rights, all in line with the Jooste et al. (2009) analysis of quality. It 
was found that there was overlap between Theme 1 Legitimacy, Theme 2 Capacity and Theme 
3 Trust in the context of quality. For example, assessing value for money was already 
analysed in the context of 5.3.1 Lead Institutional Support in terms of how the NDFA 
prepares value for money assessments and also in 5.3.2.1 Transparency in terms of the 
transparency surrounding how value for money is used to make decisions. Another of the 
Jooste et al. (2009) definitions of quality includes ensuring good project management and 
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contract management on all projects, and this theme is addressed in 6.3.1 PPP programme 
accountability. However, no interviewee discussed selecting a strong consortium or a need for 
government to understand the objectives of private finance, the absence of which suggests a 
limited acknowledgment of the importance of these factors.  
In terms of risk transfer, the study found that risk is not transferred in line with the 
method suggested by Burger and Hawkesworth (2011); De Bettignies and Ross (2004); 
Murphy (2008); Hodge (2004); Vining and Boardman (2008b). The findings of this study also 
suggest that the government is motivated to transfer as much risk as it can to ensure that the 
PPP is off balance sheet. In 6.2.2.4 Learning from PPP projects in other countries (apart 
from the UK) and from other entities it was suggested that the NDFA now represents a model 
with regard to PPP and that Ireland has now entered a maturity phase of PPP. However, it 
appears that Ireland does not possess a very sophisticated approach to risk transfer and is 
transferring risks, not to the entity best able to manage them, but is taking an expedient 
approach which is aimed at ensuring that PPP is kept off balance sheet. This would suggest 
that Ireland has an immature approach to risk transfer. 
Issues raised regarding risk transfer pose questions as to whether current approaches 
help achieve value for money, something that cannot be evaluated due to transparency issues 
as discussed under 5.3.1 Lead Institutional Support and 5.3.2.1 Transparency. These concerns 
are also in line with the criticism expressed by Gaffney et al. (1999). Another issue raised is a 
concern that the private sector is accepting risk and passing it down to sub-contractors, a 
problem that was also highlighted in 6.2.1 Methods to encourage market demand. The 
findings of the study moreover suggest that risk is being manipulated and not being managed 
well. This is particularly concerning in light of Eurostat’s interpretation of the rules 
concerning PPP, which may result in some PPPs coming back on balance sheet (Kelly, 2016). 
The research raises serious concerns that the way risk transfer is carried out is problematic, 
which means the role of this in building PPP capacity is weak. 
The literature states that capacity is built through the identification of the best projects 
and execution of them in such a way that takes into account the local context (Jooste et al., 
2009). There is overlap here with 5.3.2.1 Transparency where the examination of value for 
money in decision-making is analysed and was found to be lacking. However, in the study 
interviewees discussed quality of PPP built infrastructure solely in terms of the quality of 
materials, service and the end product. No interviewees spoke about PPP quality in terms of 
the how projects are selected, suggesting that this is not high on their agenda. However, 
interviewees were positive in their discussions about the quality of the PPP built 
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infrastructure. Overall the contribution of this component of quality to developing PPP 
capacity is mixed. 
Jooste et al. (2009) emphasise the importance of step-in clauses and performance 
specifications in the context of quality and interviewees confirmed that they do exist and as 
such strongly contribute to building capacity in PPP.  
Jooste et al. (2009) state that making use of performance specifications on PPP 
projects is essential in the context of quality. However, an interviewee who has worked on 
international PPPs suggested that Ireland is behind the UK in its approach to setting 
performance specifications in PPP contracts. This suggests that the contribution of 
performance specifications to building capacity in PPP is mixed. 
In summary, the contribution of various components of quality and quality 
management to building capacity in PPP in Ireland is mixed, particularly when looked at in 
the context of existing problems with regard to value for money and transparency.  
6.2.5: Coordination of deal flow  
The literature indicates that capacity not only refers to the building up of competence 
within government, which includes the public sector, but also the building of the capacity of 
the private sector (Jooste et al., 2009). One way of achieving this is to develop a PPP 
programme which includes an environment which attracts private investment. This is helped 
by the development and application of a legal framework which should be applied 
consistently and by coordinating the PPP deal flow (Jooste et al., 2009; Dewulf et al., 2011). 
There is overlap here between Theme 1 Legitimacy and Theme 2 Capacity as the 
establishment of a legal and regulatory framework is also considered to be necessary to build 
legitimacy as discussed in 5.3.2.2 Legal and regulatory framework. During the extended 
study, it was found that there are mixed results in terms of the legal and regulatory framework 
and its contribution toward the legitimacy of PPP. 
Dewulf et al. (2011) and Jooste et al. (2009) explain that coordinating deal flow is 
achieved through communicating upcoming projects to the market. During the extended 
study, it was found in 5.3.1 Lead Institutional Support that the NDFA is instrumental in 
keeping the market informed, an activity that contributes to the legitimacy of PPP.  
Jooste et al. (2009) discuss the coordination of deal flow in terms of coordinating the 
exercise of public sector buying power. However, there is a disconnect here as the public 
sector departments are removed from the direct procurement of PPP in that the NDFA 
manages this function. In 5.3.1 Lead Institutional Support the various roles of the NDFA is 
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discussed. These include acting as a procuring adviser as well as a financial and technical 
adviser to government departments. During the extended study, it was confirmed that the 
NDFA has a strong role as an adviser to the public sector and expert in the procurement 
process.  
Deal flow was also referred to in  5.3.4 Project portfolio where it was found that 
increasing the number of PPP projects is seen by stakeholder interviewees as essential for the 
legitimacy of PPP. During the extended study, it was found that the private sector considers 
the public sector’s assertion of a pipeline of projects to be patchy, which and in turn weakens 
the legitimacy of PPP. 
The literature suggests that the establishment of a PPP unit is also a contributor to 
building capacity in PPP especially where it encourages deal flow (Jooste et al., 2011). This 
also overlaps with Theme 1 Legitimacy where the establishment of a PPP unit or Lead 
Institutional Support is also seen as necessary to build legitimacy in PPP (see 5.3.1 Lead 
Institutional Support). During the extended study, it was found that the NDFA is a promoter 
of PPP which does not necessarily contribute to the legitimacy of PPP. 
Jooste et al. (2009, p.9) also discuss the coordination of deal flow in terms of the 
avoidance of “bunching” of projects, something also reiterated by Dewulf et al. (2011). 
During the extended study, a private sector interviewee who has worked on stage 2 and 3 
PPPs and is hoping to work on Social Housing projects explained that the NDFA tries to 
avoid bunching of projects: 
No they try and keep them … staggered (13, 2016) 
However, the extended study highlighted the lack of a coordinated deal flow and in particular 
suggested that there is either a glut or a famine of projects. This is of concern to the public 
and private sectors. For example, an interviewee who formerly worked with the NDFA 
discussed: 
sometimes when there was no projects and … sometimes when there was three 
or four or five or six projects that the NDFA were working on at the one time 
(P4, 2016) 
Concern was also expressed by a senior public sector interviewee involved in PPP decision-
making who said: 
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 there’s a bit of a lull now before we announced two phases … it will take some 
time before they actually go to market and the question is, will the funders 
have gone away because we’re not issuing one every couple of months or 
something … in the meantime … the big PPP Cos aren’t going to send teams 
…over here and waiting for it to come… and it’s this trade-off between having 
enough of a pipeline going into the future that people will be putting effort in 
to bidding for the work and … at the same time not over committing ourselves 
… we’re limited to the amount of PPPs we feel we can do (P8, 2016) 
A public sector interviewee who is working on a stage 3 education PPP project expressed 
concern about deal flow: 
PPP is not viable unless there’s a steady stream of projects (P5, 2016)  
As would be expected, the private sector is also concerned about deal flow. For 
example, a private sector interviewee who has worked on stage 2 and 3 PPPs and is hoping to 
work on Social Housing projects said: 
I think PPP needs to be … constant…And we’re not doing the constant bit… at 
the moment we’re waiting for the next PPP announcement in terms of the next 
slew of projects that are coming out … announcements that aren’t followed up 
(P13, 2016) 
This interviewee speculated that this is not the fault of the NDFA but is down to political 
decision-making: 
what can the NDFA do?  They’re waiting on word from above (P13, 2016) 
However, this interviewee made the point that delays in deal flow are cumulative when 
procurement rules are taken into account, and this can result in an onerous procurement 
process: 
 it’s always tight. .. there are statutory timelines that they have to keep to in 
terms of EU procurement… depending on when they publish notices timelines 
are statutory… I think there’s enough advance warning because it’s not about 
… putting the bid together it’s getting your team together (P13, 2016) 
This reiterates the findings in 6.2.1 Methods to encourage market demand, which stated that 
PPP timeframes are still very long. 
Summary 6.2.5 Coordination of deal flow  
During the study, mixed evidence was provided that a deal flow is contributing to PPP 
capacity building. This was supported by the earlier examination of the legal and regulatory 
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framework in 5.3.2.2 Legal and regulatory framework, the results of which were also found to 
be mixed. The examination of the NDFA in 5.3.1 Lead Institutional Support, in which the 
contribution of the NDFA in keeping the market informed had been found to be strong as is 
its role as adviser and expert. However, the role of the NDFA as a promoter of PPP was 
shown to be a strong but a negative attribute in terms of its potential contribution to the 
legitimacy of PPP. Also, the analysis in 5.3.4 Project portfolio indicates that the pipeline of 
projects was found to be patchy and, despite the NDFA’s endeavours to avoid bunching of 
projects, there is a lack of a coordinated deal flow. 
6.2.6: Performance of PPPs 
The literature indicates that the capacity to undertake PPPs is strengthened by the 
“ability to structure and govern PPP projects”, for example, through procedural frameworks 
and regulation (Matos-Castaño et al., 2012, p.5). Jooste (2010) suggests that this should take 
the form of independent oversight of performance monitoring, the results of which should be 
published. This will provide evidence that can be used to improve future projects (Verhoest et 
al., 2013) 
It appears that the NDFA considers performance monitoring to be essential, as 
expressed by Stephen Burgess, then Head of Procurement and Project Management, NDFA, 
who stated: 
 This includes a more visible and transparent reporting regime between the PPP 
and ourselves in terms of its level of compliance on a monthly basis with, for 
example, payments to sub-contractors within the supply chain. A statement to 
that effect must be signed by two directors. Failure to comply would 
potentially constitute a breach of contract. We ensure compliance is taken 
seriously (Dáil Éireann, 2012b, p.29) 
However, the findings of the pilot study outlined in chapter 4 indicated that there was a high 
degree of fragmentation in the regulatory oversight of Irish PPPs. As statutory financial 
adviser, the NDFA has responsibility for the procurement of PPPs in sectors other than 
transport, local authorities and the direct procurement of certain education projects. It 
performs its functions through the National Treasury Management Agency, and while its fees 
and expenses are audited by the Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG), the auditor does 
not oversee procurement decisions nor does it publish the performance-monitoring results of 
the NDFA (Sheppard and Beck, 2016). 
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When the extended study was conducted in 2016, interviewees confirmed that Irish 
PPPs are monitored in terms of performance and this is linked to unitary fees. This was 
explained by an interviewee who formerly worked with the NDFA: 
one of the big performance measures is that …at end of the contract the facility 
[the asset] has to be handed back to the public sector … in the state it’s 
supposed to be from day [one] … [there is] ongoing dialogue between the PPP 
company and … the other [public sector] partner … about what they are doing 
around performance and keeping the infrastructure …[it is] built into the detail 
of contracts (P4, 2016) 
The public sector interviewee involved in Justice projects explained: 
There’s a lot [of] analysis done… during operation …there’s a payment 
mechanism … and testing that’s done on a monthly basis on most projects 
…you get a report … once a month with all the metrics… it’s an obligation… 
the PPP company has to report monthly… the PPP company … are responsible 
for everything … we will get [a] monthly report as to what the service failures 
were… there is absolutely everything in the report about every aspect of their 
service and because … there are deductions for service failures you get the 
monthly rigour of looking at that (P7, 2016) 
This point was also confirmed by a private sector interviewee who was successful in winning 
Primary Care projects, who stated: 
 there are … strict performance criteria, availability criteria and they [the 
private sector] are financially hit every time they don’t deliver (P18, 2016) 
Performance failures in some projects are logged at a service desk, as described by a private 
sector interviewee who works on the Convention Centre: 
we have a service desk so any query, fault etc., complaint from the member of 
the public gets logged immediately… you can literally at a point of time 
produce a report and it will tell you all these different tickets that were raised, 
how long it took to respond, to rectify, what the outcome was and the OPW get 
lists of all these things ... the OPW would … have visibility on all that and 
they’ll track that every month (P10, 2016) 
 
A fine, or a reduction in the unitary payment made by the public sector to the private sector is 
imposed for service failures. This can vary and was described in one case as follows: 
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 There was quite a substantial fine (P4, 2016) 
However, the issue here is that there is no independent oversight as performance is 
monitored by the NDFA, TII or public sector department who are typically involved in the 
project procurement. This was confirmed by the previous interviewee who said that it was the 
OPW which monitored performance in the Convention Centre. The public sector interviewee 
with more than 15 years’ experience of working in transport projects confirmed that it was TII 
which monitored performance on transport projects: 
it’s more ourselves, as in the public sector, are monitoring them (P3, 2016) 
A PPP consultant who has worked on stage 1 and 2 PPP projects in Ireland beginning in 2006 
confirmed that it was also the NDFA which monitored performance (P6, 2016). This suggests 
that there may be a lack of independency in the way operational projects are managed on 
account of the fact that the public sector who commissioned the project performs this.  
Summary 6.2.6 Performance of PPPs 
The analysis under 5.3.2.1 Transparency highlighted the lack of transparency 
surrounding PPP, particularly with regard to post-project reviews, which has serious 
implications for capacity building. This is out of line with the recommendation of the 
literature that such reports be published (Verhoest et al., 2013). Coupled with the fact that 
there is a lack of independent oversight of performance monitoring, again in direct 
contradiction to the recommendations set down by the literature (Jooste, 2010), suggest a 
serious weakness in PPP capacity building.  
Conclusion of Theme 2 Capacity 
The literature on institutional theory was examined in chapter 3 and in the context of 
PPP it was found that PPPs were considered more sustainable when governments understood 
the complexity of PPP and where institutional capacity was built. Accordingly, this research 
focused on institutional theory to examine the legitimacy, capacity and trust of PPP as a 
means for gauging whether this policy is sustainable. This is in line with a similar framework 
proposed by Matos-Castaño et al. (2012) and Jooste et al. (2009). The data collected during 
the study was analysed in line with the theory and themes were created from the data. These 
were legitimacy, capacity and trust. Theme 2 examines the capacity of PPP and its 
contribution to the sustainability of this policy. 
Theme 2 Capacity was divided into sub-themes during the data analysis. In 6.2.1 
Methods to encourage market demand  it was found that the cancellation of projects during 
the financial crisis and a subsequent loss of state credibility in the PPP market weakened 
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Ireland’s capacity to undertake PPPs. The stimulus programme announced in 2012 and new 
measures announced in 2013 have had mixed results in terms of contributing to building 
capacity in PPP. These issues are summarised in Figure 6.1 which outlines the effect that each 
factor has on building the capacity of PPP.  
The introduction of design-led PPPs with planning in place has been welcomed by the 
public and private sector. However, there is concern that this has resulted in a lack of 
innovation, which is a serious concern as innovation is one of the motivating factors given for 
PPP procurement.  
Interviewees considered the reduced timeframe for preparing PPP projects to the 
market through to contract award has not been significant and the process is still too long 
making it less attractive compared to forms of procurement. The partial refund of bid costs to 
unsuccessful bidders in Phase 1 of the stimulus programme was seen as a gesture and not 
significant in terms of overall bid costs and has not had a substantial effect on encouraging the 
market.  
The pipeline of projects introduced in the Infrastructure and Capital Investment Plan  
2016 – 2021 has been unclear and the timelines confusing for the private sector, which has 
had implications for attracting private sector interest in PPP. Another capacity weakness 
identified by interviewees was the difficulty in attracting foreign companies to bid in Ireland 
due to the small scale of the market. The NDFA is trying to encourage local contractors to 
engage with PPP but the transfer of risk down the line to sub-contractors can be prohibitive. 
The Irish market is dominated by one company, yet local contractors need to align with larger 
contractors. International companies willing to bid in Ireland are at a disadvantage as they are 
not familiar with the bidding process.  
These findings are not in line with the literature which suggests that governments 
should develop the necessary capacity to ensure that projects are brought to fruition 
successfully (Matos-Castaño et al., 2012). These authors write that capacity to undertake 
PPPs will strengthen the ability to structure and govern PPP projects which is necessary for 
PPP development. While the pilot study outlined in chapter 4 indicated that the Government 
recognised the need to create a pipeline of PPP projects (Sheppard and Beck, 2016) the 
extended study suggests that, while there is currently interest in the Irish market, it is quiet at 
the moment and the concern is that the private sector capacity built up will diminish, which 
will have adverse effects on the sustainability of PPP. 
6.2.2 Policy learning was divided into sub-themes during the data analysis. These 
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themes are summarised in Figure 6.2 which outlines the varying strengths of the learnings that 
have taken place in relation to PPP and their contribution to building capacity in PPP. 6.2.2.1 
Learning from UK PFIs indicates that learning from the UK has taken place and continues to 
take place but it also suggests that there has been adaption to the Irish market. Another finding 
is that policy learning is refined over time. Initially when policies are transplanted there is 
mimicry, but as the policy-makers and implementers become more experienced and confident, 
mimicry becomes less prevalent. It appears that Ireland relied heavily on learning from the 
UK initially but more recently is relying on learning from indigenous projects. The research 
confirms that learning from UK projects that has taken place is strong, therefore increasing 
PPP capacity and contributing to the success of PPPs in Ireland. 
The research indicates that, as outlined in 6.2.2.2 Learning from Irish PPPs, as 
projects have moved through the various PPP stages 1 – 3, increasingly stage 3 projects are 
learning from stage 1 and 2. This suggests that overall learning from Irish PPPs is varied and 
its contribution to increasing PPP capacity mixed. 
6.2.2.3 Public sector learning presents evidence that learning within the public sector 
is strong, with learning taking place between departments and the PPP steering committee. 
This suggests that the pathway to learning has evolved in Ireland as PPP has matured.  
The research indicates that there may be conflict between the OPW and the NDFA and 
that there is a sense that the NDFA believes it is in charge of government departments. If this 
is correct, it ties back to 5.3.1 Lead Institutional Support which discusses the NDFA as being 
a market driver and highlights how it is trying to manage the public and private sectors. On 
the one hand the NDFA is trying to legitimise PPP by encouraging the policy but on the other 
hand it seems to be managing government departments and thus stifling capacity. 
The NDFA has not established a national PPP training programme to build expertise 
within government departments as recommended by the UNECE (2008). Instead the public 
sector shares information at the PPP steering committee level. The NDFA acts as a common 
link between the public and private sectors and thus shares its learning with the private sector. 
This suggests that Ireland has developed a unique national pathway to policy learning that has 
evolved organically from the strong position of the NDFA.  
In 6.2.2.4 Learning from PPP projects in other countries (apart from the UK) and 
from other entities it was confirmed that public sector learning from countries other than the 
UK is weak, with no interviewee mentioning learning from EPEC. It appears that the NDFA 
does not consider EPEC to be a significant contributor to PPP in Ireland. An interesting 
observation is that in EPEC’s 2014 review of PPP units the NDFA is commented on as an 
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agency with “a clear focus on delivering specified outputs within a framework of 
accountability to ministers or parliament, allowing the ministry or department to focus on 
policy issues” (EPEC, 2014, p.64). Perhaps the NDFA is seen as a leader of PPP units and is 
not considered to be a follower of other PPP units. This suggests that while policy transfer 
initially took place between the UK and Ireland, this has now evolved to a situation where 
Irish PPP policy is being transferred to other countries. Ireland thus seems to have entered a 
maturity phase with PPP, at least in as far as external observers are concerned.  
In 6.2.2.5 Private sector learning it was confirmed that private sector learning is 
centred on learning from local experiences of PPP. This type of learning appears to be strong, 
and through the formation of consortia smaller private sector participants can team up with 
experienced PPP staff. The private sector also draws lessons from the NDFA as discussed in 
6.2.2.3 Public sector learning. However, in 6.2.1 Methods to encourage market demand, the 
scale of the Irish market, an uncertain pipeline of projects and limited contractor capacity 
were considered impediments to attracting private sector interest. If this is considered in the 
context of the potential to form consortia in which learning can take place, there is a 
possibility that wider learning in the private sector, certainly for smaller contractors be 
limited.  
The literature suggests that capacity to manage PPPs is enhanced by the 
institutionalisation of expertise and systems for learning and knowledge diffusion (Verhoest 
et al., 2015), all of which are key to PPP success (Matos-Castaño et al., 2014). The pilot study 
discussed in chapter 4 indicated that although the interdepartmental group tasked with 
exploring the introduction of PPP in 1998 endeavoured to learn from UK PFI experiences, it 
was unclear whether this was effectively communicated to public sector managers (Sheppard 
and Beck, 2016). The extended study suggested that learning from UK PFIs, learning from 
the public sector and learning from the private sector all strongly contribute to building 
capacity in PPP. Learning from Irish PPPs and its contribution to building capacity in PPP is 
mixed and learning from PPP projects in other countries, apart from the UK, and other entities 
is weak in its contribution to building capacity in Irish PPP. 
In 6.2.3 Public sector expertise the results of the 2016 extended study indicated that in 
government departments and state authorities expertise in PPP was mixed. These themes are 
summarised in Figure 6.3 where the different degrees of strength that each government 
department or state authority has in growing public sector expertise in PPP is outlined. 
Specialised expertise to develop and operate PPP infrastructure has been developed in DPER, 
the DoES, TII and the HSE but the situation is mixed for the Courts Service and the 
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Grangegorman/DIT Campus Planning Team and weak in the OPW. This is in line with Jooste 
et al. (2009) and confirms Matos-Castaño’s (2011, p.18) suggestion that new public sector 
capacity will create an environment where both the public and private sectors have 
“confidence to invest and cooperate together”, which will lead to sustainable environment for 
PPP to flourish. This would apply to most Irish government departments involved in PPP but 
obviously not to all of them. 
PPP units have been established in DPER, the DoES, the TII and the Courts Service, 
which is in line with the recommendations of Dutz et al. (2006) and Petersen (2011, but they 
have not been developed for stage 3 type PPPs in the HSE and the Grangegorman/DIT 
Campus Planning Team. In line with the recommendations of Matos-Castaño et al. (2012) it 
appears that the Grangegorman/DIT Campus Planning Team has received training in PPP. 
There is an understanding that PPP does not simply substitute private sector capacity 
for public sector competitive but rather that they require new public sector capacity to be 
developed (Jooste, 2010). The pilot study outlined in chapter 4 suggested that there was PPP-
specific training and guidance to public sector staff (Sheppard and Beck, 2016). The findings 
of the extended study are that public sector capacity is patchy and mixed across government 
departments and state authorities, which is likely to lead to sustainability issues for the future 
of PPP in Ireland. 
In terms of 6.2.4 Quality of projects the literature discusses quality in terms of risk 
transfer and commitment to quality (Matos-Castaño, 2011). The UNECE expands this 
definition of quality to include achieving value for money (UNECE, 2008) and Jooste et al. 
(2009) also set out a definition of quality which will be discussed shortly. Figure 6.4 
summarises the issues regarding the quality of PPP projects and outlines the degrees of 
strength that each element has in contributing to the quality of PPPs which is necessary in 
building capacity.  
During the data analysis stage, it was noted that there was overlap between Theme 1 
Legitimacy, Theme 2 Capacity and Theme 3 Trust in the context of quality. For example, 
“assessing value for money” had already been examined in the context of 5.3.1 Lead 
Institutional Support in terms of how the NDFA prepares value for money assessments and 
also in 5.3.2.1 Transparency in terms of the transparency surrounding the use of value for 
money calculations in decision-making. Jooste et al. (2009) provide a definition of quality 
which includes ensuring good project management and contract management on all projects, 
and this theme is addressed in 6.3.1 PPP programme accountability.  
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As regards key aspects of PPP quality highlighted in the literature it was found that no 
interviewee discussed selecting a strong consortium or whether the government understands 
the objectives of private finance, all quality issues, the absence of which suggests a weak 
understanding among interviewees of this area. 
In terms of risk transfer, the study found that risk is not transferred in line with the 
method suggested the literature which is to the party best able to manage it (Burger and 
Hawkesworth, 2011; De Bettignies and Ross, 2004; Murphy, 2008; Hodge, 2004; Vining and 
Boardman, 2008b; Burke and Demirag, 2015). The findings suggest that the government is 
motivated to transfer as much risk as it can to ensure that the PPP is off balance sheet. In 
6.2.2.4 Learning from PPP projects in other countries (apart from the UK) and from other 
entities it was suggested that the NDFA is now a model in terms of PPP policy-making which 
suggests that Ireland has now entered a maturity phase of PPP, at least in so far as outside 
observers are concerned. However, it appears that Ireland does not have a very sophisticated 
approach to risk transfer and is not transferring risks to the entity best able to manage as it is 
taking an expedient approach to ensure that PPP is kept off balance sheet. This suggests that 
Ireland has at best an under-developed approach to risk transfer. 
Issues raised regarding risk transfer suggest that current practice is unlikely to provide 
value for money, something that cannot be proven due to transparency issues which were 
raised in 5.3.1 Lead Institutional Support and 5.3.2.1 Transparency. Another issue raised is a 
concern that the private sector is accepting risk and passing it down to sub-contractors, a 
problem highlighted in 6.2.1 Methods to encourage market demand. The findings of the study 
suggest that risk is being manipulated and not being managed well. This is particularly 
concerning in light of Eurostat’s interpretation of the rules concerning PPP, which may result 
in some Irish PPPs coming back on balance sheet (Kelly, 2016). Overall the research raises 
serious concerns that risk transfer and its role in building PPP capacity is weak. 
The literature states that capacity is built through the identification of the best projects 
and execution of them in such a way that takes into account the “local context” (Jooste et al., 
2009, p.10). There is overlap here with 5.3.2.1 Transparency where the examination of value 
for money in decision-making is analysed and was found to be lacking. However, in the study 
interviewees discussed the quality of PPP built infrastructure in terms of the quality of 
materials, service and the end product. No interviewees spoke about PPP quality in terms of 
the how projects are selected, suggesting that this is not high on their agenda. Interviewees, 
meanwhile, were positive in their discussions about the quality of the PPP built infrastructure. 
Overall quality of PPPs in building capacity is mixed. 
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Jooste et al. (2009) emphasise the importance of step-in clauses and interviewees 
confirmed that they do exist and that this contributes potentially to building capacity in PPP. 
Jooste et al. (2009) also state that making use of performance specifications on PPP projects is 
essential in the context of quality. However, an interviewee who has worked on international 
PPPs suggested that Ireland is behind the UK in its approach to performance specifications in 
PPP contracts. This suggests that the contribution of performance specifications to building 
capacity in PPP may be mixed. 
In summary, the contribution of various component aspects of PPP quality to building 
capacity in PPP in Ireland is mixed particularly when looked at in a context to which 
highlights a problematic approach to the issues of transparency.  
Mixed evidence also emerged in 6.2.5 Coordination of deal flow which suggested that 
an adequate deal flow exists which is contributing to PPP capacity building, but also 
suggested that there were still problems in this area. This chimed with the earlier examination 
of the legal and regulatory framework in 5.3.2.2 Legal and regulatory framework, the results 
of which were found to be mixed, and the examination of the NDFA in 5.3.1 Lead 
Institutional Support. Here the contribution of the NDFA in keeping the market informed had 
been found to be strong in terms of its role as adviser and expert, while the strong role of the 
NDFA as a promoter of PPP was shown to be seen a negative attribute in as far as its 
contribution to the legitimacy of PPP. Also, the analysis in 5.3.4 Project portfolio indicates 
that the pipeline of projects was patchy, and despite the NDFA’s endeavours to avoid 
bunching of projects, there was a lack of a coordinated deal flow. 
6.2.6 Performance of PPP highlights that there is a lack of transparency surrounding 
PPP, particularly of post-project reviews, which has serious implications for capacity 
building. This is out of line with the recommendation of the literature that such reports be 
published (Verhoest et al., 2013). Coupled with the fact that there is a lack of independent 
oversight of performance monitoring, again in direct deviation from the recommendations set 
down by the literature (Jooste, 2010), this suggests a serious weakness in capacity building 
Irish PPP projects.  
Perhaps, most importantly, this part of the study suggested that private sector capacity 
built up is likely to diminish as the Irish market is currently very quiet. While learning from 
UK PFIs, from the public sector and from the private sector strongly contribute to building 
capacity in PPP, learning from Irish PPPs and its contribution to building capacity in PPP is 
mixed. Learning from PPP projects in countries other than the UK, and other entities is weak 
in its contribution to building capacity in PPP. Public sector capacity is patchy and mixed 
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across government departments and state authorities which may lead to sustainability issues 
for the future of PPP in Ireland. This situation is aggravated by a lack of widespread oversight 





 6.3 Theme 3 Trust 
As previously noted the research draws on institutional theory to examine the 
legitimacy, capacity and trust of PPP with the overall objective of gauging whether this policy 
is sustainable in Ireland. This is in line with a similar framework proposed by Matos-Castaño 
et al. (2012) and Jooste et al. (2009). In this chapter trust is examined in the context of PPP. 
Trust has been defined as an attitude relating to the willingness to rely on the actions of other 
actors, under the condition of contractual and social obligations, with a view to collaborating 
(Smyth and Pryke, 2008). Zaheer et al. (1998, p.143) further suggest that trust comprises of 
“the expectation that an actor (1) can be relied on to fulfil obligations, (2) will behave in a 
predictable manner, and (3) will act and negotiate fairly when the possibility for opportunism 
is present”.  
In the context of PPP, Matos-Castaño (2011) have put forward a definition of trust 
which includes fostering trust between the public and private sectors through the use of 
standards and mechanisms implemented by government. Specifically, the public sector can 
develop trust through the use of decision-making departments, guidance documents, a 
regulatory agency, dispute resolution mechanisms and cooperation platforms. The private 
sector can develop trust through the use of project monitoring and cooperation platforms. 
Verhoest et al. (2015) stipulate that trust is developed between the public and private sectors 
through the use of clear regulations and standards, clearly defined roles of the public sector 
and ex-ante evaluation.  
Jooste et al. (2009) do not discuss trust itself but emphasise balancing the interests of 
the various stakeholder groups: the public sector, the private sector and the civic sector. They 
suggest that there should be “give and take” between the various stakeholder groups 
specifically, fairness in contract negotiations, regulation, preventing corruption and 
preventing opportunistic behaviour (Jooste et al., 2009, p.7). In other words, there should be 
trust between the various stakeholders involved in PPP and this will strengthen the 
sustainability of the policy. 
In this study, the term “trust” is used in line with Matos-Castaño (2011) and it is found 
that there is overlap between trust, legitimacy and capacity. For example, trust can be 
developed through the use of decision-making departments (Matos-Castaño, 2011). During 
the extended study conducted in 2016, aspects relating to this were examined under 5.3.1 
Lead Institutional Support, where the role of the PPP unit, the NDFA in this context, in 
contributing to the legitimacy of PPP was found to be mixed. It was also examined under 
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6.2.3 Public sector expertise where the roles of government departments and state authorities 
and their contribution to the building of capacity in PPP were found to be mixed. Trust is also 
developed between the public and private sectors through the use of clear regulations and 
standards (Verhoest et al., 2015). There is overlap therefore with 5.3.2.2 Legal and regulatory 
framework. During the extended study it was found that the legal and regulatory framework’s 
contribution to legitimacy was mixed and the NDFA’s flexible approach to applying rules 
along with the fragmented approach to updating guidelines and contracts weaken the 
legitimacy of PPP. The private sector can develop trust through the use of “project 
monitoring” and “cooperation platforms” (Matos-Castaño, 2011, p.22). There is overlap here 
with 6.2.6 Performance of PPPs. During the extended study, it was found that PPPs are 
monitored in terms of performance but that there is a lack of transparency surrounding the 
publication of the results, which seriously weakens trust in the context of the taxpayer. Trust 
is also developed through the use of oversight by a regulatory agency (Matos-Castaño, 2011). 
There is overlap here with 6.2.6 Performance of PPPs where the pilot study outlined in 
chapter 4 drew attention to the high degree of fragmentation in the regulatory oversight of 
Irish PPPs (Sheppard and Beck, 2016). 
The approach to the analysis of data under Theme 3 Trust in this section is similar to 
the approach adopted in Theme 1 Legitimacy and Theme 2 Capacity. The method for this is 
outlined in 4.4.1 Data analysis used in this research study. Appendix H shows how the 
literature groups the broader themes under the main themes. Appendix I shows the thematic 
framework which was reflected in Table 5.1 shown earlier and is now repeated for Theme 3 
Trust. The order in which the analysis of the Trust theme is again carried out is based on the 
number of text blocks identified against each sub-theme, as outlined in Table 6.5. The number 
of text blocks does not necessarily reflect the importance of the theme. 
 
Table 6.5: Order of analysis of Theme 3 Trust 
Name Number of text 
blocks 
6.3 Theme 3 Trust: 366 
6.3.1 PPP programme accountability 250 
6.3.2 Fairness of PPP procurement 63 




Specifically, 6.3.1 PPP programme accountability examines whether there is 
independent oversight in PPP, 6.3.2 Fairness of PPP procurement examines whether there is 
fairness in project procurement and selection, and 6.3.3 Complaints and arbitration examines 
how dispute resolution is structured. 
6.3.1 PPP programme accountability 
The literature indicates that PPP capacity can be built through government by ensuring 
that PPPs are held accountable in terms of their performance. This usually is not by the PPP 
unit, but by an independent scrutiniser who is technically competent to review projects 
(UNECE, 2008). Feedback received should then be used to inform future policy and guidance 
(UNECE, 2008). However, in the context of building trust between the public and private 
sectors, the literature suggests that this can be developed through the use of project 
monitoring and reporting by the private sector (Matos-Castaño, 2011), in other words, self-
monitoring. The European PPP Expertise Centre (EPEC) has commented that the NDFA 
operates within “a framework of accountability to ministers or parliament” (EPEC, 2014, 
p.64). It is interesting that there is no mention of accountability to the public or taxpayer. 
During the extended study, interviewees spoke of accountability. Superficially, there 
appears to be accountability in Irish PPPs in terms of the private sector preparing performance 
reports for the NDFA, an independent auditor oversees the initial operation of the asset and 
benchmarking exercises are carried out, but there appears to be a lack of independent scrutiny 
of PPPs.  
A private sector interviewee who works on the Convention Centre, a stage 2 PPP 
project, gave the following comments regarding oversight: 
it’s an awful lot of money the government put in … as a taxpayer … I would 
say we’ve probably come off lightly in the amount of scrutiny we get from the 
public sector (P10, 2016) 
However, interviewees had different ideas as to what constituted good accountability. 
Some thought that the reports drawn up by the private sector which trigger unitary payments 
constituted accountability. For example, a public sector interviewee involved in stage 2 and 
stage 3 Justice projects thought that there is accountability, but in the sense that there is a 
public sector employee overseeing the day-to-day operation of the PPP and the reporting that 
is carried out: 
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Yeah there’d be quite rigorous… in the CCJ we’ve a building manager 
…There’s a lot more analysis done, a lot more data, even during operation 
there’s a payment mechanism there and testing that’s done on a monthly basis 
on most projects… contract management is a lot more robust than traditional 
build (P7, 2016)  
This was the view also held by a private sector interviewee involved in stage 2 and 3 
Education projects. It was revealing that this interviewee highlighted the fact that self-
reporting by the private sector was built on trust between the public and private sectors: 
we have to do a monthly report for the authority… That would cover all of the 
help desk items, the length of time it took to close them out, any penalties … 
we have to tell the authority what they have to penalise us, like it has to … very 
transparent and … we go with our begging bowl, but … it isn’t a wink, wink, 
nudge, nudge situation at all … you live by the contract and you have to 
perform to that (P12, 2016) 
Other interviewees took accountability to mean the use of the service or help desk in 
PPPs. A private sector interviewee who works on the Convention Centre, a stage 2 PPP 
project, spoke of how the service desk is used: 
we have a service desk so any query, fault etc., complaint … gets logged 
immediately... you can literally at a point of time produce a report and it will 
tell you … how long it took to respond, to rectify, what the outcome was and 
the OPW get lists of all these things (P10, 2016) 
A private sector interviewee involved in stage 2 and 3 Education projects also 
explained how the help desk is used to generate the payment mechanism in the contract and to 
gather information on key performance indicators (KPIs). This interviewee again drew on the 




part of … the contract was we had to build a help desk to drive out … the 
payment mechanism in the contract … every single service we provide … has 
… performance standards… a KPI, it has a monitoring methodology all built 
into our help desk and it has a penalty attached to it that will be accrued if we 
don’t comply and part of our contract is that we have to report … if we don’t 
do something we have to say we haven’t done it so you’d be … saying to 
yourself … if [you] … didn’t say you didn’t do it who’d know. Well the 
principal would know, it’s part of your obligation, you have to, it has to be very 
transparent (P12, 2016) 
The extended study also revealed that interviewees believed accountability to 
encapsulate the use of a process auditor or independent auditor who oversees the initial 
operation of the asset (P22, 2016) and (P10, 2016). However, a public sector interviewee 
involved in Environment projects was of the view that oversight is conducted by the investors 
in the project (P9, 2016). 
Other interviewees took accountability to mean local benchmarking exercises. At 
certain dates the services of the PPP are benchmarked against comparable evidence from 
similar contracts to ensure the cost of the service is reasonable (P10, 2016). This exercise is 
carried out by the private sector and reported to the NDFA, but as a private sector interviewee 
who works on the Convention Centre, a stage 2 PPP project, said:  
I don’t even know if the NDFA have got that much experience in advising on 
that … there’s a bit of ambiguity (P10, 2016) 
 A private sector interviewee working on Education projects discussed a 
benchmarking exercise that has recently been carried out on schools bundle one. The 
interviewee indicates that trust is paramount to this exercise to the extent that they engaged an 
external expert to conduct the exercise in an attempt to be as transparent as possible:  
we’re responsible for conducting a benchmarking exercise … we would have 
to go about that in a particular way to ensure that it was transparent … the only 
way to benchmark effectively is to get somebody independent to do it for you 
… because otherwise you’d only have your own data wouldn’t you?  …  that’s 
how we approached that process. We got somebody who was expert UK based 
… to conduct a benchmarking exercise on our behalf for the authority (P12, 
2016) 
While it appears that there is a high level of trust in stage 2 PPPs, that is, schools 
bundle one and the Convention Centre, there appears to be less mutual trust in transport 
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projects. The TII appears to be more experienced than the NDFA in overseeing the self-
reporting of the private sector, as a public sector interviewee involved in Transport projects 
explained: 
As more and more schemes came on … we engaged consultants … in doing 
periodic audits … they’d go on site and … check and test various things … 
self-reporting is such that [the] PPP Co are obliged to tell you if there are 
issues … we get annoyed … if they don’t tell us an issue and they don’t report 
it (P3, 2016) 
The literature surrounding accountability is contradictory in that it states that the 
government should ensure that PPPs are held accountable for performance through the use of 
an independent scrutiniser (UNECE, 2008). However, the literature also states that trust can 
be built through the use of project monitoring and reporting by the private sector (Matos-
Castaño, 2011), in other words, self-monitoring. The analysis of the extended study indicates 
that the interviewees’ views of what constitutes accountability are muddled and unclear and 
two main issues arise. First, some interviewees believe that accountability is achieved through 
the preparation of performance reports for the NDFA, others believe it is through the use of an 
independent auditor, and others believe it is through the use of benchmarking. Second, trust in 
terms of accountability is significant, in so far as building trust between the public and private 
sectors does appear to be important to stakeholder interviewees. The NDFA has a light-touch 
approach to performance reports and benchmarking. However, the TII appears to be more 
experienced than the NDFA in overseeing performance reports, and engages in more 
oversight which may be construed as having less trust in the private sector’s approach to self-
reporting. 
6.3.2 Fairness of PPP procurement  
Definitions of trust in the PPP literature focus on fostering trust between the public 
and private sectors through the use of standards and mechanisms implemented by government 
(Matos-Castaño, 2011). The literature emphasises that trust is also cemented by governments 
encouraging transparency and fairness during project procurement and selection (Matos-
Castaño, 2011). The UNECE (2008, p.31) states that the “contracting authority must work to 
ensure fairness in the tendering procedures for PPP to avoid discrimination”, a point also 
reiterated by Jooste et al. (2009) who expand on this definition to state that ensuring this will 
avoid corruption and ensure that the selection and awarding criteria will be fair and neutral to 
all bidders. Jooste et al. (2009) moreover stress that the PPP unit should remain neutral and 
independent from the private sector, thus ensuring fairness in PPP. 
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During the extended study, issues of fairness outlined by the literature were found to 
appear within Theme 1 Legitimacy and Theme 2 Capacity. For example, 5.3.1 Lead 
Institutional Support highlighted that there is a perception of a lack of transparency in the role 
that the NDFA plays in assessing value for money and preparing the public sector benchmark. 
It was concluded that the NDFA demonstrates a weak role as a decision-maker and therefore 
does not contribute to the legitimacy of PPP. In 5.3.2.1 Transparency, it was found that there 
is a lack of transparency surrounding the decision to go down the PPP route, a lack of 
transparency surrounding the publication of the basis on which PPP proposals are evaluated 
and published, and a lack of transparency surrounding value for money testing. However, 
there is transparency surrounding the bidding process and interviewees believe the bidding 
process to be fair to those involved. There is mixed transparency in terms of feedback given to 
bidders at meetings with the NDFA, the reason being fear of litigation on the part of the 
NDFA. There is transparency in feedback given to unsuccessful bidders. In 5.3.2.2 Legal and 
regulatory framework it was found that the involvement of the NDFA in the process and its 
flexible approach to applying rules along with the fragmented approach to updating guidelines 
and contracts weakens the legitimacy of PPP. In 6.2.4 Quality of projects it was found that 
there is mixed evidence of risk transfer being achieved, with some projects performing within 
or above expectations and others being problematic. The uncertainty about risk allocation 
between partners and the costing of risk transfer adversely affected the accuracy and 
reliability of value for money calculations, and suggests that the role of risk transfer in 
building PPP capacity is weak. The following section will examine further some of the issues 
which have been said to contribute to trust. 
 
6.3.3 Complaints and arbitration  
The literature states that trust between the public and private sectors is enhanced 
through providing an “avenue for complaint to an independent tribunal” (Jooste et al., 2009, 
p.11). It is generally suggested that initially parties should try to solve issues themselves but 
there should be resort to “amicable resolution, arbitration, and court in the last instance” 
(Matos-Castaño, 2011, p.49). 
During the extended study conducted in 2016 interviewees spoke of the complaints 
and arbitration system in place for Irish PPPs. Specifically, there is a dispute resolution 
procedure (DRP) where an independent arbritrar such as the Institute of Engineers of Ireland 
is appointed to hear a dispute (P3, 2016) (P4, 2016). As one interviewee pointed out, parties 
tend to try to solve disputes between the parties as the instigation of a DRP takes the outcome 
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out of their hands (P12, 2016). In the event of this failing, there is redress to the courts, as 
happened with Grangegorman. 
In line with the literature there is an avenue for complaint and systems in place to 
instigate arbitration and redress to the courts if necessary. In this context there does appear to 
be available a key component for building and maintaining trust between the public and 
private sector.  
Conclusion of Theme 3 Trust 
The literature on institutional theory was examined in chapter 3 and in the context of 
PPP it was found that more sustainable PPPs were ones where the government understood the 
complexity of PPP and where institutional capacity was built. The data collected during the 
study was analysed using institutional theory and themes were created from the data. These 
include legitimacy, capacity and trust which can be used to gauge the sustainability of the 
policy, similar to the frameworks proposed by Matos-Castaño et al. (2012) and Jooste et al. 
(2009). Theme 3 examines this theme further which centres on fostering trust between the 
public and private sectors (Matos-Castaño et al., 2012) and the contribution of this to the 
sustainability of this policy. 
The available data on Theme 3 Trust was divided into sub-themes during the data 
analysis. In 6.3.1 PPP programme accountability it was found that there was overlap here 
with 5.3.2.1 Transparency. Transparency is of the utmost importance for public 
accountability (Aziz, 2007; Li et al., 2005a). It is impossible to comment definitely on 
accountability due to the lack of available information of Irish PPPs but, and as one 
interviewee stated, there seems to be little scrutiny of PPP (P10, 2016). Even though there is a 
certain level of trust between the public and private sectors, the lack of transparency of PPP 
and the inability of the taxpayer to examine the value for money of PPP suggest the 
contribution of PPP programme accountability to building trust is very weak. 
In 6.3.2 Fairness of PPP procurement it was also noted that there was overlap with 
Theme 1 Legitimacy and Theme 2 Capacity. For example, Theme 1.1 Lead Institutional 
Support highlighted issues concerning the lack of transparency of the role that the NDFA 
plays in assessing value for money and preparing the PSB. In 5.3.2.1 Transparency concerns 
were noted surrounding decisions to go down the PPP route, a lack of transparency 
surrounding the publication of the basis on which PPP proposals were evaluated and 
published, and a lack of transparency surrounding value for money testing. In 5.3.2.2 Legal 
and regulatory framework there were concerns surrounding the involvement of the NDFA 
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and its flexible approach to applying rules along with the fragmented approach to updating 
guidelines and contracts. In 6.2.4 Quality of projects, there were concerns surrounding risk 
transfer and  project performance. While some projects seem to be performing within or 
above expectations others seem problematic. These issues are out of line with the literature 
which emphasises the importance of encouraging trust between the public and private sectors 
and cementing transparency and fairness in procurement (Matos-Castaño et al., 2012). In 
6.3.3 Complaints and arbitration the study found that there is indeed an avenue for complaint 
together with systems to instigate arbitration and redress to the courts if necessary. This is in 
line with the recommendations in the literature (Jooste et al., 2009; Matos-Castaño, 2011). 
Overall, in the context of trust, problems are notable surrounding transparency, the 
legal and regulatory framework and risk transfer. These issues create a climate of doubt 
between the public and private sector not to mention the civic sector and the taxpayer in 
particular, which can lead to a lack of trust in PPP. While trust is an independent element in 
the literature data from the study on trust was limited on account of the study design. As 
discussed in 4.4.1 Data analysis used in this research study the extended study did include 
interviews with trade unions but no other “civic sector” group was included. The main 
concentration was on interviews with the public sector and private sector who had 
considerable knowledge of a wide range of aspects associated with Irish PPPs. The 
implications of this are discussed further in 7.6 Limitations of the study and avenues for 
further inquiry. 
The next chapter evaluates and conceptualises the research findings from the analysis 
carried out in chapters 5 and 6. It discusses these findings in relation to the research literature 




Chapter 7 – Conclusions, Implications and Limitations 
7.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a general conclusion to the thesis with a 
focus on the research questions initially posed.  
The chapter is divided into seven main sections. Section 7.2 revisits the theoretical 
framework, the research questions and the case study. The theoretical underpinning of this 
study and the development of the research questions are summarised. The research case is 
restated indicating its development from the gaps identified in the literature, the findings of 
the pilot study of 2013 and early 2016 to the extended study which was conducted during 
2016. Section 7.3 summarises the core findings of the study in relation to the research 
questions. Section 7.4 focuses on the novel findings and the contributions this study makes to 
the literature. Section 7.5 outlines the policy implications of this research. Finally, section 7.6 
discusses the limitations of the study and maps out avenues for further inquiry. 
 It is useful to revisit the structure of the thesis at this stage. Chapter 1 outlined the 
structure of the thesis. Chapter 2 discussed the literature in relation to the evolution of PPP in 
Ireland and identified contributions which question the sustainability of this policy. Chapter 3 
discussed the literature on institutional theory and policy transfer theory and put forward a 
framework which assisted in examining the sustainability of PPP in Ireland. Chapter 4 
discussed the choice of research method used in the thesis and the ontological, 
epistemological, and philosophical positions that were chosen for this research. It also 
outlined the pilot study which was conducted early on in the research. Chapters 5 and 6 
provided an analysis of the data gathered during the extended study in 2016 and analysed 
them under the themes of legitimacy, capacity and trust.  
7.2 The Theoretical Framework, the Research Questions and the Case Study 
This section outlines the development of the theoretical framework applied in this 
research. The research utilises policy transfer theory. Policy transfer causes organisations to 
mimic others (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996). Early transfer studies focused on voluntary 
transfer which can occur where there is dissatisfaction with the status quo or perceived policy 
failure more generally. More recent studies have explored coercive transfer which occurs 
when supra-national institutions, for example, the IMF, force the adoption of a policy 
(Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996). This research applies policy transfer theory, in particular, the 
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Dolowitz and Marsh (1996 and 2000) framework to consider the process of PPP policy 
transfer in Ireland. Specifically, the study investigates whether PPP was adopted originally on 
a voluntary or coercive basis and whether its ongoing use is voluntary or coercive. This has 
implications for the sustainability of PPP in Ireland. 
Institutional theory is also utilised, as research into the impacts of institutional 
arrangements on the implementation of PPP has found that successful institutional 
environments are ones where governments understand the complexity of PPPs (Willems and 
Van Dooren, 2011). For example, research found that the first generation of PPPs in the 
Netherlands in the early 1990s suffered from financial and structural problems.  The second 
generation of PPPs came about after the government assessed international experience of 
PPPs, evaluated this and assessed the conditions necessary for a successful partnership 
leading to political and public buy-in (Matos-Castaño et al., 2014).  Lessons were learned and 
institutional change came about with the development of revised PPP policy, guidelines and 
procedures. This research applies institutional theory to examine the sustainability of PPP in 
Ireland. The next sections position policy transfer theory and institutional theory and their use 
in this research to fine tune the research questions. 
7.2.1 The Theoretical Framework using Policy Transfer theory 
Chapter 3 charted policy transfer theory and its application in examining the manner in 
which new policies are adopted by countries. Policy transfer can increase the “effectiveness of 
government operations” (Marsh and Sharman, 2009, p.281) and help organisations gain 
legitimacy (Connolly et al., 2009). Research has found that cross-national policy transfer is 
not necessarily “rational, mechanical or automatic” as policy-makers operate within 
“bounded” contexts as a result of a lack of resources, ambiguous goals and a lack of 
understanding of imported policies (Dolowitz and Medearis, 2009, p.686). This has led to the 
introduction of further categories within the broad categories of voluntary and coercive 
transfer (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996). As regards coercive policy transfer the literature has 
distinguished direct and indirect coercive forces (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996). Research has 
found that a country can be indirectly pushed towards policy transfer if political actors 
perceive it as falling behind neighbours or competitors (Keating et al., 2012). It has also been 
found that where similarities in policy between countries can be explained by policy transfer 
there may also be policy learning (Keating et al. 2012). Overall, the literature on policy 
transfer tends to be “process oriented, focusing on how, when, and why adopters use diffused 
information rather than on networks or patterns of diffusion” (Mossberger and Wolman, 2003, 
p.429). The Dolowitz and Marsh (1996 and 2000) framework adapted by O’Dolan and Rye 
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(2012) reflects this and elements of it have been used in this research to analyse PPP policy 
transfer in Ireland.  
3.2.1 Policy Transfer Theory: Dolowitz and Marsh (1996 and 2000) framework 
examines the evolution of the Dolowitz and Marsh framework and its adaption by O’Dolan 
and Rye (2012), outlined  earlier in Table 3.1. Table 7.1 lists the policy transfer questions 
(based on O’Dolan and Rye (2012)) regarding the adoption of a policy: 
Table 7.1: Policy Transfer Questions 
 
Who is involved in the policy transfer process? 
 
What policies are transferred? 
 
Why do actors engage in policy transfer? 
 
From where are the lessons drawn? 
 
What are the different degrees of transfer? 
 
What restricts or facilitates the policy transfer process? 
 
How is the process of policy transfer related to policy “success” or “failure”? 
 
 
In particular, this study examined the rationale as to why Ireland adopted the PPP 
policy and the extent of the influence which policy transfer has had on PPP adoption in 
Ireland. Before the findings of this analysis are discussed further, the second main component 
of the study’s theoretical framework will be summarised. 
7.2.2 The Theoretical Framework using Institutional theory 
There is a strong rationale for combining policy transfer and institutional theories 
(Radaelli, 2000) and chapter 3 discussed aspects of institutional theory. In particular, the last 
question on the Dolowitz and Marsh (1996 and 2000) framework focuses on the process of 
policy transfer and how it is related to policy “success” or “failure” and this led the researcher 
to investigate institutional theory as a means for examining the success or sustainability of the 
adoption of PPP in Ireland.  
Institutional theory is premised on the assumption that organisations operate in an 
institutional environment which influences their actions (Matos-Castaño et al., 2014). 
Institutional theory assume that pressure to conform to a set of expectations is exerted by 
external and internal influences on states and state organisations, whereby compliance with 
these expectations allows them to gain organisational legitimacy and secure “access to 
resources while securing long-term survival” (Brignall and Modell 2000, p.288). 
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Organisational structures, policies and procedures stem from social expectations and “myth” 
about what is socially and economically acceptable such as private sector efficiency which are 
rationalised and gain legitimacy (Khadaroo, 2005, p.72). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) use the 
term “isomorphism” to explain the tendency for public and private organisations to adopt 
similar rules and routines. They describe three types of institutional isomorphism – coercive, 
mimetic and normative. Connolly et al. (2009, p.14) state that in the context of institutional 
isomorphism, “coercion” can explain the “manner in which PPPs were introduced in the UK”. 
This research has hypothesised that successful institutional environments where 
governments understand the complexity arising within PPPs (Willems and Van Dooren, 2011) 
will foster more sustainable and transparent PPP arrangements. PPPs require a variety of new 
types of institutional capacity (Jooste et al., 2009), and research has also shown how 
shortcomings in the institutional setting can lead to problems with the performance of PPPs, 
such as a lack of transparency and regulatory safeguards (Matos-Castaño et al., 2014). 
Creating an enabling environment for PPPs requires a combination of institutional creation 
and institutional change, a form of institutional isomorphism. In some cases, governments 
have borrowed PFI policy from other countries but have failed to change the institutional 
environment (Matos-Castaño et al., 2014), or borrowed policy in a fragmented nature, leading 
to uncoordinated policies (Johnston, 2010) with weak overall policy performance. There is no 
one-size-fits-all institutional framework. Success in this area is usually path-dependent and 
relates to the ability of policy-makers to adapt institutional forms, thus creating legitimacy, 
trust and capacity in the adoption of PPPs (Matos-Castaño et al. 2014).  
7.2.3 The Research questions and the Case Study 
Both policy transfer theory and institutional theory have helped structure the ideas 
which underpin the research questions in this study. One core assumption is that policy 
adoption is likely to be more successful and sustainable if it is adopted voluntarily and also if 
policy learning takes place. This led to the following research questions (RQ) being examined 
in this study: 
RQ 1: What are the reasons for the adoption of the PPP policy and its continued use 
in Ireland? 




The literature review on institutional theory highlighted the lack of research in Ireland 
into the success or otherwise of the adoption of PPP in Ireland and this was identified as a gap 
in the literature. This led to the final research question (RQ) being examined in this study: 
RQ 3: What is the extent to which institutional environments have been adapted to 
enable a sustainable PPP policy in Ireland? 
In investigating these research questions during the pilot study, as outlined in chapter 
4, the existing theoretical approaches in relation to the sustainability of PPP in Ireland were 
expanded and a framework which specified four possible adoption patterns was developed 
(see Table 7.2): 
Table 7.2: Patterns of PPP Adoption Framework     
 
 































Voluntary (3) Voluntary PT & weak 
institutional capacity building 
(1) Voluntary PT & strong 
institutional capacity building 
Coercive (4) Coercive PT & weak 
institutional capacity building 
(2) Coercive PT & strong 
institutional capacity building 
(Sheppard and Beck, 2016) 
This framework proposes that it is likely that the most sustainable PPP environment is 
associated with (1), voluntary policy transfer with strong institutional capacity building, 
where institutional environments and institutional capacity are changed and developed to meet 
the challenges arising from PPP procurement (see Table 7.2). This is followed by (2), 
coercive policy transfer and strong institutional capacity building; (3), voluntary policy 
transfer and weak institutional capacity building; and (4), coercive policy transfer and weak 
institutional capacity building (Sheppard and Beck, 2016).  
The pilot study used exploratory interviews to provide some preliminary insights into 
this while focusing on nine of the themes laid down in the Jooste, Levitt and Scott (2009) 
framework. In the preliminary analysis it was suggested that policy transfer was initially 
largely voluntary but latterly became coercive and this affected attitudes toward PPP. 
Regarding the nine factors examined – supportive legal framework, political commitment, 
buy-in from key constituents, good public sector knowledge of PPPs, a PPP unit, measures to 
coordinate deal flow, programme transparency, ensuring the quality of projects and 
implementing independent oversight - it was found that not all these conditions had been met. 
There was evidence of the development of a supportive and comprehensive legal framework 
as well as improvements in public sector PPP skills which benefited from the establishment of 
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the central PPP policy unit in 1999 and the creation of the National Development Finance 
Agency (NDFA) in 2002.  
More mixed results were observed in the pilot study as regards efforts to gain buy-in 
from key constituents. A significant problem with the coordination of deal flow was 
identified. It was noted that efforts had been made to address this in Ireland in 2013, with 
measures aimed at instilling confidence and maximising market participation in PPP 
following the creation of the UK’s PF2 reform package.  
The lack of frameworks for ensuring PPP quality appeared to be the most significant 
institutional barrier to the sustainability of Irish PPP. This concerns objective and systematic 
value for money (VFM) evaluations of existing and future deals, which seem to be hampered 
by fragmentation and a lack of detailed cost and return data which allegedly arises from the 
commercial confidentiality needs of private participants. Uncertainty about risk allocation 
between partners and the costing of risk transfer seemed to affect adversely the accuracy and 
reliability of VFM calculation.  
Major difficulties in the sustainability of Irish PPPs also arise from lack of 
transparency and poor oversight. Government documents and interviewees during the pilot 
study highlighted problems in obtaining financial data on operating costs and profits which 
would allow for a thorough assessment of existing and future projects, suggesting serious 
repercussions because learning about the performance of PPP projects is obstructed. This was 
compounded by a lack of effective independent oversight, which arose from the fragmentation 
of regulatory control.  
The findings of the pilot study gave focus to the extended study which was conducted 
in 2016. The structure of the extended study is presented in chapter 4 and the approach taken 
to analysing the resulting data is discussed in chapters 5 and 6. The next section highlights the 
core findings from the data analysis carried out in chapters 5 and 6. 
7.3 The core findings in relation to the research questions 
This section presents the core findings relating to the research questions and utilising 
the literature, some elements of the pilot study and most importantly the data from the 
extended study carried out in 2016.  
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7.3.1 Research question one: What are the reasons for the adoption of the PPP 
policy and its continued use in Ireland? 
The literature review in chapter 2 and the pilot study in chapter 4 outlined reasons for 
the adoption of PPP in Ireland during stage 1 PPPs (Pilot projects 1992 – 2002) as well as the 
subsequent reliance on this procurement approach in stage 2 PPPs (Pre-crisis 2003 – 2008). 
The extended study conducted in 2016 (presented in chapters 5 and 6) indicates that the 
motivations for the continued use of PPP in stage 3 PPPs (Post-crisis 2012 onwards) have 
evolved from those initially given and this is discussed in this section. 
Chapter 2 discussed some of the early motivations for the introduction of stage 1 PPPs 
into Ireland. One of the reasons was to fill the infrastructure gap which existed at the time. 
This gap came about from the curtailment of the capital programme followed by a period of 
rapid economic expansion. Awareness of infrastructure need was coupled with a concern 
about the prospect of reduced investment by the EU and domestic fiscal constraints in the 
form of the Maastricht Treaty convergence criteria, imposed by membership of the single 
European currency. However, chapter 2 indicated that in the 1990s Ireland’s budget deficit 
never went above 3%, and the ratio of gross government debt to GDP did not exceed 60%, the 
stipulations imposed by the EU. Nonetheless, Ireland pursued the PPP programme despite 
being fiscally healthy and leaving no immediate need for the private financing of 
infrastructure. This suggests that the introduction of PPP was rolled out on a voluntary basis 
with motives other than economic pressures. This point is expanded further in research 
question two which examines the adoption of PPP in the context of policy transfer theory. 
Chapter 2 explored other reasons for the introduction of PPP. These included an 
ideological predisposition in favour of private sector involvement, with the National 
Economic and Social Council suggesting that PPP offered benefits in terms of efficiency 
gains and expertise not available in the public sector. From the government’s perspective PPP 
was found to be attractive as it allowed risk to be transferred to the private sector. Political 
expediency may also have played a role in the introduction of PPPs, with PPPs offering short-
term political attractions to government by providing early project infrastructure and also 
moving capital expenditure off balance sheet. Another factor favouring PPP discussed in 
chapter 2 was that PPP formed part of the implementation of the economic liberalisation 
policies of the then Minister for Finance, Mr. Charlie McCreevy TD. This was referred to by 
interviewees during the extended study who noted that the implementation of PPP was 
favoured by the ideological leanings of that Minister for Finance. This is a theme that was 
alluded to in the pilot study in chapter 4 where it was suggested that the uptake of PPP in 
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Ireland was closely related to the introduction of new public management (NPM) reforms in 
the UK at the time (Sheppard and Beck, 2016), which raised the possibility that the continued 
use of PPP was on an indirectly coercive basis, in line with the Keating et al. (2012) analysis. 
This analysis and theme is discussed further in research question two which examines the 
influence of policy transfer on the adoption of PPP in Ireland. 
However, the reasons for the continued use of PPP in Ireland, that is, stage 3 PPPs, 
have evolved, as found during the extended study and analysed in chapters 5 and 6. Stage 3 
PPPs (Post-crisis 2012 onwards) were affected by the financial crisis, and the response to this, 
the domestic infrastructure stimulus programme, was announced in 2012 by the then Minster 
for Public Expenditure and Reform, Mr. Brendan Howlin TD (outlined in chapter 2). One of 
the principal motivations given for this PPP programme was to create jobs and stimulate the 
economy. This programme was followed by a number of new PPP measures announced in 
2013 aimed at building PPP capacity. A further reason for the use of PPP during this period 
was given by the NDFA. The NDFA explained that it was, perhaps unsurprisingly, using the 
PPP programme so that borrowing would be off-balance sheet in accordance with Eurostat 
rules and would not affect the general government balance.  
Accordingly, the research found that the reasons for the use of PPP had changed 
significantly by 2013, with PPP procurement no longer being a voluntarily adopted option but 
increasingly becoming a necessity in terms of the maintenance of adequate levels of public 
investment while maintaining procurement off-balance sheet. This point is developed further 
in research question two. However, it is worth noting that the extended study revealed that 
Eurostat’s interpretation of the rules concerning PPP is not shared by Ireland (P22, 2016) and 
this raises serious concerns about risk transfer. This point is developed further in research 
question three. 
The pilot research found that by 2013 PPP was used to create jobs and stimulate the 
economy. The extended study revealed, however, that there were issues surrounding the 
pipeline of projects and questions about encouraging smaller Irish contractors to engage with 
PPP. This point is again developed further in research question three. 
The introduction of the domestic infrastructure stimulus programme in 2012 implies 
that political commitment increased substantially. Initially, PPP was considered a fashionable 
approach to procurement which created an image of modernisation and modernity in line with 
UK policy and thus helped legitimise existing government institutions. Later on it became the 
main (if not sole) option in dealing with a capital spending shortfall in a financial crisis and 
post-crisis era. However, the extended study revealed that despite this important role political 
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support and understanding of PPP are actually rather weak. This point is again developed 
further in research question three. 
In summary, this study found under research question one that the reasons for the 
adoption of PPP as a procurement method have evolved over the different stages of PPP use 
in Ireland. While originally, at stage 1 level, it was argued that PPP would fill the 
infrastructure gap that existed at the time, this study indicates that there was no real economic 
need for this and that PPP was introduced at a time when Ireland was fiscally healthy and 
could have therefore procured necessary capital investment in a traditional manner. The more 
likely reason for introducing PPP, therefore, was that it fitted with the political and 
ideological motivations of the Minister for Finance of the day. The research notes that this 
Minister took an ideological stance that favoured the introduction of PPP and that he believed 
that private sector involvement was able to mobilise efficiencies and expertise not found in 
the public sector. PPP being closely linked to NPM meant that it was attractive to this 
Minister for Finance who looked to emulate similar policies introduced by the UK. Political 
expediency can also be seen as a reason for the introduction of PPPs, as PPPs offered short-
term political attractions to governments by allowing for potentially early project 
infrastructure and also moving capital expenditure off balance sheet which reduced the risk 
exposure of public sector organisations at a time of increased scrutiny and citizen 
expectations. Also, PPP allowed risk to be transferred to the private sector. However, since 
the financial crisis, at stage 3 level, the reasons for the continued use of PPP have evolved. In 
2012, the domestic infrastructure stimulus programme was announced and this was followed 
by new measures in 2013 to strengthen PPP. At this time PPP was mooted to create jobs and 
stimulate the economy. Simultaneously, PPP offered a possibility to keep borrowings off-
balance sheet, thereby not affecting the general government balance.  
In the extended study, it was found that, despite the increase importance of PPP, there 
are problems with the legitimacy of PPP procurement on account of weak political support 
and a lack of understanding of PPP by the public sector compounded by transparency 
problems. Also, commitment to PPP by industry and investors has been weakened by the an 
irregular pipeline of projects and unclear timelines. The extended study found that there were 
additional issues with the capacity to procure and manage PPPs. For example, the stimulus 
programme announced in 2012 and new measures in 2013 have had mixed results in terms of 
encouraging local contractors to engage in PPP. The hope of stimulating the economy through 
job creation by engaging local contractors is hampered by the transfer of risk from larger 
contractors to sub-contractors and the dominance within the Irish market of one company.  
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The evolution of the reasons for the adoption of PPP and its continued use are 
summarised in Table 7.3. This table indicates that while the reasons for the introduction of 
PPP were largely voluntary, reasons for its continued use are largely coercive in nature.  
Table 7.3: Reasons for the adoption of PPP and its continued use 
Reasons for the introduction of PPP: Reasons for the continued use of PPP: 
• Filling the infrastructure gap 
• Ideological reasons  
• Risk transfer 
• Political expediency 
• NPM reforms 
 
• Create jobs and stimulate the economy 
• Off-balance sheet nature of PPP 
 
Voluntary                                                                                                                              Coercive  
 
 
The shift from voluntary adoption to a more coercive approach to the continued use of 
PPPs in Ireland is significant when applied to the Patterns of PPP Adoption Framework 
outlined in 7.2.3 The Research questions and the Case Study above. To achieve a fuller 
understanding of PPP policy adoption in Ireland, elements of the Dolowitz and Marsh (1996 
and 2000) framework were applied to the research to examine PPP policy transfer, and this is 
examined in research question two.  
7.3.2 Research question two: What is the extent of the influence of policy transfer 
on PPP adoption in Ireland? 
This research used the Patterns of PPP Adoption Framework outlined in 7.2.3 The 
Research questions and the Case Study above, to establish the degree of PPP policy transfer 
in Ireland, and in doing so utilised elements of the Dolowitz and Marsh (1996 and 2000) 
framework. By identifying the motivations for PPP policy transfer together with the extent of 
their influence on policy transfer, classified as voluntary and coercive, as outlined in 7.2.1 The 
Theoretical Framework using Policy Transfer theory, it is possible to describe in some detail 
of PPP policy adoption in Ireland. In doing so the research also indicated what policies were 
transferred and where lessons were drawn. This in turn is relevant to the subsequent question 
about the sustainability of PPP in Ireland.  
The Patterns of PPP Adoption Framework establishes the degree of policy transfer and 
asked who was involved in the PPP policy transfer in Ireland. This study found that the then 
Minister for Finance, Mr. Charlie McCreevy TD introduced the policy into Ireland. The 
policy continued through the domestic infrastructure stimulus programme announced in 2012 
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by the then Minster for Public Expenditure and Reform, Mr. Brendan Howlin TD. As 
discussed in RQ 1 above, the research found that PPP policy transfer was initially voluntary, 
while its continued use has been coercive. Specifically, it is apparent that the decision to adopt 
UK-style PPP was largely voluntary in nature and coincided with a time when the country 
was fiscally healthy but sought to mimic the NPM reforms movement introduced in the UK. 
The continued use of PPP, meantime, largely took on an indirectly coercive form. For 
example, the pilot study found that for local authorities the adoption of PPP was mostly 
coercive and that the Department of the Environment was biased in favour of PPP (Sheppard 
and Beck, 2016). Also, the pilot study suggested that industry expectations created a coercive 
element with regard to the evaluation of PPP schemes and it was during this time (stage 1 
PPPs and stage 2 PPPs) that commercial confidentiality was forced on the public by industry 
(Sheppard and Beck, 2016). 
In analysing whether the decision to continue to use PPP was voluntary or coercive, 
the extended study found that the use of PPP post crisis in stage 3 PPPs was directly coercive. 
The extended study identified areas which weaken the legitimacy of PPP. For example, there 
is a lack of transparency surrounding how the decision is made on which projects are put 
forward for PPP, the NDFA’s VFM testing of projects and how the public sector benchmark 
is calculated. Issues with transparency and a failure to demonstrate VFM to the taxpayer have 
created a perception that there is a culture of secrecy in the public sector around PPP. This 
coupled with weak political support for PPP, weak political commitment to PPP and a legal 
and regulatory system which has a flexible approach to applying rules and a fragmented 
approach to updating guidelines and contracts. All of this makes it unlikely that the ongoing 
use of PPP as a procurement method is voluntary. Indeed, as outlined in research question one 
above, the reasons underpinning the domestic infrastructure stimulus programme in 2012 
which focuses on job creation and economic stimulus possess all of the features to suggest 
that the use of PPP post crisis in stage 3 PPPs is directly coercive. If this is indeed the case 
and continues to be so in the future, then this has serious implications for the sustainability of 
PPP, a point which is developed further in research question three. 
The Patterns of PPP Adoption Framework establishes the degree and nature of policy 
transfer by analysing what policies were transferred as Irish PPPs evolved. The pilot study 
compared PPP policy guidelines produced in the UK and Ireland and this research found a 
number of areas of similarity between Ireland and the UK. This included PPP policy 
guidelines on PPP project implementation; training for public and private sectors; availability 
of expertise through a procurement unit; allocation of risk between the parties; and the 
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composition of the public sector comparator. This type of policy imitation repeated itself in 
later years. Similarities could be also found between the announcements in Ireland and the 
reform measures of PF2 introduced in the UK by HM Treasury in December 2012 and also 
between the approaches taken to risk transfer in a C&AG report (2012) and an important HM 
Treasury report (2012). The research thus found a high degree of mimicry between Ireland 
and the UK suggesting that Ireland was influenced by the UK and that it attempted to 
legitimise PPP from this PPP pioneer by directly borrowing policy. 
The Patterns of PPP Adoption Framework analyses where lessons were drawn, and 
this is important as it establishes if policy learning has taken place, as well as whether the 
policy has evolved or matured, and whether it is tailored to the unique environment in which 
it is utilised, all of which enhances the capacity to sustain and manage PPP. The pilot study 
found evidence of policy transfer in that Ireland adopted a UK-style approach to PPP 
procurement (Sheppard and Beck, 2016). The extended study found that Ireland initially drew 
mainly on the experience of the UK, and the research indicates that mimetic isomorphism has 
taken place particularly in the case of the UK public sector comparator. However, more 
recently, Irish public sector departments and the Irish PPP steering committee are learning 
from each other. The research also found that public sector learning from countries other than 
from the UK was limited. Learning was not confined to the public sector as the private sector 
has also learnt from its past experience of PPP and also from the NDFA.  
In summary, the research used The Patterns of PPP Adoption Framework to identify 
the degree of PPP policy transfer in Ireland and in doing so utilised elements of the Dolowitz 
and Marsh (1996 and 2000) framework. The results of this part of the study indicated that the 
introduction of the policy was initially voluntary. However, as its use continued, this changed 
from indirectly coercive to a directly coercive pattern. The research also found that Ireland 
borrowed significantly from the UK PFI policy, a policy which has proven to have serious 
flaws in terms of sustainability, as discussed further in research question three. The research 
also found that patterns of policy transfer have evolved as Ireland started relying on learning 
from previous indigenous projects when implementing stage 3 PPP projects. Indeed the 
research has found that the European PPP Expert Centre (EPEC) considers the NDFA to be a 
leader of PPP units and it appears that policy transfer is now taking place from Ireland to 
elsewhere. This illustrates a maturity in the policy and this point is developed further in 7.4 
Novel findings and contributions.  
The Patterns of PPP Adoption Framework utilised elements of the final section of the 
Dolowitz and Marsh (1996 and 2000) framework to consider how the process of policy 
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transfer is related to the success or failure of the policy. As outlined in chapter 3, it was not 
possible to examine PPP success from a financial point of view as this information is not 
publicly available. Instead the Patterns of PPP Adoption Framework used elements of the 
Jooste, Levitt and Scott (2009) framework to examine the sustainability of PPP in Ireland and 
the findings from this are outlined in research question three. 
7.3.3 Research question three: What is the extent to which institutional 
environments have been adapted to enable a sustainable PPP policy in Ireland? 
Jooste, Levitt and Scott (2009) proposed a theoretical framework for the actions 
needed to ensure the sustainable implementation of PPP projects and grouped them under the 
three main objectives of a successful PPP implementation: building capacity, obtaining 
legitimacy and balancing interests. However, in this research the term trust, not balancing 
interests, is used as has been adopted by other researchers (Matos-Castaño et al., 2012; 
Verhoest et al., 2015). The pilot study outlined in chapter 4 applied elements of the Jooste, 
Levitt and Scott (2009) framework to the document analysis and initial exploratory 
interviews. This part of the research focused on nine themes: supportive legal framework, 
political commitment, buy-in from key constituents, good public sector knowledge of PPPs, a 
PPP unit, themes to coordinate deal flow, programme transparency, and ensuring the quality 
of projects while implementing independent oversight.  
The results of the pilot study formed the basis for the expansion of the theoretical 
approaches used in the development of the Patterns of PPP Adoption Framework outlined in 
7.2.3 The Research questions and the Case Study above. When the study was extended in 
2016, the questions asked of interviewees were again based on the Jooste, Levitt and Scott 
(2009) framework with the addition of findings from the pilot project. Data was analysed 
under the three broad headings of legitimacy, capacity and trust, all of which contribute to the 
sustainability of PPP. 
The results of the research carried out during the extended study are summarised in 
Figure 7.1. The research found that in terms of legitimacy, stakeholder consent was mixed and 
lead institutional support, political support and the provision of a project portfolio were all 
weak. In terms of capacity, the research found that methods to encourage market demand, 
policy learning, public sector expertise, quality of projects and a coordinated deal flow were 
all mixed but the performance of PPP was weak. The research found that in terms of trust, the 
provision of a complaints and arbitration process was strong but programme accountability 




Figure 7.1: Sustainability of PPP in Ireland 
 
The following sections discuss each of the findings of the research under the main 
headings of legitimacy, capacity and trust. 
Legitimacy 
The research has found that in Ireland the contribution of stakeholder consent to the 
legitimacy of PPP is mixed and the contribution of the lead institutional support, political 
support and project portfolio is weak. These points are explained in more detail. 
Lead Institutional support makes a weak contribution to the legitimacy of PPP: 
The research found that the roles of the PPP unit, the NDFA in the case of Ireland, in 
many aspects is similar to those identified in the literature for similar organisations. In other 
aspects these roles have evolved from those identified in the literature and in some aspects 
there are new roles not identified in the literature. The pilot study found that the NDFA did 
not yet fulfil all the functions it ideally should pursue (Sheppard and Beck, 2016). When the 
study was extended in 2016, it was found that the NDFA plays a strong role as a PPP adviser 
and expert, a role which should have a positive effect on legitimacy. However, it cannot be 
clearly confirmed what role the NDFA plays in providing technical advice and support for 
projects as there is a lack of transparency regarding the NDFA’s value for money testing of 
projects, while the true role of expert and adviser also cannot be investigated.  
Overall, the NDFA seems to occupy a weak role as a decision-maker and it is 
questionable whether it has the power to make well-reasoned decisions in complex PPP 
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contexts. Also, the lack of transparency in the NDFA’s approach to assessing value for money 
and preparing the public sector benchmark (PSB) casts doubt on the true value for money of 
the PPPs it supports. The NDFA, therefore, can be said to make no clearly significant 
contribution to the legitimacy of PPP. 
Interviewee views as to whether the NDFA is a policy-maker are mixed, with the 
senior public sector interviewee involved in PPP decision-making and an interviewee 
involved in projects procured before the financial crisis saying that it is not a policy-maker or 
developer, while those involved in post-crisis PPP are more willing to attribute this role to the 
NDFA. Therefore, the role of the NDFA in this regard is unclear, and again this suggests that 
it does not make a clearly significant contribution to the legitimacy of PPP. 
The NDFA occupies a strong role as a promoter of PPP, a role also highlighted by 
EPEC. This role does not explicitly contribute to the legitimacy of PPP, as was highlighted by 
interviewees. Interviewees did not identify the NDFA as a regulatory body for PPP and this 
can be said to weaken the role of the NDFA as well as legitimacy of PPP in general. 
The NDFA is instrumental in keeping the market informed and reassuring the market 
about the continuation of the PPP programme. However, the research conducted in 2016 
indicates that the role of the NDFA has evolved from a disseminator of knowledge, market 
consultant and project driver to a market driver during the financial crisis. This helped to 
stimulate the market and is indicative of a new role not discussed in the literature. However, 
this new role is limited in its reach which is demonstrated by the fact that even though a new 
PPP pipeline has been announced, new projects have only slowly been followed through. 
Despite the NDFA being assigned a role as market driver by government, its role is still 
hampered by political whims and short-termism. This lessens effectiveness of the NDFA as 
market driver and PPP promoter which in turn weakens its legitimacy and that of the PPP 
programme in Ireland. The failure to follow through with a deal flow also weakens capacity 
building and is discussed further below. 
The role of the NDFA is largely centred on being a supporter of PPP. This weakens its 
overall role and the role it could play in contributing to the legitimacy of PPP in Ireland. 
According to interviewees, the NDFA is rigid, bureaucratic and process-driven, a role not 
identified in the literature. This makes it difficult for the NDFA to be seen as playing an 
important role for PPP and is also confusing for the private sector. The NDFA also exhibits 
contradictions and inherent tensions such as wishing to encourage private sector participation 
by having a light touch regulation, but in so doing it may be short-changing the taxpaying 
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public. The lack of consideration of the taxpayer was illustrated by the lack of reference to 
this stakeholder group by interviewees. This has implications for future generations of 
taxpayers who will be left to pay for PPPs which potentially are not value for money, with 
value for money being difficult to assess due to a lack of transparency in the procurement 
process. Overall, the research has found that the NDFA’s contribution to the legitimacy of 
PPP is weak. 
Political support makes a weak contribution to the legitimacy of PPP: 
The pilot study indicated that there was a consistent legal framework in place to 
support the implementation of PPP coupled with strong political support (Sheppard and Beck, 
2016). However, when the study was extended in 2016, it was found that there was weak 
political support for, and commitment to, PPP with a lack of transparency surrounding PPP, a 
legal and regulatory system which has a flexible approach to applying rules, and a fragmented 
approach to updating guidelines and contracts.  
The pilot study found major difficulties in the sustainability of Irish PPPs resulting 
from a lack of transparency and poor oversight (Sheppard and Beck, 2016). When the study 
was extended in 2016, it was confirmed that there was a lack of transparency surrounding 
how the decision is made on which projects are put forward for PPP and how the subsequent 
VFM tests are carried out. This has resulted in speculation on how decisions are made, a 
failure to demonstrate VFM to the taxpayer, a culture of secrecy in the public sector and 
suspicion about the calculation of the PSB. It was noted in research question two that, in the 
context of policy transfer, Ireland borrowed heavily from UK PFI policy. This is a form of 
mimetic isomorphism and this research has shown that problems with the use of the public 
sector comparator in the UK and the suspicion surrounding it arising from a lack of 
transparency are mimicked in Ireland as there has been a failure to draw relevant lessons. 
This research study found that there are mixed patterns in terms of the transparency of 
the bidding process. Jooste, Levitt and Scott (2009), Matos-Castaño et al. (2012) and Matos-
Castaño et al. (2014) argue that procurement and negotiations should be conducted in a 
transparent way, as should the awarding of projects. The research found that there is 
transparency surrounding the bidding process itself and interviewees believe the bidding 
process to be fair to those involved. However, there is no transparency for the taxpayer and 
there is mixed transparency in terms of feedback given to bidders at meetings with the NDFA. 
There is some transparency in feedback given to unsuccessful bidders and there is mixed 
transparency in terms of feedback given to other bidders. This is due to the NDFA’s wish to 
be seen to be fair while simultaneously trying to avoid litigation from the bidders involved. In 
the bidding process, transparency can increase or decrease. If it decreases, bidders may feel 
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the process is not open and transparent and this may interfere with their inclination to bid. If 
transparency increases, however, bidders may feel that there is too much transparency and 
they may be deterred from bidding as they do not wish crucial information from their bids to 
be disclosed. 
The pilot study found that evaluations of VFM assessments are not in the public 
domain because of commercial sensitivity issues, resulting in Irish PPP not fully meeting the 
literature’s requirement for sustainability (Sheppard and Beck, 2016). The extended study 
confirmed that there was a lack of transparency surrounding the publication of PPP contract 
information, as recommended by Khadaroo (2008), Boardman and Vining (2012) and Vining 
and Boardman (2008a). This is also out of line with the Irish Committee of Public Accounts 
report on PPP in 2007 which recommended that Ireland adopt a similar approach to Victoria, 
Australia and British Columbia, Canada in making PPP contract information publicly 
available (Dáil Éireann, 2007). Interviewees suggested that there should be transparency 
surrounding the publication of PPP contract information so taxpayers could evaluate value for 
money assessments. As the market is very competitive, however, demands for transparency 
seem to have been overridden by commercial sensitivity and several public and private sector 
interviewees expressed concern that the publication of commercially sensitive information 
would interfere with the workings of the market. Transparency surrounding the publication of 
PPP data increases overall transparency, which has the potential of attracting greater political 
support and ultimately increasing legitimacy. The consequence of a lack of transparency 
surrounding contract information is that it impedes oversight and leads to suspicion, thus 
weakening the overall legitimacy of PPP procurement. 
The only sectors to have carried out a post-project review which has been published in 
the public domain are the Courts Service and, to a limited extent, the C&AGs’ value for 
money review of the Pilot Schools Project. It is the intention of the Department of Education 
and Skills to carry out a post-project review of the Pilot Schools Bundle but the publication of 
costings was not discussed as part of this review. In terms of Primary Care, a post-project 
review will be carried out but it will be an internal review and it is not known if it will be 
published.  
The Criminal Courts of Justice (CCJ) complex is a one-off PPP project and there was 
eagerness by project participants to demonstrate VFM. However, the Schools and Primary 
Care projects are long-term projects and there seems to be a reluctance to publish any post-
project reviews. 
Where there is transparency this has the potential to increase the likelihood of 
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legitimacy, as in the case of the CCJ. In the case of the Schools bundles and the Primary Care 
projects where no post-project review has been carried out, the failure to do so leaves a 
question mark over their value for money. 
The withholding of contract information due to commercial sensitivity may be a 
legacy from the UK. UK PFI projects have frequently been criticised for a similar lack of 
transparency and lack of external scrutiny (Shaoul et al., 2009). Other countries, such as 
Canada and Australia, seem to be not as concerned about commercial sensitivity and find 
ways to circumvent it.  
The pilot study revealed evidence of policy transfer in that Ireland adopted a UK-style 
approach to PPP (Sheppard and Beck, 2016) and it appeared that this strong transfer of the 
UK policy occurred without reference to lessons learnt elsewhere. Ireland has drawn mainly 
on the experience of the UK in implementing PPP. This suggests that mimetic isomorphism 
has taken place with little adaptation of the policy to local conditions and little learning from 
the problems encountered by UK PFI policy, particularly with regard to value for money 
calculations. The research found that, in the view of a majority of interviewees in Ireland, this 
lack of transparency has weakened the legitimacy of PPP, causing serious concern over the 
long-term sustainability of PPP in Ireland. 
This research found that there has been very little evolution of PPP contracts, which is 
again indicative of a weak institutional environment not conducive to strengthening 
legitimacy. The involvement of the NDFA in the process and its flexible approach to applying 
rules along with the fragmented approach to updating guidelines and contracts affect the 
legitimacy of PPP, making the overall contribution of the legal and regulatory framework to 
the legitimacy of PPP at least a mixed one. 
The extended study found that the PPP programme stalled during the financial crisis 
as projects were cancelled. When the PPP programme was resumed post crisis, political 
commitment to PPP was revived, albeit in a very weak form, without a political champion and 
in a less ideological and more pragmatic way. The research found that political commitment 
to PPP is weakened by the ongoing controversy surrounding the on-off balance sheet debate, 
by weak political support, and, by a lack of understanding of PPP among politicians. Also 
noted is a short political cycle which is not suited to the slow nature of PPP delivery. This is 
coupled with uncertain and confusing political planning and decision-making, and political 
risks which add ambiguity to making long-term commitments. This again can be seen as 
adversely affecting the legitimacy of Irish PPP, which seems to be seen as an expedient means 
for procuring infrastructure at a time of ongoing fiscal constraint, without there being the 
political will to turn it into an effective and sustainable approach to public procurement. 
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Stakeholder buy-in makes a mixed contribution to the legitimacy of PPP: 
The pilot study found that buy-in from key PPP stakeholders was mixed (Sheppard 
and Beck, 2016). Buy-in seems to have been fairly broad in the early stages, with support 
being articulated by the employers’ association, industry bodies and trade unions. By the mid 
to late 2000s, this had partially eroded, with trade unions and community groups voicing 
concerns over inadequate consultation. When the study was extended in 2016, it was found 
that stakeholder engagement differs across PPP sectors, with the type of stakeholder, and 
during different stages of the PPP process. There is more stakeholder engagement in Justice 
and Primary Care projects than in Education projects. This relates directly to the fact that 
more importance is given to legitimacy of stakeholder groups in the two sectors of Primary 
Care and Justice compared with Education.  
The research found that within stakeholder groups consultation is stronger with 
clinicians, judges and local communities affected by schools and Primary Care projects. 
Consultation is mixed with school principals and weak with teaching staff and trade unions. 
When analysed by stage of PPP implementation, consultation is stronger with school 
principals at the operational stage than at the design and construction stages. Also, more 
intense consultation takes place with local communities affected by Education and Primary 
Care projects at the design and operational stages than with those affected by the Convention 
Centre at the operational stage. This suggests that more importance is put on legitimising PPP 
for local communities affected more directly by PPPs such as Education and Primary Care 
projects than those adjacent to a one-off project such as the Convention Centre which perhaps 
has less impact on the local community and its members. It also suggests that more 
importance is put on legitimising PPP for those stakeholder groups that are more influential, 
such as clinicians and judges, than for schoolteachers and trade unions. Consultation with 
school principals is mixed at the design and construction stages but strengthens at the 
operational stage. However, the real power of decision-making at the operational stage lies 
with the operations and maintenance (O&M) company and the NDFA, and school principals 
have very little influence at this stage. Where school principals seek influence at the design 
and construction stage, their involvement is mixed.  
There is a lack of importance given to the taxpayer which is evidenced by the lack of 
discussion by interviewees of this major stakeholder in PPP. There seems to be a correlation 
here between the lack of importance given to the taxpayer and the lack of transparency 
highlighted earlier. This issue centres on the publication of PPP contract information which 
would be essential for the taxpayer to make a value for money assessment. These observations 
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seem to indicate that the taxpayer is very low down the stakeholder pecking order. Evidently, 
legitimising PPP to the taxpayer is not seen as important at this stage of Irish PPP 
development. 
Overall, the research found that the strength of stakeholder consent and how it 
contributes to the legitimacy of PPP is mixed. This is concerning, as consultation with 
stakeholders clarifies expectations, prevents misunderstandings and mitigates against 
unrealistic expectations of what PPP can achieve. Consultation can also lead to a more 
transparent and more successful PPP process. 
Project portfolio makes a weak contribution to the legitimacy of PPP: 
Ireland suffered reputational damage in the PPP market post crisis as a result of 
cancelling projects, and there was very little PPP activity from 2008 to 2012. A pipeline of 
projects was announced in 2012, a second phase in 2014 and a third phase in the 
Infrastructure and Capital Investment Plan 2016 – 2021. As noted earlier, the NDFA is a 
market driver and is instrumental in keeping the market informed as well as reassuring the 
market about the continuation of the PPP programme, a factor which in theory contributes to 
the legitimacy of PPP. Despite these activities, there is criticism in the private sector that there 
is very little activity in the Irish market and that it is fragmented. There also appears to be 
confusion about the launch of the Social Housing bundles and new Garda station projects. 
The issue of Ireland being a small country arose in 6.2.1 Methods to encourage market 
demand where the small scale of the Irish PPP market and the concern about the lack of 
contractor capacity was highlighted. 
Having a strong portfolio of projects across different sectors with a clear pipeline 
keeps the market engaged, and a strong market contributes to the legitimacy of PPP. 
However, the interviewees questioned in this study indicate that despite the public sector’s 
assertion of a pipeline of projects, the private sector considers this to be patchy, and this 
aspect seems to be weakening the legitimacy of PPP in Ireland. 
In summary, the research has found that the contribution of stakeholder consent to the 
legitimacy of PPP in Ireland is mixed and the contribution of the lead institutional support as 
well as political support are weak. This has serious implications for the sustainability of PPP. 
Past research has found that problems in the institutional setting of PPP can lead to a lack of 
transparency, a lack of regulatory safeguards and ultimately problems with the performance of 
PPP. PPP requires institutional creation and adaptation as well as institutional change, and 




The research has found that in Ireland the methods used to encourage market demand, 
policy learning, public sector expertise, quality of projects and the coordination of deal flow 
of PPP and their contribution to the building of capacity of PPP is mixed and the performance 
of PPP in terms of regulatory oversight is weak. Each of these points is now discussed in 
more detail. 
Methods to encourage market demand makes a mixed contribution to the capacity of PPP: 
The extended study found that the cancellation of projects during the financial crisis 
and the subsequent loss of state credibility in the PPP market weakened Ireland’s capacity to 
undertake PPPs. The stimulus package announced in 2012 and new measures announced in 
2013 have had mixed results in terms of building capacity in PPP. The introduction of design-
led PPPs with planning in place has been welcomed by the public and private sector, 
especially for so-called cookie-cutter PPPs and also heritage PPPs. However, there is concern 
that this has resulted in a lack of innovation, which is a serious concern as innovation is one 
of the motivating factors given for PPP. 
The reduced timeframe for preparing PPP projects to the market through to contract 
award has not been significant enough for the private sector and the process is still seen as too 
long and not as attractive as other forms of procurement. The partial refund of bid costs to 
unsuccessful bidders in Phase 1 of the stimulus programme was welcomed by interviewees of 
this study but was seen more as a gesture than a significant alleviation of overall bid costs and 
risks. Interviewees suggested that it has not had a substantial effect on encouraging the 
market.  
The pipeline of projects introduced in the Infrastructure and Capital Investment Plan  
2016 – 2021 has been unclear and the timelines confusing for the private sector. This has 
implications for Ireland in terms of attracting private sector interest in PPP. Another capacity 
weakness identified by interviewees was the difficulty in attracting foreign companies to bid 
in Ireland due to the small scale of the market. International companies who are willing to bid 
in Ireland are at a disadvantage as they are not familiar with the bidding process.  
The NDFA is trying to encourage local contractors to engage with PPP, but the 
transfer of risk down the line to sub-contractors is prohibitive and costly to smaller 
contractors. The Irish market is dominated by one company, yet local contractors need to 
align with larger contractors. This is a catch-22 situation as there are only three or four 
international companies willing to bid in Ireland, and newer entrants to the market are at a 
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disadvantage as those who bid regularly are familiar with the bidding process. Also, while 
there is some interest in the Irish market, as it is quiet at the moment, the concern is that the 
private sector capacity built up will diminish which will have adverse effects on the 
sustainability of PPP in the medium to long term. These problems result in a lack of 
competition in the market which is necessary for successful PPPs. Overall, Ireland remains a 
limited PPP market which has difficulty in supporting the build-up of PPP capacity. 
Policy learning makes a mixed contribution to the capacity of PPP: 
Learning from past projects and from other countries is important for building 
capacity in PPP. This area was addressed in research question two where it was found that 
Ireland borrowed significantly from UK PFI policy. UK PFI policy has proven to have serious 
issues of sustainability. However, policy learning on PPPs in Ireland has evolved as the 
country increasingly relies on drawing lessons from previous indigenous projects when 
implementing stage 3 PPP projects. 
Public sector expertise makes a mixed contribution to the capacity of PPP: 
The extended study examined different government departments and state authorities 
to see if a PPP unit had been set up, if there was formal PPP training and if there was a PPP 
champion. The research revealed mixed results. The Department of Public Expenditure and 
Reform (DPER) which is influential in PPP decision-making, convenes regular PPP steering 
meetings and appeared to be very knowledgeable about PPP. The Department of Education 
and Skills (DoES) has a PPP unit, and staff working there are considered to be champions of 
PPP. Staff at Transport Infrastructure Ireland (TII) lack formal PPP training but there is a PPP 
unit and a PPP champion within the authority. Despite the lack of a PPP unit, the Health 
Service Executive (HSE) has built up PPP knowledge and expertise through experience of 
various projects and it also has a positive attitude to PPP. 
Results were mixed for the Grangegorman/DIT Campus Planning Team which suffers 
from a lack of a PPP champion. Despite receiving PPP training from the NDFA, the 
interviewee from that group felt that PPP is being imposed on them. Results were also mixed 
for the Courts Service which does have a PPP unit. There was criticism that the staff working 
there are biased in favour of PPP, there is a lack experience and there is no formal PPP 
training for staff. Results were weak for the OPW where there is no PPP unit, a lack of a PPP 
champion and a generally negative attitude to PPP. 
It has been argued that specialised public sector capacity will create an environment 
where both the public and private sectors have confidence to invest and cooperate together 
(Matos-Castaño, 2011) and this will lead to a sustainable environment in which for PPP to 
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flourish. Specialised expertise to develop and operate PPP infrastructure has been 
implemented in DPER, the DoES, the TII and the HSE but is mixed for the Courts Service 
and the Grangegorman/DIT Campus Planning Team and weak in the OPW. 
PPP units have been established in DPER, the DoES, the TII and the Courts Service. 
However, PPP units have not been developed for stage 3 type PPPs in the HSE and the 
Grangegorman/DIT Campus Planning Team. This could also be seen as a sign of maturity of 
PPP in that there is enough expertise at steering committee level and in the NDFA to manage 
PPP without the development of unique units within government departments or state bodies. 
However, the fact that only Grangegorman/DIT Campus Planning Team has received public 
sector training indicates that there is probably no systematic decision-making in assessing and 
responding to these needs. 
Overall, the extended study examined different government departments and state 
authorities to see if a PPP unit had been set up, if there was formal PPP training and if there 
was a PPP champion. This research revealed mixed results. In stage 3 projects, PPP units have 
not been developed in departments and there is a lack of expertise in some departments. This 
is concerning as research has shown that PPP requires new public sector capacity and 
specialised expertise to develop, manage and operate PPP infrastructure. This has 
consequences for the sustainability of the existing PPP policy in Ireland.  
Quality of projects demonstrates a mixed contribution to the capacity of PPP: 
The pilot study found that risk transfer and the quality of PPP projects in Ireland was 
sometimes poor. The small population of the country meant that road projects in particular 
continued to suffer from poor estimates of demand risk, with the government frequently 
accepting “all of the downside risk” without “benefiting from potential upside risks” 
(Sheppard and Beck, 2016, p.12). When the study was extended in 2016, it was found that 
there are considerable issues with risk transfer and VFM, which was discussed earlier in 6.2.4 
Quality of projects.  
Quality in PPP projects centres on ensuring good project management and good 
contract management (Jooste et al., 2009). None of the interviewees of this study discussed 
selecting a strong consortium or the ability of government to understand the objectives of 
private finance, the absence of which suggests that secondary importance is attributed to these 
areas. 
In terms of risk transfer, the extended study found that risk is not transferred in line 
with the approach suggested by the literature which involves transferring risk to the party best 
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able to manage it. The findings also suggest that there is an incentive for government to 
transfer as much risk as possible so as to ensure that the PPP is off-balance sheet. It appears 
that Ireland does not have a very sophisticated approach to risk transfer and that it is not 
transferring risks prudently but rather is taking an expedient approach to ensure that risk is 
transferred to ensure that PPP is kept off-balance sheet. This suggests that in some respects 
Ireland’s approach to risk transfer is immature. 
The issues identified regarding risk transfer raise doubts about whether PPP comprises 
value for money, something that cannot be proven in any case due to transparency issues. 
Another issue of concern discussed by interviewees is that the private sector is accepting risk 
and passing it down to sub-contractors. The findings of the extended study further suggest the 
accounting treatment of risk is being manipulated and not being managed well. This is 
particularly concerning in light of Eurostat’s interpretation of the rules concerning PPP, which 
may result in some PPPs coming back on balance sheet (Kelly, 2016). The research raises 
serious concerns that risk management and its role in building PPP capacity is, and has 
remained, weak. 
During the extended study, no interviewees spoke about PPP quality in terms of the 
how projects are selected, suggesting that this is not high on their agenda. However, study 
interviewees discussed quality of PPP built infrastructure in terms of the quality of materials, 
services and the end product, being positive overall in their discussions about the quality of 
the PPP built infrastructure. Given weaknesses in project management, however, it can be 
concluded that the quality of PPPs in building capacity is at best mixed. 
Jooste et al. (2009) discuss the importance of contract clauses providing for step-in 
rights in the context of quality. Step-in rights are clauses in contracts that give lenders the 
right to take control of the contract in case of a “default on payments” (Aziz, 2007, p.924). 
During the extended study, interviewees confirmed that step-in clauses exist and, as such, 
strongly contribute to building capacity in PPP, which is in line with the recommendations of 
Jooste et al. (2009). Ireland, however, is behind the UK in terms of its approach to 
performance specifications in PPP contracts, suggesting that the contribution of performance 
specifications to building capacity in PPP is mixed.  
Overall, the research found that there are serious concerns about Ireland’s approach to 
risk transfer in PPP and this is particularly worrying in light of the on-off balance sheet 
debate. The research also found that there is a lack of discussion on how projects are selected, 
which is perhaps a consequence of the lack of transparency discussed earlier. Also, it was 
found was that Ireland is behind the UK in terms of its approach to performance specifications 
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in PPP projects. This suggests that the contribution of quality of projects to the capacity of 
PPP in Ireland is mixed. 
Coordination of deal flow makes a mixed contribution to the capacity of PPP: 
The pilot study found that Ireland took measures to increase the PPP deal flow post 
the 2008 crisis (Sheppard and Beck, 2016). This highlights the vulnerability of the PPP 
industry to economic shocks and indicates that Ireland did not procure PPPs on the basis of a 
long-term structured national infrastructure policy. It was also found that there were problems 
with the coordination of deal flow. It was difficult initially to attract international companies 
and create sufficient market interest for scalability reasons. When the study was extended in 
2016, there was mixed evidence that a deal flow was contributing to PPP capacity building. 
This was supported by the examination of the legal and regulatory framework outlined earlier, 
the results of which were also found to be mixed. Thus, the examination of the NDFA 
outlined earlier found that its contribution to keeping the market informed was strong, as was 
its role as adviser and expert. However, the role of the NDFA as a promoter of PPP seemed to 
have a negative impact on its contribution to the legitimacy of PPP. Also, the research 
indicated that the pipeline of projects was found to be patchy, and despite the NDFA’s 
endeavours to avoid bunching of projects, there was a perception the deal flow was not well 
coordinated.  
Overall, the research found that the contribution of deal flow to the building of 
capacity of PPP in Ireland was mixed. This has consequences for creating and encouraging 
competition in the market which is an important factor in achieving VFM. National and 
international bidders will be less inclined to bid if there is not a clear pipeline of projects. 
Equally, they will be reluctant to engage in a market where the timing, scale, and nature of 
new projects is uncertain. 
Levels of PPP performance appear to make a weak contribution to overall PPP capacity: 
The pilot study found a high degree of fragmentation in the regulatory oversight of 
Irish PPPs (Sheppard and Beck, 2016). While this would not be problematic if each agency 
carried out its assessment to similar standards, current practice is likely to make performance 
comparisons of PPP across different areas of activity difficult. When the study was extended 
in 2016, it was found that there was a lack of independent oversight of performance 
monitoring, which suggests a serious weakness in capacity building on PPP projects. Also, the 
research highlighted the lack of transparency surrounding PPP projects, particularly of post-
project reviews, which has serious implications for capacity building. 
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In summary, the research found that in Ireland, the methods used to encourage market 
demand, policy learning, public sector expertise, quality of projects and the coordination of 
deal flow of PPP and their contribution to the building of capacity of PPP is mixed, and the 
performance of PPP in terms of regulatory oversight is weak. This has serious implications 
for the sustainability of PPP as past research highlighted the importance of a new type of 
institutional capacity which will structure and govern PPP as a perquisite for ensuring the 
sustainability of PPP procurement and operation.  
Trust 
The pilot study indicated that while the avenue for complaint and arbitration in Irish 
PPPs is strong there are issues with transparency, the legal and regulatory system and risk 
transfer. The extended study, found that though there is a certain level of trust between the 
public and private sectors, there are specific concerns that suggest the contribution of PPP 
programme accountability to building trust is weak. These concerns surround the lack of 
transparency of PPP and the inability of the taxpayer to examine the value for money of PPP, 
as discussed earlier. It is impossible to comment definitively on accountability due to 
commercial confidentiality and the resultant lack of transparency in PPP. This is problematic 
particularly in light of past research by Aziz (2007) and Li et al. (2005a) which suggests that 
transparency is of the utmost importance for public accountability. There are many issues 
surrounding transparency, the legal and regulatory framework and risk transfer which paths 
overlap and interact in their effects. These issues seem to create a climate of doubt between 
the public and private sector, not to mention the civic sector and the taxpayer in particular, 
potentially creating a lack of trust in PPP. Issues with transparency, the legal and regulatory 
framework, and risk transfer highlighted earlier suggest that there is now an air of suspicion 
surrounding PPP procurement which affects how stakeholders feel about it.  
The building of trust between the public and private sector is strengthened by the use 
of standards and mechanisms such as clear regulations and standards coupled with ex-ante 
evaluation. However, the research has found that in Ireland, while the avenue for complaint 
and arbitration is strong, issues relating to transparency, the legal and regulatory system and 
risk transfer are widely considered problematic. This has created doubts about the fairness of 
PPP procurement among several parties, and coupled with poor programme accountability, 
the building of trust in PPP has been flawed, which in turn adversely affects the sustainability 
of this policy in Ireland.  
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7.4 Novel findings and contributions 
Ireland is a second generation adopter of PPP but has not fully embraced the policy. 
For the purposes of this research Irish PPPs are described as being mature.  However, this can 
be disputed. It is assumed that the policy has matured as it has moved on from the first 
generation UK PFI model, yet despite the inception of the NDFA, Ireland has been selective 
in engaging with PPP policy as it has evolved over time. This is evidenced in the core 
findings which identified issues regarding limited policy learning, a problematic role of the 
NDFA, fraught stakeholder involvement, de-politicisation of PPP, and operational 
functionality deficits, all of which contribute to widespread doubt about PPP. Figure 7.2 
summarises the discussion which follows in this section. The focus of this analysis is on key 
issues and novel findings identified in this research and their place within the existing 
disciplinary matrix of PPP research. 
Figure 7.2: Novel findings and contributions 
 
To start, this research makes a contribution to methodology by taking a critical realist 
perspective and using a unique framework, the Patterns of PPP Adoption Framework, to 
explore the rationales for PPP policy-making. This research utilised Merriam’s (1998) 
approach to case study design and combined this with thematic analysis using Braun and 
Clarke’s (2006) method of data analysis. Nvivo software was utilised to store and retrieve 
data, and results were plotted to the Patterns of PPP Adoption Framework. 
This research gives unique insights into the patterns of PPP adoption and utilisation as 
it moves from being a first generation adopter (such as the UK) to a second generation 
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adopter (such as Ireland), with resultant insight and contribution to knowledge of the practical 
and theoretical aspects of PPP implementation. As a second generation adopter of PPP, 
Ireland has moved on beyond the modus operandi of first generation adopters of PPP which 
was typically closely related to the UK PFI model. For example, the establishment of a PPP 
unit, the NDFA, shows that Ireland’s approach to PPP utilisation is mature. Yet some of the 
requirements of a mature PPP policy have not been fully embraced, with Ireland failing to 
engage with PPP policy to the same extent as other countries and jurisdictions, such as, for 
example, Victoria, Australia. There, disclosure on all PPP contracts is provided (English and 
Walker, 2004) and the Irish Committee of Public Accounts report in 2007 stated that the 
approach of Victoria, Australia, where the onus is on the tenderer to prove that “commercial 
in confidence” will adversely affect their business (Dáil Éireann, 2007, p.4) was exemplary. 
The report also recommended that, in line with British Columbia, Canada, contracts should be 
disclosed in their entirety after an appropriate period and three months after completion has 
been recommended. The report noted that in Victoria, Australia, the parliamentary committee 
and the Auditor General have authority to report “commercial in confidence” material when it 
is in the public interest for the information to be revealed (p. 16). This shows that none of 
these recommendations has been implemented in Ireland and in so doing  provides a novel 
analysis of the ongoing weaknesses of Irish PPP policy. The first generation of PPPs in the 
Netherlands of the early 1990s suffered from financial and structural problems. In contrast, 
the second generation of PPPs came about after the government assessed international 
experiences of PPP, evaluated this and assessed conditions necessary for a successful 
partnership leading to political and public buy-in (Matos-Castaño et al., 2014). Given the 
weaknesses of PPP adoption and utilisation highlighted in this thesis, such a review seems 
overdue in the Irish context. 
Related to this issue, this thesis also provides unique insights into the nature of policy 
transfer, and contributes to policy transfer theory by highlighting the impediments to the 
natural evolution of a policy during a period of uncertainties such as those experienced by 
Ireland during and after the financial crisis of 2008. This crisis created problems on account 
of changing market forces, budgetary constraints and complex multiple stakeholder 
involvement. The natural evolution of PPP policy as a second generation adopter would be 
that the policy would mature and follow the path of other well-managed examples of PPP, 
such as has been the case in the Netherlands. However, Ireland has failed to fully embrace 
measures which, had they been adopted, would have increased the legitimacy of PPP. For 
example, transparency is very weak and arguments surrounding commercial sensitivity are 
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used to block demands for greater transparency. Also, past projects reviews are scarce with 
only the review of the Criminal Courts of Justice building, a one-off PPP, and the C&AG’s 
value for money review of the Pilot Schools Project having been published. To date, no 
reviews have been published of long-term projects such as Schools or Primary Care projects. 
Despite this, the research contributes to the knowledge of PPP by indicating that 
Ireland’s PPP policy has evolved in the sense that there is increasing reliance on learning from 
Ireland’s own experience and less so from that of other countries such as the UK in particular. 
Also, the research shows that problems plaguing UK PFI have been recognised in Ireland and 
that, in doing so, Ireland has been careful with regard to some of the elements of PFI policy it 
now borrows. It also appears that as Irish PPPs have evolved, policy transfer now takes place 
in a different direction, where the European PPP Expert Centre (EPEC) considers the NDFA 
to be a model that other countries should follow. This suggests that, at least outwardly, PPP 
policies and practice in Ireland are perceived to have entered a mature phase. This insight into 
a country entering a maturity stage of PPP adoption without having addressed some key 
problems contributes to the literature on policy transfer theory by illustrating that a country 
can become a mature policy adopter while maintaining a flawed and selective approach to 
implementation.  
Policy transfer and learning thus are not following established patterns of adoption as 
suggested by the literature. As the Patterns of PPP Adoption Framework, laid out as part of 
the pilot study in chapter 4, indicates, the most sustainable PPPs are those that are adopted on 
a voluntary basis, have strong institutional capacity built around them and are highly 
isomorphic. Yet Figure 7.2 shows that, while PPP implementation in Ireland was initially 
voluntary and strongly isomorphic, adoption has become more coercive and less isomorphic 
over time. This suggests that a hybrid form of policy transfer has taken place where there was 
initial transfer following a strong isomorphic route. After that, independent learning took 
place but with an á la carte approach to where only some measures which strengthen 
legitimacy, capacity and trust were implemented. This analysis contributes to the literature on 
PPP and theory by combining policy transfer theory and institutional theory to develop a 
unique framework, the Patterns of PPP Adoption Framework, which can be applied to other 
countries and settings to evaluate patterns of PPP adoption and as a predictor of PPP 
sustainability. For the Irish case, this framework suggests that PPP policy can persist despite 
flaws and despite less conducive external factors. 
This research contributes to the literature on PPP by finding that there are ongoing 
weaknesses as well as advances in the sustainability of PPP in Ireland, outlined through the 
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themes of legitimacy, capacity and trust. This also provides unique insights into the practical 
application of PPP. One of the main contributors to the legitimacy of PPP is the role of the 
Lead Institutional Support or PPP unit. In Ireland, the NDFA is the centre of knowledge and 
expertise in PPP and is the state’s adviser on PPP policy. However, there is confusion about 
its role. The NDFA wants to manage PPP but does not want to be a principal PPP policy 
decision-maker. While the organisation seeks to promote and inform policy, it appears to be 
reluctant to develop policy. Coupled with its role as implementer of policy, as exemplified by 
its bureaucratic structure and setup, this suggests the NDFA occupies a hybrid identity as PPP 
enabler. As a hybrid organisation it is a PPP unit which acts on behalf of the state and a state 
institution in the PPP sphere which seeks to promote PPP by being close to the private sector 
and its interests. Although the NDFA is supposed to provide lead institutional support, it 
abdicates some of this role by failing to engage more fully with policy innovation, 
development and decision-making, preferring to leave these roles to the political sphere. The 
research findings of this thesis indicate that political commitment to PPP in Ireland is weak, 
and it is therefore perhaps not surprising that the NDFA has adopted a role that falls short of 
that of an ideal lead institution, this supports and complements the state’s policy-making 
efforts but in turn is likely to undermine the long-term sustainability of PPP in Ireland. 
This research contributes to the literature on stakeholder salience theory in that one of 
the key findings of this research highlights that there is poor stakeholder involvement in PPP 
in Ireland with a complex multi-stakeholder system and hierarchy in place. Simon (1957) 
coined the term “satisficing” where one accepts the simplest theory that works (Simon, 1972). 
When it comes to stakeholder involvement in PPP in Ireland, patterns of satisficing manifest 
themselves in a tendency to engage only with those stakeholders who could hold up or 
prevent the PPP progressing, such as judges, clinicians and the local community (in the case 
of Education projects). This pattern also mirrors some of the predictions of stakeholder 
salience theory. Mitchell et al. (1997) discuss why importance is given to some stakeholder 
groups and not to others. They suggest that stakeholders can be recognised by their possession 
of the attributes of power, legitimacy and their eagerness to achieve certain ends. Mitchell et 
al. (1997) predict that significant attention will be given to stakeholders who possess these 
attributes. This research has found that in line with stakeholder salience theory, there is a 
hierarchy of stakeholders by sector and stage of PPP as outlined in Table 7.4.  
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Table 7.4: Mapping of stakeholder groups according to Stakeholder Salience Theory 





































































Mitchell et al. (1997, p.878) refer to stakeholders at the top of the hierarchy as 
“definitive stakeholders” who possess all three attributes of power, legitimacy and their 
eagerness to achieve certain ends. This research identifies definitive stakeholders as judges, 
clinicians and local communities (in the case of education projects and primary care projects) 
during the design and construction phase. The path of least resistance is taken to ensure that 
these stakeholders are kept satisfied. School principals at the design and construction phase, 
meanwhile, would be defined by Mitchell et al. (1997, p.877) as “dependent stakeholders”, 
because they have “urgent and legitimate claims” but have “little or no power to enforce their 
will in the relationship”. 
There is typically no consultation with those stakeholders who exhibit the attributes of 
“demanding stakeholders”. Mitchell et al. (1997, p.875) define these as groups with “urgent 
claims but neither power nor legitimacy”. These stakeholder groups occupy a very weak role 
in the relationship. This research identifies as demanding stakeholders teaching staff and trade 
unions at the design and construction phase. At the operational phase, school principals are 
elevated to the level of definitive stakeholders whereas the local community in the case of the 
Convention Centre PPP exhibit the attributes of dependent stakeholders. Mitchell et al. (1997, 
p.874) also identify a stakeholder group which they refer to as “non-stakeholders”, 
representative of taxpayers in this research, as Irish taxpayers are not given any apparent 
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legitimacy, power or urgency in PPP. The fragmented and partisan approach to consultation in 
Irish PPP projects gives rise to fraught levels of stakeholder involvement, creating suspicion 
and, when coupled with the de-politicisation of PPP, results in a widely perceived lack of 
transparency and accountability which, in turn, is likely to weaken the sustainability of PPP in 
the long run. 
The research found that as PPP policy has evolved in Ireland, the de-politicisation of 
PPP has, if anything, progressed. This is in line with Willems and Van Dooren (2016, p.2) 
who write that there is a growing trend in the 21st century of “shifting functions and 
responsibilities of public policy in terms of decision-making away from elected politicians to 
‘specialised technical actors’”. They suggest that the de-politicisation of PPP has seen 
governments turning to consultancy and advisory firms at the policy preparation and decision 
phase and during the operational phase. They also claim that the “budget autonomy of the 
parliament is reduced” through these practices, leading to poor visibility in public accounting 
(Willems and Van Dooren, 2016, p.7). This research found strong evidence of a de-
politicisation of Irish PPP, with administrative day-to-day decision-making being transferred 
to the NDFA, a PPP unit which, as discussed, has a confused role as a PPP enabler. Irish PPP 
policy lacks a strong political presence which occurs in conjunction with an absence of 
transparency, particularly regarding decision-making and the financial justification of 
projects. There is no public scrutiny of how the public sector benchmark is calculated and 
projects may well be going ahead that are of limited value for money. In the absence of the 
publication of project reviews, however, this is impossible to examine. There is a lack of 
independent oversight of PPPs and the decisions of the NDFA are not scrutinised by the 
Comptroller and Auditor General. Irish PPPs also lack a political champion, with apparent 
indifference by politicians to PPP and a lack of effort to highlight the advantages of PPP to 
users. In fact, stakeholders are kept at a distance, with priority given to satisfying those who 
can delay projects. 
Political indifference to PPP is also evident in the absence of independent oversight of 
post-construction performance monitoring of projects, a situation which again contributes to a 
lack of accountability to the public. A lack of transparency, meanwhile, makes it impossible 
to comment definitively on levels of performance and performance accountability once 
projects are operational. This lack of information is conveniently excused on commercial 
sensitivity grounds which are cited to avoid the dissemination of information which is 
routinely published in other jurisdictions. Willems and Van Dooren (2016, p.18) argue that 
“just because decision-making has shifted towards places that are less publicly visible and 
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controllable” does not mean that they are less political. They suggest that the de-politicisation 
typical of PPP policy-making in western European countries has been taken too far and the 
“balance needs to be adjusted” (Willems and Van Dooren, 2016, p.18). The Irish case studied 
here seems to confirm this. 
If Irish PPP policy and procurement were more politicised, this would bring with them 
an obligation for more transparency, regulation, accountability and post-project reviews. 
Ultimately, politicians would be unable to engage in the arbitrary selection of projects which 
benefit their constituencies and satisfy electoral demands. McGeough and Beck (2018) 
suggest that the Irish political system is extremely competitive which creates a reluctance 
among politicians to use fixed decision criteria or performance metrics in the allocation of 
funds. They propose that, instead, politicians defer to their electoral base and will do whatever 
it takes to ensure their election, irrespective of longer-term national requirements. McGeough 
and Beck (2018) recommend that parliamentary committees should demand performance 
information on performance and spending targets. Perhaps there is a slow shift to this form of 
political oversight in Ireland where the Chairman of the Committee of Public Accounts called 
for financial information on PPPs to be provided by the Department of Public Expenditure 
and Reform, the Department of Education and Skills, Transport Infrastructure Ireland and the 
National Development Finance Agency in advance of an overview of PPPs which was to be 
held on 22 March 2018. Specifically the Chairman stated: 
we will ask them to justify their inability to give us full commercial details of 
any contract more than five years old. Commercial sensitivity might be valid at 
a certain point in time but not for ever. This will give us the opportunity to 
consider the information before we have the public meeting 
(Dáil Éireann, 2018). 
McGeough and Beck (2018) cite Hofsted’s (2001) work on organisational/managerial 
culture which ranks Ireland as a collectivist country, with a score of 70, similar to other 
countries such as Sweden (ranking 71) and Finland (ranking 63), while the UK is said to be 
individualistic (ranking 89). The introduction of performance related pay and the publication 
of performance targets were facilitated in the UK. Meanwhile, Ireland, with a more 
collectivist culture, has been slow to implement these measures. Irish policy-making is largely 
consensual and based on agreement and negotiation (McGeough and Beck, 2018) with reform 
proceeding slowly expect in times of crisis, while the UK system is adversarial, which 
paradoxically has come to facilitate a command-style culture. 
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The absence of political support for PPP exemplifies a culture of satisficing where 
PPP in Ireland appears to be a workable system and an important tool in the procurement box, 
but one which is allowed to meet the bare minimum requirements in terms of legitimacy, trust 
and capacity. The level of transparency and accountability in PPP currently ensures that the 
system is manageable, but it is at a level where there is a large margin for error as the 
financials involved are not publicly scrutinised. Irish PPP policy exhibits many of the 
hallmarks of Lindblom’s (1959) pattern of  “muddling through”. It is just good enough to be 
workable, but there is no political ambition for excellence. It is possible that PPPs are being 
procured that would not commissioned if there were more transparency or that PPP would be 
procured and operated more effectively if there were transparency and ongoing 
accountability. This may not necessarily be attractive to policy-makers and politicians, 
however, as it would limit their discretion in fund allocation. This is hugely problematic, of 
course, in light of the fact that Ireland is still struggling with debt and there is a need for 
scarce public funding to be utilised correctly and effectively. 
This research has found that there is PPP policy stagnation in Ireland, an area 
“underdeveloped” in the literature (Hope and Raudla, 2012, p.400). Attempts at understanding 
policy change can be explained using “discursive institutionalism” (Hope and Raudla, 2012, 
p.415) and this can also be used to explain policy stasis. Hope and Raudla (2012) put forward 
a model to explain that discourse surrounding a policy can lead to its change and also its 
stasis. Contributors to stasis or constraints to change include “cultural blinkers”, “institutional 
obstacles” and “entrenched interests” (Hope and Raudla, 2012, p.403). Examining the 
discourses surrounding PPP adoption in Ireland, this research has found that the adoption was 
closely related to the introduction of new public management (NPM) reforms in the UK, 
suggesting that Ireland was pushing towards adopting a similar political culture. The 
motivation for the current phase of PPPs, meanwhile, is more pragmatic, and is about 
stimulating the economy and creating jobs. Mapping this to Hope and Raudla’s (2012) model, 
the latter pattern mirrors the characteristics of a “cultural blinker” and as such can be seen as a 
contributor to policy stasis. The research also found that the discourse around the role of the 
NDFA in PPP represents an “institutional obstacle” and contributes to policy stasis. Problems 
associated with PPP are accepted because PPP is seen to contribute to a bigger goal: 
employment creation and economic growth. The discourse surrounding the domination of 
larger contractors in the Irish PPP market reflects an “entrenched interest” which contributes 
to policy stasis because the interests of these contractors are accepted as paramount. This 
research thus has contributed to the literature on policy stasis by examining the discourses of 
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PPP policy in Ireland. In so doing, it sheds new light on policy stagnation and stasis as a key 
characteristic of PPP policy in Ireland. While PPP is limping along, it has not been proven to 
be effective, the methodology underlying decision-making is flawed, there is an absence of 
political support and there are fraught levels of stakeholder involvement. Existing discourses, 
meanwhile, prevent a serious reflection on the weaknesses of PPP practice, yet no one seems 
to be willing to address these issues until concerns for PPP long-term viability become more 
urgent. 
This research contributes to the literature on the practical aspects of PPP as it found 
significant operational functionality deficits, outlined in the 7.3 The core findings in relation 
to the research questions. These include a lack of independent oversight, poor programme 
accountability and issues with risk transfer. The lack of transparency surrounding PPP 
procurement and operation due to commercial sensitivities are conducive to a lack of credible 
oversight. The main stakeholder to whom value for money should be demonstrated, the 
taxpayer, is a non-stakeholder, very much in line Mitchell et al.’s (1997) terminology. 
Combined with the lack of programme accountability, this chimes with de-politicisation of 
PPP. As Irish PPP adoption has matured, this de-politicisation has intensified, allowing 
politicians to make convenient and expedient use of this procurement method while outwardly 
the image of a mature and efficient system is being cultivated. This also relates to the 
significant operational problems highlighted by this research with risk transfer. Rather than 
transferring risk to the party best able to manage it, as suggested by the literature, an 
expedient approach is taken to ensure that as much risk as possible is transferred to the private 
sector to ensure that a PPP project is kept off-balance sheet. This chimes with the experiences 
of early UK PFI contracts where excessive risk was transferred to the private sector when it 
should have remained with the party best able to “bear it”, that is, the state. This resulted in 
high levels of compensation being paid to the private sector for risk (Pollock et al., 2002). 
Evidently, PFI sustainability lessons from the experiences of risk transfer in the UK and 
recommendations made have not been learnt or applied in Ireland. Again, this falls in line 
with the prevalent de-politicisation of Irish PPP as well as the Willems and Van Dooren 
(2016) hypothesis of a new technical pseudo-rationality replacing traditional concepts of 
public financial and parliamentary accountability. As a whole, macro-political factors at the 
fiscal policy level and meso-political problems at the organisational level exemplified by the 
NDFA’s problematic position seem to reinforce each other in preventing credible reforms. 
Added to this are micro-factors at the market level where the dominance of large players 
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seems to prevent a more detailed analysis of employment and economic gains associated with 
PPP procurement. 
7.5 Policy implications 
There is an opportunity to reform PPP policy in Ireland. Attention should be paid to 
exemplars of transparency such as Victoria, Australia and British Columbia, Canada. 
Increased transparency in PPP was recommended by the Committee of Public Accounts in 
2007 (Dáil Éireann, 2007, p.24). Yet, more than ten years later, the Chairperson of the 
Committee of Public Accounts is still asking for this in February 2018 (Dáil Éireann, 2018).  
A number of reform measures are possible. One measure concerning the publication of 
the public sector benchmark (PSB) would help to demonstrate the value for money, or 
otherwise, of individual PPPs to stakeholders and in particular the much ignored group of 
stakeholders, taxpayers. At the very least there should be an independent review of the PSB 
perhaps carried out by the C&AG. This would avoid the necessity to publish potentially 
sensitive figures, particularly when there is an active market of PPP, while an independent 
body would examine figures and report its findings to the public. 
Similarly, the findings of post-project reviews should be made available to the public. 
A precedent was set with the value for money review carried out by the C&AG on the Pilot 
Schools Project in 2004 (Comptroller and Auditor General, 2004) a “path-finder” project, and 
the review of the Criminal Courts of Justice (CCJ) project in 2012 (Mazars, 2012). However, 
since then, the Department of Education and Skills has not published any reviews, and while 
there is a planned internal review of Primary Care projects, it is unclear whether this will be 
published. The decision whether to publish post-project reviews should rest with the 
Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, as this is the Department which is tasked with 
delivering “well-managed and well-targeted public spending, through modernised, effective 
and accountable public services”26.  
In fact, the Department of Publication Expenditure and Reform has recommended 
these points in a report published in July 2018. This report recommended that the business 
cases for PPP projects should be published alongside the public sector benchmarks once an 
appropriate time has elapsed and the commercial sensitivity of the information is no longer 
relevant. The report also recommended that post-project reviews be undertaken and published 
(Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, 2018). 




Accountability to stakeholder groups is paramount in PPP. However, there is a 
complex multi-stakeholder system in place in Ireland. As previously argued, by applying 
Mitchell et al. (1997, p.876) stakeholder salience theory, it appears that the taxpayer is 
considered a “non-stakeholder”. It looks as if Ireland is following the same route as the UK. 
PFI projects there were found to lack “consistent, comparable, and understandable financial 
information” and it became difficult for public sector stakeholders to examine the use of 
public money in PFI projects (Shaoul et al., 2009, p.251).  This makes informed public debate 
on policy and fiscal commitments difficult (Shaoul et al., 2009; Shaoul et al., 2013) and 
adversely affects the sustainability of the policy for future generations.  
By increasing transparency in PPP, particularly regarding the decision to go down the 
PPP route, in the PSB and in post-project reviews, due regard will be given to the taxpayers, 
promoting a new importance of taxpayer as potential future “definitive stakeholders”. 
An active market is essential for PPP and this requires a clear pipeline of projects 
which encourages potential bidders to bid. However, issues surrounding transparency, the 
legal and regulatory framework and risk transfer create a climate of doubt among public and 
private sector PPP stakeholders. They also affect the civic sector and taxpayers who have little 
reason to put trust in the integrity of PPP procurement. This has implications for Ireland in 
attracting private sector interest in PPP, particularly as the scale of the Irish market is very 
small. The dominance of the Irish market by one contractor is problematic for smaller 
contractors and is a unique feature to Ireland. The strong market dominance by one company 
creates a danger of a monopoly where prices can be dictated, where there are barriers to entry 
by other competitors, and where there is the risk that the company may go bankrupt. Creating 
market demand requires a market that is easily entered into. The stimulus package announced 
in 2012 and new measures announced in 2013 have gone some way to encouraging 
participation in the market, and perhaps these measures could be augmented. Solutions to 
encouraging smaller contractor engagement with PPP without interfering with the workings 
of the market should be investigated. This point was made by the aforementioned report 
published in July 2018 by the Department of Publication Expenditure and Reform. This report 
recommended greater competitive tension in the procurement process and suggested that this 
would open the PPP market to smaller domestic contractors (Department of Public 
Expenditure and Reform, 2018). 
During the financial crisis when PPP was seen as the only viable way of building 
infrastructure, the satisficing nature of PPP could perhaps be justified. However, now that the 
financial crisis has come to an end and more avenues for funding are available, PPP is perhaps 
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no longer as useful an option as it was in these years. This should therefore be a time when all 
options are rigorously and systematically assessed and the widest possible level of stakeholder 
engagement encouraged. Indeed the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform in its July 
2018 report stated that PPPs should be considered on a “case by case basis” based on the 
merits of the project and that value for money criteria be fully restored (Department of Public 
Expenditure and Reform, 2018, p.4).  
7.6 Limitations of the study and avenues for further inquiry 
When reviewing the findings and conclusions of this thesis a number of issues should 
be taken into account. While steps were taken to ensure the validity and reliability of the 
analysis, some limitations should be acknowledged when interpreting the results of this work. 
The following paragraphs draw attention to these limitations but should also be looked at in 
the context of avenues for further inquiry. This study has told the ongoing story of PPP in 
Ireland and has revealed a number of interesting areas for further research which could not be 
fully addressed in this thesis. 
First, this study has examined the role of the public and private sector in the 
sustainability of PPP in Ireland and a representative sample was drawn from these groups. 
There was limited access to the civic sector, although trade unions are categorised as the civic 
sector (see for example, Jooste et al. (2009)) and they did form part of this research. Access to 
more civic sector groups such as the users of the assets, local residents, taxpayers and civic 
organisations would have added an extra layer of data, particularly in the context of Theme 3 
Trust. However, this was beyond the range of this research but it would be worth 
investigating the views of this group to provide an important addition to the research 
conducted here. There was also limited access to the financiers of PPP. This was due to the 
timing of the research, because at the time the data was collected, Irish banks were largely 
controlled by the state and were unwilling to be interviewed. It would also be worth 
investigating the role of financiers in Irish PPPs at a future date because research into UK PFI 
has found evidence of massive private sector profit-making, failure of private sector financiers 
to share the profits of refinancing, and the lobbying of state agencies by the private sector to 
alter the structure of accounting regulations in their favour (Toms et al., 2011).  
Second, at the beginning of the research, the PPP unit, the NDFA, was considered to 
be a lesser component of this research project. As the data-gathering stage continued, 
however, the importance of the role which the NDFA plays in the sustainability of PPP came 
to the fore. However, this research project did not include interviews with key NDFA staff in 
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part due to fears that access would be denied or members of their media department would act 
as sole interviewees. This view was confirmed at a PPP conference on 19 November 2015, 
when an NDFA official responded with a standard response and was unwilling to give an on 
the record statement. There was also a fear that the NDFA would demand editorial control 
over the data analysis had the organisation been included. As part of further research, the 
NDFA could be approached for its consideration of the findings of this research and asked to 
comment on relevant sections.  
Third, this research draws attention to the lack of transparency of the PPP policy in 
Ireland and asks questions on the nature and make-up of the public sector benchmark (PSB). 
It would be useful to contrast Ireland’s approach to the transparency of the PSB with that of 
other jurisdictions such as Victoria, Australia and British Columbia, Canada. Transparency in 
PPPs is an issue raised by the European Court of Auditors report (2018). The Department of 
Education and Skills in January 2018 published the make-up of the PSB for Schools Bundles 
1, 2 and 3. Within this it highlighted the “value for money headroom” of each of these 
bundles. However, no explanation was given as to what the precise meaning of this was. 
There is scope for further research into the value for money assessment process these recent 
projects have undergone. 
Fourth, this research draws attention to the role of the Comptroller and Auditor 
General (C&AG) as a state auditor of PPP projects. Future research could contrast the role of 
state auditors in other jurisdictions with the C&AG in Ireland to provide insights into how the 
role of the C&AG could be expanded to address some of the current deficiencies of PPP 
governance. 
Fifth, the government introduced a domestic stimulus programme in 2012 which 
focused on job creation and economic stimulus and then introduced new measures in 2013 to 
encourage participation in the market. The effects of this programme are unclear and could be 
explored further, first, to see if it did result in job creation and economic stimulus, and second, 
to see if it encouraged the private sector to participate more actively in the PPP market.  
Sixth, there are opportunities to examine the implications of the cyclical nature of Irish 
PPP spending. Ireland increased PPP spending as the country moved out of austerity and 
credit became more readily available. There is a need to examine how PPP spending could be 
targeted effectively to encourage growth in periods of stagnation or recession. This research 
could provide insights into whether countries can utilise PPP as a long-term instrument of 
public policy rather than adopting an ad hoc approach. 
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Finally, following the announcement in the UK in January 2018 of the liquidation of 
Carillion, a construction company involved in a consortium to build six schools through PPP 
in Ireland, there is a need to examine the vulnerability of PPP to private sector business failure 
and the potential roles of government organisations in mitigating this. 
7.7 Conclusion 
PPP in Ireland appears to be a workable system and a useful tool in the state’s 
procurement box. According to this research, however, it only meets the minimum 




Figure 7.3: Results of the research 
RQ 1: What are the reasons for the adoption of the PPP policy and its continued 
use in Ireland? 
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Reasons for the introduction of PPP: Reasons for the continued use of PPP: 
• Filling the infrastructure gap 
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RQ 2: What is the extent of the influence of policy transfer on PPP adoption in 
Ireland? 
Patterns of PPP Adoption Framework     
 
 































Voluntary (3) Voluntary PT & weak 
institutional capacity building 
(1) Voluntary PT & strong 
institutional capacity building 
Coercive (4) Coercive PT & weak 
institutional capacity building 
(2) Coercive PT & strong 
institutional capacity building 
 
 
RQ 3: What is the extent to which institutional environments have been adapted 




The reasons for the continuing use of the PPP policy have changed over time. 
Originally, PPP was intended to help fill the infrastructure gap that existed at the time, but it 
also fitted with the political and ideological motivations of the Minster for Finance of the day. 
However, since the financial crisis, the use of PPP has evolved to it being seen as a means for 
creating jobs and stimulating the economy as well as a way to keep borrowings off-balance 
sheet. 
While some policy learning has taken place around Irish PPP, this has been very 
mixed. PPPs have gone from being adopted voluntarily and being strongly isomorphic to 
more recently being coercively imposed and being less isomorphic. Over the same period, 
Ireland has continued to be selective in embracing measures to increase legitimacy, capacity 
and trust. Although Ireland was aware of policy failures in the UK, it did not replicated policy 
reform and approaches such as were adopted in the Netherlands, Victoria in Australia or 
British Columbia in Canada. 
Institutional support and capacity building in Ireland are confused and 
underdeveloped. The NDFA, as lead institutional support, does not act as a genuine leader or 
champion. It is more an implementer, day-to-day routine decision-maker and administrator. 
Political commitment to PPP is weak and is not helped by the NDFA’s hands-off approach. 
There is also evidence of uneven institutional capacity across the public sector with some 
government departments and state authorities having set up a PPP unit and others not having 
done so. 
Efforts to encourage a competitive market have been hampered by the NDFA’s 
unwillingness to champion PPP policy, and coupled with a lack of political commitment and a 
stuttering pipeline of projects, this has resulted in a small PPP market which lacks scale and 
certainty to attract large bidders. The rigid, overly bureaucratic tendering process creates high 
levels of administrative overhead in the bidding process which has driven out all but the 
biggest contenders. The dominance of one bidder discourages new bidders from entering the 
market, and innovation has been stifled further by the introduction of design-led projects. 
PPP in Ireland has fraught levels of stakeholder involvement, with the main reason for 
stakeholder consultation being that a group could potentially delay the project. There is 
evidence of satisficing and an opportunistic attitude to stakeholder engagement.  
The PPP system which exists in Ireland does work, but there is a large margin for 
error due to a lack of transparency and accountability, poor independent oversight and no 
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VFM or post-project reviews. The implication of this is that PPPs may come about which are 
poor VFM and not suitable but exist because of the foregoing. 
Ireland needs to emulate the measures adopted by progressive jurisdictions such as 
Victoria and British Columbia. This will involve making PSB calculations publicly available 
as well as other measures aimed at improving accountability through independent review. 
There is the opportunity perhaps to engage the C&AG in reviewing and publishing post-
project reviews, and this would give greater regard to taxpayer. Ireland needs to ensure an 
active market for PPP with a clear pipeline of projects brought about through political 
commitment. There also needs to be clarity around risk transfer and the legal and regulatory 
framework. Above all else, there needs to be honesty about whether PPP is the best option for 
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Appendix A: Summary of the literature examining the 
Legitimacy, Trust and Capacity of PPP 
Delhi and Mahalingam 2012 write about the key capabilities that need to be present in the institutional 
environment: 
Delhi and Mahalingam (2012): 6 
case studies across different PPP 
sectors 
• Clear rationale 
• Legitimacy 
• Political willingness to initiate projects and to ensure that projects 
deliver their intended benefits 
• Predictability and commitment in decision-making which 
increases credibility of project players and confidence of key 
stakeholders 
• Capacity to develop and monitor projects 
• Advocacy whereby stakeholders are convinced and well-
informed, and an effective communications strategy is evolved 
 
Whereas other authors divide these capabilities into measures under Legitimacy, Trust and Capacity: 
 Legitimacy Trust Capacity 
Jooste et al. (2009) •  Transparency 
• Publicly available 
information 
• Consistency & 
fairness in applying 
legal & regulatory 
frameworks 
• Providing a stable 
political environment 
• Conducting 




Instead of “Trust” the 
article discusses 
“Balancing interests”: 
• Public sector vs 
private sector 
• Private sector vs civic 
sector 
• Public sector vs civic 
sector 
• Centralised PPP unit 
• Strong and vibrant 
market of infrastructure 
providers to ensure 
competition and quality 
work 
• Government guarantees 
or direct financial support 
• Engagement of general 
public in the PPP process 
• Improving the 
objectivity and 
independence of the media 
• Developing norms of 
information sharing and 
participation in the 
decision-making procedure 
Delhi et al. (2010): 11 
case studies across 
infrastructure projects 
in India 





commitments can be 
quickly enforced 
• Capacity to 
appropriately select and 
structure projects is high 
  
Matos-Castaño (2011): 
see Matos-Castaño et 
al. (2012) below 
• Clear rationale for 
PPPs including expected 
benefits and in conditions 
where they are preferred 
to traditional 
infrastructure 
- Policy guidelines 
- Indicators to identify 
potential projects for PPP 
- Standard operating 
procedures 
• Public sector 
predictability 
- Sound policies that 
lay down clear objectives 
and principles 
- Transparency and 
fairness during project 
procurement and 
selection 
- Predictability in 
decision-making by 
• Public sector capacity 
- In house PPP 
knowledge 
- Training programs and 
workshops 
- Guidance notes 
• Risk and financing 
mechanism 




 Legitimacy Trust Capacity 
• Political willingness 
- Ensure programme 
solidity 
- Predictability of 
decision-making  
- Support at a high 
political level (political 
champion) 





and acts as an adviser 
• Advocacy 







- Constant consultation 
with all stakeholders at 
every stage 
- Consultation with 
potential bidders and 
partners  
- Informal feedback 
from the market during 
the preparation stage is 
convenient 
developing transparent, 
well documented and 
consistent policy-making  
- Carrying out the 
project in a transparent 
manner  
- Competitive bidding 
process 
- Making information 
readily available for 
everyone interested 
- Involving the public 
in the consultation 
processes 




- Standard dispute 
resolution mechanisms 
- Cooperation 
platforms by using 
contracts to put emphasis 
on helping business to 
comply with rules and 
become real partners 
• Private sector 
commitment 
- Project contracts and 
structures should be 
planned to enforce 
private sector 
commitment to provide 
service quality at a cost 
- Contracts should be 
enforceable and based on 
clear laws 
- Type of contract 
- State support funding 
• Private sector capacity 
enhancement 
- Competitive bidding 
- Cooperation 
Matos-Castaño et al. 
(2012): longitudinal 
approach in two 
countries (Netherlands 
and India) over time 
and analysed the 
impact at three 
different points in time 
(1st, 2nd & 3rd stage). 
Each point represents 
a road project. There 
are 4 case studies in 




• Giving strategic 
information 
• Providing a stable 
political environment 
• Actions that promote 
the willingness of public 
and private actors to 
engage in PPPs 
• Political champion 
• Project portfolio 
• PPP policies 
• Public consultation 




• Guidance Documents 
- Project preparation 
and identification 
guidelines 
- Standard documents 
- Model contract 
- Project development 
responsibility 










- Project monitoring 
• Public sector capacity
  
- In-house PPP 
knowledge 
- Training 
programs/workshops            
- Cross project 
knowledge 
- Guidance notes 
• Risk and financing 
mechanisms 
- Standard risk allocation 
mechanisms 
- Type of contract 
- State support funding 
• Private sector capacity 
enhancement  
- Competitive bidding 
- Cooperation 




 Legitimacy Trust Capacity 
- Cooperation 
platforms 
Matos-Castaño et al. 
(2014): two case 
studies (Netherlands 
and India). They 
evaluated 4 different 
projects in each 
location at different 
points in time that 
were comparable with 
projects in the other 
location at around the 
same point in time. 
• Creating transparent 
procurement procedures 
• Ensuring community 
involvement and 
acceptance of PPPs 
• Providing a stable 
political environment 
• Predictable, equitable 
and transparent project 
award procedures 
• Creation of 
coordination agencies 
• Documenting 
experiences and providing 
training programs 
• Providing appropriate 
risk and financing 
mechanisms to effectively 
award and govern PPP 
projects 
 
Verhoest et al. (2015) • Supportive political 




• Clear regulations  
• Standards 
• Clear roles of public 
actors 
• Ex-ante evaluation 
• Expertise centralisation 
at different levels 
• Dedicated units 
• Systems for learning 
and knowledge diffusion 







Appendix B:  Key documents brought into Nvivo  
Dáil Éireann Committee of Public Accounts 
• First Interim Report, 2007, Access to the Private Element of Public Private 
Partnerships – An International Comparison 
• 6 December 2012 
• 13 December 2012 
• 15 May 2014 
• 29 May 2014 
• 21 July 2016 
 
Dáil Éireann Budgetary Oversight Committee 
• 17 January 2017 
• 28 March 2017 
 
Dáil Éireann Joint Committee on Housing, Planning, Community and Local Government 
• 9 March 2007 
 
Dáil Éireann Joint Committee on Finance, Public Expenditure and Reform, and Taoiseach 
• 4 May 2017 
 
Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government 
• A Policy Framework for Public Private Partnership (PPP) in Ireland, Evolution of PPP 
Policy in Ireland, November 2003 
 
Courts Service documents 
• Post Project Review, Criminal Courts of Justice Complex, Mazars, October 2012 
 
National Development Finance Agency Annual Reports 
• 2003 - 2014 
 
Irish Government Capital Plans 
• National Development Plan 2000 – 2006 
• National Development Plan 2007 – 2013 
• Building on Recover: Infrastructure and Capital Investment 2016 – 2021, Department 
of Public Expenditure and Reform, September 2015 
 
Public Private Partnership policy documents 
• Farrell Grant Sparks and Goodbody Economic Consultants in association with 
Chesterton Consulting, ‘A report submitted to the Inter-Departmental Group in 
relation to Public Private Partnerships’, July 1998 
• Framework for Public Private Partnerships, ‘Working together for quality public 
service’, Department of Finance, November 2001 
• Public Private Partnership National Communications Strategy, Department of Finance, 
2002 
• Policy Framework for Public Private Partnership (PPP) in Ireland ‘Evolution of PPP 
Policy in Ireland’, Department of Environment, Heritage an Local Government, 
November 2003 




• Department of Finance Circular 18/2007, Minute of the Minister for Finance on the 
Committee of Public Accounts - First Interim Report 2007, Access to the Private 
Element of Public Private Partnerships - An International Comparison 
 
Comptroller and Auditor General reports 
• Annual Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General, 2002 
• Report on Value for Money Examination, The Grouped Schools Pilot Partnership 
Project, June 2004 
• Annual Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General 2006 
• Annual Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General 2008 
• Annual Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General 2011 
• Annual Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General 2012 
• Annual Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General 2013 
 
Business and Union reports 
• Irish Congress of Trade Unions, ‘Guidelines for unions on consultations with State 
Agencies and Public Authorities in Ireland concerning Public Private Partnerships’, 
May 2005 
• Irish Business and Employers Confederation, Public Private Partnerships Lifting the 
barriers, advancing the programme’, 2007  
• Report for the IBEC Public Private Partnership Council from CIPA, 2007 
• Irish Business and Employers Confederation, ‘Public- Private Partnerships Delivering 
During Recession’, An IBEC PPP Council Report, January 2009 
• Irish Business and Employers Confederation, ‘What next for Infrastructure?  
Infrastructure Insights for Ireland’, 2011 
• Irish Congress of Trade Unions, ‘Delivering Growth & Jobs Funding a major new 
investment programme’, Summer 2012 
 
Education documents 
• Teachers Union of Ireland News, Vol. 30/No. 2, November 2007 
 
UK Private Finance Initiative documents 
• National Audit Office, ‘A Framework for evaluating the implementation of Private 
Finance Initiative projects: Volume 1’, 15 May 2006 
• National Audit Office, ‘Private Finance Projects, a paper for The Lords economic 
affairs committee’, October 2009 
• National Audit Office, ‘Financing PFI projects in the credit crisis and the Treasury’s 
response’, 27 July 2010 
• HM Treasury, ‘The Green Book Appraisal and Evaluation in Central Government’, 
July 2011 




Appendix C: Interview questions appropriate to the public sector 
and adapted for the civic sector 
(1) What is your position in the public sector? 
(2)  How many years have you worked here? 
(3) Can you tell me a little about your dealings with PPP? 
Develop supportive legal framework and apply consistently 
(4) Do you think a clear legal and regulatory framework been established? E.g. PPP unit, 
PPP legislation, standardised contracts and documents 
(5) How well do you think the PPP legal framework works? Is it too prescriptive? 
(6) Do you think that these frameworks and policies been applied consistently? Are they 
coherent? 
(7) Do you think that the legal capacity to handle PPPs has been developed? E.g. have 
lawyers and judges been trained or are they up to speed?  
(8) If a contract needs to be changed to accommodate change or a rebalancing of interests 
is this possible? 
Provide political commitment 
(9) Is there strong political support to PPP? At what level does it manifest itself? 
(10) Do you think there is anyone on the political stage driving the PPP agenda? Who is 
that? 
(11)  Has the nature of political commitment to PPP changed over time? 
(12) Do you think there are any key political risks in terms of PPP? If so, what are they? 
Gain buy-in from key constituents 
(13) Who would you see as the key stakeholders involved in PPP? 
(14) Has there been support from those key stakeholders for the concept of PPPs? What 
shape did this support take? 
(15) Do you think the objectives of all stakeholders in PPP have been identified and met?  
Improve public sector knowledge of PPPs 
(16) Has adequate training on PPP been provided to public sector staff?  
(17) If so, what type of training has taken place? 
(18)  Do you know whether any lessons learnt from previous PPP experience have been 
communicated within the public sector? [e.g. documented failure of PPPs in Mexico in 
1990s and Benefits Agency and Passport Agency in the UK] 
(19)  What guidance material published do you find useful? 
(20) What was the outcome of pilot projects? Were any lessons learnt that informed the 
roll-out of future projects? 
Develop market of private providers  
(21) What PPP projects have you worked on? 
(22) Is the PPP programme credible to the market and does it attract strong market interest?  
(23)  Is there a strong domestic capital market from which to borrow? E.g. Irish Banks 
(24) When the public sector commission PPPs, do you know if they assess early on in the 
process the feasibility of the project in terms of sufficient market interest to raise 
finance for the project? 
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(25) Has anything been done to reduce the cost and length of time of PPP procurement to 
the public and private sectors? What were the most useful? 
(26) What actions have been taken to sustain state credibility? 
Establish a PPP unit 
(27) Does the NDFA 27provide leadership in the PPP process? 
(28) Does the NDFA have a role to play in policy development? 
(29) How do the NDFA interact with stakeholders? [such as Departments, C&AG] 
(30) In terms of recruitment in the NDFA: 
-where do staff come from? 
- what would their career path be typically? 
- are they specialised? 
- are they paid retention fees? 
(31) Does the NDFA separate policy from practice to avoid the danger of it becoming a 
promoter of PPPs? 
(32) Does the  NDFA run procurements as well as provide advisory work?  
Coordinate deal flow 
(33) Who decides on what projects should be pursued? 
(34) Do the political preferences enter into PPP decisions? 
(35) Is the pipeline of projects well managed to avoid ‘bunching’?  
(36) Is there clear communication of upcoming projects to market? [this benefits the 
sponsor as it will highlight any potential project clashes] 
(37) Is information on project timing given early so that bidders are able to allocate 
resources appropriately and prioritise projects? 
Improve programme transparency 
(38) How good is transparency in PPP programs? 
(39) Is transparency in PPP programs a good thing? 
(40) Have the NDFA a clearly defined mandate and policy on performance oversight?  
(41) Has the basis on which the proposals are evaluated been made public?  
(42) Are all interested competitors informed in advance of projects, how suppliers are 
evaluated and what criteria are used to award contracts? 
(43)  Are detailed records kept of how contract are awarded? 
(44) Are these records available to interested parties? [media, unions, citizens, investors] 
Ensure quality of projects 
(45) What aspects of PPP are of a higher (or lower) quality than traditionally procured 
projects? [through government funding] 
(46) How accurately do PPP projects reflect social and economic need? Is there a social 
and economic need for PPP projects? 
(47) What role does political opinion play in choosing projects? 
(48) Are PPP projects of sufficient size to interest international financiers and concession 
companies?  
(49) Are strong private consortium been selected? 
                                                 
27 NDFA: centre of PPP expertise; agent for state authorities for PPP procurement; Issues VFM opinions on 




(50) Are all risks been identified early in the project?  
(51) Has the optimum sharing of risk transfer between the public and private partners been 
achieved in PPP projects to date?  
(52) What risks are the private partners better able to control? What risks are the 
government better able to control?  
(53) Is there good project management and contract management on all projects?  
(54) Have any steps been taken to increase the flexibility28 of PPP contracts e.g. has the 
government the right to modify the construction or operational specifications of the 
contract?  
(55) In your experience how difficult were negotiations around quality issues? 
Keep Line Agency discretion in check 
(56) How does one mitigate against the risk of Departments/NDFA29 making unrealistic 
commitments on behalf of government? 
(57) How does the procuring Department or NDFA ensure the quality of project as it is 
developed? Or does it? 
Monitor behaviour of private providers 
(58) Is there a complaints and arbitration procedure for both sides?  
(59) Does it work? 
Increase programme accountability 
(60) Are performance assessment and measurement of PPPs set out in contracts and are 
they monitored?  
(61) Does this continue after the contract is concluded?  
Management support to public sector agencies on specific projects 
(62) Do the NDFA provide technical advice and support on specific projects?  
(63) Are external advisors hired where necessary to fill the skill gap?  
Ensure PPP projects promote the public interest 
(64) Have PPPs helped to improve public services and infrastructure? 
(65) Are the right PPPs being built e.g. schools being built in the right place? Social 
housing – only in the Dublin region? 
Ensure fairness of PPP procurement 
(66) Are you satisfied with the integrity of the project? 
(67) Has the selection and award criteria been neutral and fair to all bidders? 
(68) Has an avenue for complaint to an independent tribunal been provided for?  
(69) Have non-discriminatory rules to improve competition been included?  
                                                 
28 Particularly in healthcare – new technologies – may not be relevant in roads and schools. 
29 Line agencies such as government agencies/departments.  
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Appendix D: Interview questions appropriate to the private sector 
(1) What is your position in the company? 
(2) How many years have you worked here? 
(3) Can you tell me a little about your dealings with PPP? 
Develop supportive legal framework and apply consistently 
(4) Do you think a clear legal and regulatory framework been established? E.g. PPP unit, PPP 
legislation, standardised contracts and document 
(5) Do you think that these frameworks and policies have been applied consistently? Are they 
coherent? 
Provide political commitment 
(6) Is there strong political commitment to PPP? At what level does it manifest itself? 
(7) Do you think there are any key political risks in terms of PPP? If so, what are they? 
Gain buy-in from key constituents 
(8) Who would you see as the key stakeholders involved in PPP? 
(9) Has there been buy-in from those key stakeholders for the concept of PPPs?  
(10) Do all the stakeholders want the same thing from the PPP? 
Improve public sector knowledge of PPPs 
(11) Do you think there is adequate public sector understanding of and expertise in PPPs?  
(12) If so, has it increased/improved over the years? 
(13) How has this been achieved? 
(14) If no, how might this be achieved? 
Develop market of private providers 
(15) What PPP projects have you worked on? 
(16) Is the PPP programme credible to the market and does it attract strong market interest?  
(17) Do you think that the right actions have been taken to attract private investment, including 
developing the domestic capital market? 
(18) Have guidance materials for the use and benefit of the private sector been published?  
(19) Has anything been done to reduce the cost and length of time of PPP procurement to the 
public and private sectors? What were the most useful? 
Establish a PPP unit 
(20) What is the role of a PPP advisory unit such as the NDFA? 
(21) Does the NDFA provide leadership in the PPP process? 
(22) Should it have a role to play in policy development? 
(23) How do the NDFA interact with the private sector?  
(24) How well do you work with the NDFA? 
Coordinate deal flow 
(25) Is the pipeline of projects well managed to avoid ‘bunching’?  
(26) Is there clear communication of upcoming projects to market? [this benefits the sponsor as 
it will highlight any potential project clashes] 
(27) Is information on project timing given early so that bidders are able to allocate resources 
appropriately and prioritise projects?  




(29) Do you think that this could be improved? 
Improve programme transparency 
(30) How good is transparency in PPP programs? 
(31) Is there enough or too much transparency? 
(32) Are all interested competitors informed in advance of projects, how bidders are evaluated 
and what criteria are used to award contracts? 
(33) Has the basis on which the proposals are evaluated been made public?  
Ensure quality of projects 
(34) How are PPP projects identified? 
(35) What aspects of PPP are of a higher (or lower) quality than traditionally procured 
projects? [through government funding] 
(36) Have strong private consortium been selected?  
(37) Are all the risks identified early in the project?  
(38) What risks are the private partners better able to control? What risks are the government 
better able to control?  
(39) Is there good project management and contract management on all projects? 
(40) Have clear contract clauses for ‘step-in’30 rights been provided?  
(41) Have minimum acceptable performance levels and response times to fix deficiencies been 
established?  
(42) Have clear contract clauses for ‘step-in’ rights been provided?  
Implement independent oversight of project development and execution 
(43) Who carries out the oversight? E.g. monitoring authority or auditor 
(44) How satisfied are you with this? Can it be improved? 
(45) Do they report to anyone who might have an interest in their work? How is this done?  
(46) Are the results published?  
Provide Government support for private providers 
(47) How can government provide support for private providers or encourage the private 
sector? E.g. is a clear pipeline of projects visible? 
(48) Does the government ensure ‘even-handed’ regulation (ie avoid over regulation)?  
Keep Line Agency discretion in check 
(49) What is the line of responsibility in PPP decision-making? 
Ask union: are there projects being perused that don’t meet the PPP standards because there is 
no alternative? 
(50) Who are the key decision-makers? 
Monitor behaviour of private providers 
(51) Is there a complaints and arbitration procedure for both sides?  
(52) Does it work? 
Increase programme accountability 
(53) Do the NDFA carry out evaluations after the project is up and running?  
                                                 
30 Step-in rights: For example under concession contracts lenders ask to be given ‘step in’ rights. This allows the 
lender to take over the project, and if necessary bring in a substitute concessionaire, in order to forestall a 
termination of the concession agreement following the concessionaire’s default. The main purpose of ‘stepping-
in’ is to avoid a collapse of the agreement of the concessionaire and the basis by which the ender is repaid 
(UNECE 2008 p32). 
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(54) Do you know if there are plans to carry out evaluations after the contract has ended? 
Ensure PPP projects promote the public interest 
(55) Have PPPs helped to improve public services and infrastructure? 
Ensure fairness of PPP procurement 
(56) Have recognised procurement practices (competition) been followed to avoid conflicts of 
interest?  
(57) Has the selection and award criteria been neutral and fair to all bidders?  
(58) Has an avenue for complaint to an independent tribunal been provided for?  





Appendix E 31: Codebook\\Phase 2 - Generating Initial Codes  
Phase 2 – 513 initial codes 
developed 






Aberdeen Asset Management Reference to Aberdeen being part of the consortia 1 1 
Accommodation projects Reference to accommodation type PPP projects 1 1 
Accountability Reference to contract accountability within PPP 4 16 
Accounting for PPPs Reference to how PPPs are accounted for by DPER 1 3 
Advisors Reference to Advisors in PPP 1 1 
Alternative dispute resolution 
process 
Reference to the ADR process in PPP contracts 1 5 
Alternatives to PPP References to alternatives to PPP 5 13 
Alternatives to PPP (2) Reference to DPERs attitude to alternatives to PPP 1 1 
Amber Reference to Amber 3 10 
AMP Reference to AMP 1 1 
Anti-private sector risks Reference to anti-private sector risks 1 4 
Appeals Reference to appeals in PPP 4 4 
Applegreen Reference to Applegreen 1 1 
Arbitration Reference to arbitration in PPP 3 7 
Archaeological issues References to archaeological issues with projects 2 3 
Attitude to PPP Reference to public sector attitude to PPP 3 13 
Attitude to PPP (2) Reference to DPERs attitude to PPP 2 11 
Attracting bidders Reference to attracting bidders 12 78 
Attracting private investment Reference to whether the right actions are taken by 
government to attract private investment, including 
developing the domestic capital market 
7 24 
Availability risk Reference to availability risk in PPP 3 6 
Aviva Reference to Aviva as an independent investor 1 1 
Awareness of PPP projects Reference to the awareness of interviewees to PPP projects 
prior to working on this policy 
1 1 
Awareness of PPPs successes and 
failures 
Reference to the awareness of PPP success and failures 
elsewhere 
2 5 
Balance of risks Reference to the balancing of risks 1 1 
Balfour Beatty Reference to Balfour Beatty 1 3 
BAM Reference to BAM 7 24 
BAM (2) Reference to BAM being a key stakeholder in PPP 1 1 
Banking competition Reference to banking competition held as a separate 
competition post-crisis 
2 8 
                                                 
31 Codebook -Phase 2 – Generating Initial Coding (Open Coding) involved deconstructing the data from its 
original chronology into an initial set of non-hierarchical codes 
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Phase 2 – 513 initial codes 
developed 






Banking competition (2) Reference to banking competition as a separate 
competition 
1 5 
Banks Reference to Banks 3 13 
Banks (2) Reference to the Banks being key stakeholders 4 4 
Benchmarking Reference to benchmarking in contracts 2 11 
Benchmarking and market testing Reference to benchmarking and market testing in the 
context of transparency 
3 3 
Benchmarking market testing Reference to how services can be benchmarked and market 
tested 
1 10 
Benchmarking schedule in 
contracts 
Reference to benchmarking schedule built into contracts 1 2 
Benefit to private providers Reference to what's in it for the private sector 2 4 
Benefits to the community Reference to benefits of PPP to the community 1 1 
Bid costs and length of time Reference to whether the cost and length of time of PPP 
procurement to the public and private sector has been 
reduced 
13 73 
Bid evaluation criteria Reference to  whether all interested competitors are 
informed in advance of projects, how bidders are evaluated 
and what criteria are used to award contracts 
12 29 
Bid opening References to the NDFA and opening bids 4 14 
Bid process Reference to transparency in the bidding process 4 20 
Bidders Reference to bidders being stakeholders in PPP 2 6 
Bidding stage Reference to the bidding stage of PPP 8 44 
Bilfinger Reference to Bilfinger 1 2 
Board of NDFA References to the board of the NDFA 1 12 
Bond market Reference to the bond market 1 2 
Brexit Reference to the affect Brexit may have on the PPP 
programme 
1 3 
Brian Murphy Reference to Brian Murphy of the NDFA 3 8 
Build risk Reference to build risk in PPP 2 3 
Building infrastructure Reference to building infrastructure as a reason for PPP 6 14 
Bunching of projects References to bunching of projects 7 18 
Business Case Reference to the business case stage of PPP 2 8 
C&AG Reference to the Comptroller and Auditor General 6 16 
Cancelled projects Reference to cancelled projects 9 28 
Capital Plan Reference to the 2015 Capital Plan 2 2 
CCJ Reference to the Criminal Courts of Justice PPP 8 43 
Certainty Reference to how PPP offers certainty 1 2 
Champions of PPP Reference to champions of PPP in government 
Departments 
1 4 
Change in funding post-crisis Reference to how funding of PPP has changed post-crisis 1 2 
Change of government  4 4 
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Phase 2 – 513 initial codes 
developed 






Change of law risk Reference to how risks are identified and allocated 3 7 
Change of Technology risk References to changes in technology and how they are 
dealt with in PPP contracts 
2 2 
Changes to policy Reference to policy changes made to accommodate PPP 1 1 
Changing contracts Reference to changing contracts 2 6 
Cheaper Reference to PPP being cheaper 2 2 
CIF Reference to the Construction Industry Federation 1 2 
Commercial Sensitivity Reference to commercial sensitivity in relation to 
transparency 
9 28 
Commitment to PPP  2 3 
Common factor Reference to how the NDFA are the common factor on all 
PPPs 
1 2 
Competition in the market Reference to competition in the market of private providers 1 7 
Competitive dialogue Reference to competitive dialogue 1 3 
Competitive dialogue (2) Reference to competitive dialogue in PPP 2 4 
Complaints Reference to complaints made about PPPs 2 2 
Complexity of PPP process References to how complex the PPP process is 1 1 
Complexity of PPPs Reference to complexity of PPPs 2 2 
Compliance Reference to compliance in PPPs 1 2 
Concert Hall Reference to the Concert Hall PPP 2 3 
Concession References to the role of the NDFA in concession type 
projects 
1 3 
Concession (2) Reference to a concession 2 7 
Concession type projects References to the regulatory framework and concession 
type projects 
1 1 
Confidentiality Reference to interviewees who were not privy to all 
information due to bid confidentiality 
5 9 
Consistency of design Reference to replication and consistency of design in PPP 1 1 
Consortia Reference to the Consortia in PPP 2 13 
Construction staff Reference to finding construction staff immediately post-
crisis 
1 1 
Construction stage Reference to the construction stage of PPP 2 2 
Consultants Reference to the use of Consultants or outside experts in 
the NDFA 
8 20 
Consultation with bidders Reference to consultations sessions between the NDFA and 
bidders 
4 11 
Consultation with stakeholders Reference to consultation with stakeholders on PPP 
projects 
4 8 
Consulting with DPER References to consultations with DPER 1 2 
Contract creep risk Reference to the risk of contract creep 1 2 
Contract failures Reference to contract failures within a PPP 3 14 
Contract management Reference to contract management in PPP 2 3 
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Contract obligations Reference to contract obligations 4 5 
Contract oversight Reference to contract oversight in PPP 2 6 
Contractor insolvency documents Reference to a standard contractor insolvency document 1 1 
Contractors going out of business Reference to contractors going out of business 1 3 
Convention Centre Reference to the Convention Centre PPP 2 53 
Carillion Reference to Carillion 1 1 
Cork School of Music References made to the Cork School of Music 4 9 
Creditability of PPP programme Reference to whether the PPP programme is credible to the 
market and does it attract strong market interest 
7 28 
D&C Co Reference to D&C Co 1 6 
DB Reference to projects that are design/build 3 6 
DBFO Reference to design, build, finance and operate type of PPP 3 5 
DBO Reference to Design, Build and Operate contracts 1 6 
Debate over PPP Reference to reasons for PPP and the debate over PPP 6 16 
Debate over PPP (2) Reference to reasons for PPP and the debate over PPP 4 7 
Debriefing of failed bidders Reference to debriefing of failed bidders 6 16 
Debt funders Reference to debt funders 2 3 
Deciding on what to bid on Reference to how the private sector decide on what to bid 
on 
2 9 
Decision-making Reference to how DEPER make decisions on budget 
allocations 
6 24 
Decision to go PPP route Reference to transparency on the decision to go the PPP 
route rather than traditional procurement 
1 2 
Delivering the project Reference to the delivery of PPPs 7 11 
Delivery of public services References to the delivery of public services by the private 
sector 
1 1 
Department of Education Reference to Dept of Education 6 18 
Department of Environment References to the involvement of the Department of 
Environment in the PPP process 
4 6 
Department of Finance References to Dept of Finance 9 13 
Department of Health References to the Department of Health 1 3 
Department of Justice References to Dept of Justice and PPPs 2 17 
Department of Public Expenditure 
and Reform 
References to DEPOR 0 0 
Department of Tourism Reference to the Dept of Tourism 1 2 
Department of Transport References to the Department of Transport 4 6 
DEPFRA Reference to DEPFRA 1 1 
Design and Construction Reference to design and construction in PPP 4 8 
Design risk Reference to design risks associated with PPP 3 6 
Design Stage Reference to the role of the NDFA in the design stage 4 14 
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Detail in contracts Reference to the level of detail in contracts 2 6 
Developing policy Reference to how policy is developed 1 1 
Dispute resolution procedure Reference to dispute resolution procedure 7 18 
Domestic Banks Reference to domestic banks involved in PPP funding 5 12 
DOP Process Reference to DOP process 1 1 
DPER rules Reference to DPER spreading rules 1 2 
Dragados Reference to Dragados 2 2 
Dublin City Council Reference to Dublin City Council 1 2 





Reference to the reason for bringing in PPP, that is to 
ensure Ireland has the infrastructure to compete 
2 2 
Economic issues Reference to economic issues with PPP 2 2 
Education projects Reference to education projects 11 65 
Efficiencies References to the efficiencies of doing business in a 
functional building 
2 3 
EIB References to EIB 2 4 
Enabling policy Reference to how the NDFA enable PPP policy 1 2 
End of contract stage Reference to the end of the PPP contract and what happens 
to the asset 
2 3 
Engagement with the public Reference to engagement with the public 1 4 
Environment Waste projects References to Environment Waste projects 3 7 
Environment Water projects Reference to Environment/Water projects 2 9 
EPEC Reference to the European PPP Expertise Centre 1 1 
Equity Funders Reference to attracting equity funders 3 9 
Equity funders (2) Reference to equity funders as stakeholders in PPP 1 1 
European Commission References to DPERs interaction with the EU 1 1 
Expertise Reference to expertise in the NDFA 3 8 
Facilities risk Reference to facilitates risk in PPP 2 3 
Failure of performance of service 
risks 
References to failure of performance of service risks 1 1 
Failure to deliver a programme 
risk 
Reference to the governments failure to deliver a PPP 
programme as a risk 
1 1 
Fairness Reference to fairness in PPP process 5 20 
Familiarity with Irish Market Reference to private providers who are familiar with the 
Irish market 
3 16 
Fatima Mansions References to Fatima Mansions PPP 1 1 
Feedback to bidders Reference to transparency in relation to feedback to 
bidders 
1 3 
Ferrovial Reference to Ferrovial 2 2 
Finance risks References to finance risk in PPP 4 4 
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Financial Advisors Reference to the NDFA being financial advisors on PPP 
projects 
6 13 
Financial crisis Reference to the NDFA during the financial crisis 1 1 
Financial Statements Reference to financial statements 1 1 
Finding funders Reference to how the NDFA find PPP funders 2 6 
Finding projects Reference to the role of the NDFA in finding projects 3 6 
Fixed cost procurement Reference to how PPP is a fixed cost procurement method 1 2 
Freedom of information Reference to interviewees mentioning FOI with regard to 
transparency 
5 15 
Funders Reference to the role of the funders in PPP 2 5 
Funding competition Reference to funding competitions after selection of the 
preferred bidder 
2 6 
Funding reasons Reference to how the government identified projects due to 
funding issues 
8 26 
Future projects Reference to future projects which could be built through 
PPP 
1 3 
Garda Stations Reference to Garda Stations PPP 2 9 
General Election References to the 2016 General Election 4 7 
General risks Reference to how risks are dealt with in general 2 5 
Giving bidders a fair chance Reference to giving smaller bidders and bidders who 
haven't bid in the Irish market before a chance 
1 1 
Government Reference to Government being a key stakeholder 6 6 
Government support for private 
providers 
Reference to whether there is government support for 
private providers such as is there a clear pipeline of 
projects visible and does the government ensure even-
handed regulation 
5 10 
Grangegorman Reference to Grangegorman PPP 8 54 
Grangegorman Development 
Agency 
Reference to the GDA being a PPP stakeholder 1 1 
Guidance material Reference to whether guidance materials for the use and 
benefit of the private sector have been published 
5 15 
Guidance Material (2) Reference to guidance material 5 22 
Guidance Material (3) Reference to DPER issuing guidance material 1 1 
Hammond Lane and Court 
Houses 
Reference to Hammond Lane and Court Houses PPP 4 40 
Handover stage Reference to the stage when the building is finished 
construction and is handed over 
1 1 
Health projects Reference to PPP Health projects 5 19 
Hegarty Reference to Hegarty's 1 3 
Help Desk Reference to the use of a help desk in PPPs 1 4 
Heritage buildings References to PPPs and heritage buildings 2 5 
HSE Reference to the HSE 2 2 
ICC Reference to International Convention Centre 1 1 
ICT Risk References to ICT risk in PPP 0 0 
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Idenfication of projects Reference to how PPP projects are identified 3 9 
Ideological reasons Ideological reasons for adopting PPP 3 8 
Ideology Reference to ideology in PPP 1 1 
Improving Quality Reference to whether PPP has improved the quality of 
infrastructure 
10 27 
Independent tester Reference to an independent tester who reviews the PPP 
after construction and before it is handed over to the 
operational stage 
1 1 
Information Commissioner Reference to the NDFA and Information Commissioner in 
relation to transparency 
1 3 
Information Commissioner (2) Reference to Information Commissioner, commercial 
sensitivity and DEPER 
1 3 
Innovation Reference to how difficult it is to price innovation 2 2 
Innovation (2) References to innovation in PPP 4 19 
Institutional money Reference to institutional money 2 8 
Insurance risk Reference to insurance risk 1 1 
Integrity of PPP projects Reference to whether the interviewee believes there is 
integrity in the project 
8 14 
Interaction between private 
providers 
Reference to the possible interaction between private 
providers 
3 6 
Internal audits Reference to monthly internal audits 1 1 
Internal Government reporting Reference to internal government reporting 1 1 
Investment Policy Framework for 
PPPs 
Reference to the Investment Policy Framework for PPPs 1 3 
IOTs Reference to PPPs in the IOT sector 1 3 
IPFA Reference to the IPFA 1 4 
Irish Strategic Infrastructure Fund Reference to the Irish Strategic Infrastructure Fund 
formally the NPRF and part of the NTMA umbrella group 
2 14 
Irish Strategic Investment Fund Reference to the Irish Strategic Investment Fund 1 1 
Irish Water Reference to Irish Water 2 5 
Issues with contracts Reference to any issues with contracts 10 50 
Issues with how bids get marked Reference to issues that the private sector have on how 
bids get marked 
3 13 
Issues with Passport Office Reference to learning from issues with Passport Office in 
UK 
1 1 
Issues with risk transfer Reference to issues with the Irish public sector and risk 
transfer 
6 26 
Issues with risk transfer (2) Reference to issues with risk transfer 4 12 
Jacobs Engineering Reference to Jacobs Engineering 1 1 
Journalists Reference to transparency and journalists 1 1 
Justice projects Reference to justice projects that the interviewee worked 
on 
7 57 
Kajima Reference to Kajima 1 2 
Keeping market informed Reference to how well the NDFA keep the market 
informed 
2 9 
Key stakeholders Reference to who the key stakeholders in PPP are 2 3 
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KPI Reference to measurable KPI in contracts 1 5 
KPMG Reference to the services of KPMG 1 1 
Lack of competition Reference to a lack of competition in the market 1 4 
Land acquisition risk Reference to land acquisition risk 2 2 
Latent defect risks Reference to latent defect risks in projects 2 8 
Leadership Reference to whether the NDFA provides leadership in 
PPP 
6 15 
Leadership (2) References to the leadership that the Dept of Finance 
provide in PPP 
2 2 
Leadership (3) Reference to the leadership that DEPOR provide in PPP 5 15 
Learning by doing Reference to learning by doing 12 34 
Learning by DPER References to learning by DPER 1 2 
Learning from Australia Reference to learning from Australia 2 2 
Learning from Canada Reference to learning from Canadian PPPs 2 2 
Learning from CCJ References to learning from the CCJ 1 2 
Learning from Commonwealth 
law countries 
Reference to learning from Commonwealth law countries 1 2 
Learning from early projects Reference to learning from early PPP projects 8 31 
Learning from France Reference to learning from France 2 2 
Learning from Germany Reference to lessons learnt from Germany 1 1 
Learning from Northern Ireland References to experiences learnt from NI PPP projects 4 6 
Learning from Portugal Reference to learning from Portugal 1 1 
Learning from PPP Steering 
Committee 
Reference to learning from the PPP Steering Committee 1 2 
Learning from private sector Reference to people who were previouslyin the private 
sector and learnt from there 
1 1 
Learning from Scotland Reference to learning from Scotland 4 18 
Learning from Spain Reference to learning from Spain 2 2 
Learning from UK References to policy learning from UK 12 58 
Learning from UNECE References to learning from UNECE 1 1 
Learning from US Reference to learning from US 2 4 
Learning internationally References to learning from international PPPs 3 7 
Learning on the job Reference to public sector staff learning on the job 2 2 
Learning post-crisis Reference to learning post-crisis 1 2 
Legal advisers Reference to legal advisers being stakeholders of PPP 2 2 
Legal Advisors Reference to the NDFA and legal advisors 3 3 
Legal challanges Reference to legal challenges 4 8 
Level of service Reference to the level of service provided by PPP 3 5 
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Life cycle costs Reference to life cycle costs in PPP 2 8 
Line Agency discretion Reference to what is the line of responsibility in PPP 
decision-making and who are the key decision-makers 
1 2 
Liquidation Reference to private contractors who went into liquidation 
during the bust 
1 1 
Litigation in the bidding process Reference to the opening of bids and potential for suing 3 8 
Load risk Reference to load risk in Poolbeg PPP 1 1 
Lobbying DPER by NDFA References to the lobbying of DOER by the NDFA 1 1 
Local Authorities References to local authorities 3 6 
Local Community Reference to PPP accountability to the local community 1 2 
Local construction companies Reference to local construction companies bidding on 
projects 
2 5 
Luas Reference to the Luas project 1 1 
Maintenance provider Reference to maintenance providers 3 9 
Maintenance risk Reference to maintenance risk in PPP 5 5 
Making unrealistic commitments Reference to whether the NDFA make unrealistic 
commitments on behalf of government 
2 5 
Managing contracts Reference to managing contracts 2 5 
Maritime College References made to Maritime College 2 4 
Market Reference to the Market as being a key stakeholder in PPP 1 1 
Market Participant Reference to a market participant (someone close to the 
market) 
1 8 
Market post-crisis Reference to the market of private providers post-crisis 1 20 
Market pre-crisis Reference to the market of private providers pre-crisis 1 3 
Market testing Reference to market testing in contracts 1 3 
McCanns Reference to the legal advisors McCanns 1 1 
McQuarry References to McQuarry 5 10 
McQuarry (2) Reference to McQuarry being a stakeholder in PPP 1 1 
Meet the Buyer events Reference to meet the buyer events held by the NDFA 1 2 
Meetings with NDFA Reference to meetings the private sector have with the 
NDFA 
1 3 
Merger with TII  7 37 
Metro West project Reference to Metro West project 3 9 
Minister for Education Reference to the Minister for Education 1 1 
Minister for Transport Reference to the Minister for Transport 1 1 
Mistrust between public and 
private 
Reference to mistrust between public and private sectors 1 1 
Mitchell McDermott Reference to Mitchell McDermott who are project 
managers involved with PPP 
1 9 
Monitoring Reference to monitoring of performance 1 3 
Monitoring Committee Reference to DPER and Monitoring Committee of PPPs 1 1 
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Monte Carol risk analysis Reference to Monte Carlo risk analysis 1 1 
Mortgage Reference to interviewees calling a PPP a mortgage 2 6 
Motorway Service Stations Reference to Motorway Services Stations built through 
PPP 
1 1 
NAMA Reference to NAMA 1 3 
National Partnership Agreement Reference to the National Partnership Agreement and PPP 1 4 
NDFA (2) Reference to the NDFA being a key stakeholder 4 7 
NDFA (3) Reference to NDFA and Transparency 9 27 
NDFA (4) Reference made by DPER to NDFA 1 31 
NDFA and fairness Reference to NDFA and fairness of the PPP process 5 7 
NDFA staff and recruitment Reference to where the staff of the NDFA come from 10 43 
NDFA training Reference to training given by the NDFA and training of 
their staff 
5 9 
NEC Reference to the NEC Birmingham 1 9 
Negotiation Reference to negotiation when there are problems in 
contracts 
1 2 
Negotiation over risks References to negotiation over risks 2 4 
Negotiation stage Reference to the contract negotiation stage 3 4 
New Era Reference to New Era 1 3 
Non-conforming Node Reference to interview dialogue which cannot be coded to 
any nodes 
4 24 
Nordel B Reference to Nordel B 1 1 
NTMA Reference to the National Treasury Management Agency 6 10 
O&M Co Reference to O&M Co 1 10 
O'Devaney Gardens Reference to O'Devaney Gardens 1 1 
Office of Government 
Procurement 
 1 2 
On Off Balance Sheet Reference to the reasons for bringing in PPP 8 18 
Only game in town Reference to PPPs being the only game in town 1 2 
Only show in town Reference to how PPP is the only show in town 1 1 
Operational reports Reference to operational reports 4 8 
Operational risks References to operational risks in PPP 2 9 
OPW Reference to PPP accountability to OPW 1 14 
OPW (2) References to the OPW and PPP 3 27 
OPW (3) Reference to the OPW being a key stakeholder in PPP 1 2 
OPW (4) Reference to OPW and transparency 1 3 
OPW decentralised offices Reference to OPW decentralised offices 1 2 
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Organogram Reference to a PPP organogram 1 4 
P3 Reference to P3 1 2 
PAC Reference to the Public Accounts Committee 1 5 
Pario Reference to Pario who are the special purpose managers 
of the schools contract 
1 5 
Party best able to manage risk Reference to risks that either the public or private sectors 
are best able to manage 
5 12 
Party preferences for PPP Reference to party preferences for PPP 1 2 
Paying more Reference to how PPP costs more than traditional 
procurement in the long run 
4 4 
Penalties Reference to penalties when there is contract failure within 
PPP 
3 16 
Performance of PPPs Reference to the performance of PPPs 10 46 
Performance points Reference to performance points within PPP contracts 2 6 
Permanent Government Reference to the Permanent Government 1 1 
Prescriptive nature of bidding Reference to how prescriptive bidding has become 2 6 
PFI Reference to PFI in the UK 8 32 
Phase 1 PPP projects Reference to Phase 1 PPP projects post-crisis 1 1 
Phase 3 PPP projects Reference to Phase 3 PPP projects post-crisis 1 8 
Pierce Reference to the building company Pierce 1 1 
Pierce (2) Reference to Pierce being a key stakeholder 1 1 
Pilot projects Reference to pilot PPP projects 3 5 
Pilot Schools project Reference to the schools pilot project 7 11 
Pipeline of projects Reference to how well the project pipeline is managed to 
avoid bunching 
10 57 
Planning permission Reference to how planning permission is put in place 
before going to the market which is a post-crisis feature 
1 3 
Planning risks References to planning risks in PPP 2 3 
Planning Stage References to the planning stage of contracts 1 1 
Planning stage (2) References to planning stage 5 22 
Policy development Reference to whether the NDFA has a role in policy 
development 
8 18 
Policy Transfer Reference to PT as a reason for adopting PPP 2 3 
Policy updates References to policy updates 1 4 
Political announcements Reference to political announcements in PPP 1 1 
Political commitment initially Reference to political commitment for PPP policy initially 
when the policy was being considered 
5 10 
Political commitment post-crisis Reference to political commitment post-crisis 13 64 
Political commitment pre-crisis Reference to political commitment after the policy was 
adopted but before the crisis 
6 14 
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Political frustration Reference to political frustration in the pace of PPPs 1 2 
Political lack of understanding Reference to a political lack of understanding of PPP 1 4 
Political objections References to political objections of PPP 2 3 
Political planning Reference to political planning in Ireland 1 5 
Political preferences Reference to whether political preferences enter into PPP 
decisions 
7 21 
Political preferences (2) Reference to political preferences influencing PPP 5 13 
Political risk Reference to how risks are identified and allocated 4 8 
Political risks Reference to political risks in terms of PPP 5 9 
Political shortsightness Reference to PPP and political shortsightness 4 6 
Poor government planning Reference to PPPs and poor government planning 2 2 
Post-crisis PPP programme Reference to changes that the NDFA made to the post-
crisis PPP programme 
2 2 
Post-Project Reviews Reference to post-project reviews 2 12 
Post-project reviews (2) Reference to post-project reviews 1 7 
PPP Co Reference to PPP Co 8 18 
PPP Legislation Reference to PPP legislation in relation to regulatory 
framework 
6 7 
PPP Lobby Groups Reference to PPP lobby groups before the policy was 
adopted 
1 2 
PPP or nothing or Pragmatism Reference to infrastructure delivery through PPP or not at 
all and pragmatism as a reason for PPP 
4 10 
PPP policy Reference to PPP policy 2 2 
PPP service delivery Reference to PPP service delivery 7 18 
PPP unit Reference to PPP Unit/NDFA in relation to regulatory 
framework 
1 2 
PPP vs Conventional Reference to interviewees who compare PPP vs 
Conventional approach 
11 47 
Pre-award stage Reference to pre-award stage of the PPP process 1 1 
Pre-crisis oversight Reference to independent oversight pre-financial crisis 1 1 
Preferred bidder Reference to preferred bidder 1 2 
Preferred bidder (2) Reference to preferred bidder 1 1 
Preferred bidder (3) Reference to preferred bidder 1 5 
Preferred Bidder Stage Reference to the preferred bidder stage 6 13 
Preferred Tenderer References to preferred tenderers 2 5 
Pre-tender Stage References to the pre-tender stage 2 2 
Primble Reference to Primble who are part of the consortia 1 1 
Private Maintenance Reference to private maintenance as a reason for PPP 4 8 
Problems with PPPs Reference to problems with PPPs 3 9 
Problems with Risk Transfer References made to problems with risk transfer 6 8 
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Process driven References to NDFA being overly process driven 4 16 
Procurement law Reference to procurement law 1 1 
Procuring Departments Reference to procuring departments being key stakeholders 
in PPP 
1 2 
Profit returns to government Reference to the profit returns to the government 1 1 
Profit sharing Reference to profit sharing issues in PFI 2 4 
Project Finance Reference to project finance in PPP 1 1 
Project Managers Reference to project managers in the NDFA and their role 2 5 
Project timing Reference to whether information on project timing is 
given early so that bidders are able to allocate resources 
appropriately and prioritise projects. Also references to 
clear line of sight of PPP projects 
6 26 
Promoting PPP Reference to how the NDFA promote PPP 7 21 
PSB Reference to NDFA and PSB 5 6 
PSB (2) Reference to guidance on PSB 1 3 
PSB (3) References to the Public Sector Benchmark 7 20 
PSB and VFM test References to PSB and VFM testing of PPP 1 13 
PSB update Reference to DPER updating the PSB 1 1 
Public sector preferences Reference to public sector preference for PPP or traditional 
procurement 
2 3 
Public Spending Code Reference to DPER and public spending code 1 1 
Publication Reference to whether the basis on which the proposals are 
evaluated are made public 
3 13 
PWC References to PWC and PPP 2 3 
Quality of materials Reference to quality of materials used in PPP 11 22 
Quality of service Reference to PPPs and quality of service 6 15 
Rebalancing of interests Reference to re-balancing of interests in PPP 5 11 
Re-balancing of interests References to re-balancing of interests in contracts 4 13 
Redacted documents Reference to NDFA redacted documents 1 1 
Redress to Courts Reference to redress to the Courts in disputes 5 9 
Redundancy Reference to redundancy of NDFA staff 1 1 
Refinancing gain share Reference to refinancing gain share in PPP 1 2 
Refurbishment cycle References to refurbishment cycles of PPP buildings 1 1 
Regulation at bidding stage Reference to PPP regulation at the bidding stage 3 4 
Regulatory framework post-crisis Reference to the regulatory framework post-crisis 1 2 
Reinvestment Reference to how PPP results in reinvestment 1 1 
Relationship with public sector References to the relationship between the private 
providers and the public sector 
4 10 
Reports sent to DEPER Reference to reports sent to DEPER 1 1 
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Retention fees Reference to whether the NDFA pay staff retention fees 1 2 
Revenue share Reference to lessons learnt on revenue sharing 1 1 
Review accounts Reference to NDFA reviewing accounts 1 1 
Richard Boyd-Barrett Reference to Richard Boyd-Barrett 1 2 
Rigid Reference to how rigid the NDFA are 2 7 
Risk allocation stage Reference to the risk allocation stage of the PPP process 2 3 
Risk and PSB References to risk and PSB 2 3 
Risk mitigation process Reference to the risk mitigation process 1 2 
Risk registers Reference to risk registers 1 2 
Risk Transfer Reference to NDFA and how they negotiate risk transfer 2 6 
Risk Transfer (2) Reference to risk transfer as a reason for using PPP 4 13 
Risk Workshops Reference to risk workshops 1 2 
Risks Reference to different types of risks 0 0 
Roadbridge Reference to Roadbridge 1 1 
Robertsons Reference to Robertsons 1 1 
Robustness Reference to the robustness of PPPs 1 1 
Role in budget allocation References to the NDFA's role in department budget 
allocations 
1 2 
Role of DPER Reference to the role of DPER in PPP 1 7 
Role of NDFA Reference to the role of the NDFA 14 107 
Rules of engagement Reference to the NDFA reading out rules of engagement at 
meetings with private sector 
1 4 
Scalability Reference to scalability of projects for the private sector 1 1 
Scalability and pipeline Reference to the size and scalability of projects and how 
the pipeline of projects can be too small for the private 
sector 
11 65 
Separating policy from practice Reference to how the NDFA separates policy from practice 
to avoid the danger of it becoming a promoter of PPP 
3 4 
Service desk Reference to a PPP service desk 1 2 
Service reports Reference to transparency in relation to service reports by 
private sector to the public sector 
3 6 
Sharing by Government Depts Reference to transparency in the sharing by Government 
Departments 
1 1 
Sharing knowledge with other 
countries 
References to sharing PPP knowledge with other countries 2 3 
Short-cuts Reference to how PPP companies can take short-cuts 1 2 
SISK Reference to SISK 5 6 
SISK (2) Reference to SISK being a key stakeholder 1 2 
Size of Ireland Reference to the size of Ireland being prohibitive to PPP 1 1 
Slowness of PPP Reference to how slow PPP is 2 11 
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Social benefits Reference to social benefits from building through PPP 1 1 
Social Housing Reference to Social Housing PPPs 5 18 
Sodexo  1 19 
Sovereign risk Reference to sovereign risk 1 3 
Special Purpose Vehicle Reference to SPV 2 7 
Specifications Reference to detailed specifications given to bidders 5 10 
Speed of PPP Reference to the speed of the whole PPP process 5 9 
Spending caps Reference to spending caps put on PPPs by DPER 1 2 
Staff mobility Reference to whether staff move from private to public 
sector and vice-versa 
3 6 
Stakeholder buy-in Reference to stakeholder buy-in into the PPP concept 2 4 
Stakeholders needs Reference to whether all the stakeholders want the same 
thing from PPP 
8 12 
Stakeholders opinion on 
transparency 
Reference to stakeholders opinion on transparency 8 24 
Stakeholders opinions Reference to the interviewees perception of stakeholdes 
opinion of PPP 
6 22 
Standardised Contract and 
Documents 
Reference to whether there are standardised contracts and 
documents 
13 50 
State Credibility Reference to whether actions have been taken to sustain 
state credibility 
6 10 
Statute Procedure risk Reference to statute procedure risk 1 1 
Steering Committee Reference to the PPP Steering Committee 1 1 
Stephen Burgess Reference to Stephen Burgess 1 1 
Step-in rights Reference to step-in rights in contracts 5 19 
Stimulate the Economy Reference to how PPP is being used to stimulate the 
economy in tems of jobs 
1 1 
Student Accommodation projects References to student accommodation projects 2 19 
Sub-contractor References to sub-contractors 1 2 
Supply chain Reference to supply chain in the context of the presentation 
made at IPFA. That is reference to the availability of sub-
contractors and staff post-crisis 
1 2 
Surveys Reference to how users are surveyed 1 4 
Sustainability Reference to NDFA and sustainability of PPPs 1 1 
Sustainability (2) Reference to transparency and its affects on sustainability 1 2 
Sustainability of PPPs Reference to the sustainability of PPPs 1 4 
Sustainability risk Reference to the sustainability risk 1 1 
Tax payer Reference to the tax payer as a stakeholder 3 6 
Technical advisers Reference to technical advisers being stakeholders of PPP 1 1 
Technical Advisors Reference to the NDFA and technical advisors 4 6 
Tender stage Reference to the tender stage but not the NDFA 6 15 
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Tendering Process Reference to the role of the NDFA in the tendering process 3 6 
Third level colleges Reference to third level colleges 1 4 
Thornton Hall Reference to Thornton Hall PPP 1 4 
Too many obligations Reference to how you can end up with too many PPP 
obligations 
1 1 
Trade Unions References to Trade Unions in PPP 1 1 
Traditional Procurement Reference to design and build contracts and design and 
maintenance contracts ie traditional procurement 
6 24 
Traffic or Demand risk Reference to the different types of risk involved in PPP 6 26 
Training of public sector Reference to whether training on PPP has been provided to 
public sector staff, and if so, what type of training 
4 12 
Transfer of Risks Reference to the transfer of risks 1 2 
Transport Infrastructure Ireland References to TII 9 47 
Transport Infrastructure Ireland 
(2) 
Reference to TII being a stakeholder in PPP 1 1 
Transport projects Reference to transport projects that the interviewee worked 
on 
10 58 
Treasury Holdings Reference to Treasury Holdings 1 16 
Understanding of Public Sector Reference to the understanding of the public sector of the 
whole PPP process 
9 19 
UNECE References to UNECE 1 2 
Unitary Charge Reference to Unitary Charges made by interviewees 10 40 
Unitary payment Reference to the unitary payment and DPER 2 6 
Unitary payments Reference to the transparency of unitary payments 2 3 
Unknown risks Reference to unknown risks that are the most difficult to 
deal with 
1 1 
Unsuitability for all projects Reference to how PPP is unsuitable for all types of projects 1 1 
Use of consultants Reference to the private providers use of consultants 3 4 
Use of Consultants (2) Reference to whether the public sector use outside 
expertise in PPP 
4 8 
Use of Consultants early days References to the use of consultants in the early days of 
PPP 
1 1 
User guide to risk Reference to a user guide to risk 1 1 
Users of the facility Reference to the users of the facility being a key 
stakeholder 
4 10 
Value for money Reference to VFM carried out by NDFA 7 16 
Value for money (2) Reference to value for money of PPPs 13 94 
Value for money (3) Reference to VFM and transparency 3 5 
Views of stakeholders of the 
NDFA 
Reference to how the NDFA interacts with stakeholders 11 73 
Visibility of programmes Reference to visibility of PPP programmes 1 2 
Winners and losers in bidding Reference to winners and losers in the bidding process 2 9 
Workshops Reference to workshops held with bidders 2 9 
361 
 
Appendix F 32: Codebook\\Phase 3 - Searching for Themes  
Phase 3 – 513 
mapped to 21 
categories of 
codes 





Stages in PPP Reference to different stages of PPP process 22 356 
NDFA Reference to the National Development and Finance Agency 
and whether it provides leadership in the PPP process, does it 
have a role to play in policy development, how does it 
interact with stakeholder, recruitment of staff, how does it 





Reference to whether there is a complaints and arbitration 




Reference to the pipeline of projects, clear communication of 
upcoming projects, project timing, clear explanation and 
guidance 
15 140 
Externalities Reference to Externalities 9 20 
Fairness of PPP 
procurement 
Reference to the integrity of the project, is the selection and 
award criteria neutral and fair to all bidders and is there an 
avenue for complaint to an independent tribunal 
15 59 
Market of private 
providers 
Reference to whether a market of private providers has been 
established such as whether the PPP programme is credible to 
the market and if it attracts strong market interest, does it 
attract private investment , is there guidance material for the 
use of the private sector, has anything been done to reduce the 









Reference to the performance of PPPs 12 52 





Reference to political commitment for PPP 22 223 
PPP programme 
accountability 
Reference to whether performance assessment and 





Reference to public sector knowledge of PPPs 26 464 
Quality of 
projects 
Reference to how PPP projects are identified, are they of 
a higher or lower quality than traditional procured 
projects, has a strong private consortium been selected, 
are risks identified early, is there good project 




Reference to reasons against using PPP 23 151 
Reasons for 
adopting PPP 





Contains references to a PPP unit, PPP legislation, 
standardised contracts and documents 
23 257 
Stakeholders Reference to the key constituents or stakeholders in PPP 
and whether there has been buy-in and if they all want 
the same thing 
23 335 
Transparency Reference to how good transparency is in PPP, is there 
enough or too much, are all interested competitor 
22 412 
                                                 
32 Codebook – Phase 3 – Searching for Themes (Developing Categories) – involved merging, renaming, 
distilling and clustering related coded into broader categories of codes to reconstruct the data into a framework 
that makes sense to further the analysis.  
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Phase 3 – 513 
mapped to 21 
categories of 
codes 





informed in advance of projects, how are bidders 
evaluated, what criteria are used and has the basis on 
which the proposals are evaluated been made public 
Types of PPP Reference to different types of PPP 17 83 
Types of 
projects 








Appendix G33: Codebook\\Phase 4 - Reviewing Themes  
Phase 4 – 513 mapped 
to 21 categories 
further mapped to 4 
sub-themes 





Legitimacy   26 2381 
Transparency Reference to how good transparency is in PPP, is 
there enough or too much, are all interested 
competitors informed in advance of projects, how 
are bidders evaluated, what criteria are used and 
has the basis on which the proposals are evaluated 
been made public 
23 441 
Regulatory Framework Contains references to a PPP unit, PPP legislation, 
standardised contracts and documents 
24 285 
NDFA Reference to the National Development and 
Finance Agency and whether it provides 
leadership in the PPP process, does it have a role 
to play in policy development, how does it interact 
with stakeholder, recruitment of staff, how does it 
separate policy from practice and does it provide 
advisory work 
26 990 
Political commitment Reference to political commitment for PPP 22 226 
Stakeholders Reference to the key constituents or stakeholders 
in PPP and whether there has been buy-in and if 
they all want the same thing 
24 356 
Types of PPP Reference to different types of PPP 17 83 
Trust   23 366 
Complaints and 
arbitration 
Reference to whether there is a complaints and 
arbitration procedure for both sides and does it 
work 
13 53 
Fairness of PPP 
procurement 
Reference to the integrity of the project, is the 
selection and award criteria neutral and fair to all 





Reference to whether performance assessment and 
measurement of PPPs is set out in contracts and is 
it monitored 
20 250 
Capacity   27 3394 
Market of private 
providers 
Reference to whether a market of private providers 
has been established such as whether the PPP 
programme is credible to the market and if it 
attracts strong market interest, does it attract 
private investment , is there guidance material for 
the use of the private sector, has anything been 
done to reduce the cost and length of time of PPP 
procurement 
25 1695 
Coordinate deal flow Reference to the pipeline of projects, clear 
communication of upcoming projects, project 
timing, clear explanation and guidance 
16 141 
Performance of PPPs Reference to the performance of PPPs 13 54 
                                                 
33  Codebook – Phase 4 – Reviewing Themes (Drilling Down) involved breaking down the now reorganised 
categories in to sub-themes to better understand their meaning.  
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Phase 4 – 513 mapped 
to 21 categories 
further mapped to 4 
sub-themes 





Policy learning Reference to whether policy learning took place 




Reference to public sector knowledge of PPPs 27 516 
Quality of projects Reference to how PPP projects are identified, are 
they of a higher or lower quality than traditional 
procured projects, has a strong private consortium 
been selected, are risks identified early, is there 
good project management, step-in clauses 
26 431 
Other   27 2228 
Stages in PPP Reference to different stages of PPP process 23 319 
Externalities Reference to Externalities 9 20 
Non-conforming Node Reference to interview dialogue which cannot be 
coded to any nodes 
4 24 
Reasons against PPP Reference to reasons against using PPP 24 155 
Reasons for adopting 
PPP 
Reference to the different reasons for adopting the 
PPP policy 
26 538 







Appendix H: Grouping by the literature of the broader themes 
under the main themes 
Legitimacy Capacity Trust Others 
Transparency (Matos-
Castaño et al., 2012) (Jooste 
et al., 2009) (Matos-Castaño 







(Jooste et al., 2009) 
Market of private 
providers (Matos-
Castaño, 2011) 
(Jooste, Levitt and 
Scott, 2009) (Matos-







Coordinate deal flow 
(Matos-Castaño, 2011) 
Coordinate deal flow 
(Jooste, Levitt and 
Scott, 2009) (Matos-
Castaño et al., 2012) 
  
Fairness of PPP procurement 
(Verhoest et al., 2015) 









NDFA (Jooste, Levitt 
and Scott 2009) 
(Matos-Castaño et al., 
2012) (Verhoest et 
al., 2015) 
  




(Joosteet al., 2009), (Matos-
Castaño et al., 2012), 
(Matos-Castaño et al., 2014) 
(Verhoest et al., 2015) 
 PPP programme 
accountability 
(Matos-Castaño et 
al., 2012) (Verhoest 
et al., 2015) 
Reasons for 
adopting PPP 
 Performance of PPPs 
(Matos-Castaño et al., 
2014) (Jooste, Levitt 







Castaño et al., 2012) (Jooste 
et al., 2009) 
Policy learning 
(Jooste, Levitt & 
Scott, 2009) 
(Verhoest et al., 
2015) (Matos-
Castaño et al., 2012) 
and (Matos-Castaño 
et al., 2014)    
 Reasons against 
adopting PPP 
Types of projects (Matos-





 Stages in PPPs 
366 
 
(Matos-Castaño et al., 
2012) 
 Quality of projects 
(Jooste, Levitt and 
Scott, 2009) (Matos-
Castaño, 2011) 
(Matos-Castaño et al., 
2012), (Matos-
Castaño et al., 2014)  
and (Verhoest et al., 
2015)  




Appendix I 34: Codebook\\Phase 5 - Defining & Naming Themes 
Phase 5 – 4 
sub-themes 










5.3 Theme 1 
Legitimacy 
The extent to which PPP delivery is accepted by a variety 
of constituents, including government agencies, users, the 















Reference to the key constituents or stakeholders in PPP and 





Reference to the types of projects the interviewee worked on 
27 1172 
6.2 Theme 2 
Capacity 
The public sector needs to have the capability to bring 
projects to the table and successfully award them which 
involves the capacity to develop and monitor projects 





Reference to whether a market of private providers has been 
established such as whether the PPP programme is credible to 
the market and if it attracts strong market interest, does it 
attract private investment, is there guidance material for the 
use of the private sector, has anything been done to reduce 









Reference to public sector knowledge of PPPs 
27 737 
6.2.4 Quality of 
projects  
Reference to how PPP projects are identified, are they of a 
higher or lower quality than traditional procured projects, has 
a strong private consortium been selected, are risks identified 





Reference to the pipeline of projects, clear communication of 






Reference to the performance of PPPs 
13 54 
  
                                                 
34 Codebook – Phase 5 – Defining and naming themes  (Data Reduction) involved conceptually mapping and 
collapsing categories into a broader thematic framework.  
368 
 
6.3 Theme 3 
Trust 
Trust is a disposition and attitude relating to the 
willingness to rely on the actions of other actors, under 
the condition of contractual and social obligations with a 





Reference to whether performance assessment and 






Reference to the integrity of the project, is the selection and 
award criteria neutral and fair to all bidders and is there an 





Reference to whether there is a complaints and arbitration 
procedure for both sides and does it work 13 53 









                                                 
35 Codebook – analytical memos were used to conduct a systematic review of the thematic framework developed 
in phase 5 to analyse, report and ask questions of data. Memos were used to reduce the data from series of nodes 
to a series of documents explaining outcomes of analysis of nodes. Later, memos themselves were reduced 








                                                 
36 Codebook – example of annotation which integrates contextual factors such as coding assumptions, field notes 
and observations and the researcher’s thoughts and ideas during the encoding process. 
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37 Codebook – example of process of conceptually mapping codes to categories to themes for Theme 1 – 
Legitimacy.   
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Appendix M: PPP project portfolio 




Justice Health Social 
Housing 
N4 Kilcock/Kinnegad  

























M1 Dundalk Western 















stage in Q3 
2017) 
N8 Rathcormac-Fermoy 
(contract signed 2004) 
Cork School of 
Music (contract 
signed 2005) 
    
N25 Waterford City 
Bypass (contract signed 
2006) 
Schools Bundle 1 
(contract signed 
2009) 
    
Limerick Tunnel 
(contract signed 2006) 
Schools Bundle 2 
(contract signed 
2010) 
    
M3 Clonee/Kells 
(contract signed 2007) 
Schools Bundle 3 
(contract signed 
2012) 
    
M7 Portlaoise/Cullahill 
(contract signed 2007) 
Schools Bundle 4 
(contract awarded 
2014) 
    
N6 Galway to East 
Ballinsaloe (contract 
signed 2007) 
Schools Bundle 5 
(financial close 
July 2016) 
    




begin late 2017) 
    
N11 Arklow/Rathnew & 
N7 Newlands Cross 
(financial close 2013) 
     
N17/18 Gort to Tuam 
(financial close April 
2014) 
     
M6 & M9 Motorway 
Service Stations 
(Preferred tenderer 
awarded May 2015) 
     
M11 Gorey to 
Enniscorty 
(financial close October 
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Justice Health Social 
Housing 
2015) 
N25 New Ross Bypass 
(financial close January 
2016) 
     




Appendix N: PPP projects cancelled during the financial crisis 
• Third level education bundle 
• Thornton Hall Prison 
• National Concert Hall 
• New Theatre House 
• Metro project in Dublin 
• OPW decentralised offices 




Appendix O: Summary of transparency findings 
Transparency of the 
decision to go the 
PPP route 




of PPP contract 
information 
Transparency of 
PPP reviews and 
benchmarking 
 Presence of 
transparency in the 
bidding process and 
feedback to 
unsuccessful bidders 
 Presence of 
transparency in the 
publication of the 
2004 Review of Pilot 
Schools Project by 
C&AG and the 2012 
Post-project Review 
of the Criminal 
Courts of Justice 
Complex 
 Reason for this: 
• Regulated by EU 
legislation 
• Normal practice in 
the public sector 
• Fear of litigation as 
Ireland is a very 
litigious country 
 Reason for this: 
• Pilot Schools 




place from this 
review 







 Reasons for this: 
• NDFA wishing to 
be fair and its fear 





• Which projects are 
put forward for 
PPP and the basis 
for evaluation 
• VFM testing 
carried out on 
chosen projects 
• PSB 





in Schools projects 







• Commercial sensitivity 
issues 
• Fears over interfering 
with the normal 
workings of the market 





• Fear that costings 
will not be in 
favour of PPP 
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Transparency of the 
decision to go the 
PPP route 




of PPP contract 
information 
Transparency of 
PPP reviews and 
benchmarking 




• Speculation on 
how decisions are 
made 
• Failure to 
demonstrate VFM 
to the taxpayer 
• Culture of secrecy 
in the public sector 
• Suspicion over the 
calculation of the 
PSB 
 Recommendations: 
• Releasing information 
on stage 1 and 2 
projects for review 
• Use of condition 
surveys and customer 
satisfaction surveys 
• Onus of proof on 
tenderer to justify 
commercial-in-
confidence 
• Greater powers of 
parliamentary 
committees and C&AG 
to report commercial in 
confidence material 







Appendix P: Order of analysis of 6.2.2.1 Learning from UK PFIs 
6.2.2.1 Learning from UK PFIs Number of text blocks 
Learning from Education projects 75 
Learning from Health projects 59 
Learning from Financing 10 
Learning from Road projects 8 
Learning from Courts projects 3 






Appendix Q: Order of analysis of 6.2.2.3 Public sector learning 
6.2.2.3 Public sector learning Number of text blocks 
OPW learning 21 
HSE learning 18 
NDFA learning 7 
DPER learning 4 
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Appendix S: Publications 
See following pages 
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